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A HISTORY OF EUROPE

From 1610 to 1715

BY

W. F. REDDAWAY

SENIOR FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

WITH EIGHTEEN MAPS



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PREFACE

MOST of this book dates from 1944 and 1945, and must reflect something of the changing mood and varying perspective which those chequered years inspired. A narrative interrupted to seek shelter from a V-bomb may lose something of its judicial calm, and the sudden advent of atomic energy reduce the writer's absorption in the supralapsarian controversy. When the story was begun, the Germans still ruled in central, northern and western Europe, while eastern Asia had been annexed by the Japanese. When, punctuated by the Allies' amazing triumphs, it drew to its close, the victorious powers were haunted by misgivings that atomic energy might result in the speedy destruction of mankind.

Historical perspective, moreover, cannot remain unchanged. While the collapse of Germany perhaps lowers interest in the Great Elector, the self-revelation of America and Russia compels a more careful study of the early colonists and of Peter. Something, it may be hoped, will be gained as a century not greatly senior to our own is seen to contrast with it ever more sharply in atmosphere and motive.

Faced with several mutually remote groups among the states of seventeenth-century Europe, we may cling closely to the advantages which a chronological treatment of the whole body should afford. It has sometimes been necessary, however, to record the same events from different points of view when treating of the several states concerned. In such cases, footnotes have been freely used to direct the student.

The author can hardly hope that a book composed under war-time stresses and enforced immobility at Cambridge has escaped unscathed. Those who would gladly have given him aid were on campaign or in civilian service. His debt to their works is great.

He ventures, with humility and affection, to dedicate the volume to his Polish friends.

W. F. R.

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December, 1947


CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	XI
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	xxiii
CHAP	
I. THE EUROPEANS OF 1610	1
II. WESTERN EUROPE IN 1610	14
III. GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS IN 1610	33
(a) Germany	
(b) The Netherlands	
IV. POLAND, HUNGARY, TRANSYLVANIA	49
V. SCANDINAVIA TO 1621	67
VI. MUSCOVY AND THE TURKS	81
VII. EUROPE, 1610-1624	90
France from Henry IV to Richelieu	
VIII. THE DUTCH, 1610-1625	103
IX. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR	115
X. RICHELIEU	134
XI. THE GERMAN WAR: SCANDINAVIAN PHASES, 1625-1632	149
XII. THE GREAT WAR, 1632-1635	169
XIII. THE WAR TO 1648	177
XIV. THE WESTPHALIAN PEACE	199
XV. EUROPE, 1649-1661: THE DUTCH	212
XVI. FRANCE, 1648-1661	221
XVII. EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE, 1648-1660	236
(a) The East	
(b) The North, 1654-1661	
XVIII. EUROPEAN CULTURE, 1610-1660	252

CHAP.	PAGE
XIX. LOUIS XIV, 1661-1668	265
XX. PROGRESS OF SPAIN, ENGLAND AND THE DUTCH TO c. 1672	292
(a) Spain under Philip IV, 1621-1665	
(b) England	
(c) The Dutch	
XXI. THE GREAT ELECTOR	313
XXII. LOUIS XIV, 1668-1684	325
XXIII. EUROPE FROM THE REVOCATION TO THE PEACE OF RYSWICK (1685-1697)	341
XXIV. THE NORTH AND EAST DURING LOUIS' RISE	360
XXV. ENGLAND AND THE SPANISH SUCCESSION	386
(a) Spain under Charles II, 1665-1700	
(b) Europe and Louis XIV, 1697-1706	
XXVI. THE GREAT WAR OF THE NORTH (1700-1706)	408
XXVII. THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR FROM 1707 TO UTRECHT	419
XXVIII. THE NORTHERN WAR, 1707-1713	430
XXIX. THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT	440
XXX. THE NORTHERN WAR AFTER UTRECHT	445
XXXI. EUROPE IN LOUIS' LAST YEARS (1713-1715)	451
GENEALOGICAL TABLES	466
INDEX	471

MAPS

	PAGE
POLAND-LITHUANIA, 1569	x
VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY	xiii
THE ITALIAN STATES <i>c.</i> 1610	xv
THE RACES OF EUROPE	xviii
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	23
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1648	41
DANUBIAN COUNTRIES <i>c.</i> 1610	61
CONFESSIONAL DIVISIONS OF GERMANY (1618)	125
THE GERMAN WAR, 1618-1629	181
THE SWEDISH PERIOD, 1630-1635	158
THE WARS AND TREATIES, 1635-1648	179
EUROPE IN 1648	207
NORTH-EASTERN EUROPE <i>c.</i> 1661	241
EUROPEAN STATIONS IN THE EAST <i>c.</i> 1650	259
WARS OF LOUIS XIV, 1648-1715	267
FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XIV	339
RUSSIA IN 1725	367
AMERICAN COLONIES, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	463



POLAND-LITHUANIA
1569

Miles

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INTRODUCTION

OUR task is to trace the history of Europe from 1610 to 1715, years particularly memorable for the deaths of the two greatest kings of France. This age, in length between three and four generations, is unsurpassed in the extent and variety of its achievement by any other modern age of equal length which can yet be styled historic. Throughout its course, mankind was continually upon the march, advancing despite the fact that in these 106 years not five were undisturbed by war. As the names of Shakespeare and Newton, of Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza may suggest, the age was incomparably eminent for the activity of the human mind. Population, scientific knowledge and material wealth, indeed, were insignificant when compared with those of our own day, and help from overseas was trifling. Anything like an armed tramp through northern Italy by Brazilians, Ghurkas and Americans of Japanese descent, while New Zealanders took Trieste, was then beyond the wildest dreams of Europeans.

General
Character of
1610-1715

Yet, outside Germany and Italy, every considerable power in Europe during this age passed through a period of special greatness. Italy, indeed, though divided and in some respects declining, began the seventeenth century, and long continued, the land of matchless culture. Spain, likewise, in the early decades warranted James I in his famous expressions of reverence. Spanish, men said, was the language of the Almighty. France, in the century of Henry the Great, of the Cardinals and of *le Roi Soleil*, could dazzle and menace all the rest. When the history of Europe was expanding into that of the whole Western world, it earned the surname of the Age of Louis XIV.

Yet at the very moment when, in the eyes of Europe, Spain was the greatest of empires, and when historians point to France as endowed with irresistible if latent strength, a small and ill-knit society of stubborn rebels revealed itself as in some ways the foremost power in Christendom.

Vicissitudes
of Power

Sea-power, leadership, commercial wealth, the chances of high politics—these had combined to make a great power out of seven of the seventeen Low Country provinces which in 1572 had dared to rebel against the tyranny of Spain. Critics might sneer at the Dutchmen who to the stake a struggling country bound, and fished as desperately for each small piece of earth as if it had been of ambergris. The Dutch people, triumphant so long as the truce of 1609 held good and France and Germany were distracted, could vie with any nation in science, in the arts of life, in shipping and in profitable adventure overseas. Thus the whole of our period forms the great age of the Dutch Republic.


If we turn to the east or to the north of Europe, we shall find more epochs of peculiar greatness in the history of the Christian powers. The Danes have seldom in modern times ruled over more territory and have never become so nearly the arbiters of Europe as under Christian IV. Their neighbours and rivals the Swedes gained imperishable fame under the Lion of the North, their great Gustavus. The next generation brought them a considerable empire; and the first decade of the following century, a royal name 'at which', not without reason, 'the world turned pale'. The names of Sobieski and of Peter the Great likewise enshrine the proof that, despite all the fluctuations of the Slavonic world, glory reigned there also during portions of this shining age.

England
and Europe

Can any other hundred years be found equally resplendent in the history of England? There were, indeed, failings among both her Stuart kings and her oligarchic statesmen, while in her institutions much called for reform. But Shakespeare and Milton, Newton and Harvey, Cromwell and Marlborough (to name but a few of the greatest) show that the new Authorized Version rang in the ears of three generations richly studded with our rarest men. The manifold harvest—Britons united and victorious over Dutch and French, liberty secured, wealth acquired, empire begun—forms a more solid and enduring advance than was achieved by any continental nation.

How can a student born in the twentieth century best cross the gap of fully three centuries which severs him from the early seventeenth? His forbears of that day cannot

VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY



but be strangers. Unlike them, he is, by birth, a citizen of the whole world and of a civilization which moves at an ever-increasing pace. Within a single generation his Europe has been twice engulfed in wars dwarfing any that his ancestors have known, while a swift series of great inventions has given her powers by land and sea and air which can hardly leave mankind unaltered. The countryman has exchanged the rural seclusion and calm of all tradition for a life in which at any moment he can be in touch with men in other continents and, if need be, can be carried to the Antipodes in a few weeks, or even a few days. With such a revolution in power, in environment, and in outlook, it may seem that Man himself must have changed, and that sympathy with our ancestors of ten generations ago must therefore be far from perfect.

Ourselves
and 1610

Superficial differences of manners, however, may raise the barrier between them and us to a height unwarranted by their true importance. Ten generations back, diners plunged their hands into the dish and went home to their naked bed, while the old riddle, What is that which the poor man throws away and the rich man puts in his pocket? would as yet have had no meaning. The deaths of Raleigh, Strafford, Laud and Charles I may well estrange posterity. Still more significant and more estranging is the miasma from the unseen world which at that day poisoned life. Men felt themselves to be under the surveillance of many devils, whom witches might rouse against them, and who must be warded off by talismans and charms, or evaded by a judicious study of the stars. Perhaps a more real danger arose from the state of medicine, which in the next century a great French philosopher could describe as one of the three greatest absurdities which the mind of man had devised. These and many other differences from the men of 1610 must undoubtedly hamper the student of to-day.

He may find help ready to hand in the shape of those ancients who have witnessed many revolutions but are still cheerfully alive. The men of 1610, as we now know, were the offspring of uncounted generations before the Ark was built. They had been created by an evolution, so prolonged as to make the three centuries which sever us from them seem a mere moment. On the other hand, by comparison

THE ITALIAN STATES c.1610



STANFORD, LONDON.

with the changes since 1800, those in the whole preceding modern era appear in many ways but slight. A European born in the early 1870's, on the morrow of the three wars which inaugurated Bismarckian Germany, has been forced to witness developments unmatched in all previous history. The adventure and the catastrophe of the German race, the rise and novel consciousness of the British Empire, the staggering development of the United States, the transformation of Russia and the almost volcanic progress of Japan—all these are features of an ever-shrinking world whose inhabitants meanwhile are being continually endowed with powers undreamed of in any former age. But all that radio, Diesel engines, X-rays, television, atomic energy and their fellow marvels stand for was heralded by the age of gas and steam, which revolutionized the powers and the conditions of labour, while endowing man with anaesthetics and with electricity.

A boy whose familiar world was that of Waterloo and a grandson to whom the Crimean War was a fading legend may thus comprise within their lives a generation more than those within 1610 and 1715, while enjoying an overlapping decade in which they could know each other well. The outcome might be the certainty that men's surroundings may be transformed while their characters and outlook upon life remain substantially unaffected.


Progress and
Experience

The elder exchanged the familiar dangers from the French, from the mob and from Protection, for an age in which horses had given place to steam, a rural England to a land of great towns, and an island to an empire—all without ceasing for a moment to be the simple and kindly optimist which he had been born and bred. The younger may have felt throughout life that many changes were marvellous and a few, perhaps, unwelcome, but that the sum of all has been an advance towards a world at once brighter and more free. To the twain the passage of 130 years brought no conscious break or human revolution. Their forbears who began our period in ruffles and ended it in wigs did not thereby become new beings.

The experience of surviving men encourages the inference that the breach of continuity which has not happened in the fast-moving days since Waterloo was unlikely to have

happened in the less changeful age which found its climax in the downfall of Napoleon. In 1685, 130 years before Waterloo, our Glorious Revolution had not yet dawned and two other conscious revolutions, those in North America and in France, were yet to follow. Despite all their undoubted importance, however, even in the states which they most affected, those revolutions involved modifications in current life rather than a life which can be called new. The English in 1715 could not be sure that Stuart rule was ended and the French of 1815 found Bourbon rule restored. Between 1610 and 1685 there had been not a few momentous events, the chief of them, perhaps, a war of thirty years which postponed for many generations the creation of a united Germany. But while states dramatically rose and fell, there had been nothing which broke the continuity of the history of Europe, and only the rise of Louis XIV which threatened such a breach. Thus the Europeans of the early seventeenth century appear to be severed by no yawning chasm from their descendants of the present day.

In almost everything but contour and climate, however, ^{Change in} the Europe of 1610 differed fundamentally from the Europe ^{Europe} which we behold. Both, indeed, comprised in substance a moderate-sized peninsula of Asia, conspicuous among the regions of the world for its high proportion of coast-line, its temperate climate and its relative lack of swamp or desert. That society of Christian nations sharing a common civilization which composed the Europe of 1610 was, indeed, far smaller than the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were to make it. The continent which was later deemed to extend to the Urals and to the Euxine then hardly passed the eastern frontier of Poland and the northern frontier of the Turkish empire. In the forests of Muscovy and beyond the immense morass known as the Pripet marshes, a nation made Christian by the Byzantine rather than the Latin Church had grown up, and it might be expected to attempt to conquer an outlet towards the richer and more highly civilized west. In 1610, however, the men of Moscow had fallen on evil days, and it seemed likely that Poles and Scandinavians would rather advance the frontiers of Europe at their expense. The Muscovite 'Time of Troubles' was at hand.



The Turkish advance, on the other hand, remained formidable to Europe. Although the Moslem empire was impeded, and sometimes paralysed, by defects peculiar to itself, it remained, as its Kiuprili Viziers were soon to prove, a terror to its Christian neighbours. A miscellaneous and unprogressive empire whose Sultan was brought up as practically a prisoner and whose problems were those of three continents—such a conglomeration might not seem terrible to civilized Europeans. But with his secure base in Asia Minor, his unique standing army and his power of striking at several Christian states by sea, the Turk remained a real though intermittent factor in the politics of even the greatest seventeenth-century kings. Those anagrams in which the age delighted sometimes epitomize historic truth. ‘*Ludovicus decimus quartus*’ could reasonably be rendered, ‘*Ludovicus, quid es? Sum turca*’.

Russians
and Turks
c. 1610

With Russia not yet incorporated, and Vienna, soon to become the very heart of Europe, then almost a frontier town, the Europe of 1610 comprised less than half the area which Napoleon attempted to subdue. Its population was certainly far less than half of that of 1812. Anything like the precision of modern statistics, indeed, cannot be looked for in the seventeenth century. Figures of population have never been wholly trustworthy throughout our Continent. A great historian of Tsarist days dared to advise his students that an official figure, being official, ‘must be taken as standing at a certain distance from the facts’. Between 1610 and 1715, neither the need nor the machinery for a national census existed, and the most upright and painstaking investigator might be wide of the mark. France, the most populous of states, however, probably had less than one-half of the forty million with which she is credited in our own day, while in England the corresponding fraction might be about one-eighth. The meagre Europe of 1610 might perhaps comprise some sixty million Christians. In them and their relationships we find the hero of our tale.

Population
of the
European
Family

Before embarking on their history, we must briefly regard the theatre in which they lived and worked. What, from a geographical point of view, was their ‘Europe’?

Geographical
Europe

The answer is by no means easily framed. Other continents, by comparison with ours, are far more clearly defined.

Africa, though it can be argued that in land-level and in climate she begins at the Pyrenees, was known, even in 1610, to be girt by great seas, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the ocean. The greater part of America, South and North, seemed to be similarly encompassed. Southern and eastern Asia constituted a huge land-mass mainly disconnected from those already named. Australia, then beginning to be faintly descried, seemed likewise separate. Europe, however, if distinct from Asia, was certainly not cut off from her by sea. The Urals, low mountains which can be crossed with ease, the more majestic Caucasus, the landlocked Caspian—all these form no adequate chain or barrier to keep continents apart.

Prima facie, therefore, Europe, as a separate continent, was made by man. A number of white and Christian tribes, moved by a common purpose, defended the soil on which they lived against invaders of another faith or colour. By 1610, the Moors from Africa had been expelled by Spain, but the Turks from Asia still ruled many Christians on and beyond the Danube. Far to the west of the Urals, moreover, stretched the realm of Muscovy, Christian indeed and white, but for centuries cut off from the western world by Asiatic barbarian invaders, and, after four generations of freedom, not yet reunited. To them the Urals were a landmark, not a boundary, and, apart from the Pripet marshes, only mutual antagonism kept them remote from the West.

The Europe of 1610–1715 may thus be roughly described as an area of some 3,750,000 square miles, mainly marked out by the Urals, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Until the end of the seventeenth century at least, Muscovy was estranged from the rest, and, for the most part, the Turkish empire so continued. But, geographically, the whole formed a highly favoured peninsula of Asia, with a temperate climate and a ratio of coast-line to area the highest in the world. The soil was fertile; the rainfall abundant but not excessive. Although the north of the mainland possessed no such unifying waterway as the Danube, all parts had navigable rivers in numbers unmatched elsewhere. The elevation of the land, moreover, favoured man, for a great proportion lay less than 600 feet above sea-level, and little at more than 4,500 feet.

As a stage for the intercourse of rival though kindred tribes, however, the Europe thus formed by nature had several palpable defects. As the Turkish empire showed, she lacked any adequate natural barrier on the side of Asia. A few more miles of open water must have transformed the problem of the Balkans. The Muscovite, moreover, when he had mastered the military arts of his western neighbours, found no natural barriers either north or south of the Pripiet marshes sufficient to check his advance. In several important regions, on the other hand, such barriers hampered the inhabitants in the consolidation necessary for effective peace or war. Iberia, Italy, the Balkan Peninsula, even Scandinavia—these could not easily reach efficiency either as one state or as more than one. Perhaps most important of all in that life-experience of states which makes our history, was the lack of any strong natural obstacles dividing the great north European depression. From the region of Lourdes, where the Pyrenean rampart rises sharply from the plain, through the Low Countries, until far beyond the Vistula, nature imposes no check upon the lust of statesmen to extend their frontiers by way of war.

Far less important for our study than area and population, but characteristic of the notions of the age, is the question of the frontiers themselves. Enclaves, that is portions of one state surrounded by the territory of another, have practically vanished from the map. In the first years of the twentieth century, indeed, Wismar still technically belonged to Sweden, and, down to Hitler's absorption of Austria, one of her fairest valleys, for geographical reasons, was administered by the Germans. Three centuries earlier, however, the feudal lord signified more to a district than the sovereign of a state, and frontiers were more involved and less distinct. Professor Clark, indeed, has not been able to discover a case of a frontier fixed literally on the map until 1718.

We must steer between the twin perils—imaginary breach of continuity and undue disregard of progress. It remains true that the seventeenth century, like others, was inspired by the zeal, often the lawless zeal, of rulers to extend the area over which they ruled. Ambition, security, covetousness, religion—of such ingredients were compounded the policies which shaped the history of the age.

Its Political
Defects

Quo Vadis?

What is the moral of the narrative which we must now construct, the trend of our History and its goal? Studded as is the century with wars and treaties, with discoveries and human self-revelation, is it endowed with a conscious purpose, or a message to mankind? The answer is no fitting subject for dogma, but the student who evades the question stultifies his toil.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

MANY of the contemporary sources are in Latin, some even in Hebrew, which divines did not hesitate to quote. Many more, and countless treatises both contemporary and modern, are accessible only in a few great libraries, or are composed in languages which Anglo-Saxons seldom learn to read. Since 1939 it has been impossible to visit more than a small fraction of the European scene. The Rhine and Vistula, Helsinki, Orleans, Toledo—such scenes create for the beholder an atmosphere which printed pages cannot reproduce, and which breeds patience with tedious chapters in their story.

Happily, some most valuable guides remain accessible, though the wars may have checked their reproduction or revision. Such are *The Cambridge Modern History*, vols. iv and v (1906, 1908) with its *Atlas* (to 1910) admirably edited by E. A. Benians. Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, tomes v et vi (1895, new edition 1917, 1912) and, from the great German series edited by Wilhelm Oncken, Winter's *Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (1893) and Philippson's *Das Zeitalter Ludwigs des Vierzehnten* (1879)—these, the English and French with their bibliographies and the German with their illustrations—still offer a sound foundation. To them may be added, though of varying merit, many articles in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, preferably the 11th edition (1910–11).

An extensive though uneven collection of monographs is the *Historian's History of the World*, ed. H. S. Williams (1926). The student may also find it profitable to consult works of the dictionary kind which, though long since obscured by their successors, were written with more interest in the actors and events than can characterize many more recent publications. Thus the *Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography* shows, not uninstrucively, what a magistral body of carefully selected authors thought of their seventeenth-century heroes, nearly a hundred years ago.

At the close of the last century, the *Cambridge Historical Series* comprised fairly full monographs upon many European states. About the same time Professor Émile Bourgeois published his *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*, of which about half the first volume serves our period. On a larger scale are Halphen

et Sagnac, *Peuples et civilisations*, tomes v et vi (1984, 1985). After the first world war, many states were treated in a valuable series, *Nations of To-day*, edited by John Buchan. Among collections of illustrative documents, the second volume in the series edited by R. G. Laffan, *Select Documents of European History* (1930), comprises the years 1492–1715, and the American Professor J. H. Robinson has published an Introduction (1928) and a collection of Readings (1906) covering modern times. Twentieth-century brief treatises include several of great value, notably Professor G. N. Clark's *The Seventeenth Century*, in 1946 undergoing revision. Mr. David Ogg's *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (4th edition 1943) is an erudite compendium by an author zealous to learn from History, and is conspicuous for a scholarly bibliography. The relevant portion of the *History of Europe* (1938) by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher offers a brief but masterly survey. Professor R. B. Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions*, and Professor Basil Willey's volumes on the *Cultural Background of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* are stimulating and suggestive. Professor E. F. Heckscher's *Mercantilism* (trans. 1935) and Professor A. Wolf's well-illustrated *History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy* (1935) illuminate the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

English offers a wide choice of those chronological summaries which save much labour in searching for the date of a reign or battle, or for the substance of a treaty. Carl Ploetz' *Epitome of History*, edited in English (1926), and William Edwards' *Survey in Outline* (1925) have the advantage of an index, as has the *Annals of Politics and Culture* (1901) by Dr. G. P. Gooch, a scholarly chronological work. Arthur Hassall's *European History, 476–1871* (1897) contains many convenient summaries. The valuable *Historical Tables* of Dr. S. H. Steinberg appeared more recently, in 1939.

Many brief treatises, now generally replaced by newer works, still retain advantages of their own, and some have played a part in influencing the selection and even the opinions of their successors. Such include Dyer and Hassall's *History of Modern Europe*, vols. iii and iv (1901), covering the years 1576–1789. The brief single volume of Professor G. B. Adams (1899); the Lectures of Bishop Stubbs, re-edited in 1904; D. J. Hill's scholarly *History of European Diplomacy*, vols. ii and iii (1906, 1914), and the small compendiums by A. H. Johnson and H. O. Wakeman (1932, 1931) may be named.

Classic works on English history (which this series assumes as already known) throw much light also upon continental affairs. Among them may be named our *Dictionary of National Biography*,

Traill's *Social England*, the writings of Macaulay, Gardner, Acton, Trevelyan, Lecky, Seeley and many of only less renown.

Among Historical Atlases none can rival that now known as Spruner-Menke, and Droysen, Putzger and Rothert all help to increase the Germans' lead. Those of R. L. Poole (to 1897) and W. R. Shepherd, however, are highly serviceable, and the combination of maps and comments in the *Cambridge Modern History* volume is unsurpassed. The atlases published in many states for school use often give valuable insight into the national point of view of the country of origin.

Advanced students will turn for information about the several states to the great collections of diplomatic documents published after many years. Such are the *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs de France*, the Brandenburg *Urkunden und Aktenstücke*, and, in a less degree for our period, the long series published by the Imperial Historical Society at St. Petersburg. No mature inquirer will neglect for the state with which he is concerned its equivalent of our *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, *Camden Society*, *English Historical Review*, or *History*.

For introduction to the several continental states, some of the following books may be specially useful :

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 Kitchin, G. W. : *History of France* (highly authoritative for many years).
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CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEANS OF 1610

LONG before 1610, the wanderings of the European peoples in search of new tribal homes were substantially at an end. Latins, Teutons and Slavs alike had found their settled dwellings, and until the twentieth century national deportations were unknown. The political significance of racial differences, however, was for the most part still to come.

‘A state for every people, nationality the basis of every state’—that nineteenth-century formula has continued to gain adherents. If man inherits the right to choose the government which he will obey, nationality is the logical outcome; for most men have a preference for the stock to which they themselves belong. The seventeenth century, however, knew nothing of natural preference as a source of political allegiance. God, held the ruling classes, assigned to every human being his place in the commonwealth, and those whom He had made lowly must obey those whom He had made high. To reject the Lord’s anointed must be high treason, punishable with every atrocity that justice could devise. But most men were far more conscious of the authority and prerogative of uncrowned kings, the petty tyrants of the fields upon which they lived. When communications were rudimentary, moreover, the idea of nationality in a large state was necessarily dim. Most people spent their lives within a few miles of their own homes, and knew only a few score or a few hundred of their neighbours. With no assistance from the Press, most of those who lived beyond walking distance from a town depended for illumination upon their parish priest, himself often cut off from fresh supplies of intellectual fodder.

In such an environment, four evils must be rife. The villagers, though they joined in public worship and lived close to nature, inevitably became narrow in outlook and self-centred. They took the rustic cackle of their bourg for

The National
Principle

The Evil and
Good of
Parochialism

the great wave that echoes through the world. They gave undue weight to local tradition, with its fantastic remedies for disease and its fatuous superstitions. They could form little conception of the greater community to which they belonged, or of its relationship to other states. The bereaved Lakeland mother in the Boer War who lamented that her soldier son had been 'murdered by savages, down Kendal way', may stand for limitations widespread three centuries before. Lastly, pugnacious men remote from foreign nations sought enemies nearer home, often no farther than the next village. Devonians and Cornishmen, Lancastrians and Yorkists and a thousand humbler neighbouring communities—such might be hereditary foes. In rural Cambridgeshire before the railway age, some villages were reputed unsafe for 'foreigners' when the absent sons and daughters came home for the annual feast.

Racial
Intercourse

The converse, happily, also was often true. Foreigners in the modern sense, that is, men of another nation, not seldom received a hospitable welcome. Scots in half the lands of Europe, Dutchmen and Huguenots in Brandenburg and Britain—these furnish conspicuous instances of profitable and cherished foreign guests. 'Colonization' in that age suggested not so much emigration as the endeavours of energetic princes to people their vacant territories. Cossack history in eastern Europe, and Jewish in many lands, afford conspicuous examples. Difference of religion might bar the entry of foreigners, but difference of origin usually roused no resentment. Robinson Crusoe's grandfather is recorded, quite dispassionately, as having come from Bremen. The ancient grouping of the races which inhabit Europe has since been but slightly modified by their migration. A racial map of the east central region must indicate that in some considerable regions the prevailing Slavs are now 'strongly mixed with Jews'. Individual migrations such as those which brought William of Orange to London, Eugene to Vienna and Lefort and Gordon to Muscovy, though of vast moment in history, are numerically negligible. The century witnessed none of those 'treks' which, as the evidence of language shows, in an earlier age had caused the Poles and the Serbs to exchange their dwelling-places.¹ While it

Migration

¹ *Listopad*, 'leaf-fall', means November in Poland, where the leaves fall in October, and in Serbia just the opposite.

initiated momentous movements of transoceanic colonization, it produced nothing comparable with our Danish and Norman Conquests, or even with the artificial deportations, Greeks and Turks, Germans and Slavs, of the latest age. Louis XIV, though against his will, became the chief transplanter in our period, for his Huguenots by thousands fled from France.

While the races thus remained in 1715 where they had been in 1610, they also remained substantially unchanged in size. Human toil found means to feed a few millions more, while the almost continuous warfare swept off almost as many. In agriculture, in medicine and in transport, the period produced no such revolution as that which occurred within a century of its close. While humanity attained fresh heights in literature and science, the life of the common man changed little.

Race, in the seventeenth century, however, may furnish the key to the limitations on Lutheran progress, to the religious uniformity of Iberia and of Italy, to the all-potent monarchy of France. Visible in a nation's language, it sometimes proved the inspiration of an orator or affected the popularity of a king. While directly causing few important movements, it qualified many such, perhaps all.

On the evidence of language, Europe, outside the Turkish and the Russian empires, was divided between two great races and at least seven of smaller size. Teutons and Latins dwelt in adjacent regions, which broadly comprised the north and south of western, of northern and of central Europe. All these lands were Christian, and all had now been freed from the Mohammedan invader. The Latins first, and afterwards the Teutons, had begun to 'colonize' America and the Indies. As for the two ancient heads of Christendom, the Teutons in fact monopolized the election of the Emperor, while the Latins always carried that of the Pope. While all educated men could use Latin, the rank and file of each great family of peoples found little difficulty in understanding the dialects of that family, but much in any dialect of the other. Such basic words as 'mother', appearing in all their tongues, might have taught Latins, Teutons and Slavs that they had once been brethren. Since that prehistoric age, however, they had grown far apart, both in vocabulary and syntax. The lesser groups who still survived, moreover,

Slow
Progress

Races of
Europe
in 1610

had no such similarity either of origin or of speech. The Basques (Biscayans), a small but virile race, lacked apparent kinship with any other. The 'Celtic fringe', Bretons, Welsh and Gaels, both Scotch and Irish, dwelt far apart, but were mutually intelligible and sympathetic. The Finnish family in the Far North, comprising nomadic Lapps, peopled Finland and Estonia with men of no small ability, though ruled by Teutonic masters. To the south of them, beyond a clear-cut racial frontier, dwelt the Letts and their cousins the Lithuanians. The Letts shared the fate of the Estonians, while before her union with Poland (1569), Lithuania had ruled a spacious empire. Both Letts and Lithuanians spoke and wrote in dialects near akin to Sanskrit, but totally unintelligible to their racial neighbours.

Far to the south, however, the Finns had kinsfolk in the Magyars, who dwelt on the Hungarian plains and escaped being wholly engulfed in the Turkish empire. The Latin group likewise included the dwellers in Roumania, but these, like the Greeks, Albanians, and southern Slavs, were for the most part Turkish vassals temporarily lost to Europe. The 'western' Slavs, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, however, were Western in faith and outlook, and enriched Europe with a temperament wholly different from the Latin or the Teutonic.

The Jews

All these races formed more or less contiguous communities, comprising several states or regions. In no case did an independent state comprise all the members of a single race but no others. One great race, however, originating in Asia but surviving chiefly in Europe, pervading many states but monopolizing none, taxed and still taxes the resources of statesmanship—the Jews. Their strange position, as sojourners for life in alien surroundings, finds no parallel save that of the humble Gipsies.

National policy towards them has never ceased to perplex the Europeans. In the free Poland of 1938, a dispassionate American publicist ascribed to the Polish tradition the surprising acceptance by the villagers of 'the Orthodox Jew, wearing his skullcap, black boots, long double-breasted coat, curls and beard, mingling with the Poles proper'.

Segregation in Jewry or ghetto could only emphasize and increase such racial and cultural contrasts. In the sixteenth

century, moreover, the Jews had drawn up a rule of life which stereotyped their separatism from the Gentiles. When our period begins, they had been for half a century in possession of the code of Qaro, which almost all obeyed. To the elaborate injunctions which this code imposed upon an ingenious race may perhaps be ascribed that reputation for clever hair-splitting which still attaches to the Jew. Pigs tended by a Christian gardener, envelopes slit open on the Sabbath by a Christian butler, lights extinguished on the Sabbath for the Jew by a Gentile friend—such devices suggest a contest of wits with the Almighty rather than what Europeans think of as religion. A conscientious Jewish don is said to have harmonized the one mile journey lawful on the Sabbath with the six that his ‘constitutional’ required by placing bits of biscuit on four successive milestones. ‘Where your food is, there is your home,’ and the three new homes created on these outward ‘journeys’ were exchanged for others during the return, since the Law did not forbid removals.

Letter and
Spirit of
Judaism

It is well, therefore, to remember the great ideas upon which the Jewish rules and ritual are based—absorption of the individual in the family and of the family in God. To the Jew life and religion were inseparable, and the moral life the sole purpose of existence. In his history he saw a struggle to create a holy land by the exact fulfilment of the divine commands. His momentary shortcomings might delay the ultimate victory, but they did not involve defeat.

‘Every nation’, it is said, ‘has the Jew that it deserves,’ and our period gives the aphorism some support. Iberia then had few or none; Poland, by her own impolicy, too many; Holland and eventually England, valuable communities. Their presence was fraught with exotic possibilities. From Constantinople to Jerusalem came the young and fascinating Sabbatai (1626–1676), declaring himself the Messiah. It was revealed that in 1666 he would restore Israel, ‘riding on a lion with a seven-headed dragon in his jaws’, and that the salvation of the world would follow. The theologians of Jerusalem did not accept his mission, but Smyrna went mad in his praise, and the commercial capitals of the West contributed supporters. Faith in him-

self and his miracles did not wholly cease, even when, in 1666, he obeyed the Sultan and accepted Islam.

European
Opinion of
the Jews

Such facts, it need hardly be said, had but slight effect on public opinion. Howell, who knew Europe and kept back nothing, recorded the widespread belief that their frequent captivity and misfortunes had made the Jews the most subtle, contemptible and timorous people on the earth. They had been expelled successively from England, France, Spain and Portugal, it was said, not for their religion 'but for villainies and cheatings, for clipping coins, poisoning of waters, and counterfeiting of seals'. But as they multiplied fast and grew rich by broking and moneylending, they believed themselves to be favoured by Providence, and clung to the religion which governed all their life. Three sects comprised the race, including the Africans, 'who besides the holy Scriptures embraced the Talmud also for authentic', and the Samaritans, who accepted only the five books of Moses.

Distribution
of Jews

Among Christian states, the Jews were admitted chiefly to Germany, Holland, Bohemia and non-Spanish Italy. 'In the Levant and Turkey they swarm most,' said Howell, as counsellors or spies to the great officials, whom they incited to counter-crusades. These Jews believed that they were of Benjamin's tribe, but that the Messiah would come from Judah's, which was settled in Portugal. In that country, therefore, thousands lived on disguised as Christians. Among Jewish customs were abstinence from wine, slaughter of beasts with no gap in the throat, circumcision, while boys roared out the psalms of David, and the exclusion from the Synagogue of women as having souls not so divine as men. No territorial limits, it was clear, could be assigned to the Jewish question or to the Jewish race. Many states were

Jewish
Contribution
to Europe

confronted with the question of opening the door to men useful to the secular power, or of closing it because Jews were intolerable to the Established Church. Jews, if admitted, might be expected to enrich any country by their talent for arts and sciences, especially for medicine. In an age when few could travel, they were by long tradition cosmopolitan. Their financial insight and world-wide organization might well enable a government to pay its way, particularly in time of war. Thus victory or defeat might turn on them.

Such abilities, and Jewish freedom from Christian restrictions upon usury, made them potentially serviceable to innumerable clients and employers. Were they, as the so-called enemies of Christ, to be excluded, like a potent but poisonous medicine?

In earlier ages, the problem had been tragically illuminated, notably in Iberia. The greatness of Portugal owed much to crown levies upon Jewish wealth and talent. The Jews largely atoned for the inability of the Portuguese to form an educated middle class. The presence of an alien race despising the faith and customs of their neighbours and more prosperous than they, however, must always arouse difficulties. In Portugal, the Jews, always distasteful to the Church and nobles, had lost the protection of the Crown. Spain was then attacking Judaism, and, as the price of a Spanish marriage, the King of Portugal violently purged his realm. Many of the exiles fled to Holland.

The simultaneous Spanish purge produced an even wider ^{Persecution} and weightier effect on Europe. Fleeing to the shelter of the Turk, as well as to other parts of Christian Europe, the Jews from Spain formed an *élite* which did much to gain prestige for their race. Among Protestants, moreover, the unwavering anti-Judaism of the Catholic Church produced a natural reaction. It was not surprising that the Dutch, rebelling against the persecuting Spaniards, and eager for wealth and commerce, should view the exiled Jews with favour. The community at Amsterdam was soon to produce Spinoza—a great gift to the world, though, as the attempt to murder him made manifest, an embarrassment to an orthodox Hebrew congregation. England under Cromwell moved towards the re-admission of the race which Edward I had expelled.

Far greater difficulties, however, confront the student ^{The} of the seventeenth century by reason of the part then played ^{Religious} in Europe by the Christian religion. A century ago, indeed, ^{Factor in} the life of Britain was conspicuously tinged with a religious ^{Christian} zeal and strife which would have made the earlier religious ^{Europe} wars and persecutions far more intelligible to the student than they seem to-day. The age of the Thirty Years War and of witchcraft trials, of Jesuits, Jansenists and the Revocation, has been styled the century of saints, and was

certainly conspicuous for widespread religious zeal. The modern Englishman may be helped towards comprehension by his knowledge of John Bunyan and George Fox; the modern Pole, by the sight of countless pilgrims and of a nation at prayer; the modern Dutchman, by the general devotion of a people to-day divided into many sects. In not a few countries, however, especially those officially Lutheran, church life now appears rather traditional than energetic, and men's minds to be filled with other quests.

In 1610, however, religious tolerance was rare, and religion was aggressive. 'Frank respect for the freedom of indwelling conscience' could not flourish when almost everyone believed that compatriots outside the state church imperilled both his own salvation and the safety of the populace as a whole. The peril to a whole ship's company from the profanity of a single member gave a picturesque illustration of this common interest. Hawkins, it is said, banished profane swearing from his ships in a few days by a voluntary arrangement that 'a palmer or ferula' should be given, with chastisement upon the hand, to anyone convicted of an oath. The man who held it at the time of morning or evening prayer also received three blows from the captain or master. Such was a mild outcome of the anxiety which filled naval life with reminiscences of Jonah and often dictated more than one general assembly daily for collective prayer. Obedience to the Lord's Anointed meant that subject and sovereign shared one faith. France, indeed, in Henry's day set a rare example of tolerance. But the Edict of Nantes (1598-9) was hardly more than a temporary escape from the deadly dilemma—toleration or a hopelessly divided state. In general, sovereignty implied that the European and his ruler gained salvation by strict conformity.

Since the Reformation, indeed, the Protestants had notoriously tended to divide into ever more numerous and less harmonious sects. This was a proof of their vital interest in religion, and perhaps of the impossibility of restoring any pan-Christian control. The Catholics, on the other hand, had gone far towards providing organizations for promoting the zeal of sections without sacrifice of disciplined unity. Churchmen claimed that, at the

jubilee of 1600, some three millions of the faithful had flocked to Rome. It was certain that, without impairing the authority of the Pope, many devout Catholics were forming new religious orders, or reinvigorating the old. Such were notably the Franciscans and their offspring the Capucins, strict, bearded, eloquent and self-denying. The revived Carmelites, both men and women, came from Spain to tend the poor and to instruct. The ancient Benedictines also underwent revival, while by the seventeenth century many new orders, such as the Theatines and Barnabites, had taken root.

In France, holy women invoked the traditions of St. François de Sales and St. Theresa.¹ By 1626, chiefly through the new orders, some fifteen hundred French convents were to be found. St. Vincent de Paul, a peasant by birth, once a galley-slave, and himself charity incarnate, brought to many generations an enduring inspiration. The year 1611 saw the foundation of the Oratory of Jesus, designed to produce strict and well-taught priests. Seven years later, the famous Congregation of St. Maur was formed at Paris, and soon gained great renown. Its research in history, theology and many other studies became outstanding, and it soon comprised nearly two hundred establishments.

The most conspicuous and powerful of the religious The Jesuits orders, however, was still the 'Company' or Society of Jesus. Founded by a Basque soldier in Paris, and shaped by zealous students from many lands, it surpassed all other Catholic organizations both in learning and in missionary success. The Jesuits, earnest and cultivated men of the world, appealed so strongly to the taste of young Catholic princes that they could exert great political power by influencing those born to wield it. As a papal army, however, they embodied a challenge to states which aimed at independence of the Pope, most notably to France. Against the Jesuits, Gallican feeling reinforced Huguenot distaste, but Henry IV recalled them from their exile, and bequeathed to later kings the custom of choosing a Jesuit confessor. In Poland Sigismund III (1587-1632) continued to wear his uneasy crown only because the Society exhorted him thus to serve the Church, and he amply earned his nickname of 'the

¹ Not, of course, the modern St. Theresa, who reigns in Lisieux.

Jesuit King'. The combination of mystery and real influence inevitably bred exaggeration, so that men held the Jesuits more nearly omnipotent than they could possibly have been. Seventy years of progress, none the less, had justified the papal verdict, 'This is the finger of God'. A society soon to number 800 'houses' and some 15,000 devoted members might be a force like none other upon earth.

Jesuit
Weaknesses

From a purely mundane point of view, however, some adverse probabilities could not be disregarded. It would be a miracle indeed if the succession of generals could maintain, or even approach, the standard set by Loyola, Lainez and Acquaviva. The first principle of the Society was the complete subordination of the individual will. The General, of course, was always trained and chosen with the utmost care, and surrounded by coadjutors, admonishers and confessors. A Venetian policy of caution could thus preserve an aristocracy, but could hardly inspire crusaders. The number of Catholic Europeans willing to renounce earthly ties and to become 'like a little crucifix, to be held head up or head down', was not likely to be very large. No one claimed that to gain eternal salvation it was necessary to become a Jesuit. By 1610, indeed, it was evident that north of the Alps and Pyrenees the Order made far less progress than to the southward. But it remained a great if indeterminate factor in the history of Europe.

Astrology,
Demonology,
Witchcraft
and Miracles

Far stronger, because far more pervasive, was the influence of the occult. While Catholics might claim a history of more than 1,500 years against less than three generations of the new religion, Catholics and Protestants alike were deeply influenced by beliefs which came down to them from ages vastly more remote. Magic and miracle, sorcery and witchcraft, rule of stars and devils—these aspects of an unseen world haunted man through all his life, and have not yet been completely banished by science. The records of our period abound with instances grotesque or tragic of 'superstitions' which might outweigh reason and, on occasion, determine history.

Let us, carefully avoiding the supposition that our own age is always wiser, consider a few of the wonders in which many in the seventeenth century could believe. A monastery

near Leyden, for example, showed the tomb of a Countess who, in 1276, in her fortieth year, had been delivered at one birth of 365 children. After baptism by a suffragan of Utrecht, all died on the day of their birth and were buried in the monastery, which still displayed the brazen basins wherein they were baptized. 'This most portentous miracle' was confirmed by 'sundry ancient chronicles of infallible certainty' and, a few years before the famous synod, was still discussed in Dort.

Astrology, of course, influenced vast numbers whose habitual credulity was not so great. An eminent astronomer could then draw horoscopes for gain. Even in recent times an Oxford tutor, it is said, was compelled to condone the late return of an eastern pupil who could plead that 'the horoscopes' had delayed his journey. No less mysterious, Astrology but far more scholarly and dignified, was the prevailing international belief that men's fate was determined by the configuration of the heavenly bodies at the moment of their birth. Thus Louis XIII was styled 'the Just', not from any conspicuous rectitude, but because he was born when *Librae* (the Scales) were in the ascendant.

Many believed in

'a star which is of all stars the most beneficial to man. For where this star entereth with the moon it maketh void her hurtful influence . . . which if it be so is a notable secret of the divine Providence, and a special cause amongst infinite others to move us to continual thanksgiving.'

More sinister and far more influential was the superstition that dark forces could be made to serve the wicked. Witchcraft In 1610, indeed, the belief that women could acquire and exercise occult powers was well-nigh universal. In the twentieth century, when a Cambridge College failed to sell a rural holding because the mother of the occupier was credited with 'the evil eye', men were amazed that, even in the remotest village, such nonsense still survived. Three hundred years earlier, however, they might well have been shocked to find that the reality of witchcraft could be doubted. Was not the Witch of Endor described in the Word of God, and disobedience declared to be 'as the sin of witchcraft'? Had not the Pope and the Inquisition laboured unceasingly to counteract its effects? Did not strange events occur within everyone's experience for which man's prompting by

a demon seemed the most likely cause? Most convincing of all, could not innumerable cases be quoted wherein a witch had confessed to satanic practices, or had even boasted of superhuman powers? Thus when Lord Chief Justice Coke told a female prisoner that she had the seven deadly sins, he called her sorcerer and witch, as well as whore, bawd, papist, felon and murderer.

James I on
Demonology

King James I in his *Daemonologie* elaborated with learning and conviction the prevalent theory of witchcraft, and the duty of Christians towards it. The institution itself, declared the King, attracted women more than men because of their greater frailty. It was invented and taught by the devil—taught for ‘the everlasting perdition of their soul and body’, with manifold regulation of furnishings, and of seasons, days and hours. ‘These things being all ready and prepared, circles are made triangular, quadrangular, round, double or single, according to the form of apparition that they crave.’ If the aspirant in thus raising a spirit makes the slightest error, the devil carries him body and soul away. Damned devils wander through the world as God’s hangmen. When unemployed they must return to their prison in hell, to be there enclosed for ever.

Witches, said King James, are taught by the devil

‘how to make pictures of wax or clay, that by the roasting thereof the persons that they bear the name of may be continually melted or dried away by continual sickness. To some he teacheth kinds of uncouth poisons which mediciners understand not, for he is far cunninger than man in the knowledge of all occult proprieties of nature.’

As ‘God’s ape’, the devil could make men and women love or hate one another. He could lay diseases upon them, ‘when God will so permit him’. He could likewise raise tempests in the air by sea or land, but only within such bounds as God might sanction. Demoniacal possession and the haunting of houses had no local limitation. In Britain, said the King, many ghosts and spirits appeared in the time of blind Papistry, ‘where now a man shall scarcely all his time hear once of such things’, and yet unlawful arts were never so rife as now (1616).

Death
Penalty for
Witchcraft

The King’s conclusion regarding magicians and witches was sun-clear. ‘According to the law of God, the civil and imperial law, and municipal law of all Christian nations’,

the guilty men and women, by fire or otherwise, ought to be put to death. Almost to the close of our period, Britain followed this advice, and New England became notorious for an outbreak of persecution. Belief in witchcraft tintured contemporary life in Europe. This belief and the parts played by God and devil, which the King so confidently expounds, must have contributed not a little to the self-questioning of the seventeenth century. England, at least, reached a characteristic solution by duly sentencing an indicted witch and refraining from carrying out the sentence.

Richelieu's France offered an illuminating case in 1634, ^{A French Example} when Grandier, a priest, was put to death for sorcery, after an elaborate trial. His great enemies were the Capucins, who, it is said, influenced Richelieu against him by declaring that he had libelled the Cardinal. He was charged with having caused the demoniacal possession of Ursuline nuns and others. The devils themselves, Ashtaroath and eleven more, were indicted before a Councillor of State and twelve judges, the nuns acting as their spokesmen. It was noted that while the exorcists put their questions in Latin, the devils replied in French, but they stated their names and dignities and were explicit as to Grandier's guilt. On this evidence he was burned alive, together with his writings, and his ashes scattered in the air. Though refused the Confessor whom he desired, he made a brave and Christian end.

CHAPTER II

WESTERN EUROPE IN 1610

Travellers'
Tales

IT is probably impossible to recover the social atmosphere of Europe in 1610. Contemporaries will long remember their own stupefaction when the general election of 1945 revealed the mind of the electorate in Britain. Ten generations earlier, direct evidence of what the masses thought could hardly be said to exist. Bright travellers made confident and piquant assertions, but, even if they wrote in good faith, their sources of information remained slender. Many described 'the English' as proud and beautiful, lazy and prone to good living, and so forth. But their observation was commonly based on what they had seen in one section of London, and on journeys by road from the coast by London to Oxford and Cambridge, with perhaps one or two provincial towns. When we enjoy the bright narratives of our own travellers, we must never forget how slight were their opportunities of penetrating either the lives or the thoughts of the inhabitants.

Primitive
Civilization

To us, of course, our ancestors of the early seventeenth century seem to lack many things now deemed necessary to civilization. Sumptuous on great occasions to a degree which to us may seem ridiculous, most of them lived in conditions of almost dangerous discomfort. In Sweden, for instance, a country now perhaps the most thoroughly civilized in the world, and at that time about to be ruled by the greatest king in Europe, only the greatest and richest dwelt in houses built of stone.

'Most country houses were of wood, one storey high and roofed with peat. A few had a second floor with balcony and stairs outside. The windows were small and seldom filled with glass, thin skin or membranes taking its place. Instead of chairs and sofas, the living-room had benches of wood or stone, fastened to the walls, which were unadorned and bare. Even the gentry usually ate from trenchers of wood or tin. Guests brought their own knife and spoon. Forks were still unusual, meat being taken with the hand. . . . High and low alike ate and drank to excess, and festivities often led to violence. In some parts of Småland, it was the

custom for the combatants to be tied together by a belt, and thus to fight it out with long knives. In many cases one or both were killed, and the wives, it is said, took shrouds with them to the feast' (Odhner).

Public life everywhere was still inspired by the spirit of Medieval the Middle Ages, when the people found the very height of Pomp pleasure in such processions as the Lord Mayor's Show. The Spanish kings taught their subjects to close their carriages when the royal equipage came in sight, and the Imperial etiquette was still regulated by the pedantic mummeries of the Golden Bull. An outraged Protestant described the normal pageantry of the progress of the Pope to church. First came a cohort of men on foot, followed by the famous Swiss Guard. Then some 400 gentlemen of Rome, bravely mounted, and a score of Chamberlains in violet gowns with white staves in their hands. These were followed by the chief servants of the Cardinals on horseback, each bearing his master's crimson velvet hat. The Cardinals themselves rode on mule-back, and a further contingent of white mules preceded the Master of the Ceremonies. 'Down! down!' he cried to the people, who awaited the papal blessing. At last the Pope himself appeared, borne under a canopy in an open litter, with a troop of high ecclesiastics in his train. His light horsemen might bring up the rear while he was being carried to his place beside the altar.

Much of this pageant-loving Europe was described in 1642 Howell by James Howell, 'the priggish little Clerk of King Charles' 1594-1666 Council', whom Thackeray reckoned with Montaigne as on European 'two dear old friends'. His careful observations had been Travel made, for the most part, nearly a quarter of a century before. Son of a Carmarthenshire minister, he went from the free school at Hereford to Jesus College, Oxford, and graduated in 1613 at the age of nineteen. He then became a glass-maker, travelled for three years on business, became a Fellow of his College, distinguished himself in public employment, and in 1642 found himself a prisoner in the Fleet for debt, if not for political indiscretion. His brother was then about to become a bishop. Thus his *Instructions for Foreign Travel* was the work of one who for eight years had leisure in plenty, but no immediate opportunity of practising what he preached.

Howell advised the traveller who would survey Europe and learn its languages to devote three years and four

months to the task, and later to make a second visit of a year or less. . He must avoid the example of Jonas in the whale's belly, who travelled much but saw little. The outstanding sights which he recommended were the Escorial in Spain, and the Plate fleet at its arrival, Saint Denis 'and other things' in France, the citadel of Antwerp, the new town of Amsterdam and its perpetual forest of masts, the stately Imperial and Hanse towns of Germany, the treasury and arsenal of Venice, 'the Mount of Piety in Naples; the Dome and Castle of Milan; the proud palaces in and about Genoa—200 within two miles of the town, and not one of the same form of building', and of course, Rome, with St. Peter's and the Vatican in the foremost rank.

The list is characteristic of the age, both in what it includes and in what it omits. Conspicuous omissions are those of the mountains, lakes and rivers which we so much admire. The aim prescribed by Howell, however, was to study mankind and thereby to achieve self-improvement. Be well-instructed in your own religion, and in the topography, government and history of your own country, and you may then converse with foreigners and learn from them—such was his advice. Foreign languages must be acquired by the islander who would travel, but since Italian, Spanish and French were daughters of Latin, 'having gained the good will of the mother, he will quickly prevail with the daughters'.

France
and Spain

The country most necessary for the English to know, he declared, was France, and French was at once the most useful and the most difficult language. Let the traveller, therefore, 'retire to some university about the Loire, unfrequented by the English'. Students, he explained might chat at the grates with an ancient nun, for the nuns had all the news, and if given some trifles, such as English gloves or knives or ribbons, they would talk till the giver was weary. Let him systematically read the history of the country, since History, 'only after God Almighty, can do miracles, for she can bring back ages past and give life to the dead, to whom she serves as a sacred shrine to keep their names immortal'. The student's own chamber should be furnished with French books of devotion, as on Sundays and holy days that must be his place of worship.

The contrast between Spain and France, and between their

respective nations, Howell elaborated to the full. Paris, 'that huge though dirty theatre of all nations', would be succeeded beyond the Pyrenees, he said, by a more dangerous climate, where the traveller should not be dressed in the French fashion, and should walk humbly, and keep silence about religion. Though merchants were free everywhere, the presence of our ambassador made Madrid alone safe for a Protestant gentleman. While the Frenchman was active and mercurial, Howell observed, the Spaniard was speculative and saturnine, 'the one quick and airy, the other slow and heavy, the one discursive and sociable, the other reserved and thoughtful. . . . It is a kind of sickness for a Frenchman to keep a secret long, and all the drugs of Egypt cannot get it out of a Spaniard.'

Within and without, the two nations seemed in almost all respects unlike. The Frenchman accepted the tenets of faith, but applied to them his reason, 'and so is often gravelled upon the quicksands of his own brain'. The Spaniard, on the other hand, laboured to avoid all speculation. The long-haired Frenchman with a comb and looking-glass in his pocket, thinly clad, walking fast, with high-heeled shoes, drinking watered wine, talking and even singing while he ate, contrasted at every turn with the short-haired closely muffled Spaniard, duster in pocket for his low-heeled shoes, slow in gait and at meals silent, and abhorring the rude French habits of eating fruit in the street or saluting a lady with a kiss on meeting. In battle, the French excelled on horseback and in attack, the Spaniards on foot and in retreat, just as at tennis the Frenchman volleyed and the Spaniard waited for the bound. 'One may say, what the one is, the other is not.'

The France of 1610, indeed, had but little of the glamour with which the seventeenth century came to surround her. Between the assassination of his predecessor and his own, Henry IV had laboured to reconquer his kingdom, and not in vain. Unhampered by civil war, the talent and energy of the French and the excellence of their soil and climate soon made them a respectable power. An English visitor could enter the country and traverse it from north to south with no great formality or risk. He would find little to be shocked at. Here a ruined village, there a gallows, or the more

National
Contrasts

Coryat on
France

dreadful instrument of death, a wheel, but an easy journey through a fertile landscape enriched by the glories of Amiens cathedral—such was the prelude to Paris.

Paris was then described by Thomas Coryat as a city 'exceeding great, being no less than ten miles in circuit, very populous, and full of very goodly buildings, whereof the greatest part are of fair white freestone: wherewith it is naturally more plentifully furnished than any city of Christendom that ever I read or heard of'. Its ancient walls with their fourteen gates enclosed the king's palace called the Louvre, and much else worth seeing, but by no means challenging the supremacy of Venice, 'the queen of the Christian world'. When Coryat surveyed Paris, Margaret of Valois, divorced in 1599, was carried openly about the streets under a stately canopy.

Gipsies

At Nevers, where the wooden shoes of French peasants were on sale at twopence farthing a pair, Coryat saw a great multitude of 'roguish Egyptians, that disguise their faces, as our counterfeit western Egyptians in England'. Their men, 'very Russians and swashbucklers', wore swords and long curls, which, like their faces, 'looked so black as if they were raked out of hell', while crowds flocked round dishevelled women, who danced in the streets and sang lascivious songs. Three years later, four Gipsies were hanged in Edinburgh for unlawful presence in the Kingdom. The survival, in many parts of Europe, of mysterious nomad aliens, forms a slight but genuine link between the seventeenth century and our own.

Natural
Endowment
of France

'The great century of France', wrote Professor Grant, 'begins from the end of the sixteenth century.' Yet in 1610, when Henry IV was slain, the future of his country was still far from secure. Thanks to him, indeed, civil war had for a dozen years ceased to convulse the land, while, for the first time in modern history, Frenchmen could rally round an inspiring king. Populous beyond all other states, endowed with much natural wealth and latent talent, centrally situated amid the leading powers of Europe, France could hardly be denied a great career. Even Henry must have failed to restore her ancient glories had he lacked the co-operation of a matchless land and nation.

Full sixteen centuries before Henry's great achievement,

the most famous of geographers had described that system of waterways which was to become the inalienable endowment of the French.

. 'The hand of Providence', wrote Strabo before the Christian era, 'seems to reveal itself in this amazing whole. . . . All the land is furrowed by rivers. The districts which they cross are for the most part flat or moderately broken, offering the most favourable conditions for river navigation.'

The soil, though still far from what modern implements and manures have made it, in Henry's day yielded corn and fruits, fodder and fuel in enviable abundance. Manufactures were at least beginning, and they were soon to owe much to Henry's care for silk. Towns, though not large, were numerous, mines had attained importance, and Paris gave a model and a stimulus to all France. By 1610, a dozen years of peace and firm government, helped by a moderate inflation, had sufficed to restore the shattered finances. After the interminable wars of religion, prosperity, it seemed, had been restored.

It is significant, however, that when Henry's reign reached its tragic close, the old system of government still in the main prevailed. One innovation, indeed, six years old, was the *paulette*, by which judges paid one-sixtieth of their official revenues to the crown and thereby became not only irremovable but hereditary. No one, indeed, could suppose that legal ability necessarily descends from father to son. But in sixteenth-century France, judicial office had commonly been sold, like military commissions in nineteenth-century England. As the English Justices of the Peace have shown, an office virtually hereditary is not unlikely to secure a tolerably efficient service. The French judges who paid the *paulette* would have no reason for subservience to Henry and his successors. The far more dangerous infusion of the aristocratic principle threatened by the summons of States-general was, despite his promise, sedulously avoided by the King. His own small council must suffice. Thus the centralization of power which formed the prime necessity of a strong state was resumed and developed in France.

By 1610, in spite of Huguenot semi-independence, the King was master in the kingdom. At his bidding, and in some degree for his private gratification, three armies were then arrayed against the national foe. Meanwhile the

French
Government.
The *Paulette*.

Jesuits, superb teachers and diplomatists, had been recalled by him to France. The converted Huguenot, once he had been accepted by the Pope, had not failed to make use of his position as 'the eldest son of the church'. For reasons of state, indeed, he wished to see all Huguenots following his example. Meanwhile, he could rejoice in the old concordat with the Pope (1516) which gave him the right of nominating the bishops and abbots in his realm. This right was the source of a standing alliance between the French Crown and church, and, among other advantages, secured to the crown a constant supply of skilful statesmen with no offspring to divert their course.

The *Taille*

Another conspicuous prop of monarchy was the *taille*, a tax on property, from which the nobles and clergy were exempt. Its existence signified that, since the days of the Hundred Years War, the French King had been able to maintain an army of his own. All the modern history of Europe shows that a king who can command an army stands on an entirely different footing from one who can only desire his magnates to call up their men. It was therefore hardly surprising that Henry retained the *taille* in its traditional form, without attempting to extend it, on grounds of equity, to classes hitherto exempt. A king in his position, indeed, must rather change the spirit than the form of institutions, veiling innovation, wherever possible, by following established usage. Therefore the provinces were still divided between the *pays d'états*, notably Languedoc and Brittany, where the old self-government by their Estates survived, and the *pays d'élection*, where crown officials governed. All provinces had their lieutenant-general, a noble appointed by the crown, and, as the next generation was to learn, a stronger royal power was possible. Meanwhile the most irritating of the ancient imposts, the *gabelle*, levied upon purchases of salt, was likewise substantially retained. King, Chancellor, Steward, Constable and Admiral—these remained the leading officers of state.

Other

Institutions

It is far easier to marshal these formal particulars than to catch the contemporary atmosphere of France. As the Fronde¹ was soon to hint, and as the Cardinals and the *Grand Monarque* afterwards proved, her character when

¹ In its beginnings as a faction, not yet capable of civil war.

Henry fell was still unfixed, but her possibilities were unbounded. To many Englishmen she was above all else the land where Protestants enjoyed an ample toleration, and, like England, a state threatened by Spain.

• However mighty and majestic as an empire, Spain was far less intimate a member of the European family of nations than was France. Geographically, she has been styled non-European, and the mountain plateau to the south of her great mountain-chain lacked the attractiveness of the lowlands which swept from its northern slope round the whole of northern Europe. Foreigners agreed that above all else Spain was 'hard', a land of frugal heroes and unbending gentry, proud and unsympathetic. She governed many regions, but cared little for those outside.

Spain and
Other
Powers

France, on the other hand, was pre-eminently a European power. Nature had given her a long coastline, supplied by many rivers, and fronting three busy seas. Within a few miles of her northern shore lay the great island conquered more than five centuries before by Norman dukes, and whose descendants, after a passing counter-conquest, still claimed to be kings of France. Now French and English added to their ancient rivalry a share in not a few burning questions of the day. Europe's foremost problem, Catholic or Protestant?, found in each of them a solution in which no other nation shared. Catholic, was Henry's answer, but with no excessive obedience to the Pope, and with chartered rights to Huguenots which made France the most tolerant of unitary states. Protestant, replied Elizabeth and England, but with bishops and a liturgy such as no other Protestants would accept, and a practical tolerance of Romanists which not even Guy Fawkes could wholly overthrow.

The religious differences between France and England were thus in 1610 by no means fatal to a political alliance between them. Such might well be called for by their common peril from Spain. The power which had inspired the Catholic League and launched the Armada was at once a religious crusader and an aspirant for world dominion. The *Herrenvolk*, whose watchword was the Inquisition, who expelled the Moors and Jews, who had incorporated Portugal and hoped to reconquer Holland, who in Italy as

in the Indies, East and West, aimed at sole dominion—these conquering fanatics must rouse a common sympathy, if only for self-defence, between Henry and Protestants everywhere.

Spanish
Power

The inchoate coalition against Spain, moreover, could not fail to be conscious of certain advantages. Of these the foremost was superiority in man-power. France possessed many more subjects than all Iberia. While in the Tower from 1603 to 1616, Raleigh surveyed the history of the world and declared that


‘since the fall of the Roman empire (omitting that of the Germans, which had neither greatness nor continuance) there hath been no state fearful in the east, but that of the Turk; nor in the west any prince that hath spread his wings far over his nest, but the Spaniard. . . . These two nations, I say, are at this day the most eminent and to be regarded; the one seeking to root out the Christian religion altogether, the other the truth and sincere profession thereof; the one to join all Europe to Asia, the other the rest of all Europe to Spain.’

Howell
on Spain

Raleigh, whom his poems and his hostility to Spain had made the darling of the nation, undoubtedly expressed that public opinion which he profoundly influenced for many years. Howell, writing later, saw more and penetrated deeper. Although, he maintained, about one-third of Iberia was ‘made up of huge craggy hills and mountains’, the watered portions and valleys were so fertile that if she had more of them, and if her wars and colonies did not drain her of man-power, she would prove formidable to all her neighbours. ‘Let the French glory never so much of their country, yet the Spaniard drinks better wine, eats better fruits, wears finer cloth, hath a better sword by his side, goes better shod, and is better mounted than he.’ A Spanish fancy picture of the Garden of Eden made God command in Spanish, the Tempter persuade in Italian, and Adam crave pardon in French. Howell noted that, throughout all seasons, the Spanish King remained in the centre of his Kingdom, ‘as the heart in the body, or the sun in the firmament’, giving vigour to all around him.

Spain to
1706

These picturesque and valuable dicta cannot disguise the fact that, at the outset of the seventeenth century, no power in Europe was so hard to appraise as Spain. For more than fifty years from the death of Philip II (1598) men thought of her as the mightiest of empires. ‘Greater than all the rest of us combined’, was in effect the estimate of James I.



To historians, on the other hand, she has often seemed, even in Philip's later years, a doomed and bankrupt state. The revolt of the Netherlands, the overthrow of the Armada, and the King's devotion to the Inquisition have blinded many to his long career of success—to the Spanish triumphs at Trent, in France, in Portugal, in Italy, in the New World, in the marriage market, and, perhaps chief of all, within his own inheritance. Yet these triumphs were great enough to warrant Philip's fatal conviction that God was on his side, and to warrant also that over-estimate of Spain which has been accounted the supreme folly of James I but was shared by many who were wiser.

Outstanding
Spaniards

One source of at least temporary Spanish weakness, indeed, was as clear to Philip II as to the historian. Spain had owed her amazing rise to the emergence of exceptional public servants—to Ferdinand, to Isabella, to Columbus, to the 'Great Captain' Gonsalvo, to Ximenes, to Charles the Emperor, and to his incredibly laborious son. When Philip died, it was with the just conviction that he was leaving no adequate successor. Philip III (1598–1621), his father's gay and careless opposite, although no less devout, Lerma, the mere favourite to whom he cheerfully delegated royal power and labour—these men were the more deadly that Spain was a power built up on the supposition that she would have at least a sensible and industrious head.

Spain and
her Empire

In 1610, the twelfth year of incompetent monarchy, however, the façade of Spanish greatness seemed unimpaired. Literature, painting and architecture were in their bloom. The distance between a Spanish king and his subjects was reckoned as far less than that in England. The Court and the provinces swarmed with nobles, many indeed of recent creation, and ennobled not without corrupt considerations. Ecclesiastics abounded on every side. The Most Catholic King had shown his power and zeal by cleansing Spain from Jews and Moors. Spanish etiquette proclaimed to every nation the boundless claims of Spanish pride. The precious metals flowed in, from mines in Spanish hands. While the navy remained considerable, her army was still to retain for a generation the reputation for invincibility which the Great Captain had created.

Spanish territory and administration, moreover, seemed

still almost unbroken. The addition of the Portuguese to her countless other crowns made Spain the unchallenged mistress of the Indies. In Iberia, her sovereignty comprised every kingdom to the Pyrenees, and in Roussillon even passed beyond them. Majorca, Minorca and Sardinia were hers, and on the Italian mainland a quartette of great dependencies made her dominant in the peninsula. Milan and Naples, setting the Pope 'between the hammer and the anvil', Sicily, the *Presidi* or defended ports of Tuscany—these, with the probability that allies would be found among the remaining Italian rulers, gave the King of Spain the leading voice south of the Alpine wall. North of the mountains, indeed, in the previous year, when threatened by Henry of France, he had granted the Dutch rebels a truce until 1621. But the southern Netherlands, traditionally far richer and more populous than the northern, were now a Catholic kingdom ruled by his able daughter, Isabella, and her husband and cousin the Habsburg Archduke Albert. Between the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Italy the Free County of Burgundy (Franche Comté) bridged a great part of the land route, and naturally inclined Spain to seek for further territorial acquisitions. What she already held, however, made her by far the most imposing state in Christendom.

The Spanish administration, moreover, ranked high. It was neither ludicrous, like that of the Empire, nor changeable, like that of France. Within Iberia, indeed, traces of the constituent kingdoms remained, and Portugal was destined, a generation later, to regain her independence. But while Catalonia remained consciously different from the rest, and while the Basques defied racial assimilation, the bulk of the Peninsula was now becoming a political unit. The survival of regional Cortes or Estates in the constituent kingdoms implied no check on Philip. The King, on the other hand, was served by an orderly system of councils, five of which divided the business of administration. In them the nobles found no place, while lawyers abounded. Foreign affairs fell to the Council of State, ecclesiastical questions to the Council of the Inquisition, and military matters to the War Council. Councils of Crusade and of Finance made up the number, and two Senates officiated in

Spanish Administration

the north and south. Thus a land which nature has deeply divided, so that neither Madrid nor any other city can be its London, its Paris, or even its Rome, was fairly covered by an orderly administration. The pulse of government was regular, though its beat was slow.

Spanish
Defects

Mere order and regularity, however, could not make good the defects which proved themselves deep-seated in the Spanish being. The ideals of both governors and governed were not such as promised to make Spain a prosperous empire. Life in an unfertile country, and centuries of struggle against a heathen yoke, had bred a race, resolute and devoted indeed, but fierce, unsympathetic and unbending. Their dignity forbade many Spaniards to engage in industry or commerce, and not a few to toil for any gain, while the eviction of the Moors and Jews was none the less disastrous that it was a gesture natural to a race which had passed centuries upon crusade. By Protestants, all Spain was summarized in the one word 'Inquisition'. Spanish poverty and ruthlessness, moreover, were accompanied by no little reckless spending by the great, and by no little folly on the part of those who levied taxes. Alva's 'tenth penny', that clumsy purchase tax which drove all the Netherlands to revolt, was matched by later imposts which crushed great sections of the Spanish people. Spain could grow the best wool in the world, but her government contrived to limit its production. Her empire was incomparably rich in mines, but her coinage was so debased as to be driven from circulation. Philip II had been the most rigid of economists, but his wars left the monarchy in debt and the exchequer empty. The rich Netherlands had become an expense instead of a source of revenue. Ruthless taxation raised the cost of living, since it fell upon the people's foodstuffs, oil and vinegar, meat and wine. When Lerma, until 1618 King in all but name, imposed on Spain a corrupt and lavish government, she became a bankrupt and declining state. At the same time, her viceroys in Italy must wrestle with deficits of their own, while financially the expulsion of the Moriscos ranked as a mortal blow. Shrewd observers, among them Francis Bacon, divined that the sources of her greatness were running dry. From 1601 to 1606, indeed, lack of funds drove her court to rusticate at Valladolid.

The whole of the seventeenth century was to be filled by the unsuccessful efforts of Spain to maintain her accustomed greatness.¹ Like a spendthrift nobleman too proud to retrench, she insisted on retaining her empires in the north and south of Europe, her habit of mingling in all European controversies, her rigid claims to all kinds of precedence, and her support of hosts of idlers, both ecclesiastical and lay. Foreign historians have deplored that her fundamental weaknesses were not exposed under the successor of Philip II. But it chanced that the course of events in foreign states long averted the disclosures which a great war in Iberia itself must make.

Since 1604, moreover, there had been peace with England, and James I was eager for a Spanish alliance. After his failure, the English were destined to be absorbed for a generation in their own affairs. The rebels of the Netherlands had been too few and too distant to dream of attacking Spain, while their commercial interests made them loth to stand ill with her. The French, with aid from Savoy and other powers, were, in 1610 on the verge of widespread war. The assassination of their king however, averted all risk to Spain, and transferred their government to a friendly Catholic princess. The Pope might chafe at Spanish domination in Italy, but he could hardly launch a crusade against the Most Catholic King. Above all, intermarriage among the Habsburgs linked Spain with Austria. Their union was now close, now loose, but always such as to make a great war between them impossible. Not until 1701 was the progressive decline of Philip II's monarchy fully revealed to Europe.

Philip III, it is said, protested that, of all the nations and countries over which God had made him supreme, only Spain and the West Indies yielded any clear revenue, and in Spain only Castile. In the rest, declared the King, 'all is drunk up 'twixt governors and garrisons: yet my advantage is to have the opportunity to propagate the Christian religion, and to employ my subjects'. The Spanish church, indeed, was immensely rich, and, among no less than sixteen Spanish

Spanish
Obstinacy

c 1610
International
Situation

Financial
Weakness
Incongruous

¹ 'Even in matter of sport', wrote a Persian charmed by bullfights and tilting in the ring, 'the Spaniards possess a grandeur and composure which is lacking to all other nations.' But the needful financial basis had crumbled.

universities, Salamanca had 15,000 students. Though the French decried Philip's empire as a beggar's cloak made up of patches, the patches were such as outshone what France could show. 'The East Indies is a patch embroidered with pearls, rubies and diamonds; Peru . . . with massy gold, Mexico with silver, Naples and Milan are patches of cloth of tissue'—so ran the verdict of a traveller, grateful for the firm Spanish government that made it safe for him to journey with gold in the palm of his hand.

Miscellaneous
Empire

But while the sources of splendour were failing, the Spanish empire was so variegated as to perplex and exhaust the monarchy with countless problems. The Spain of 1610 was still an imperfect amalgam of several diverse regions separated both by human memories and by nature. Even disregarding the separateness of Basques, Portuguese, Catalans, men of southern Navarre, and of Roussillon, the union of Castile and Leon with Aragon was but recent, and that with Granada more recent still. To make one Kingdom out of eastern Iberia, which looked towards the Mediterranean, and western, which looked across the Atlantic, must be to overwhelm their common directing body with a mass of disconnected tasks. The state which owned the Indies added to its strictly colonial problems those which were raised by the intrusion of English, French and Dutch. Aragon could not be incorporated without involving Spain with the Italian princes and again with France. To hold the Netherlands and Franche Comté meant that disputes with the Dutch and English were probable and that disputes with France were certain. When to all this is added the close connection with the House of Habsburg, it is evident that at Madrid only a master of foreign policy could hope for continued success.

During the first twelve years of what native and foreign historians agree in calling the decline of Spain, France had a Henry IV and Spain a Philip III. In 1610, therefore, Henry could prepare to seize the supremacy in Italy, at the same time launching a German war which might well have led him to conquer Flanders. His death saved Spain, but the weakness of her structure remained, and the German war, when it came, did not fail to expose it.

About the fall of the leaf, wrote Howell, the traveller

might discreetly visit Seville, to converse with merchants and try to obtain a copy of the constitutions for the West Indies, 'which is accounted the greatest mystery in the Spanish government'. Thence he might proceed; by Granada, Murcia and Valencia, to Barcelona, and there take the galleys for Genoa, learning in the fleet of galleys much about navigation. From Genoa, where the men were proverbially Italy without conscience, and the dialect the worst in Italy, he should hasten to Siena and learn Italian. Italy, the educator of Spain, was 'the prime climate of compliment', 'always accounted the nurse of policy, learning, music, architecture and limning', and its people 'only bountiful to their betters, from whom they may expect a greater benefit'.

From Siena, the traveller might pass by Milan to Venice, 'a rich magnificent city seated in the very jaws of Neptune', in spite of the Turk a Christian virgin for nearly twelve long ages, and without showing the least symptom of decay. This she owed as much to policy as to arms, often sewing a piece of fox-tail to the skin of St. Mark's lion. Further travel to Naples would reveal many absolute and potent princes, more than ten dialects, countless gardens, aqueducts, grottoes, sculptures, castles and fortresses, 'the whole country being frontier almost all over'.

From Italy the traveller might cross the Alps, and pass through many of the stately proud cities of Germany to Brussels. 'The Netherlands', Howell declares, 'have been for many years the very cockpit of Christendom, the school of arms and rendezvous of all adventurous spirits and cadets, which makes most nations of Europe beholden to them for soldiers'. Having surveyed Brabant and Flanders, he could, by the usual safe conduct, visit the United Provinces, 'accounted the surest confederates of England and her fastest friends' against their common dangers. Having nothing of their own, the Dutch were the most industrious people upon earth, assimilating to their own homely heaviness vivacious immigrants.

Howell was so truthful and competent a witness that his estimate of the power of the several states is also worth recalling. Spain, though the richest in treasure, and keeping a veteran army always afoot, he found ill-nourished, thinly peopled, burdened by scattered colonies and unpopular.

Her coasts and West Indian fleet were exposed, especially to the new colonies of England. France, on the other hand, swarmed with men and with corn, money and soldiers. Though politically liable to convulsing fevers and the determination of blood to the head, she was a well-compacted body of a shape conveniently circular. The Pope was then her friend, Holland her arsenal, and Richelieu, since he sat at the helm, had succeeded in all his attempts. 'They of the Religion', said Howell, 'are now townless and armless, and so are her greatest peers most of them out of office.' Richelieu had made the monarchy supreme.

Great Britain, if true to herself, was secure against all attack by sea, and, with Holland as her ally, could defy all other powers. It had therefore been sound policy for her to support France against Spanish aggression. The eve of the conquering of France was the morning of that of England, and *vice versa*. If, however, Spain gave up the Netherlands, the English would be faced by a greater threat from an aggrandized France than distant Spain could offer.

National
Traits

The traveller, Howell declared, should observe 'the likeness of the Spaniard with the Irish, the French with the Pole, the German (specially Holsteinmen) with the English', and some Italians, especially those in Lombardy, with the ancient Britons. As a Welshman, he finds that 'the old Italian tunes and rhythms have much affinity with the Welsh'. From the Italian, the traveller should borrow his reserve, not his jealousy and humour of revenge; from the Frenchman, his horsemanship and confidence, but nothing else; from the Spaniard his sobriety, not his lust; from the German his continence, not his weakness for strong drink; 'from the Netherland his industry, and that's all'.

The heart must remain English, but France may profitably do away 'that blush and bashful tincture' which attends on compliment and sudden salutes. Italy can reduce prodigality of speech, 'for with a nod, a shake of the head and shrug of the shoulder they will answer to many questions'. There one may learn not to interrupt the narrator, nor to laugh at one's own jest, 'like a hen, which cannot lay an egg but she must cackle'. Hot countries may also break the English of two habits peculiar to themselves—'to make still towards the chimney, though it be in the dog-days''

and, by riding fast without reason, to justify the like of the horse's heel.

Right down to the last year of Louis XIV, history amply ^{Arms} fulfilled the promise with which 1610 began—to open a period of war. For Britain civil wars could hardly have been foreseen, and far less than thirty years might well have eased the tension in Germany. But France and Spain, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, southern and Slavonic Europe, all teemed both with regional disputes and with dynastic rivalries prompting their rulers to make war. Besides the seemingly insoluble Bourbon-Habsburg question, the Portuguese, the Huguenots, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danish, Polish, Turkish, and Venetian empires encircled with inflammable materials the Empire, where the greatest conflagration was destined soon to break out. For a century armies were to pervade Europe.

We must therefore consider more closely the nature of ^{Recruits} armaments in 1610 and their development with widespread use on an unprecedented scale. It is obvious, indeed, that in proportion to its population, Europe was abundantly endowed with potential fighting men. Great towns were rare, and the urban dwellers far less numerous than the rural. These last formed ideal recruits, wont as they were from boyhood to live a frugal life, to master axe, spade, flail, pitchfork and sickle, and to gain from nature that ineffable calm which defies panic. If trained, they would be admirable soldiers, especially when commanded by the gentry whom from childhood they had been accustomed to obey. Local feeling would make good the lack of a patriotism which had not yet widely developed.

In the days of the great Bourbon King, however, three obstacles which have largely disappeared impeded the creation of an army. The surplus wealth of almost every nation was too small to maintain a great whole-time professional force. The notion of such a force, moreover, which must have looked rather to the Crown than to the local magnates, was foreign to the political conceptions of the age. Squires did not relish the investiture of their sovereign with a costly weapon for use against themselves. Most armies were the aggregate of bands both assembled and commanded by the nobles when war had been resolved on.

Further, the mode of warfare was such that long training was necessary to practise it. The national force raised to meet the Armada has been termed 'a miscellaneous levy of inferior quality', and in 1610 many 'armies' must have been little better. From the days of 'the Great Captain' Gonzalvo, however, the Spanish army was the foremost in the world, while as soldiers the Swiss ranked high, and German *Landsknechts* formed well-ordered regiments. The sharp severance of the military from the general population came only with the prolongation of the Thirty Years war.

The arms of both cavalry and infantry were such as demanded long training for their effective use. The infantryman wore a sword and carried either a musket or a pike. Pikemen in a solid square had often defied cavalry with success, but determined manipulation with hand and foot of a spear some fourteen feet in length could not be taught by instinct. The musketeer, with his match of rope, his flint and steel, powderhorn, ramrod, balls and aiming-crutch, must perform several dozen movements before a shot could be fired against the mailclad lancer galloping towards him. It was plainly necessary to devise some combination of horse and foot which could break the square, and this was to be the work of Gustavus Adolphus. The coming military glories, however, were due to the increased wealth of nations, the new unity of states, and the birth of such men as Turenne and Marlborough, rather than to any revolution in weapons or in strategy.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS IN 1610

A. GERMANY

LESS accessible than was France from Britain, and ^{Travel in} to British travellers in general less attractive than ^{Germany} western Europe was the great section of the Continent loosely styled Germany. Its inhabitants, indeed, were themselves the most inclined towards travel. They were renowned of old for foreign trade, and their universities had given birth to the Reformation, while their nation still retained the prestige of the Holy Roman Empire.

Travel in Germany, Hermann Kirchner maintained at Marburg, was to be preferred before all other travels.

‘Pray what can Italy, France, England, or Spain shew unto thee that Germany hath not?’ he proudly asked ‘Germany will afford thee far more elegant gardens and fields [than the Cardinals] not only of our sovereign princes and noble peers, but also of our most wealthy citizens of Nuremberg, Augsburg and elsewhere. The Rhine and Neckar will shew thee that plenty and excellency of wine, the Main will yield thee that amenity, and so will the Ister, that neither the Adriatic gulf, nor the Seine, nor Tiber, can compare with those places of Germany. . . . The pleasure of hunting, which many do prefer before all other recreations, thou mayest enjoy in Germany to thy very fill. Dost thou delight to behold the sea? . . . Then go to the maritime cities of lower Germany . . . Germany will shew thee in the havens of Hamburg and the Baltic cities, Russians, Italians, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Spaniards, Polonians, Danes, Suecians, and also the farthest Portugals. Besides so many plentiful mines of copper, iron, silver and gold, in Germany, in Bohemia (which is also a great part of the German Empire) in Misnia, in Moravia, in Saxony, in Silesia.’

The baths of Baden, printing, guns, clocks, even antiquities, held this devoted German, attested the superiority of his native land. Germany, he claimed, had been ‘a very flourishing kingdom with cities and villages above a thousand years before Rome was built’. ‘The hospitality of the Germans (the excellentest virtue of all), like their faith and integrity, must delight the traveller, as must also the most safe seat of travelling,’ where Italy and Spain were full of a thousand treacheries and dangers. All these attractions,

he held, must amaze those who came even from the Antipodes to 'the mother and sovereign queen of all other kingdoms . . . enriched with all gifts of humane blessings and prosperity'.

English
Critics

This sincere and glowing panegyric, uttered a mere decade before the Thirty Years War, finds some support from less biased visitors. 'All writers', Fynes Moryson declared, 'commend the Germans for modesty, integrity, constancy, placability, equity, and for gravity, but somewhat inclining to the vice of dulness.' He himself bore witness to their modesty, especially that of the women, and to their great integrity and fidelity of word and deed. A German, at least in lower Germany, might indeed be rude, and, especially in Saxony, he would probably be drunken. But he could be trusted to feed the horses, even when the traveller who hired them was not there. Coryat, self-styled 'the Odcombian leg-stretcher', who traversed much of western Germany on foot when fresh from revelling in the beauty of Italy, was shocked by the mixed bathing at Baden, as was Moryson by the opening of shops on Sundays, and by the preachers' omission to denounce excessive drinking, though in many goodly cities he saw no man drunk. He bore witness, however, to the ravages of freebooters, especially near the middle Rhine, where many of their bodies hung on gallows or lay broken upon the wheel. The climax of his German tour was reached at Cologne, which boasted a church or chapel for every day in the year, and a market-place surpassed only by the Piazza of St. Mark at Venice. But many other Rhenish towns also won praise from an Englishman who was always quick to note what he had not found at home. In Italy, table-forks, fans and, for horsemen, leathern contrivances called 'umbrella', in Germany, cranes for unshipping goods, and stony crosses upon graves, with the names and the year of death—such were novelties of civilization to the Englishman of that day.

The
German
Problem

Travellers like Coryat and Moryson agreeably introduce the region which at the opening of the seventeenth century, not for the last time, confronted Europe with her greatest problem. In the days of Machiavelli, observers had been convinced that no power on earth could rival Germany, if only she should be united. Luther had given his country-

men a common language, the dialect of the Lutheran Bible, but at the price of the religious disunion which he added to their earlier political and social strife. Since the Augsburg settlement (1555), however, almost two generations of Germans might well have profited by the healing influence of time, while France was reaching toleration by way of exhausting civil wars, and while the Turkish menace faded. When the Spain of the Catholic Reaction was flagging, and a bevy of friendly Protestant states rose on her frontiers, it remained for Germany by wise organization to take her rightful place among the Christian nations.

In a Europe truncated by the Turk and with nothing to fear from Russia, with Italy, Poland and Scandinavia for various reasons unaggressive, the place of Germany might well be very high. Covering the centre of the Continent with her vigorous and versatile population, she was by hereditary right 'the Empire'.

'Germany', wrote an Englishman, 'is the largest region of all Europe, being divided from France by the river Rhine, from Rhetia and Pannonia by the Danube, from Sarmatia (now called partly Polonia, partly Prussia), likewise from Dacia (whereof the greatest part is now called Transylvania) by certain mountains. The other parts are bounded with the Ocean.'

'German', it was said, came from the Low Latin *gwerinna*, and signified man of war. But, however brave and soldierly, natives of Germany, if uncontaminated by their neighbours, were reputed unaggressive.

Abstention from aggression against foreign powers, more-
 over, was favoured by the German constitution. Everyday
 sovereignty within the Empire was divided between the
 elected Emperor, the Diet, and several hundred individual
 rulers. The story of the later traveller who avoided deten-
 tion at a petty frontier by directing his coachman to 'drive
 round' does no injustice to the Germany of 1610. Some
 threescore Imperial cities were in effect republics, ruled by
 senates of their own. Twice as many ecclesiastical states
 obeyed their own lord, whether he were Elector, archbishop,
 bishop, abbot, abbess, prior, or Grand Master of a Military
 Order, and in each case he held office for life. Still more
 numerous were the secular states, each with its Elector, or
 duke, or landgrave, or marquis, or count or burgrave. 'To
 whom the region belongs, to him belongs also the choice

The
 German
 Constitution

of its religion,' so ran the Augsburg rule of 1555, but in many states a rough toleration was maintained. Unless the Turks regained their vigour, it seemed that Germany need fear no external foe.

Decline of
Toleration

Signs were not wanting, however, that, through their own shortcomings, the halcyon days which the Germans had lately enjoyed might now be drawing to a close. The Augsburg settlement owed its stability to causes which had since been weakened by time. Like the Edict of Nantes (1598) it came into being because, in an exhausting religious struggle, neither side could conquer. The German leaders, moreover, were moderate men, and one of the Emperors so moderate that the Pope knew not whether to wish him success or failure against the Turk. But the growth of Jesuit and Calvinist influence, the enthusiasm of the Catholic Reaction, the inevitable forgetfulness of bygone sufferings in war—all these favoured the longing of zealots for the ruthless triumph of their own faith. The expectation that in Ferdinand of Styria a zealot Emperor would succeed, favoured a new appeal to arms.

Ferdinand, moreover, embodied a cause which might well be the curse of Germany—the rise of the Habsburg power. It was perhaps unnatural that vigorous Germans should be content with such a spiritless conglomerate as the existing Empire. But it is hard to believe that they could have followed no other course than that of submission to half-foreign families, first to the Habsburgs and then to the Prussian Hohenzollerns. If their religious diversity was indeed the cause, it had much for which to answer.

European
Outlook
in 1610

Apart from some deep-seated disease in Germany, the outlook of Europe in 1610 seemed on the whole not unhappy. Spain ruled an imposing European empire, but keen observers knew that she had become top-heavy, rather than a power menacing to all the rest. France had lost the greatest of her kings, just when he had given her order and strength and was about to plunge her into war. England had secured a monarch who embodied peace with Scotland, and who, in spite of all his absolutist theories, was not strong enough to quell her legitimate aspirations for self-government. The Netherlands, both southern and northern, and the Swiss had gone far towards gaining the rule that they desired. Danes,

Swedes and Poles had done, or seemed about to do, the same, and Italy, if decadent, was relatively tranquil. From Muscovites and Turks Europe had not much immediately to fear. If quiet still reigned in Germany, the Continent might hope for perhaps thirty years of peace.

We must therefore study more closely the constitution of the body on which all now seemed to turn. The foremost layman in all Christian Europe was beyond all question the elected head of the Holy Roman Empire. The regulations elaborately prescribed for his office by the Golden Bull of 1356 still held good, and even survived for two more centuries, until Napoleon swept all away in 1806. That the Emperor had been designed to be the secular head of all Christendom, not only of the German nation, appeared on every hand. The seven Electors included the King of Bohemia, a Slavonic country. They were free to choose any Christian prince, and for a time Francis I of France had seemed a strong candidate. The heir-designate whom they elected was styled 'King of the Romans', and so remained until the existing Emperor should abdicate or die. The taxes that an Emperor might levy, chiefly for a crusade, were 'Roman Months', a name which preserved the memory of medieval coronations in the Holy City. When Henry VIII was severing the links between his realm and Catholic Christendom, he declared that England was an 'independent Empire'.

At least six of the seven Electors, it is true, must be important German princes. The Archbishoprics of Mayence, Trèves and Cologne, with the Rhenish Palatinate to the south of them, formed a wide and continuous belt of territory on both sides of the middle Rhine. Electoral Saxony, lying between the Electorates of Brandenburg and Bohemia, in like manner covered Germany to the east. But the course of recent history had raised the importance of Lorraine, of Würtemberg, and, above all, of Bavaria, states whose rulers were not Electors. No European monarch questioned the Emperor's primacy, or his right to ennoble whom he pleased, whether within Germany or outside. The closest parallel to his social deification and official impotence may perhaps be found across two continents or two oceans in the Emperor of Japan. As the seventeenth century progressed, it became

ever clearer that the Holy Roman Empire rose or sank as the House of Austria proved itself strong or weak.

The German
Failure

The Imperial office, indeed, may well have exercised its greatest influence by obstructing the growth of a national spirit and of a national organization in Germany. Her failure to march with England, France and Spain along the road to political unity is often ascribed to Maximilian I (1493-1519), who preferred action outside Germany, and earned fame as 'the last Knight of the Middle Ages'. Before he died, with a united Germany still unplanned, Luther in the Church and Charles V in the State had built barriers to unity which only centuries could overthrow. Some common institutions, of course, there were, but none that could coerce an unwilling sectional ruler. The Emperor-elect must swear to rule constitutionally and not through foreign agents. The Estates or local sovereigns of the Empire were wont to meet in Parliament, or Diet, at Ratisbon (Regensburg) significantly situated on the Danube, far from the west and north of Germany, but near to the Austrian lands. Thither the Electors, Princes and Free Cities sent representatives, whose slow debates took place in separate assemblies and usually led to nothing. Their meeting at least affirmed the Empire's independence of the Emperor, for it was summoned not by him but by the Electors, hereditary guardians of the German weal.

In justice, at least, the Emperor counted for something, though, even there, logic and symmetry were to seek. The Imperial Chamber Court (*Reichskammergericht*) was one-fourth Austrian, and served normally as a court of appeal, or, for princes, as a court of first instance. Its decisions added to German law. Here, however, the growing religious tension had in 1608 prevented the election of a president, and the Chamber Court was therefore suspended. The Imperial Court Council (*Reichshofrat*), which normally assisted the Emperor, took its place, thus advancing centralization. Some help in defence at least, moreover, might be expected from the ten 'Circles' into which, after Maximilian's failure, the Empire had been divided. Bavaria, Swabia, Franconia, the Upper and the Lower Rhine, Westphalia, Upper and Lower Saxony, Burgundy and Austria—such were the units of an organization stretching from Holstein to Trent beyond

the Alps, and from Spanish Burgundy to the Bohemian border. It had at least improved upon those casual leagues to face a special danger which had previously been the Germans' sole resort. The Circles embodied a permanent arrangement, comprising both strong and weak states, with a Diet for each Circle and a president chosen by themselves. The disturber of one Circle found himself faced by one, three or five of them, according to his estimated strength. If necessary, the five might appeal to the senior Elector, the Archbishop of Mainz (Mayence) to summon representatives of the Imperial Diet to Frankfort. Only if all this proved insufficient, was the Emperor petitioned to convoke a full Diet. Autonomy could hardly be more amply affirmed. This constitutional weakness was enhanced by geography. Northern Germany is merely part of an immense European plain: southern, extends through hills and forests to mountains difficult to cross. Early struggles with the Slav inhabitants of the north resulted in the slaughter or expulsion of some, the subjection or absorption of others, and the colonization and conversion of whole races beyond the bounds of what emerged as Germany.

German
Weakness
and Strength

This diffusion of the Germans within and beyond their fatherland was accentuated by their eminence in trade. German merchants formed privileged communities in the neighbouring lands, and used the excellent waterways and highroads of their centrally sited country to make imports and exports, fairs and manufactures flourish. Thus without achieving a Ghent, a Paris or a London, Germany came to contain more towns than any other country of her size, and a population which her arable alone would hardly warrant.

National government, however, as we have seen, was lacking, and local independence reached ridiculous extremes. All the sons of a German noble inherited his rank, and in many cases all divided his estates. The failure of national unity was accentuated partly by the friction in religion and partly by the sharing in German sovereignty of foreign powers. The King of Denmark ruled in Holstein, while the Elector of Brandenburg held East Prussia as a vassal of Poland, and some Burgundian lands were practically annexed by Spain. Every Habsburg Emperor disposed of provinces beyond the bounds of Germany, and the memories of

sovereignty in Switzerland and Italy still distracted the Empire. There was formal parity between great states, such as Bavaria, and sovereign units grotesquely small.

Since the days of Charles V, it had become clear that states outside the Empire might surpass it in unity and power. Spain under his son had dazzled the world, and France might yet become a dictator. Habsburg ambition and Catholic zealotry menaced both the Imperial and the European peace. A homegrown dynastic problem, however, furnished the greatest immediate danger. In 1609 the Duke of Cleves and Juliers or Julich died, and more than half a dozen princes laid claim to his rich inheritance. Even the Emperor meditated annexation. Brandenburg and Neuburg, both Protestants, were first to take action, the former claiming through the late Duke's elder sister who had predeceased him; the latter, through his younger sister, who survived. In 1609, they arranged for joint administration, in 1614, for a temporary partition, and in 1666 for a permanent assignment. This gave the Great Elector Cleves, Mark, Ravenstein and Ravensberg, while Neuburg gained the no less spacious area of Berg and Jülich. Was it not a good omen that in 1614 the treaty of Xanten had averted a great European war?

B. THE NETHERLANDS

In the seventeenth century, one small fraction of Europe assumes beyond all the rest the character of the glory, jest and riddle of the world. How and why the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands broke into sections, how they became both the richest of communities and 'the university of the civilized world', how they gained great power and narrowly escaped destruction—all this and much more forms an amazing chapter in the evolution of Europe, and this we must briefly survey.

The virile race which for more than forty years had defied the greatest empire in the world, seems, at least since the turn of the century, to have ceased to fear a reconquest by Spain. Knowing their superiority by sea, and convinced that a bankrupt and distant power could not overcome one which could hire whatever fighting men were needed, they

traded overseas almost as freely as in time of peace. Their East India Company, with its national capital of 6,500,000 florins and its democratic directorate, replaced in 1602 many separate and sometimes conflicting Dutch trading ventures. The year 1610, significantly enough, was marked by the introduction of the term 'share' and by the first importation of tea.

Eminence of
the People

The traveller who then visited the Netherlands found himself in a region which was in many respects unique. A fragment of the vast plain which stretched northward from the Pyrenees and followed the coast of Europe until it lost itself in Russia—that tiny area was unsurpassed by any other in the vigour and genius of its population. Ranking in size with Portugal or Baltic Denmark, about half as large as England south of the Cheviots, the seventeen provinces had led the Continent in industry and commerce, and bade fair to do the same in many fields of thought and learning. Yet they were themselves almost as crowded as the Italians, in all perhaps a bare five million souls, and these in history, outlook, language and religion deeply divided. While the ten southern provinces, whether peopled by French-speaking Walloons or Flemings with their Teutonic speech, were a Catholic appanage of Spain, the seven Dutch northerners, moving towards a general Protestantism, had at long last gained from Spain a twelve years' admission of their factual independence. For little more than two million souls, in the least defensible of countries and one less well-endowed by nature than the south, their achievement had been amazing. But the very virility of their people had its latent dangers. When the immediate peril of reconquest was removed, the Dutch revelled in a local independence worthy of the Italian towns, rejecting regimentation. Holland, with its Amsterdam, Hague, Rotterdam and other cities, was too great a province to be ranged alongside little Drenthe in an equal federation, while the House of Orange, indispensable in war, became in peace the suspected tyrant.

Dutch Char-
acteristics

More than sixty years after the truce of 1609, the great Sir William Temple described with unique authority the history and institutions of the Dutch. They had grown so strong and rich, he declared, because of 'the vastness of their trade, into which their religion, their manners and

dispositions, their situation and the form of their government were the chief ingredients'. He found their country one in which

'the earth is better than the air, and profit more in request than honour, where there is more sense than wit, more good nature than good humour, and more wealth than pleasure, where a man would choose rather to travel than to live, shall find more things to observe than desire, and more persons to esteem than to love.'

By 1610, these characteristics were already strongly marked. But the hallmark of the commonwealth was its creation by the Dutch themselves. Nations more blessed than they by nature had solid ground beneath their feet, and also some endowment in the shape of natural frontiers. The Dutch, on the other hand, dwelt in a region in which highways must be few, and the security which mountains give was lacking. Water, on the other hand, abounded, and had been turned to good account. Waterways, said the admiring foreigner, 'lead almost to every village and every farmhouse, and sails are seen everywhere coursing up and down upon them'. The soft and level soil made the cutting of canals possible for the private man, 'and one horse shall draw in a boat more than fifty in a cart', the industrious writing or eating or sleeping the while. The Rhine and the Moselle brought commodities from Germany to be exported, and the intercourse of cities sharpened men's wits and conduced to that plainness and justness of dealing that are the soul of successful trade.

The Dutch people of the early seventeenth century have been portrayed by their own admirable artists and by many European pens. With their kinsmen of the southern Netherlands, tragically severed from them by the fortunes of the war, they had become, as they still remain, a people and a country strikingly different from the rest of Europe. The flatness and neatness of the tiny country, with its dykes, its frequent towns, its countless windmills, and its sails moving, as it seemed, across the meadows, contained among the strangely costumed multitude a maritime section which was surprisingly large, though many foreigners were brought in to man the great fleet and navy. The burghers, however, with their neatness, sobriety, wealth and invincible calm, roused the greatest wonder. The year of the Truce was also

National
Character

marked by the foundation of the bank of Amsterdam, destined seemingly to confirm the Dutch in their position as the carriers of all merchandise and as moneylenders to all Europe. Saddled with no expensive court, and threatened by no indignant serfs, their task, it seemed, was to expand their industry and commerce and to consolidate their power.

Rise of
the Dutch

In 1579, however, when the seven northern provinces moved towards complete independence of Spain, they had been the less rich and populous half of her revolted provinces. Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels, Courtrai, Furnes, Ghent, Liège, Louvain, Oudenarde, Tournai—to this brilliant category must even then be added Ostend, Nieuport and Dunkirk, Arras, Lens and Mons, Malines, Maastricht and Namur. The Grand' Place at Brussels, the Cloth Hall at Ypres, the glories of Ghent and Bruges and many another city—these were monuments to a race manifestly great and unenslaved. Antwerp by tradition rejoiced in its money-bags, as Louvain in its learned men, and Bruges in its comely women, but this common consciousness fell far short of a patriotism for which men sacrifice their lives. The earlier grievances of the Spanish Netherlands had been much reduced while Parma ruled for Spain, and in 1598 Philip ceded them to his daughter, the bride of Albert of Austria. By 1610 they had enjoyed a full decade of enlightened Catholic rule, and Rubens had already come to Antwerp.

With due deduction from their prosperity for war losses and flight on religious grounds, the Spanish Netherlands in 1610, on land at least, surpassed the Dutch alike in soil and buildings. While the language of the Flemings and of the Dutch was one, and their coastal regions were not dissimilar, the south and north had begun their separate careers on notably different lines. The Dutch were becoming fiercely Protestant, but the 'Belgians' (to borrow a label from ancient and from recent history) were growing as unanimously Catholic as their Iberian overlords. The one dwelt chiefly in the fens; the other, in a pleasant undulating country. While the element of water permeated all things Dutch, the Belgians had a short coastline and far fewer rivers. The northerners were resolutely democratic, the southerners accepted the mild government of their 'archdukes', Albert and Isabella. The Dutch, in great part, looked beyond the

seas for their national career. The 'Belgians', whether they spoke French or Flemish, shared the knowledge that a conflict between Spain and France might at any time threaten them with that French invasion which no natural frontier impeded, and which they themselves were not strong enough to avert. In 1610, therefore, neither of the Low Countries could count upon a peaceful future.

Within two years of the Truce, however, they were confronted by that contest between Brandenburg and Neuburg for the Jülich-Cleves succession, which almost brought on a German or even a European war. It was impossible for the Dutch to look on unmoved while the Catholic Habsburg Emperor gained a territorial connexion with the Spanish Netherlands, and so with the Catholic Habsburg King of Spain. But of the eight claimants to the ducal heritage, the chief were Brandenburg and Neuburg, alike distasteful to the Emperor both as Lutherans, and as threatening to the Catholicism of the Spanish Netherlands. Before Jülich-Cleves had been vacant for a year, therefore, Brandenburg and Neuburg had jointly mastered it. In 1610, however, the Archduke Leopold used force, only to be expelled by Protestant contingents coming from England, Holland and Germany. The assault of the Elector upon Neuburg, his would-be son-in-law, soon proclaimed Europe's danger.

Yet more dangerous and difficult was the internal peril of the Dutch which arose from a deep-seated dispute about religion. Since 1603, the university of Leyden had been convulsed by a theological controversy between Professor Gomarus, who taught absolute predestination, and Professor Arminius, a man of milder views. God's decree, held Arminius, was absolute only so far as His own actions were concerned. The Saviour and the way of salvation could not be denied or changed. The salvation or condemnation of the individual, however, depended on his belief and repentance or their opposites. Owing to the Fall, he could be regenerated only by divine grace. Every believer, however, might know that through grace he had gained salvation.

Arminius, a man of peace, had admitted that for the sin of Adam even innocent children might be sent to hell, but his Gomarist opponents were not appeased. In 1610, therefore, 44 ministers in a 'Remonstrance' defined their

Jülich-Cleves
Succession

Religious
Cleavage

'Arminian' views on justification by faith, and applied to the States (i.e. Estates) of Holland for protection. This the States granted, thus calling forth the fury of the clerical majority against themselves. The violent Gomarists formulated their doctrine of election in a 'Counter-remonstrance', and demanded that doctrinal questions should be settled by the Church alone.

Religious
Feuds

Other provinces supported the Counter-remonstrants, but the States stood firm. In 1612, the local authorities were empowered to enforce an earlier tolerant settlement drafted by the secular power, and in January, 1614, for the preservation of order, the States declared the Remonstrants' doctrine sufficient for salvation. Zealous Calvinists protested against such an interference, but it was upheld by James I, who wielded an equal authority in England and now recommended toleration to the Dutch.

Despite James's efforts the ferment grew, and it was significant that Amsterdam was strongly Gomarist or Counter-remonstrant. The religious dispute, moreover, could not fail to be deeply tinged with politics. Among the Dutch, monarchical and republican opinions were bitterly opposed. The House of Orange, through William the Silent, had led them towards emancipation. His son Maurice, Stadholder or Lieutenant for the (imaginary) King since 1586, resented the truce of 1609, made at a time when he could hope to lead the Dutch to victory, and perhaps become their sovereign. He was defeated, however, by Oldenbarnevelt, once Pensionary of Rotterdam, and since 1586, the Advocate of Holland. It was he who had first secured the stadholdership for Maurice, and, until the turn of the century, the two great Dutchmen had combined to guide their country, the elder dominant in civil matters, and the Prince in those of war. In 1609, when the Truce still further exalted Oldenbarnevelt, Maurice held that Spain should have had no respite. In controversy, the Advocate might count on Hugo Grotius, probably the ablest of living Dutchmen.

Outlook for
the Dutch

The achievement, after a thirty years' struggle, of practical independence by seven provinces showed that their virility must be great and their quality rare. The emergence, on the other hand, of a rift between the ten and the seven, and, within the seven, of a fierce dispute about religion,

augured ill for the future. To cast the horoscope of the Dutch in 1610, we must examine more minutely their status at that time, and, as may be needful, the events which had created it.

First let no doubt remain that the Dutch were much more than a mere secondary power. The Seventeen Provinces, Holland and Zeeland now foremost among them, had reached an unsurpassed level of European civilization. Endowed with widely diffused wealth, and thickly sown with vigorous towns, both the Dutch and 'Belgian' nations were notably progressive and alert. Catholic and Calvinist alike, the Provinces were linked with the ideas of the greatest states in Europe. An all-Netherlands nation, endowed with common culture and religious toleration, is a glittering ideal for the native historian. Spain, however, could never have tolerated such an ideal, and the religious zeal of Spain forced those of her subjects who sought independence to embrace a competing creed. William the Silent had no choice but to turn Calvinist, and of his co-religionists few could imitate his moderation.

In the shock of unsuccessful war which preceded the death of William in 1584, the unity of the Seventeen Provinces vanished for all time. But a new unity of the rebel seven became possible through his self-sacrifice and courage, and through his bequest in Maurice of a competent successor. Maurice, the namesake of his famous Saxon grandfather, was then a student at Leyden, and for several years continued to prepare for the quasi-royalty which came to him. The conditions, indeed, were in his favour. While the Dutch provinces were fundamentally egoistic and independent, they could and must subordinate their individuality to the struggle for existence. At the same time their Protestantism, incarnate in an Orange leader, helped them to the alliance with England, another foe of Catholic imperial Spain. That alliance, as the career of Leicester showed, had its own dangers, but the Seven United Provinces survived. After a whole generation of rebellion, the new nation found itself unconquered, prosperous and full of vigour. A people that is free and busy does not readily take its tone from the records of by-gone servitude, or from fear of possible hostile leagues. Later English critics might sneer at the country

Eminence
of the
Netherlands

Their
Division

Dutch
Eminence

which Napoleon styled the alluvial deposit of French rivers. But to set about land-reclamation on a great scale at least proved their confidence that the land would remain their own. On the shores of the Zuyder Zee a new nation, easier, as its sons assert, to lead than to drive, a nation conspicuously tenacious, enterprising and talented, had been formed within frontiers that were also new. Its weaknesses were those which its evolution might have taught men to expect—small size, lack of home-grown soldiery, local self-assertiveness both in politics and in religion, and a tendency to overrate the importance of private profit. These defects were offset to some extent by the Dutch gains from the immigration of Protestant southern Netherlanders, Spanish Jews and other foreigners in quest of an asylum, while the rivalries between more formidable nations were such that they might reasonably expect always to find allies.

Lords of Amsterdam, Middleburg and Rotterdam, of the lower Rhine and of the Zuyder Zee, well used to traverse the ocean and to sway the Indies, they were the strongest seapower in the world. Of their neighbours, some, like the Bishop of Münster or the Spanish Netherlands, were weak, and others, notably the Danes and British, were by inclination friendly. Most important and most complex was the attitude of France towards them. Catholic by tradition, she had in Henry a steersman superior to prejudice, and if with him a great protector vanished, they had become strong enough to defend themselves alone.

CHAPTER IV

POLAND, HUNGARY, TRANSYLVANIA

A. POLAND TO 1621

DURING the twenty years which separated the two World Wars, Poland, a state extinct for a century, was struggling to convince the Europeans that she had indeed returned to life. The memory of her bygone exploits had inevitably faded from Latin and Teutonic minds, though not from hers. In the west, especially in England, her remoteness by land and sea, the slender dimensions of her industry and trade, the difficulties of her language and, to many, her Roman faith, made her peculiarly foreign and unknown. Statistics demonstrating that the country which in 1939 was thrice as large as England had been in 1618 almost three times more spacious still, rouse a surprise which compels a brief glance at her earlier history, if we would comprehend the seventeenth century.

A century before the Norman Conquest, those Slavs who lived at no great distance from the Vistula and spoke the Polish language embraced the Christian faith in its Latin form. They continued the secular struggle of the Slavs against the advancing Germans, and became within sixty years the strongest power of central and eastern Europe. With few distinctive physical features except the Baltic, the Pripet marshes and the Carpathians, to limit progress, and with an absolute monarchy to make them strong or weak, the Poles underwent great fluctuations in power. While called upon to defend Christendom against the Tartars, they must face their own seclusion from the sea by the new Knights of the Cross, as well as the aggressive rivalry of Bohemia. Throughout their history, indeed, they have been fated to live in the midst of hostile nations. Casimir (1333-70), conspicuous for skilful negotiation, is the only king whom they have styled 'the Great'. But the tribute was also deserved by his success in strengthening the monarchy and enlarging Poland's boundaries towards the south.

Origins of
the Polish
State

In 1374, a memorable landmark in Polish history was set up, for the nobles were then granted immunity from taxes by the Crown. The nobles, meanwhile, had been affected by the growth of other elements in the population, burghers brought in from Germany, and Jews admitted from lands which drove them out. It thus became possible for Polish nobles to turn away from commerce and finance, with no sacrifice of comfort, and ideals of selfish ease developed.

Union with
Lithuania

The most conspicuous triumphs in Polish history, however, swiftly followed. In 1386, the young queen Jadwiga gave her hand to Jagello of Lithuania, and shared with him in ruling the widest empire in eastern Europe. Lithuania herself accepted Latin Christianity, but many of her subject provinces clung to the Greek. Midway through his long and glorious reign (1386-1434), Jagello won the most famous of Polish triumphs over Germans, at Grunwald (or Tannenberg) in 1410. The menace from the Knights was thus dispelled, and the complete incorporation of Lithuania with Poland encouraged. In 1466, by the treaty of Torun (or Thorn), the Knights, again defeated, kept only a part of East Prussia, and that under the suzerainty of the King.

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries continued to bring to Poland more possibilities of expanding and of being attacked than a state with better boundaries could encounter. The incorporation of Bohemia, of Hungary, even of Muscovy and Sweden were envisaged, no less than the perils which might arise from Muscovy and from the Turks, and, as time would show, also from the Polish Constitution. Meanwhile, under the last two Jagellons (1506-72), Poland-Lithuania became a dual monarchy, prosperous, relatively peaceful and well governed. Since 1505, the state enjoyed a parliamentary constitution, with a Senate of magnates and high officials, and a 'Sejm' or Diet of deputies elected by the gentry. When the Reformation came, her tolerance, increased by the growing local autocracy of the gentry and their jealousy of the ecclesiastics, became so conspicuous as to earn her the title of *Asilium Haereticorum*.

In the 'sixties, Poland conquered the lands east of the Gulf of Riga, and in 1569, by the Union of Lublin, she became permanently incorporated with Lithuania. Twin Polish and

Lithuanian treasuries, armies and high officials were to be ruled by a single parliament and king. Unhappily, when the last Jagello died, the succession question had not yet been settled. Unhappily also, as all later Polish history was to prove, it was settled in favour of election to the throne by meetings open to all the gentry. Thus the imaginary danger of a hereditary tyrant was averted by ensuring many evils. Every vacancy must involve an interregnum and an election by a tumultuous body, which those who lived near Warsaw could easily attend, but distant gentry with difficulty, if at all. Violence was probable; corruption, certain; while foreign powers, whether openly or secretly, would surely intervene. The first election, that of May, 1573, gave the crown to Henry of Anjou, who in June, 1574, stole away to become King of France. Not until December, 1575, was Stephen Bathory elected.

Defects of
the Polish-
Lithuanian
Constitution

Stephen, a vigorous warrior, aided by Zamoyski, an outstanding chancellor, bridled the rising power of Muscovy, where since 1547 Ivan the Terrible held sway. In 1587, however, the throne again fell to a foreign prince, Sigismund III of the Swedish house of Vasa. He, indeed, had a Jagello mother, as Stephen Bathory a Jagello wife, but he lacked inborn Polish sympathy, and would gladly have renounced his crown. Retaining it, in obedience to the Jesuits, until his death in 1632, he made his reign in many ways a turning-point in Polish history.

Late in 1592, Sigismund inherited also the throne of Sweden, from his father John III. This subjected the most Protestant state in Europe to the rule of perhaps the most Catholic of kings. In 1593, the Swedes unanimously drove him out and a bloodstained contest followed. In 1604, his Calvinist uncle, Charles IX, procured his deposition, and war raged intermittently for more than half a century. In its early stages, the Poles looked down on Sweden as a petty foe, while they themselves bade fair to conquer Muscovy. The Poland of Sigismund, indeed, pursued a career of greatness which it certainly did not owe to its king. Since the Union of Brest¹ in 1595, the Ruthenes ruled by Poland had been throwing off their allegiance to the Greek or Orthodox Church and, as Uniats or Greek Catholics, had been accepting

¹ See page 59.

Papal rule. Greek in ritual, Latin in allegiance, they encouraged high hopes of religious reunion, and of Polish predominance over Muscovy.

To the Elizabethan traveller from Britain, a slow sea-voyage with its tedious passage by Jutland and the Danish isles, ended at the Polish dependency of Danzig, with the prospect of no easy journey by land to Poland proper. Any land route thither from western Europe involved a long and costly crossing of many states, with the added risks which haunted all but the best and safest of European roads. Countless passengers were overturned, weather-bound, robbed by highwaymen in daylight or by thieves at night, forced to eat tainted food and to sleep in filthy lodgings. Transport difficulties and differences in faith and language helped to keep Poles and English strangers.

Carew on
Poland

We are therefore the more fortunate that the Poland of 1598 was fully and dispassionately described by Sir George Carew, Elizabeth's envoy to Sweden, Poland and Danzig, whose beautiful manuscript is preserved in the British Museum¹. While an official report must omit those personal adventures which sometimes reveal so much, its contents show what contemporary statesmen deemed best worth knowing. Carew instructs his sovereign with care, impartiality and the best procurable information.

'The Poles', he reports, 'are large of body, tall, upright and personable. The gentry full of ceremonies . . . bountiful at table, costly in diet, great gourmands and quaffers . . . in their drunkenness quarrelsome and proud, but in a jollity, and not surly as the Germans . . . Hating avarice, they distaste the arts and trouble of gaining; great shifters to live bravely (which they much affect), and therefore bad paymasters; highly conceited of themselves, and so the more easily led and cozened by parasites, who, adoring them, strip them of their wealth.'

Hence came the conspicuous Italian immigration into Poland, but their own desire to travel was beginning to check the Poles' extravagance.

Prussia

Among Polish provinces Carew found Prussia the richest and most thickly peopled. It was the seat of a great trade by sea and river. This trade, like the abundant towns and castles, dated from the time when Prussia was the seat of

¹ Royal MS., 18 B.1, pp. 224 folio. Translated by Siegfried Mews in *Deutschland und der Osten*, iii (Leipzig, 1936).

the German colonies. The countryside, he said, teems with cattle, game and fish. Its transfer to the Crown of Poland (1466) had been facilitated by the tyranny of the German Knights. The arrangements of 1526, when the Reformation secularized East Prussia, involved a separate status for the 'Ducal' and 'Royal' halves, with considerable liberties for Thorn, Elbing and Danzig. Danzig Carew respected as the strongest, cleanest, richest and most powerful Polish town, enjoying an almost incredibly rich trade with all northern Europe.

In some respects, indeed, Prussia set an example to the rest of Poland. Its Diet more readily voted funds for the common weal, and its laws were less prejudiced against those not of noble birth. In Prussia the ordinary citizen could buy land and hold office. Hence German liberty had been maintained, and the common people had not been enslaved by the nobles, as in Poland proper.

Livonia, rich in waterways, Carew described as full of Livonia castles, the home of mighty barons, and exposed to the attacks of a mighty foe, the Russians. Owing in part to the establishment by England of trading relations with Russia, Livonian trade had sharply fallen, while Narva flourished. Riga, on the other hand, had become a weighty port and fortress. There some forty vessels discharged cargoes of salt every year, while more than a hundred were laden with home-grown products. Both by maintaining two Catholic churches, and by keeping their two castles in her hands, Poland had vexed the men of Riga.

Lithuania, united with Poland, but disinclined wholly to Lithuania renounce her independence, and defended by a line of fortresses against the Muscovite, Carew deemed not to be compared with Poland or with Prussia. It lay far from commerce or civilization. Victuals, however, were so plentiful that living was much cheaper than in Poland, and the land could keep a large army in the field. Where Livonia was fortified in stone, Lithuania did not aspire beyond wood and earth. Samogitia, with its barbarous men and tough though tiny horses, was a rudimentary colony of the Crown.

At a moment when the modern historian may think that Poland had sealed her fate by adopting a 'crazy constitution',
The Polish Constitution
 Carew was investigating what she deemed the life-giving

essences of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. To the Poles, the Senate personified the collaboration of the grandees with the elected King, while the Diet, chosen by meetings ('dietines') of local nobles aggregating at least 300,000, infused a truly popular element. According to the notions of the age, this enfranchisement of some 10 per cent. of the adult male population might be styled genuinely democratic. It became far more so now that the King was elected by a mass meeting of Polish nobles and was compelled to purchase their suffrages by abjuring various royal rights and making onerous, if often fragile, promises. Carew insisted that in the other elective monarchies, Bohemia, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden and the Empire, freedom of election was far less extreme, and that thereby they escaped the danger which threatened Poland.

Poland, Carew pointed out, could boast that her kings were not tyrants, nor did their subjects rebel against them. But this happy state was guarded by restrictions on royal power some of which verged on the absurd. Thus the King might build no fortress, nor give titles or offices to foreigners, nor refuse to examine any petition. The nobles, on the other hand, had power over their dependants such as no prince in Europe possessed. Their serfs were hardly more than cattle.

Religion
in Poland

With regard to religion, Poland, surrounded by diverse creeds, offered a motley exterior. While Catholics alone could reach the Senate, Protestants were not debarred from office. Among them, Calvinists predominated in Poland proper, but in Prussia and Livonia Lutherans prevailed. Cracow contained a Calvinist church, though within six years it was twice destroyed by the students. In Lithuania and Samogitia, Calvinism was progressing, but the great family of Radziwill had reverted to the Catholic faith. King Sigismund, later nicknamed 'the King of the Jesuits' (1587-1632), was already distinguished by his devotion to the Order. White and Red Russia, Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia contained many Greeks, with two Archbishoprics and six Bishoprics. The Uniat movement, combining papal supremacy and Greek ritual, had already begun.

While Armenians, Mohammedans, and heathen tribesmen all found toleration, for centuries past Jews had been growing

in importance. This Carew ascribed to three causes. The Poles, he says, looked down on trade; Jewish usury was unrestricted; and the King tolerated a body which he could tax at pleasure.

The Catholic clergy were rich, levying tithes and owning 76,500 villages or estates, more than half as many as the nobles. The famous salt-mines of Wieliczka formed only one source of the revenues of Cracow. The highest spiritual offices were usually reserved for nobles. The King it was who named the bishops. The universities, of which Cracow was the most highly privileged, ranked as ecclesiastical institutions, but lack of efficient professors checked their growth. Austrians were sometimes appointed to the higher teaching posts.

A great hierarchy of officials, almost all holding for life, culminated in the Crown Marshal, Chancellor, Treasurer, Court Marshal and Vice-Chancellor, all duplicated for Poland and for Lithuania. The magnates even mustered private armies, which, Carew observed, 'causeth great riots, and may in time divide the state'. In sharp contrast to their magnificence stood the penury of many of the lesser nobles, indistinguishable, it has since been said, from serfs, except that they might be flogged only on a Turkey carpet. In a poor countryside, when thousands of a caste which is forfeited by trade 'live riotously and gallantly according to the Polish humour', poverty can hardly be avoided. A few nobles turned to study, and a few espoused rich plebeians.

Carew was not alone in viewing with suspicion the mass meetings of nobles in the provincial diets, and the tedious annual parliaments or diets, both threatening to impair the royal power. The diversity of laws and customs in the several provinces likewise weakened the state. Conquered lands apart, Poland recognized three codes—her own, the German and the ecclesiastical. If one noble slew another, he might suffer a year's imprisonment and a fine of 120 crowns, but if the victim were a non-noble, a fine of 10 crowns sufficed. Not unnaturally, the dead man's kinsfolk might prefer to take their own revenge, and bodyguards came into being. Such, with widespread violence and much sexual freedom, was the 'Polish liberty' which the Poles adored as unique in Europe.

Omens of
Anarchy

Armaments

With so much 'liberty', Carew might well inquire, how could the widest frontiers in Europe be defended? By ancient Polish custom, only Parliament had the right to declare a war, though some emergency action might be taken by the Crown. To defend their country, nobles could claim to be released from prison. The King might hire mercenaries, but they must serve under well-tried Poles, and the 'prest money' due to them on enlistment came from the exchequer. To guard against their ravages, they were sent home a fortnight before their term of service was due to close. As to numbers, Carew substitutes 130,000 to 160,000 horsemen for the then prevailing Polish estimate of 300,000. Polish infantry he regarded as without military value. Those who seek to keep a state in slavery, he argued, should not arm its peasants. For many wars, infantry could be hired abroad—if there were no danger of making the King too powerful. Similar causes, and the German population of her seaboard, told against the creation of a Polish fleet, or, except on the Muscovite frontier, against the construction of fortresses.

Poverty

In seeking to explain why, with much fertile soil, Poland should be conspicuously poor, Carew stressed the fact that her vassals, Prussia and Livonia, almost monopolized the profits from her exports and imports. Their seaports, indeed, served Poland and Muscovy alike. But raw materials, he insisted, do not enrich a country as do manufactured goods. 'Nuremberg, standing in a barren soil, Augsburg, which hath no territory', Ulm, Venice, Milan—these populous abodes of handicraft proved his point, while in England the export of wool brought no such wealth as she had gained since the Flemings taught her to turn it into cloth. Poland, on the other hand, sent masses of flax to Riga, and bought it back again as costly linen. She could become independent of the craftsmen of Germany and the Netherlands 'by repressing the insolence of the gentry' and raising the townsmen to their proper level, while prohibiting injurious exports, including that of coin, and restoring the Dnieper-Düna trade route.

Outlook

The future of the state, declared Carew, was threatened on the side of Lithuania, especially by the former possessions of the German Order. In spite of their many complaints,

Prussia and Livonia, he held, would not lightly forego the privileges and the protection that their union with Poland afforded. The root of every weakness in the Polish state might be found in the caste of nobles.

Diplomacy, to succeed in Poland, Carew held, must be conducted with the utmost caution. In state affairs, application should be made both to King and Senate, and in weighty matters also to the leading military men. Their titles must be used, compliments paid, and 'other considerations' not neglected. A diplomat, if he would do well, must be intimate with Polish manners and customs. The powers which sought the throne should also be regarded. The House of Austria, for example, was commended by its ancient consequence, and by its intimate relations with Spain, the Pope, Germany, Italy and Moscow. It could thus array all Christendom against the Turk, but its enmity against the Turk had led the Turk-threatened Poles to pronounce its exclusion from the competition. Sigismund, as a candidate, was strong in his knowledge of the Polish language, his local friendships, and the hostility of both himself and the Poles towards Moscow. Candidates for the throne, as indeed might be expected, were wont to make promises which they could not possibly fulfil.

The Pope, Carew reported, was obeyed by the Poles in questions of religion, but in other matters made many concessions, fearing that 'such a stomachous nation' might otherwise fall off from Rome. From the Danes the Poles had had much to suffer because they lacked a fleet. Their acquisition of Prussia and Livonia, and Danish fears for the Sound Dues, however, helped to redress the balance.

Although Germans and Poles strongly disliked each other, the former, Carew held, had no desire to recover Prussia and Livonia. Of German princes, Brandenburg, remote from the Turkish peril, was 'the ablest to hurt Polonia'. But the Turks themselves were far more dangerous, since Poland had neither fortresses, infantry nor allies to set against their Tartar vassals and themselves. The best remedy would be an Austrian alliance. The Poles, however, were threatened by wild northern neighbours, while the Germans differed in religion from all others, and hated and despised them, especially Hungarians, Poles, French and Italians.

Moscow and
Poland

The Russians had secured their land against the Poles by leaving uninhabited a frontier some 100 miles in breadth, 'suffering it to grow wild and unpassable for thickets of trees and bushes'. Yet Stephen Bathory and Zamoyski broke through to that victory which was still assured if Poles could meet Russians upon equal terms. The Muscovites might none the less be credited with great wealth, strong fortresses manned by devoted men, and an enlisted army of 80,000 horse and 16,500 foot, with perhaps some 200,000 mounted men, chiefly Tartars, liable to service. Their Tsar was as absolute as the Sultan, with subjects who obeyed him like a god.

Poles and
Swedes

When Carew wrote, and when our period actually begins, the most pressing problem which confronted Poland came from Sweden. Sigismund, elected King in Poland in 1587, was formally deposed by the Swedes from their throne only in 1599. For a full decade more, the Swedish succession remained uncertain, and a further half century was to pass before the two powers enjoyed a lasting peace. Livonia, therefore, a region often held to comprise Estonia and Courland, must be a centre of conflict.

Carew laid stress upon the importance of Livonia to the Swedes as a bulwark of their country, since it enabled them to attack the Poles or Muscovites without exposing themselves to attack in turn. King Sigismund he regarded as simple and easy-going, but conscientious, loving music and things mechanical, though not without ambition. A somewhat inadequate ruler of Poland, for the recovery of Sweden he could trust only to a few close friends in that country, and to the Poles, who would tire of the business in two or three years. He could best rely on the indecision of his uncle Charles of Sudermania (Charles IX) whom he himself had appointed regent.

Carew and
Posterity

Such is the gist of a contemporary survey of rare value. A modern historian, with the sifted records of the ages after 1598 before him, must depict as matters of course facts which Carew would have deemed incredible. Moderns cannot forget that 'the Deluge' was awaiting seventeenth-century Poland, and in the dimmer distance, the Partitions. They know Charles IX as conspicuous for ambition, and Sigismund as far too favourable to Austria and to Rome. They cannot

ignore, moreover, his complex bargainings for the transfer or retention of Estonia, and his efforts to relinquish the burdensome Polish crown.

After the Council of Trent (1545-63) had restored unity and zeal to the western Catholics, however, strong efforts were made to recover the rest of Europe. In Sweden, the high hopes of the Jesuits were disappointed, but Poland showed herself a more fertile field for propaganda. While the Catholics on all sides assailed the worship and privileges of the so-called Dissidents, a special effort was made to end the schism which estranged the Latins from the Greeks. These had learned from Byzantium to honour the Seven Sacraments as did the Latins, but to obey their own hierarchy with its married priests and eastern ritual. Now, the Greek Church in Lithuania and the Ukraine was dependent on the Patriarch, who dwelt in Constantinople as a subject of the Sultan. In 1589, however, the 'Greeks' in Muscovy established a Patriarch of their own, and he claimed the allegiance of his co-religionists under Polish rule.

Cut off from intercourse with foreign countries, the Greeks of eastern and southern Poland were so ignorant and unprogressive that their own enlightened pastors sought for church reform. Could not the ancient schism, they asked, be healed by a union with the Latins of the West? Faced with a choice between Rome and Moscow, the Poles could hardly hesitate. In June, 1595, a synod of Orthodox clergy held at Brest-Litovsk (Brest in Lithuania) declared for union, and Pope Clement VIII issued a bull which established it. The so-called Uniats were Greek Catholics who retained their own liturgy and married priesthood but acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. From the first, this compromise, though accepted by a great majority of the local bishops, was opposed by many congregations.

In the first decade of the seventeenth century, the burning controversy between Latins, Greeks, Dissidents and Uniats, was accompanied by three Polish wars. Faced by his uncle's usurpation in Sweden, Sigismund prevailed with the Polish Republic to take up his cause. He promised to endow Poland with Estonia, but was immediately faced by Charles and his army, who invaded Livonia. The invasion gained only a momentary success, but was renewed in 1605, when

Counter-Reformation

Uniats

Seventeenth-Century Wars


Charles threatened Riga. At Kirkholm, a few miles from the city, however, the Poles gained a crushing victory, only to fall into a disastrous civil war (1606).

The war of 1606 was caused by the refusal of a party in the Diet to accept the reforms demanded by the King. A standing army, a regular revenue, the replacement of unanimity in the Diet by majority voting—these were to be vainly urged by reformers for the next five generations. Denouncing Sigismund as a would-be tyrant, the Republicans took up arms. In 1607 they were defeated, but the Diet of 1609 voted that the constitution should never be changed. Thus the monarchy suffered virtual defeat, and Sigismund turned his attention to church matters and to the crisis in Muscovy. Meanwhile, Muscovy was passing through an unprecedented convulsion with which Poland was intimately concerned. When the son of Ivan the Terrible died in 1598, the royal house of Rurik became extinct, and fifteen years of confusion followed. Murderers and impostors successively gained the throne, and Polish men and women acquired an influence at Moscow which offered boundless possibilities. In 1609, Basil, the momentary Tsar, allied himself with Charles IX. Next year, however, the Polish army brought him as a prisoner to Warsaw, and Sigismund aspired to take his place. The upshot was that, on promise of freedom for the Orthodox Church, the King's son Ladislas was elected Tsar, while the King himself recognized no candidature but his own.

The
'Time of
Troubles'

Such was the amazing situation in 1610, with Polish troops beginning a two years occupation of the Kremlin and their King slowly effecting the reduction of Smolensk. The assassination of a Pretender, and the rising of the Muscovites against Poles and Catholics, however, heralded the election of Michael Romanov in 1613. It had been proved that even if the Muscovites could not hold Smolensk, the Poles could not maintain themselves in Moscow, and that a union between the two nations was impossible. Ladislas, none the less, did not renounce the title of Tsar, and it was not until 1618 that even a truce could be concluded. Within ten years, therefore, Polish constitutional reform had been defeated, and hostility to the northern neighbour reinforced by hostility to the still vaster neighbour in the east.

DANUBIAN COUNTRIES c. 1610



STAMFORD, LONDON.

Turks and
Poland's
Prospects

The north and east, however, were by no means the only quarters from which danger then threatened Poland. To the south lay the great military empire of the Turks, incurably hostile to the Catholic states, and fringed by inflammable elements on both sides of the common frontier. In 1617, indeed, an open conflict was at least postponed. The Sultan then undertook to keep the Tartar freebooters in check, while Poland promised good behaviour from her Cossacks, and her own non-intervention in Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. The Church, none the less, was winning back the Polish people and drawing their King towards the Emperor. What hope of permanent peace, save perhaps in the west, could there be? And, with a constitution practically stereotyped by the outcome of her domestic rebellion, how could Poland hope to be an alert and well-knit power?

Further
Wars

While the west neared the Thirty Years War, Poland and Muscovy patched up a truce in 1618, which became a full peace sixteen years later. The Poles kept Smolensk and regained Chernigov, but Muscovite ill-will made the price a high one. The immediate risks were greater, however, from the unhealed conflict with Sweden, and from a new attack launched by the formidable Turks. Having taken, in 1617, Ingria and Carelia from Moscow, Gustavus Adolphus proceeded to capture Livonia from Poland (1621), and the Truce of Altmark (1629) left this great granary in Swedish hands.

Poland's
Essential
Weakness

Meanwhile, the Turkish war had painfully illuminated what was false in Poland's situation. It was unfortunate for 'the Republic' that its Vasa kings should be claiming also the thrones of Muscovy and Sweden. That evil, however, might be transient. More ominous by far was the fact that the Poles were committed to defend a vast empire with an inappropriate constitution. The boundless plain comprising Danzig, Poznan and Cracow, Riga, Smolensk, Chernigov and the Ukraine, could be defended only by an invincible army, liberally supplied and centrally controlled. In a dual monarchy, elective, hampered by feudalism and divided by religion, such a force was inconceivable. Could allies atone for its shortcomings? Poland was surrounded by warlike powers, but almost all hoped to gain strength at her expense. At this time, the Catholic Emperor, himself threatened in

Bohemia, was the most approachable and the least aggressive. When in 1618, Ferdinand II was threatened in Vienna, Sigismund came to his aid. But the rebellious Protestants were led by Bethlen Gabor, the half-savage Prince of Transylvania, a *protégé* of the Turk. In response to his appeal, the Turks attacked, and Poland poured out her blood and treasure in acting as the bastion of Europe.

B. HUNGARY AND TRANSYLVANIA

Among the most difficult problems of Europe none, since The Magyars modern history began, has surpassed the problem of Hungary. For more than a thousand years, the Magyars, a gifted and vigorous race of Asiatic invaders, have peopled a large tract of eastern Europe. Having conquered a great kingdom in the heart of the Slav world, Christians since the eleventh century, freemen since the thirteenth, they gradually became Europeans. Their religion is that of the West; their language, remote alike from the Latin, the Teutonic and the Slavonic families. They form a landlocked people, isolated in a vast and fertile plain by ranges of high mountains, and furnished by nature with only one great waterway, the Danube. Although over an area more spacious than England or Italy the Magyars predominate, they share their country with many other racial groups, from Slavs and Germans down to Jews and gipsies, and of these groups several live on the frontier. Conspicuous among such are the Transylvanians, themselves a mixed community peopling the region farthest to the south-east. Hungarian politics must be further complicated by the fact that the non-Magyar frontiersmen are all in contact with co-nationals outside, Serbs and Croats, Slovaks and Germans, Roumans and Ruthenes alike. Even in the seventeenth century, when the question, Christian or Mohammedan? counted for more than differences of language, friction between the several racial groups existed, and the Magyars, who had come as conquerors, were not renowned for toleration.

Two generations after the close of our period, however, the whole medieval society seemed to be still crystallized there. As Temperley wrote in the first decade of the nineteenth century

‘Traces of the most primitive savagery still abound in the folklore, the songs and the customs of the peasants. In the Eastern Carpathians, bears, lynxes and wolves are still to be found, buffaloes may be seen in the marshes of Hungary, and in Transylvania men are still living who have seen horses tread out the corn in true Biblical style’

Influence of
the Turks

Hungarian
Constitution

Magyars
and Slavs

This conservatism of Hungarian society, like its aristocratic and warlike character, owed much to the advent of the Turks. From the fourteenth century onwards, the Magyars were confronted with a militant Mohammedan empire, probably akin to themselves in blood, which lopped off their outlying dependencies and forced Hungary to become a bastion of Christian Europe. Her life in the Middle Ages, indeed, had found expression in a constitution not to be exactly matched elsewhere—a king limited by Estates, but preserving great possibilities of action, magnates of vast wealth and astounding ignorance, gentry looking to the King as the guardian of their independence, ecclesiastics likewise sharply divided into high and low, and by no means conspicuously Christian. In Hungary, as in other states of eastern Europe, the towns and trade and industry owed much to the eastward movement of the Germans. The greatest contribution of the Magyars to history may well have been the outcome of their first intrusion, which made the Slavs to the west of them unable to maintain themselves against the Germans. But they also did much to render the Western Church more powerful than the Eastern. Before the Turkish advance in the fourteenth century, they had built up an empire which reached the Dnieper, but which comprised great regions disaffected to their rule. The vast privileges of the Hungarian magnates had been extorted from their king after his return from the futile crusade of 1217. Now, under the stress of counter-crusades by the Turks, and alternate victory and defeat, came a union of Hungary itself with Bohemia, and although the Magyar by no means loved the German, their succession was secured to the Habsburg house. The two centuries which ended thus had seen Hungary advance far in civilization, but without losing that military eminence which distinguished her early knights. These, as opposed to the great lords, ‘continued to be the dominant class, to which the King could always appeal in his struggle with the magnates’ (Temperley). When at last the Turkish onslaught menaced Hungary with ruin, the

county system, dominated by these independent gentry, saved the mutilated state.

In 1526, at Mohacs, the Hungarian King was slain, and some two-thirds of his dominions conquered. The remainder was governed mainly by the Habsburg dynasty, with Transylvania isolated, as a Turkish dependency ruled by its own prince.

Transylvania is a land which, though neither vast nor wealthy, was destined by its history and geography to play a great part in the seventeenth century, and perhaps also in the twentieth. Mountainous enough to contrast sharply with the great Hungarian plain, it comprised an area about one-half that of England without Wales, lying beyond the Carpathians due south of Lemberg (Lwów), and roughly bisected by a line from Jassy to Budapest. Its population in the seventeenth century was a mixed one, Magyars and their kinsmen the Szeklers predominating, but Germans and Roumans from the Danubian lowlands forming substantial minorities. Besides the Calvinists, who, relatively to the Catholics, were more numerous than in Hungary proper, Lutheran and Unitarian elements gained equal recognition. Nature had given to Transylvania mountains which made it far more easily defensible than most of Hungary, but earlier centuries had surrounded it with greater states, Hungary, Poland and the Turkish dependencies, with the Empire by no means disinterested, France ready to intervene and in the far distance the Muscovite peril looming.

In both Hungary and Transylvania, the spread of Calvinism favoured the combative spirit of the people and the maintenance of popular institutions. Essentially the Huguenots and their fellow-Christians in Danubian Europe were close akin, while in their defence of local liberties, the Hungarian counties rivalled the provinces of Holland. The Calvinism of the gentry roused the contempt and dislike of the Emperors, and the dawn of the seventeenth century found Transylvania leading the Magyar struggle against Rudolf and Jesuit aggression. Between 1593, when the Turkish war reopened, and 1606, when two treaties re-established peace, a complex set of hostilities enveloped the Hungarian lands. While the Emperor's forces fought the Turks, and the Transylvanians attacked him, war also

raged between the latter and both the Turks and the Prince of Moldavia. The Emperor was generally unsuccessful, but in 1600 he seized Transylvania, styled 'the Holland of East Europe', but a natural fortress lying among the 'Seven (German) Towns' (Siebenburgen). Rudolf's autocratic intolerance won the support of the Hungarians for the rebellion of the Transylvanian noble, Stephen Bocskay, who had called in the Sultan, his overlord. His ability and prudence, together with the moderation of Matthias, Rudolf's brother, in 1606 procured his recognition as Prince of Transylvania, and, after his own death in December, the recognition of the Hungarian constitution. The Transylvania which Bethlen Gabor ruled from 1613 to 1629 comprised the largest section of Hungary, some two-fifths of the whole. The Turk held somewhat less, and royal Hungary not as much as a quarter.

Under Bethlen and his able successor Rakoczy (1630-48) Transylvania became almost the protector of Hungary. Bocskay's successor, Sigismund Rakoczy, had expelled the Jesuits. From 1613 to 1629, Bethlen Gabor (Gabriel Bethlen) showed himself a conspicuous advocate of toleration. Thus, until the end of the Thirty Years War, Transylvania served as a check on the Catholic Reaction as designed by the Habsburg Emperors, and both the autonomy and the tolerant policy of Hungary were maintained.

Meanwhile, however, the balance of the internal forces in Hungary was being changed. Although many of the gentry were Calvinist, Catholicism had never lost its majority, and this predominance steadily increased. From 1616 to 1637, a great Jesuit, Pazmany, stimulated the Catholic Reaction, safeguarding his work by diffusing a Catholic version of the Scriptures and by founding a Catholic university. In 1637, the twenty years rule of a milder Emperor, Ferdinand III, began.

CHAPTER V

SCANDINAVIA TO 1621

AN English traveller to Scandinavia in 1610 might feel himself, more than in any other foreign land, at home. Whichever of the three realms had received him, he was among Protestants, seafarers, men fond of country life and of good cheer, whose language, like his own, might have been classed as 'broken German'. Coming to a land on the border of Europe from one richer and more famous, whose population was double that of all Scandinavia, he could not fail to enjoy a pleasant prestige. What was lacking, then and for many years to come, however, was true concord of the three kindred states among themselves. Norway, on an almost provincial footing, was joined to Denmark, but in Danish eyes Sweden remained a parvenu and a rebel. Throughout our period, vengeance upon renegade and aggressive Sweden remained an ambition of the Danish kings.

The Three
Kingdoms

In 1610, moreover, Sweden was further embarrassed by dynastic and religious strife with Poland. Sigismund, eldest son of King John III of Sweden and of his Polish consort, had been elected to the Polish throne in 1587, and, of necessity and by conviction, professed the Roman faith. In 1592, he succeeded to his father's crown in Sweden. Next year, however, at Upsala, the Swedish estates proclaimed their unswerving allegiance to the Reformation. 'Now are we all one man,' they cried, and Sigismund could not force them to obey. His uncle, Charles of Sudermania, by conviction a Calvinist, practically supplanted him upon the Swedish throne in 1599, after a widespread civil war. Although in theory foreign domains of the Polish king were no concern of the 'Republic', more than sixty years of intermittent Suedo-Polish warfare were to follow (cf. map, p. 241).

Swedish and
Polish Vasa

While the Swedish and the Polish branches of the House of Vasa were thus embroiled, their Russian neighbour, whose

The
'Time of
Troubles'

existence menaced both, fell on evil days. The presence of so many enemies had caused Sweden to establish a standing army, a step fraught with the most momentous consequences for Europe. Poland at this time looked down on Sweden and drove her to ally herself with Moscow. The downfall of the Tsar in the so-called Time of Troubles (1611-13), however, impelled King Charles to seek the Russian succession for himself. This ambition, accompanied by a failure in his rival's health, roused the young and ambitious Christian IV of Denmark to take up arms. Thus 1611 brought both a Suedo-Danish war and the accession of Charles's son, Gustavus Adolphus, born in December, 1594.

Gustavus
Adolphus
(1611-32)

Gustavus, co-regent with his stricken father since 1610, proved sufficiently able and forceful to give Sweden eventual superiority both in war and peace, and to gain a fame which no modern Danish king has ever approached. It is therefore important to realize that, while the history of Sweden may indeed be the history of her kings, the nation which Gustavus now exalted owed its greatness above all to itself. Nowhere else was there a people which as thoroughly and wholeheartedly adopted and absorbed the Reformation. While other lands styled Protestant left to the Church much wealth and power, and contained many secret or open Dissidents, Sweden became a monarchy whose subjects with practical unanimity upheld the State religion. Denmark, with her elective monarchy and powerful aristocracy in Church and State, England with her Guy Fawkes plot, her popish recusants and crypto-papists—these could not rival the vigorous ecclesiastical unanimity of Lutheran Sweden.

Character
of Sweden

In their political and social freedom, moreover, the Swedes were unsurpassed. Slavery, or even serfdom, found no place within their shores. Their four Estates, nobles, clergy, burghers and peasants, shared the sovereignty with the new and vigorous hereditary king. As the career of Charles IX had shown, a Swedish monarch who forsook their church forfeited his throne, and it was for the nation to determine his successor and to revise the constitution. Denmark, whose monarch ruled in Jutland, the Danish islands, Norway and the coastal plains of southern Scandinavia, had perhaps twice the manpower and, with her oppressive Sound Dues, twice the revenue of Sweden. The Swedish quest of an

outlet by the Gôta river which should by-pass the costly passage through the Sound, did much to cause the war of 1611. The Swedish acquisition of Estonia, in whose capital of Reval (Tallinn) the sacred standard of the Danes came down from heaven, pointed also to Baltic ambitions which challenged many powers. Denmark, Poland, Russia, Brandenburg and several commercial states and corporations might all oppose a newcomer. But Sweden, as the next two decades were to prove, had gained a vigour which enabled her to defy all dangers. The keynote of her policy, first sounded by Charles IX, was willing co-operation between King and people. From the frontiers of Danish Halland, Scania and Bleking, and of Norwegian Hårfjedal and Jämtland, right round the Gulf of Bothnia, through Finland and Estonia to Polish Livonia, the Swedish freemen were ready to venture goods and lives to support their country and its head.

Although their lands were wide and the dwellers in them united, however, the Swedes must still be accounted few and poor. Most of them tilled the soil in the manner of their forefathers, and without amelioration of the stony landscape and harsh northern climate. The Gulf Stream, which produced subtropical vegetation at Trondheim, gave them no aid. Their industry, indeed, slowly encroached upon the desert, and thus made possible a slow increase in population. In the wild north also, hunting and the fur trade flourished, and Charles IX took stern measures to save stags and elks from extermination.

The Swedish mining industry, however, was ancient when our period begins, and here again Charles IX had proved a benefactor. By lowering his demands, he encouraged private enterprise, while importing German methods to improve technique. Smelting before export was developed, and the output of silver increased. Commerce and national life in general, on the other hand, were still gravely handicapped by the lack of communications in a spacious land. Without highroads, the Swedes must, if possible, reserve their journeys for the winter, and the admirable waterways of modern times were as yet unmade. Here again Charles IX showed initiative, directing the army and the neighbouring peasants to make rivers navigable. In 1610 (the year in which Gothenburg gained the right to coin its own money), the

Swedish
Resources

Gota canal could be let to a Dutch immigrant, Cabeliau. The city at its outlet the King purposed to make into a Swedish Amsterdam.

Swedish
Towns

Towns, however, constituted the hardest problem which Sweden had to face. In that age it was difficult for any town to house a larger population than the surrounding fields could supply with food. Great cities like Paris and London were usually situated both on a river and on several roads, with a government and many national institutions to enrich them and to raise the population. Few towns even of 10,000 souls were needed, for, as any modern urban directory will show, most of the callings that are now pursued within them were at that time unimportant or unknown. But small market-towns, for the exchange of the cultivator's modest surplus against the few goods that he needed and could not make, perhaps also to slake his thirst for human intercourse or his need to consult a doctor or man of business—these were indispensable to every countryside. The task of government was to regulate their rights, and, in some cases, also their growth. Here, industry must be kept at a distance; there, ships must be forbidden to trade abroad; in modest Stockholm, wooden houses must give place to stone. Customs dues, of course, involved much interference with private desires, and in some allocations of privilege the King's private interest was not forgotten. Profits on the sale of goods tendered in payment of taxes had been a valuable source of royal revenue.

The
Swedish
Nobles

The Swedish noble families, whose number did not exceed 400, ranged from a few great counts and barons down to men who lived like simple farmers. Their Kings looked to them for service on horseback in the field, and, on great occasions, for a certain pomp at court. If their estates would not support them, John III declared, they should go to the towns and become merchants, which, said a doubtful grandee, would certainly be better than turning brigand. Although they usually married among themselves, their order was less exclusive and less dictatorial than in some other lands. Government service was at this time offering them a new career. They were the more important that the Swedish middle class was weak, and industry almost negligible. Priests and burghers, like the nobles and

peasants, were closely connected with the land, and all classes lived very simply. A nation of homely freemen, willingly but not blindly following their homely king, such was Sweden when Gustavus Adolphus began to reign.

Denmark, 'the brother people', despite many similarities, differed strongly from Sweden. Geography and history alike had decreed that Danes and Swedes should dwell and develop together, that they should have a common faith and almost a common speech, and that, superficially at least, they should possess common institutions. Yet their spirit and outlook were sharply, even perilously, unlike. Two Lutheran monarchies sharing a vast peninsula and its attendant islands, both living by agriculture and seacraft, developed a mutual antipathy which no royal intermarriage could dispel. Denmark, the smaller but the more populous and the richer state, by situation, intercourse and institutions was the more European of the two. Her kings of the House of Oldenburg shared in the administration of ducal Holstein, which gave them a seat in the Imperial Diet. Their ambition, besides the recovery of Sweden, was the extension of their power in northern Germany, by acquiring bishoprics and seaports, as well as the part of Holstein which obeyed the Duke. This was an Oldenburg rather than a national Danish aim, and it emphasized the feudal character of Denmark, in contrast with the national unity of contemporary Sweden. The handsome and vigorous Christian IV, indeed, though anything but passive and in some circles popular since his coronation in 1596, none the less lacked the authority and the influence of the Vasa kings. No match for Charles IX, as a regent he was completely overshadowed by Gustavus Adolphus. A king whose dominions stretched from Iceland to Altona on the Elbe, however, could hardly fail to be significant, and Christian IV, with characteristic energy, used his holdings outside Denmark proper to magnify his position in the kingdom. A frequent visitor to Norway, where Danish kings had been rarely seen, he increased the vigour of its government and thereby his own importance. His right to dispose of the national revenue, moreover, in an age of mounting income enhanced his power. He welcomed the general tendency of the early seventeenth century to promote the well-being of the people by royal paternal

The Danes
under
Christian IV

activity. The Danish Kings, however, being elected, were hampered by the need to grant charters to the nobles, and by the lack of a trained bureaucracy to keep the government stable. Since the nobles owned half of the kingdom, moreover, and in the National Council could refuse extraordinary supplies, Christian must be aware that in times of crisis he was only half a king. He could not yet appeal to the inert burghers or to the unawakened peasants, while the clergy lacked union and political sense. The Danish yeomen in that age were giving place to serfs, while the power of the nobles grew. Christian, therefore, could seek power and wealth most readily by developments in commerce, but his reign was to show with what formidable competitors he was faced both at home and abroad. Unsuccessful adventure epitomizes his history as king.

Denmark
and Sweden

In 1610, however, as contemporary drawings show, Copenhagen, on its great waterway, far outshone the remoter and more provincial Stockholm. The city owed much to a king who was at least in name the overlord of Hamburg, and whose sister, Anne of Denmark, London hailed as queen. While Gustavus Adolphus found Sweden far removed from the main currents of European life, Christian IV, who also took his bride from Brandenburg, lived in close contact with Germans, Dutch and English. The contrast between the rival powers of Scandinavia extends also to the glimmering dawn of their resplendent careers in literature and learning. The far-famed Upsala university owed its being to the declaration of 1593. In 1604 a great professor began his work there by lamenting that, while no handicraft in Sweden was so wretched as not to furnish its practitioners with food and clothing, those who followed learning were forced to beg their bread. 'Our traducers', he declared, 'revile us for living in idleness, printing and publishing nothing. But the answer is obvious. Where is our university press?' Were they, he asked, to print in Stockholm, and if so, who was to pay? Was it to be the students, who had not a farthing with which to buy themselves a halter?

The Brahe

The early contrast between Denmark and Sweden was not inaptly summarized by the achievements of two scions of the great family of Brahe. The Swede, Peter, wrote a *Household Book for Young Nobles*, compendiously instructing

them to be 'ingenious, quick, ready, eloquent, well-taught, and learned in all godfearing and human virtues'. Horses, harness and arms, he declared, should come next to the fear of God, wisdom and manliness, and by studying politics and warfare the youth should fit himself to serve his king. This manual of perfection was widely read, but as a national landmark it could in no wise compare with the achievement of his Danish namesake. Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), however difficult as a man, was an astronomer whose greatness won the homage of many kings, who paved the way for Kepler, and who gained enduring renown for his country and for himself. His contemporary, the Chancellor Hvittfeldt (1546-1609), composed a history of his fatherland in Danish which remains a literary landmark.

Such were the Sweden and Denmark whose jarring ^{Dano-Swedish War} interests in the north brought Christian IV, in May, 1611, to drive his reluctant Council into war. The Danish King (1611-18) disposed of the stronger fleet, and hoped in vain that with the aid of mercenaries he might raise his forces on land to 25,000 men. Encouraged by the preoccupation of the Swedes with Poland and Muscovy, he planned to march on Stockholm. The campaign turned on the capture of the Swedish port of Kalmar, which was effected early in August through the venal treason of its commandant. By sea, however, the Swedes proved successful, and young Gustavus Adolphus carried out a brilliant raid upon the Danish supply base at Kristianopol. Roused to fury by the success of Christian's bribes, the ailing Charles IX challenged him to a duel, but the Dane replied with matchless rudeness that a warm stove or a good doctor might restore his reason. Within three months, in which the Swedes held the upper hand, Charles IX was dead.

Charles IX, dark and sharp-featured but the off-spring of the Liberator, Gustavus Vasa (1523-60), had in failing health called to his side as practically a co-regent his fifteen-year-old son, Gustavus Adolphus. The boy had already spoken from the throne to the four Estates of the Diet. Athletic, eloquent and artistic, an enthusiast with practical good sense, passionate yet winning and humane, the 'golden king' physically reverted to his granduncle Gustavus' type, that of the northern hero. In the records of a monarchic nation, his name is of all the greatest. It is significant,

however, that when Charles IX died at the end of October, 1611, Gustavus did not immediately claim the Swedish crown. In his training for the throne, indeed, nothing had been neglected, but neither his father nor himself would violate the superior hereditary right of his cousin John, Duke of Östergötland. Duke John, however, contented with a modest augmentation of his duchy, transferred to Gustavus his royal rights, and the Estates, after stipulating for the Swedish liberties, hastened to acclaim him king. Thus in 1611 the Swedes emphasized the characteristic monarchy and liberty which most distinguished them from other nations. In the sphere of religion they shared only with Denmark the character of a wholly Lutheran monarchy. Owing both their independence and the royal revenue to the Reformation, they ranked among the last tolerant of states. This was brought home a few years later to the Anglican merchants of Riga, a goodly band. While the city remained Polish, they were free to worship within its walls, but its conquest by Sweden forced them to make Sabbath journeys across the frontier to Catholic soil. Swedish subjects could claim even less toleration.

Swedish
Intolerance
and
Freedom

Swedish social and political liberty, however, surpassed even that of England. Among Swedes, serfdom was unknown, and representation comprehensive. The four Estates, soon to be distinguished as nobles, clergy, burghers and peasants, were wont to assemble at various towns in frequent and real conclave, and thus monarchic tyranny became impossible. Their significance, made clear at Upsala in 1593, was emphasized in December, 1611, when they established Gustavus on the throne after his renunciation of what had irked them in the conduct of his father. Their King, it was agreed, must grant security of person, of property and of office. Swedish nobles alone might hold the higher posts, and their lands were to be inviolable except for treason. Neither peace nor war, and no alliance or fresh taxation was lawful without the consent of the Council and of the Estates, while the summoning of the Estates became dependent on the concurrence of the Council.

Possibilities
of Sweden

Swedish historians ¹ may contend that the Reformation had effectively transformed their country, and had prepared

¹ E.g. M. och L. Weibull: *Sveriges Historia*, Indelning 4

it for the European greatness that was soon to come. Whereas in Germany Protestantism had developed the power of the Princes, and in Denmark that of the nobles; while monarchic England and the republican Netherlands had not yet undergone much political change; Sweden had gained a hereditary monarchy and a truly modern state. Despite her lack of population and of resources, she had become fit to make a real contribution to the European commonwealth, unhampered by the deep divisions which paralysed many larger nations. Soon she would meet with all her strength the challenge of the Counter-reformation.

First, however, Gustavus must dispose of the two wars which darkened the final months of Charles IX. The past had girdled Sweden with foes on every side. Denmark and Norway, Muscovy, the Polish King and the powers which upheld the Counter-reformation were actual or potential enemies. A nation of perhaps a million souls, scattered over a vast area, and master of only a narrow corridor towards the open sea, dependent for the most part upon scanty fisheries and tillage—only superb unity and leadership could make her a significant factor in Europe. But while nature had denied her easy wealth or continental intercourse, it had endowed her remote and spacious countryside with rare character and charm. The vast area of rivers, lakes and forests, interspersed with countless rocks and islands, which lay between rich Danish southern Scandinavia and the eastern bounds of Swedish Finland formed the ample cradle of a virile, sociable and eventually an accomplished race.

Few Swedes, indeed, could lack the education that intimate contact with nature may afford. Sport and solitude, land and water, heat and cold—of these the normal subject was assured, and no feudal lord disposed of him. While the distances between communities threw their members back upon themselves they encouraged sociability and local pride, the more readily that everywhere building materials were to be found in plenty, and the long hours of northern winter darkness favoured music, dancing and the arts. If Sweden has become above all other lands the home of craftsmanship, she must ascribe it in great measure to her countryside. As an unwearied traveller and a genial Swede, Gustavus could know his people as few kings have ever done.

An amazing strength came from their mutual love. As her classic historian declares, 'the nation, in itself somewhat sluggish and hard to move, save for immediate self-defence, willing yet wondering, reluctant yet loving, as though by some potent impulsions, followed her Gustavuses and Charleses to danger, to glory and to the brink of destruction!'

Wars with
Denmark
and
Muscovy

In 1611, only amazing strength skilfully employed could save Sweden from disaster. Although she had made a truce with Poland, Sigismund remained the hope of the aggressive Counter-reformation and a strong claimant to his father's throne. Two years before, the conflict between the Swedish and the Polish Vasa kings had been transferred to Muscovy, which was then convulsed and seemingly helpless in her Time of Troubles. In return for Tsar Basil's cession of Keksholm, west of Lake Ladoga, Charles sent 5,000 men to help him to put down a rebellion at Moscow (1609). The Poles, however, intervened; the Swedish force and Basil himself collapsed; and Sigismund's son Ladislas was actually acclaimed as Tsar. The Swedish answer was to form a new army under their commander de la Gardie, and to seize not only Keksholm but also the famous city of Novgorod, some 200 miles farther south. With a history more resplendent than that of Moscow, Novgorod might serve to support a Swedish tsar, vying in power with his cousin and rival who was tsar in the southern city. Estonia had been for fifty years in Swedish hands and formed a base of action.

In 1611, however, the Muscovite campaign was for Sweden a mere speculation. It seemed to promise aggrandisement, and it might avert future peril, either from the Muscovites or from the Poles. But the Danish war, which then broke out anew, was a struggle of life and death. Swedish claims to display the Three Crowns on her scutcheon, Swedish aggression in northern Norway, the menace of Elfsborg and the newly-founded Gothenburg alike to the Danish coast and seas and to the cherished profits from the Sound, all had impelled young Christian IV to strike at a moment when Charles IX desired to continue friendly.

The onslaught of richer and more populous Denmark was perilous indeed for Sweden. As warriors, it is true, Charles did not rate the Danes high, whereas many of his own troops had had experience of war. Some, like his son

Gustavus, had learned warfare from the *condottieri* who flocked northwards when the Dutch made their truce of 1609 with Spain. But although Christian's great plan for a dual invasion of Sweden failed, he proved himself superior at sea, while the eastern prong of his pincer movement on the heart of Sweden at Jonköping gave him the weighty Baltic fortress of Kalmar. While Charles, though moribund, challenged his king to single combat, Gustavus won renown by conquering Kristianopol, the Danish basis of supplies.

The next campaign, that of 1612, gave King Gustavus Campaign
of 1612 an ample initiation into war. Although many foreign troops appeared on both sides, some 18,000 helping the Danes, no foreign power deprived the struggle of its character as an old-fashioned border feud. While winter still prevailed, Gustavus raided Scania. He found, however, the Danish garrison too strong, and almost lost his life in fleeing over treacherous ice. Christian kept his supremacy by sea, captured Elfsborg, destroyed the new-built Gothenburg and occupied the important isle of Öland. Both sides practised unsparing devastation, and many prisoners were slain—thirty, who cried for bread, by order of the wife of a Swedish commander. The savage destruction spread to the eastern Baltic shores and even to the Arctic circle.

Sweden, however, maintained her centre intact, and Christian's purse was empty. Foreign Protestants, who feared the Counter-reformation, urged the two Lutheran kings to make peace. As Christian's brother-in-law, James I could mediate acceptably. English diplomats, therefore, brought Swedes and Danes to negotiate on a bridge which spanned their common frontier, while both monarchs hovered not far away. The peace-terms reflected the balance of success in war, which had certainly not favoured Sweden. Gustavus, burning to reconquer Elfsborg, must coin his plate to buy back that 'eye of Sweden' at a huge price, while he renounced his claims in northern Norway and admitted the Danish right to display the Three Crowns. On the other hand, Christian agreed that conquests should be mutually returned, and that Swedish ships might pass through the Sound toll-free. The tacit admission by Denmark that the rebel Swedes were her equals also formed a concession of no small value.

Peace
in 1613

This Peace of Knared, signed in January, 1613, proved momentous in the wider history of Europe. The apparent superiority of Danish arms impelled the German Protestants, eleven years later, to look to Christian rather than to Gustavus for salvation. Early disaster taught the Swedish king his limitations, and thereby helped to fit him for his supreme historic task. After his death, and thirty years after the Peace of Knared, moreover, the memory of the Danish inroad shared in inspiring the Swedish statesmen to a terrible revenge. More than a century from the war of 1611, strife between the two powers of Scandinavia remained an almost unbroken tradition, an undertone in the history of Europe.

Axel
Oxenstierna

The peace negotiations, moreover, had given scope to the greatest of all Swedish statesmen, whose accidental coincidence with the greatest Swedish king initiated the Age of Greatness. Axel Oxenstierna, ('ox brow' from his coat of arms), the chancellor whom a Frenchman did not scruple to describe as 'that axle upon which the world turns', took rank even with Richelieu and Mazarin, among the *élite* of Europe. In him Gustavus recognized a colleague utterly loyal to both king and nation, a firm Protestant, but a dispassionate and skilful diplomatist, a 'second self' who tempered his own impetuosity with cool wisdom. During more than a generation, Swedish policy gained strength and purpose from his unrivalled competence and judgement.

The
Romanov
Dynasty

Yet another historic consequence of the Danish war had been its diversion of the Swedes from Muscovy. While they wrestled with Christian's armies, and debated whether or no to accept the offer of the tsardom to Gustavus' younger brother, the men of Moscow had hurled themselves upon the intrusive Poles. De la Gardie's conquest of Ingria was menaced by this national uprising which cleansed the Kremlin of the Roman Catholic invaders. A month after the Peace of Knared, a native noble, Michael Romanov, inaugurated the dynasty which for three centuries bore his name. But for the peace with Denmark, Sweden could hardly have repelled the storm from the south-east which immediately followed.

A valiant Swede who fell in his country's struggle for a barrier against the Muscovite explained the source of his

ambitious country's strength. 'Sweden', he declared, 'has one king, one religion and one physician, which is some sign of health.' In this war, and in the far greater wars which were to follow, unity and health made head against a vast preponderance in numbers. Gustavus himself, overruling the Estates, the Council and the Queen Mother, twice shared in the campaigns, and though he failed to capture Pskov, he restored harmony in discontented Finland. With no prospect of complete victory for either side, the mediation of James I was again accepted, this time, by Sweden, with an admixture of influence from the Dutch. The Muscovite formalities seemed endless, but in February, 1617, peace was concluded at Stolbova in Ingria, south of Lake Ladoga. Peace of 1617

The Peace of Stolbova, forced upon the Muscovites by their dire need of rest, was for Gustavus, in comparison with that of Knäred, a triumph. At the price of abandoning dreams of a Swedish tsardom or Novgorod as a dependent principality, he gained what he regarded as impassable ramparts both for Finland and for Estonia. 'Without Swedish leave', as he boasted to the Estates, 'the Muscovite cannot launch a boat upon the Baltic.' This was the more welcome that, through the outer veil of barbarism, he had perceived the potentialities of the future Russian empire. In return for the recognition of Tsar Michael and for the restoration of Novgorod, he received a small indemnity, the privilege of trade with Muscovy, and territorial cessions in Ingria and Carelia which promised to make his eastern frontiers impregnable. With pride and confidence, he could invite his subjects to found colonies in Finland, while he devoted himself to constitutional construction during four years of peace. New towns, eventually fifteen in number, were a symbol of Gustavus' overhaul and improvement of every Swedish institution. Development of Sweden

The labour by which the young king gave Sweden the strength for a career of greatness was incessant and almost patriarchal. It has been aptly likened to the building of the Temple, with the sword and trowel in either hand. So far-flung were his almost continuous journeys, that in three years he spent only as many months at Stockholm. His administration was personal and direct, extending to the choice at Wapenshaws of likely lads for the army. A king

who rejoiced to meet his subjects face to face, and to give them an ungrudging share in his decisions, could rally every ounce of Sweden's strength for her great tasks. It has, however, been remarked not only that his confidant, Skytte, taught him to distrust unstable democracy, but that his reign caused taxes to be heavy and the nobles dangerous. He made birth the qualification for high office, gave nobles the right to appoint parish priests, and favoured their peasants at the expense of others both in taxation and in conscription.

Catholic
Reaction

The year 1617, moreover, showed clearly that Gustavus realized the danger which militant Catholicism held for Sweden. Poland itself was still a conquering power, ready to rule in Muscovy, scorning the Swedes, and firmly rejecting any idea of recognizing Gustavus as a lawful sovereign. Sigismund, 'the King of the Jesuits', exchanged the traditional Polish tolerance for a series of attacks upon dissenters. Before the outbreak of the European struggle in 1618, Gustavus denounced the Catholics of Europe to his people as their most deadly foes. In the first months of 1617 he recalled to the Diet the Saint Bartholomew, the Armada, the 'devilish' Jesuits, and Sigismund, the papist foe of Sweden. The Diet responded with a law proscribing every form of Catholic toleration, while the Burghers denounced their own Calvinists as well. Defying Poland by a stately coronation (October, 1617), he led his people into an aggressive defensive war.

Polish
War

While in far-off Bohemia the Catholics were gaining the upper hand, Gustavus achieved modest successes in Livonia, a Polish fief. In 1618, the Poles made a truce with Muscovy, only to fall into an unprofitable struggle against the Turks. In July, 1621, therefore, Gustavus with some 14,000 men could descend upon Riga, the Livonian capital. To encourage his men, he and his brother plied their spades with the rest, and, after a month's brave resistance, Riga fell. Mitau, the capital of Courland, followed, and the fame of the new Protestant hero spread through Europe.

CHAPTER VI

MUSCOVY AND THE TURKS

THE powers already sketched, diverse and disparate as they were, formed with ourselves a loose society of nations. By their side might be found two empires of a different and an alien stamp, which menaced that society with destruction. That of the Tsars was a Christian but antagonistic power, to whose future expansion no bounds, save perhaps the ocean, could be assigned. The Turks, meanwhile, had proved themselves a conquering military state which had already subjugated many Christian countries, and which was the more formidable that it could be tolerant enough to make some at least of the oppressed welcome its rule. Since, from the very first, seventeenth-century politics must be affected by what the Russians and the Turks chose to do, the place of both in its early decades must next be indicated.

A. RUSSIA 1610-1715

Throughout our period while Poland was declining, Muscovy was as swiftly gaining power. A single generation divides Sobieski's triumph in 1683 from the Polish humiliating acceptance of Peter's guarantee in 1717. Less than a decade had passed before the Tsar, whose army was routed at Narva in 1700, shattered the triumphant Swedes at Poltava (1709). The years of our survey witnessed many such striking vicissitudes. But no European revolution was more conspicuous or fateful than that which established Russia. Muscovy, which in 1610 seemed less than half European, repelled by the Swedes and destined to obey the Poles, by 1715 had become Russia, soon to be the leading power in eastern and northern Europe.

Like all Slavonic peoples, the Russians could draw inspiration from a glorious past. Before the Tartar inroads

Emergence
of Russia

of the thirteenth century, the descendants of Rurik ruled in a vast region of which Kiev, Moscow and Novgorod formed only prominent parts. Russians might not be well-organised, but all were Christian, and the fact that their christianity came from Byzantium gave them both religious unity and an interest in the eastern Christian world. Their prospects of union and progress, however, were shattered by Mongolian invasion. If they saved western Europe from the scourge, it was at the cost of their own seclusion and servitude for almost eight generations.

Mongolian
Conquest

The Tartar domination from about 1240 to within sight of 1480 had many and lasting effects upon the Russians and their institutions. It effected a sharp division between 'Great' and 'Little' Russia, between those who fled northwards to the forest lands and there intermarried with the Finns, and those who remained in the south-west and kept their Slavonic blood unmixed. Of no less importance was the severance of every link with Europe. Losing contact with Byzantium, the Muscovite also remained strange to the educative forces of the western world. Crusades and councils, industry and commerce, universities and chivalry—from these he was debarred. To exist he must practise agriculture, but the climate did not encourage progress. The burning summer and freezing winter gave the husbandman a few months of unceasing strain and as many, or more, of torpor. The Muscovite kept bees, fished the lakes and rivers, and pastured cattle, but as a husbandman he showed but little zeal or skill.

The
Eastern
Church

With small access to neighbouring nations, and for the most part lacking means to reach the frontier, the Muscovites for many centuries could only stew in their own juice. Nature and history had decreed that the population should be sparse and that the great majority should seldom if ever stray far from their ancestral village. This, in all likelihood, consisted of straggling wooden buildings in a featureless countryside, remote from any considerable centre, and puny by comparison with the Russian heat and storm. Isolated and exposed, man turns to the supernatural, and in Russia the Church was without a rival. There is not a little truth in the statement that in the sixteenth century it was more powerful than the state.

The course of events had contrived that within the Eastern or Great or Orthodox Church an unexpected predominance should fall to Moscow. In contrast with Roman or Latin devotion to a single Vicar of Christ, the Pope, Eastern tradition favoured 'autocephalous'—mutually independent—regional churches, kept in line by a strict adherence to 'the faith', that is, to unchanging Orthodox custom. But while Moscow rose and grew, all her European co-religionists became enslaved. The Orthodox Churches of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Constantinople, though tolerated by the Turk, were cut off from general intercourse and power. Meanwhile, in 1547, Ivan the Terrible (1533-84) styled himself Tsar (Caesar) of all the Russias, and his son Theodore (1584-98) established the Patriarchate. Moscow bade fair to become 'the Third Rome'.

The form of Christianity which, since 988, had moulded the habit and outlook of the Russians, though denounced by Rome as schismatical, was not a heresy. The Roman seven sacraments, though differently administered, were firmly established. An Eastern Christian was baptized in infancy, immediately afterwards confirmed, admitted forthwith to the Eucharist in both kinds and in due course subjected to penance. He might be married and ordained, and in sickness sanctified with Extreme Unction. The most striking contrast with the Roman use lay in the fact that in Russia the 'pope' or pastor was not ordained until he had been married. The higher clergy, however, were celibate, while the marriage of priests had more than once been favourably discussed at Rome.

Schism came rather from a divergence in the creeds of the Eastern and of the Western Church. While the Latins held that the Third Person in the Trinity proceeded from the Father and the Son, the Greeks ascribed his creation solely to the Father. They therefore blessed with two fingers only, while the Latins proclaimed their belief by raising three. Many differences in usage accentuated this fundamental difference in belief. In processions the Latins marched as the sun illuminates, but the Greeks moved eastward, to greet their risen Lord. Their Slavonic indifference to externals and to time gave the Russians a richer and more vivid

Schism
in the
Eastern
Churches

apprehension of some Christian doctrines, notably that of the Communion of Saints. The dead, the absent and even the unborn could share their devotions in a manner which the West can hardly understand. Their abstinence during not one but several Lents within the year was far more rigorous than anything that the Western Church imposed. A music-loving people, they regarded the human voice as the only lawful accompaniment of Christian worship. Much in their behaviour suggested that they looked upon the priest as a friendly sorcerer, whom they could pay to secure good weather, good health and divine favour for every undertaking. They kissed his hand, but spat when he appeared, and entered no room in any dwelling-house without an obeisance to the holy picture.

If any Westerner surveyed the religious observances of the East, he was apt to declaim against what seemed to him mere mechanical superstition. It was difficult, indeed, for a foreigner to respect a cult which produced and revered many saints qualified as such by the facts that their bodies had escaped corruption and had worked miracles. It was no less difficult to deny that many of the faithful were conspicuous for Christian virtues, and that, particularly in regard to death, the church showed herself incomparably spiritual and tender.

The Church
and Muscovy

The Eastern Church, moreover, had deeply impressed and even moulded the Muscovite state. 'Mild, mournful and non-interfering,' prone, said its critics, to be satisfied with the lip-service of an indifferent congregation, it was almost the sole source of education, and by far the strongest link between the millions comprised in Russia. A century and a half after the advent of the Romanovs in 1613, our ambassador declared that a book was a rarity in that country. All that the clergy knew, sneered a Roman Catholic historian, was that they were of the Greek religion and were bound to hate the Latins. But whatever the shortcomings of some among them, they were the only section of the people that could be called literate, that mingled with every household, and that was connected with an omnipresent hierarchy.

It was therefore of the first importance that the Greek or Eastern Church strove above all else to keep the faith. Religious progress by deduction and development, above all

things, it abhorred. Rome, applying reason to tradition and the Scriptures, had proclaimed many sacred innovations. Clerical celibacy, papal supremacy, confession-boxes, church organs, lay communion in a single kind, purgatory, Virgin-worship, statues of the Holy Family and saints—such were some of the Latin developments in which the Greeks saw mere disloyalty to God-given Christianity. Among the consequences were a general antipathy to foreign ideas and a suspicion of any change. To a primitive, poor and scattered people, remote from all save tribes inferior to themselves, their church proved a mighty obstacle to normal European progress. It was personified in the all-pervasive icons, those unchanging portraits of the Saints, by which the ancient adornment of both home and sanctuary was preserved, and the guilt of making and adoring graven images avoided.

Changelessness, indeed, was the hall-mark of the Eastern Church. Religious fervour led not to rival churches but to groups formed within the church for the attainment of greater holiness. Some mutilated their bodies, some remained celibate, some even burned themselves to death. Russia herself was surrounded by pagan tribes, by Mohammedans, by Swedish Protestants and by the Romanists of Poland. Since the true Church, her own, was practically confined to her own borders, Russia acquired the arrogance and intolerance that spring from such isolation. This Church it was that in February, 1613, rallied the Muscovites to depose Ladislas, their Polish tsar, and to choose Michael Romanov in his stead. The national uprising which thus ended the Time of Troubles was prompted in part by distrust of Sigismund, the Catholic King of Poland, and in part by respect for the later Patriarch Philaret, Michael's father. Since 1589, the Patriarchate had set the last seal upon the independence of the Church, which until the Turkish conquest of Constantinople had looked on that Patriarch as its highest human authority. Through the seventeenth century there was a latent rivalry between the Patriarch and the Tsar, who on Palm Sunday was wont to lead the ass or horse disguised as such, upon which the Saviour's representative sat. Instead of subject and sovereign they tended to be Pope and Emperor.

Michael Romanov (1613-45) must pick up the threads

of Muscovite history which during the Time of Troubles had fallen to the ground. For a full century from the death of John the Great (Ivan III, 1462–1505) the principality of Moscow had been absorbing Russia. As the title Tsar, instead of Grand-Prince, showed, Ivan IV (the Terrible) ranked himself far above other Russian princes. His empire expanded to the mouth of the Volga and beyond the Urals, while it acquired a code of law, and, through the feeble gateway of Archangel, began relations with Elizabethan England. The great Queen, indeed, consented to grant him, if need be, an asylum, on condition that he defrayed his own expenses. From 1560 to 1582 he waged intermittent war against the Swedes and Poles, but found the West too strong.

Serfdom

In 1582 he slew his eldest son, but the feeble Theodore reigned in his stead from 1584 to 1598, his brother-in-law Boris Godunov ruling. Besides the Patriarchate, the reign produced an institution of high importance for the establishment of a strong Russian state. The peasants' right to change their dwelling-place was now made subject to the consent of the local noble—a concession to the rank and file of the gentry which the magnates resented, but in vain.

Time of
Troubles

These movements towards a strong and assertive Russia were interrupted but not reversed by the Troubles which followed the death of Theodore, and the choice of Boris Godunov as Tsar. The successful expulsion of Ladislas between 1610 and 1613 left both Church and State proud of themselves and bitter against their western neighbours. Muscovy, however, needed rest, and in 1617 Michael wisely made peace with the young Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. The peace of Stolbova yielded Ingria and Eastern Carelia to Sweden, which surrendered her remaining conquests and established free trade with Russia.

Arrange-
ments with
Europe

The outbreak of the Thirty Years War in the following year heralded a great advance in the European significance of Muscovy. Behind the frontiers that she had now acquired, she might become an almost impregnable fortress in the rear of the warring western powers. What seemed the insensate destruction by Ivan the Terrible of Moscow's rival, Novgorod on Lake Ilmen, had removed both a republican rival to the tsardom and a target for onslaughts of the Swedes and Poles. Michael, indeed, gained in 1618 only an armistice of

fourteen years with Poland, and the threat of Tartar invasion remained. In uncontested possession of so vast an empire, however, he—or those who ruled for him—might fortify in the south, expand as far as China in the east, and enrich his country everywhere. A few years earlier, a Muscovite embassy to the west had received instructions to sit quiet at table and not to rob. Now western civilization had vanguards in the shape of more and more resident diplomats at Moscow, involving the equivalent despatch of Russians to the western courts. Both as a market and as a trade-route, moreover, Muscovy was growing in importance. The expulsion of the Poles and the election of the Romanov by the nation combined to raise the national status. Neither Tsar nor magnates could act like the hereditary tyrants of the former age.

A brilliant Moscow professor has described the contrast between western Europe and the great eastern plain, as it impressed the nineteenth century. In the west, the Russian found everywhere the evidences of man's presence, and of stubborn long-continued labour. At home, in the central regions of Muscovy, he beheld a 'dead level of desolate fields hunching themselves to the horizon like a sea', rare copses perhaps skirted by black droves, and, for hundreds of miles, a vague dim picture that seemed to be journeying with him, until the oppressive somnolence and silence filled him with a sense of loneliness and desolation, and a disposition to meditate without clear thought.

Muscovy, in short, exerted upon its people an exactly opposite effect from that which Holland exercised upon the Dutch. Far more docile and indifferent to comfort, they readily migrated and, if religion were not at stake, had nothing conservative in their composition. Hence came the seeming recklessness of Peter's decrees, and hence the most amazing fact in his career, that none of his subjects strove to take his life.

B. THE TURKS

While the Muscovites might be regarded as Europeans temporarily enslaved, the Turks were wholly Asiatic. Geography had placed Russia far from the main arteries of Europe, and history had taught the West contempt and dis-

like of her inhabitants. But the future, as all men know, held for her a rapid approximation to some sides of western civilization. The conquering Turks, on the other hand, had no such potential brotherhood with Europe. They came as missionaries working by armed force, and organizing every conquest so as to add momentum to the next. Though from time to time a truce might be necessary, their religion forbade them to exalt the unbelievers by making peace. Europe in the seventeenth century was still exposed to the peril of a Turkish conquest both by land and sea.

The slackening of the aggressive tradition whose hero was Solymán the Magnificent, and its climax 1526, had been due to several causes. Among these, distractions on other flanks of the empire ranked high, while the Turks were handicapped for European conquest by their relative incapacity at sea. The standard of their soldiery, moreover, was bound to decline as the numbers grew, and in tactics and armament they were unprogressive. By far their greatest weakness, however, was the lack of intelligent direction, especially in the civil government. They had no organization for training or promoting men of talent who might serve the state. Above all, they suffered from a system which almost precluded the possibility that the Sultan, whose supremacy was unquestioned, should be an able and well-educated man. The safety of him who reigned demanded, sometimes the murder, and always the strictest supervision, of every possible successor. Hence it was hardly an epigram to say that the ruler who was Pope and Emperor in one 'came forth from prison to be clothed with absolute power'.

Such Sultans could not be expected to remedy the defects which the strange evolution of the Turkish power had brought about. Placed as was their empire between Christian would-be crusaders and schismatic Persia, its European half comprised a Christian majority, and the Christian-born Janissaries ranked as its most formidable soldiers. Its institutions were such as born nomads might devise, framed for war and conquest only, and with no idea of progress. Although some Turks might surpass some Christians in justice, humanity and toleration, while to accept their faith was to gain immediate equality with them, polygamy and slavery

remained their leading institutions, and the patient endurance of wrong the chief lesson that they could teach.

Such was the Turkish power which in Europe challenged the Habsburgs and the Venetians, with no possibility of ever calling a halt in its counter-crusade. With Asia Minor as a firm basis for its advance into three continents, it had subdued all the Balkan states, passed far beyond the Carpathians and menaced Vienna. Vassal states assisted in the domination of the eastern Adriatic and of the Black Sea. Although the passing of many generations had brought some advance in civilization, and the venality of high officials had hinted at political collaboration with the French, they had hardly impaired the peasants' spartan ways or the Church's sense of mission. Well led, as the seventeenth century was to prove, the Turks might powerfully affect the balance and the heritage of Europe.

CHAPTER VII

EUROPE 1610-1624

WE have thus briefly surveyed the less familiar factors in the society of European nations at the moment when the period 1610 to 1715 begins. It is common knowledge that the age then dawning was beyond example fertile in great minds, and was also predominantly an age of war. While far from being the sole cause of this almost unceasing warfare, the outstanding military power, as all men know, was destined to be France. As we have already seen, it was only the success of an assassination which many others had vainly attempted that prevented the King of France from launching what might have been the Great War of 1610. Before tracing the fortunes of Europe during the decade before she was actually convulsed, we may well inquire, was a general war inevitable?

Dangers
to Peace

Colonial rivalries, indeed, were now beginning to provide a new and fertile cause of quarrel. In days when men believed that in trade what one party gained the other must lose, and that the way to secure a colonial market was to drive off all competitors by force—in such an age friction at least was certain. But, to save Europe, the convention gradually grew up that powers might be at war overseas while remaining at peace on their own continent, just as at home they tacitly agreed not to resent the use by one belligerent of auxiliary troops furnished under treaty by a neutral to their enemy. Violence in the Indies annoyed a mother country, but did not drive her to make war.

Religious differences, again, had grievously divided Europe, but a practical solution of them seemed to have been reached. Unanimity within each state must be desirable, but each might decide its own confession. In Germany, a confederation of several hundred states, the rulers of those states decided, and in many, since rulers did not wish to expel their sober vassals, there was a measure of practical

toleration. Such was also the case in Switzerland, where the individual cantons chose their faith. In Poland, the restrictions on monarchy had produced a somewhat similar result. On the other hand, all Iberia, now for three decades a single power, and all Italy, with its many rulers, were exclusively Catholic, as were also the 'Belgians' and the native Irish. These were balanced by powers officially Protestant—England and Scotland, Denmark and Norway, Sweden and the Dutch.

France, the most considerable single nation, occupied a unique position in the religious strife. Her mind, as Calvin had shown, was clear and logical, and her central situation forbade escape from controversy. After prolonged and severe religious wars, she had arrived at the most high-minded solution. A Frenchman's conscience, the Edict of Nantes of 1598 in effect declared, is immune from coercion by the state. France is Catholic, but her Protestants may dwell anywhere within the frontiers, and in most places they may also worship. Such rights of military security were granted to the Huguenots that they seemed almost to constitute a state within a state.

Edict of
Nantes and
Toleration

Even this bald outline of the religious position in Europe, however, indicates that it could hardly be considered final. For all its seeming enlightenment, the Edict of Nantes itself was in effect a treaty, stable only while the Catholic monarchy was not strong enough to coerce the Huguenots. England retained Popish recusants and crypto-papists enough to encourage Catholic propagandists to hope for her reconversion. In Poland and Austria, the Catholic reaction was carrying all before it. In Germany, the inherent absurdity of empowering a prince to enforce upon his subjects a faith which their consciences disapproved could not be entirely veiled. The ominous device of leagues of German princes had reappeared, this time between Protestants and Catholics, and acts of legal violence were resented.

Religious
Peace
Unstable

The religious settlement of Europe, then, was certainly unsound, and perhaps in the long run untenable. Immediately, however, as Henry's action showed, it was rather her political alliances that threatened violent action. The dynastic marriages and accidents which had heaped crowns upon the head of Charles V had brought even that law-

Encirclement
of France

abiding prince under suspicion of aiming at world-rule. Although after the Reformation he could hardly bequeath the Austrian dominions to his son, he swayed the future of the world by entrusting Philip with the Netherlands in addition to the remainder of the Spanish Empire. The consistent policy of Spain, moreover, remained that of the closest possible connexion between the Habsburgs of the west and east. Philip II espoused the daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II, and they chose as their son's bride the sister of that fervid Catholic the Emperor Ferdinand II. Mutual inheritance was the ideal.

The
Habsburg
Menace

All this meant that on every frontier France found herself confronted by the Habsburg power. From the north-east, a few marches could bring the army of the Spanish Netherlands to Paris. On the east, Franche Comté menaced the heart of France, and Milan could not be disregarded. Southward lay Spain herself, with Spanish Roussillon protruding beyond the Pyrenees. Spanish ports and islands, together with Naples, threatened French power in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile the Austrian Habsburgs could furnish the Spaniards with troops, or hold in check any German allies that France might muster. Philip II had sent aid against Henry to the Catholic League in France, and had even claimed the French throne for his daughter. With such a neighbour as Spain, Henry could never feel secure. He might toy with the notion of a Franco-Spanish marriage, but he chose allies from among the foes of Spain. The England of the Armada, the rebel Dutch, the fortune-hunting Duke of Savoy—such were the associates of France. In the future she would look further afield, turning to Scandinavia, Poland and the Turk against the House of Habsburg. In 1610, the stage was set for an attack by France and Savoy on Milan, with the design of securing Nice and Savoy, in exchange for an Italian kingdom for the Duke and the hegemony of northern Italy for Henry. At the same time he proposed to lead an army into Flanders and to distract the Habsburgs by a German war. Such was the conflagration which Ravallac's dagger averted.

Assassination
postpones
European
War

The war would have been complicated by a European factor which was steadily increasing in importance, that of

Savoy. Thanks to an intricate combination of forces, in which the accidents of birth and death played almost more than their accustomed part, the ultimate leadership in Italy was in 1610 being deflected northwards, towards the non-Italian dynasty of Savoy. Somewhat as, in divided and weakened Germany, Hohenzollerns from the south were entering the long road towards their accomplishment of national unity, so the confusion and impotence of Italy were being doomed eventually to yield to the patient egotism of a princely line from beyond the mountains. The agent of change was Duke Charles Emanuel, styled in ancient treatises 'the Great', and through half a century of rule, from 1580 to 1630, always bent on acquisition. Twenty-eighth in succession from the first Umberto, whose seventh descendant rose from Count to Duke, he belonged to the most prolific and tenacious of ruling clans. An important prince, hampered by no premature scruples of nationality, his ambitions extended to many thrones, those of the Empire, of Cyprus, Macedonia and Jerusalem among them. His appetite for French and Spanish provinces was not unmarked by the rulers of France and of Spanish Italy, but their mutually conflicting interests usually furnished him with a potential ally against the other. By comparison with them, however, Savoy was a weakling, and for many generations he and his successors, like the Great Elector of Brandenburg, were forced to skip from side to side in European contests, until at last they became sovereigns of united Italy.

Charles
Emanuel
of Savoy

In 1610, her contraction north of the Alps and expansion to the south of them governed the history of Savoy. To France she had lately lost a block of territory some 50 miles square beyond the Rhône. This was balanced against a series of losses to the Swiss Confederation on all sides of the Lake of Geneva save the south. Thus the Savoyard capital at Chambéry became an anachronism, and Turin, in the heart of Piedmont, was promoted to be the metropolis of a more and more predominantly Italian state. That nascent sentiment of nationality, as yet incapable of submerging local rivalries, but, as Charles VIII had found, sometimes strong enough to unite Italians against foreign invaders, thus gained a new focus in the Savoyard dynasty. To Charles Emanuel Italians owed the salvation of Saluzzo

Changes of
Savoy and
Territory

France
in 1610

from the French. South-west of Turin lay his great fortress of Pinerolo, a weighty factor in any north Italian contest. In the last days of 1609, after long bargaining, he bound himself to join Henry IV in attacking Milan. Within three weeks of the King's assassination, their joint invasion with more than 30,000 men was arranged, and all its conquests were to fall to Savoy. Ravallac's dagger destroyed this brilliant prospect, and the widow's tenderness for Spain seemed to threaten the Savoyard duke with ruin. He, however, stood firm; the peril passed; and many disappointing speculations were to follow. Thus on May 14, 1610, the great attack on Austria which, though sullied by the King's desire for Madame Condé, might have endowed Europe with the rule of tolerant monarchs balanced around the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, was postponed until a less favourable occasion, and France began the first inglorious decade of Louis XIII, then only eight years old.

Until the boy-King came of age, his mother, Marie de' Medici, held the reins of government. A foreigner, crowned only on the day before her husband's death, she had little understanding of his plans and principles, while Sully, his great collaborator, was to her a tainted heretic.

FRANCE FROM HENRY IV TO RICHELIEU

The death of Henry the Great, therefore, left France a nation which possessed immense latent power but which was hampered by notable and obvious weaknesses. Her potentialities were proclaimed by all the history of our period, but, alike in its first chapter and in the last, it was French weakness that proved of most account. Other nations have always reckoned Frenchmen brilliant in attack but weak in defence, quick-witted but lazy and not profound, logical, but lacking in the saving grace of toleration. Their levity and fickleness, said Richelieu, could only be conquered by the presence of their King. At this juncture, moreover, though extricated by Henry and Sully from the worst of the confusion left by her religious wars, France suffered from grave defects which only a strong monarchy could obscure, and which no monarch was ever strong and wise enough to abolish.

Of French defects, the foremost was that temporary religious toleration which was near akin to virtue. In the seventeenth century, as the record of all Europe shows, states to be strong must insist on uniformity in their religion. England herself did not go beyond a measure of tacit connivance at some religious diversity. The Huguenots, with their assemblies and cities of refuge, had gained toleration only because the Catholic crown was not yet strong enough to compel them to obey. It was the power of the Protestants, as has been well said, but not the prerogative of conscience, that the Edict of Nantes acknowledged. That Edict, we repeat, was in essence a treaty between the Catholic monarchy and an armed body which denied a portion of the monarch's prerogative. It would remain valid only so long as the contracting parties' relative strength remained unchanged.

Her Defects
—Religious

The anarchical independence of the Huguenots, moreover, was fortified by certain French deficiencies that in fact survived the Edict. Geographically, France is so well centralized, and since the Revolution of 1789 her administration has been so symmetrical and uniform, that her national unity may tend to be antedated. But the strange spectacle of the famous Fronde, with the greatest of French soldiers fighting against their king, reminds the student that the authority of the French *grande*s was still quasi-royal. The so-called Parliaments, it is well known, were law-courts with hereditary membership gained by purchase, and they were endowed at most with the right to criticise the decrees of the Crown. No body which was, in the English sense, 'parliamentary' existed in seventeenth-century France, where the monarchy aimed rather at creating sets of officials to execute its own will. These, however, were preceded by hordes of privileged Frenchmen, both holders of offices which enabled them to prey upon the public, and aristocrats in church and state who were exempt from taxation. Richelieu did not shrink from declaring that, while in Spain the council set the interest of the state above that of private persons, those who governed France preferred their own interest to that of the country. The French nobles, moreover, monopolized most of the wealth and influence of the Church, and in both monasteries and convents license flourished. Thus on all sides Henry's downfall left his centralizing work in danger.

Indiscipline

The Queen
Mother

'France', declared Sully when he heard of the King's death, 'will fall into strange hands,' and his prophecy was swiftly and abundantly fulfilled. For ten years Henry had been the husband of Marie de' Medici, and their son, Louis XIII, was now nine years old. Six lawful children and eight bastards survived the monarch, and only the imminent campaign had caused the Queen to be appointed Regent. But the dull Italian woman, though readily accepted by the Parliament as ruler, lacked all capacity for rule. She existed to give power to her fellow-Florentine Concini, husband of her foster-sister, and to promote the influence of the Papacy, of the Jesuits and of Spain. Sully retired; the nobles behaved like petty sovereigns; and the Bourbon Condé, child of the dead King's cousin, gave vent unchecked to his dangerous and far-reaching ambition. In France, above all other nations, almost every royal prince desired to reign. While upstarts and self-seekers plundered the treasury which Sully had filled, both the home and the foreign policy of Henry were abandoned.

Fluctuation
in Europe

'For fourteen years', writes Grant, 'the current of French affairs flows dismally through marsh and bog. . . . The history . . . is somewhat tedious. . . . No new or fruitful idea emerges.' The interlude between Henry and Richelieu, none the less, has much to teach the student of historic laws. For between 1610 and 1624 the vicissitudes of France form only one conspicuous proof, among many in that generation, that the immediate future might frustrate all rational calculation. Within some thirty years from 1610, indeed, every important state staggered unpredictably from strength to weakness, or the reverse. By 1640, Britain had reached the verge of civil war, the Emperor had gained but failed to hold his greatest triumph, that of 1629, majestic Spain was tottering, Denmark had been cast down and Sweden almost incredibly exalted. The triumphant Poland of the earlier years was approaching her so-called Deluge, while the Muscovites had left their Time of Troubles far behind. Savoy, the Dutch, the Pope, the German Princes, Portugal—in all of them vicissitude was the formula of the generation. No wonder that for explanation some statesmen turned to the stars.

Confusion
in France

In France the very vitality of the people made the lack of a strong ruler instantly apparent. The widowed Queen

had not understood her husband's plans. Surrounded by jarring nobles, without a single royal prince to aid her, she fell back upon Italian favourites and the Church of Rome. The Condé, whose name was at this time prominent (1588-1646), was indeed a Bourbon, son of a considerable prince, father of that Condé who was styled 'the Great', and husband of a Montmorency who had roused the lawless passion which contributed to his king's design of war. But he proved himself a mere anti-regency intriguer, a zealous pervert from the Huguenots, and ultimately a steady servant of Marie's son. Concini and Villeroy therefore became her chief agents, and financial order decayed even more swiftly than toleration. Henry IV had forced the nobles to act like patriots. His death turned them into ambitious petty kings, and France became the country of the Fronde.

The abandonment of Savoy and of the attack on the eastern Habsburgs was accompanied by the sharpening of religious and political differences at home. The Protestant assembly at Saumur (1611) organized the Huguenots into circles and accepted the firm leadership of Rohan, 'perhaps the most sympathetic figure in Huguenot history' (Leathes). Next year, the Catholic party deposed a Paris theologian who had championed Gallican independence. At the same time a double marriage linked the Catholic heirs of France and Spain. Despite his youth, Louis XIII was betrothed to Philip's daughter Anne of Austria, a bride even younger than himself, while his sister Elizabeth was to marry the future Philip IV. In both society and politics, Spain thus gained a great, even if only temporary, influence over France. Again the suspicious Huguenots met in conclave, and a Regency prone to appeasement made them several concessions.

The crown, however, could not furnish the nobles with unlimited blackmail, and, in 1614, Condé, who posed as their leader against strong monarchy, headed a rebellion. The Queen-Mother purchased a respite by the grant of offices and pensions to the rebel nobles, and in October by convoking the States-general. The three Estates at least recorded the objections of the nobles to the *pauvette*, a payment which gave the members of the Parliaments hereditary office, while the Third Estate denounced both the rapacity of the

States-
general
1614

aristocracy and the political claims of the Pope. Early in 1615, however, the States-general were dismissed, to meet again, as it proved, only on the eve of the Revolution. Once again Condé rose in arms, successfully appealing even to the Huguenots against the Favourite and against the fulfilment of the marriage pact with Spain. The Court, however, first carried out the double marriage, and then paid a high price to the Opposition.

The
Empire

While in France feebleness thus seemed inveterate, in wider Europe a sullen lull prevailed. Clouds gathered over Germany, but neither there nor in Bohemia did the storm burst before 1618. In 1613, indeed, the Turkish threat to Transylvania had stifled a movement in the Diet of the Empire for reform, but even the Julich-Cleves succession dispute had failed to rekindle the suspended Dutch and Spanish war. The conversion of the Elector of Brandenburg to Calvinism and of his rival of Neuburg to Catholicism was fraught with strife, but France and England threw their influence on the side of temporary peace, and were successful. In November, 1614, the treaty of Xanten (*Ad Sanctos* of Roman times) postponed the conflict with which the incapacity of Matthias (1612-19) threatened north-western Germany.

Louis XIII

In France, however, two personal changes threatened to revolutionize both the strength and the character of the administration. The years were inexorably perfecting Louis' title to rule his kingdom, a title for which Condé failed to substitute some effective usurpation by himself. Although impenetrable and unassuming, the young King was neither a cipher nor a fool. Wedlock with a dull Italian, it is true, had given Henry an heir who seemed the very opposite of his father, except perhaps in love for soldiering and for the open air. The gay, brilliant, winning, irreverent sire was succeeded by a stiff unimaginative son, whose virtuous life was rare indeed on the throne of France. At heart, however, he jealously cherished his royal dignity, and particularly loathed Concini, now Marshal d'Ancre, Lieutenant of Normandy, inordinately wealthy and in substance master of the State. This upstart was generally suspected of all kinds of wickedness.

Louis had a familiar friend in the nobleman and sportsman De Luynes, whose boldness atoned for his own inexperience

and reserve. In April, 1617, as the outcome of a widespread feeling that the Favourite was a traitor to the King and State, he was shot down on the drawbridge of the Louvre. Next day the Paris mob took his body from the coffin and hanged it by the heels on a gallows which he had intended for his traducers. They then cut off the nose and ears, dragged the corpse to several places, and cut it into a thousand pieces.

Murder of
Concini

'Everyone', it is said, 'would have some part of him: his ears were sold very dear: his entrails were thrown into the river; part of the body was burned before the statue of Henry IV on the Pont-Neuf, and some roasted portions of his flesh in the fire, and gave it to their dogs.'

These atrocities, with others too disgusting to be transcribed, might spring from mere mob frenzy. But it was the *Parlement* that declared Concini guilty of treason both human and divine, and sentenced his son to be degraded and his wife beheaded. Madame Concini, a joiner's daughter, whose pride had grown with her riches, was also convicted of having used magical arts to attain her ends. The subservience of the French aristocrats to both was equalled by the reserve of Louis XIII. It would have been a capital crime, he declared, for any of his officers and subjects to see him in private. He had been forced to dissemble, and to wait until it should please Divine Goodness to afford him an opportunity to end the usurpation. De Luynes, a statesman who thought that Bohemia might be by the sea, but who had rid France of Concini, did at least marry the heir of Savoy to a French princess, while he assented to a French league with Savoy and Venice. But to free France from the civil wars of self-seeking factions, a great king or at least a great minister was indispensable. Richelieu, indeed, had made his mark in 1616, only to be banished from the capital.

In the meantime, while in Germany the outcome of the Bohemian revolt threatened a great convulsion, the French were continuing in a milder form the rivalries and dissensions which the death of Henry had let loose. In 1619, the Queen Mother, banished when Concini fell, had threatened to re-enter politics, but Condé, the greater danger, rallied to the side of the King. Next year, with Luynes acting almost as a new Concini, the disgusted nobles rose, but a royal victory on the Loire suppressed them. Louis as we have seen, could

French
Troubles
Continue

even take the aggressive against the Huguenots of Béarn and Navarre, whose ecclesiastical revenues he restored to the Catholic Church.

Huguenots,
1621-2

In 1621, however, the Huguenots of all France united to oppose the Crown. Beaten at first, their stubborn defence of Montauban, northward of Toulouse, saved the campaign. In November, the siege was raised, and next month, Luynes succumbed to fever. While 1622 saw the Austrian Habsburgs victorious and the new Spanish King, Philip IV, everywhere aggressive, Louis and Condé were still absorbed in a triumphant onslaught upon the Huguenots. In October, they had reached Montpellier, but there drew rein. The fundamental question, one or two 'religions'?, remained unsolved, and France must therefore suffer from the impotence induced by her civil wars.

Valtelline
Question

At this moment another religious struggle, and that beyond her frontier, tended to draw the French once more towards the standpoint of their great king. A convulsion followed among the Swiss, and several hundred Protestants were slaughtered by the Grisons, the 'Grey Leagues' whose federation held the Valtelline as a vassal state, though against its people's will. The religious struggle had procured in 1621 an apparently satisfactory peace from Philip IV. Olivarez, however, soon contrived to renew the strife, and with such success that in September, 1622, the important passes of the Valtelline fell entirely into Habsburg hands. France, it seemed, could be blockaded on her eastern frontier by a chain extending from Milan to the Tyrol and thence by way of Franche Comté to the Spanish Netherlands. At the same time an important recruiting-ground for the valiant mercenary Swiss was monopolized by ardent papists. When Richelieu gained lasting power, the Huguenots and the Valtelline ranked high among his preoccupations.

Posterity can see that in the sixteen-twenties French political strength or weakness depended on the brain and will of a single and ailing man. Richelieu (1585-1642) lacked almost everything that had been wont to make men great in France. By birth he was neither royal nor a grandee; by calling, not the soldier that he might well have been, but the holder of a family bishopric. He was not rich or handsome, neither popular with men nor irresistible

with women. Towards life, his attitude was that of a severe ecclesiastic to whom ill-health never vouchsafed gaiety or perfect ease. Eloquence, indeed, he possessed, but as a confidential minister he could seldom address a great assembly or pour out to the multitude what was in his heart. He lived as a man of mystery, loving and loved by few.

Richelieu, none the less, was a statesman so great that the historians' problem is whether it is possible in France or even in Europe during modern times to find a greater. Few would deny that in the seventeenth century the salvation and the ascendancy of France were due to him. Disease, a mere mischance in war or peace, an imperious monition of conscience, a moment's loss of royal favour—any such stroke of fate would have extinguished the Cardinal and the 'Age of Louis XIV' together.

Like other men of surpassing ability devoid of all engaging human weakness, however, Richelieu can be succinctly if not vividly described. He was simply a statesman of perfect vision, untrammelled judgement and industry unsurpassed—an incomparable machine endowed with impeccable devotion to duty. Before April, 1624, when he became openly and finally chief minister, he had served a long and not unimportant apprenticeship to the government of France. His talents had caught the eye of Henry IV: the Pope had made him bishop prematurely: the States-general showed how highly he was regarded by the clergy and how skilfully he could compliment the Queen Mother. A bishop who declared that he would pray that his own days might be shortened that hers might be prolonged was not a Frenchman for nothing. Marie did in fact link his fortunes with her own, appointing him almoner to the Spanish bride of Louis. She thus gained two great assets—his perfect judgement both of men and of situations, and his unfailing courage. No statesman ever distilled his methods and principles more perfectly into aphorisms. Those shall be freely cited, later, to illuminate both the age and its creator.

Until Richelieu attained to power, anything like the unification of European history could not begin. North, south, east and west, the states of Europe engaged in separate struggles, while Muscovites and Turks might seek profit from intervention, and while distant lands became of more and

more account in their evolution. To us, the decade preceding 1624 stands for the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, which until 1648 was almost to monopolize the European stage. No contemporary, however, could hold such a view, and even a Richelieu must labour through a chequered decade before the politics of Europe approached simplicity. It is with this reserve in mind that we turn first to the novel factor of the Dutch Republic, then to the expansion of Europe overseas and then to the Thirty Years War.

History and
Louis XIII

It may be convenient at this point, however, to look ahead for some decades, and to inquire whether the current estimate of the reigning King may need revision.

History finds Louis XIII barely visible behind the towering Cardinals. Yet his, or theirs, is accounted the really great age of France, and he himself seemed the most fortunate of kings.

‘There is not a frontier but he has far advanced into his enemies’ country,’ wrote a contemporary. ‘France has subdued the pride of those who envied her, and has confounded their designs. And if you observe what has passed on the ocean, as well as the Mediterranean, you will conclude that all the elements fought for us under the command of this prince.’

His queen was a lady of ‘singular goodness . . . truly heroic virtues . . . one of the most perfect and most agreeable persons of her time’; his two sons, ‘beautiful and well formed by nature. He was respected by all, and on what side soever he turned in his Louvre, he saw nothing but testimonies of love and reverence.’ Yet, with all this, as he confessed with his dying breath, he had spent no day without some mortification, and had never tasted unembittered joy. Was he, none the less, the real mainspring of the state? That some modern chivalrous and combative French writers can answer Yes, probably does more honour to the heart than to the head.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DUTCH, 1610-1625

AS a factor in the history of seventeenth-century Europe, the Dutch Republic was so peculiar and so important, that, at the risk of repetition, we must insist upon the anomalies which the years 1610 to 1625 disclosed. The decade before the truce of 1609, indeed, ^{Difficulties} 1598-1609 had been for the Dutch a time of changing fortunes and of protracted danger. In 1604, England made peace with Spain, and Spinola, banker and consummate soldier, captured the ruins of Ostend. Not less perilous for the nascent Dutch Republic were the novel good government of the Spanish Netherlands and the activity of the European Catholic Reaction, which found much sympathy latent within the frontiers of the Seven Provinces. It should not be forgotten, declares Professor Geyl, that among the Dutch the substratum of the people's life was still mainly Catholic. Rebels against monarchy, Calvinist neighbours of Catholic states, challengers of vested rights or natural ambitions in wide-spread colonies and seas, the Dutch could count on no easy or sheltered existence.

It is common, indeed, to antedate their separateness from ^{Contrast} the Spanish Netherlands both in nationality and in religion. ^{with} The Dutch have been dubbed Teutonic and the 'Belgians', ^{Belgians} predominantly Latin: the one Protestant and the other Catholic. That of the modern Dutch one-half adhere to Rome, while in Belgium Flemings equal Walloons in number are facts to be ascribed to recent change. Convincing Dutch research, however, proves that the explanation must be sought elsewhere. In the Netherlands, as in all the main regions of continental Europe, when the seventeenth century began, the leaders did not seek inspiration in the masses. Even among the Dutch, local aristocracies spoke for the people. While Spain ruled, Calvinism was as strong in Flanders and Brabant as in Holland and Zeeland, and the

easternmost provinces solidly held to the Catholic faith. Such change of character as took place may be ascribed, firstly, to the shelter to Calvinists which the great Dutch rivers and the coasts afforded, and, secondly, to the use of that shelter by thousands of fugitive Calvinists from the south. The long struggle for independence, it may be added, favoured the communion which, far more than the Lutheran or the Anglican, prompted its adherents to zealous strife. Thus the first forty years of our period were destined to see the continued evolution in the Netherlands of two sharply contrasted nations, the 'Dutch' north and the 'Belgian' south.

Dutch
Disunion

To realize the disunion among the Dutch themselves, their origins and their history for at least two generations must be borne in mind. All seven provinces were peopled by the same Germanic stock, but the extension of this stock beyond their southern frontier lessened the force of its political appeal. History, by connecting parts of the Germanic Netherlands with the German Empire, and other parts with the kingdom of France, militated against racial unity. When the power of these overlords declined, it left a congeries of small and jarring states permeated by a sense of local independence. Common interests and experiences, however, had created something of a common civilisation, until the Reformation snapped one of its strongest pillars. Before this, the Netherlands had received a bond of political union in their common subjection to the House of Burgundy, and so to the heir of that House, Charles V.

The Provinces which freed themselves from the tyranny of Charles' successors were highly disparate and by no means democratic. Holland and Zealand far outweighed the remaining five. The region eastward of the Zuyder Zee was less inclined than the remainder to accept the Reformation. For many years, the head of the House of Orange was Stadholder of several Provinces but not of all. Within the Orange provinces, the rulers of the towns maintained their independence of the Stadholder. Those rulers, however, usually represented not the burghers as a whole, but certain families among them which were noble or had gained a hereditary monopoly of office. Frisia, indeed, was a true democracy, while Utrecht, though Protestant, continued to

obey ecclesiastics. When to all this we add sharp contrasts of provincial wealth and occupation, we must realise that the term 'United Provinces' must not be pressed too far. The Seven, indeed, had framed no league more permanent than that of 1579, when the Union of Utrecht linked them together in the struggle for independence. In 1609, their use of the village of the Hague had for some sixteen years given them the semblance of a common capital. In both towns and countryside, Calvinism showed most vigour, but neither the provinces nor the municipalities were unanimous nor intolerant. The States-general of the Republic consisted of a score of deputies appointed to be the mouthpiece of the Seven, but capable of acting only when these were unanimous. The Orange family, from which William the Silent sprang, had great influence in Holland, the chief paymaster and the province which had produced Oldenbarnevelt, the all-pervading statesman. 'No statesman was left in Europe during the epoch of the Twelve Years' Truce', so Motley declared, 'to compare with him in experience, breadth of vision, political tact or administrative sagacity.' Stadholder in most provinces on the other hand, Maurice, William's son, was like his father, captain and admiral in all. The Seven remained, however, united only by necessity in the loosest of confederations.

Of the Netherlands, both the later 'Belgium' and 'Holland', in 1610 three statements may be made with confidence. Their importance to Europe and to the world was vast: their structure had reached no final settlement: and they were unique. For half a century, since the abdication of Charles V, they had been subjected to every kind of stress. Industry and commerce, religion and politics, art and learning, alliances among themselves and with their neighbours, warfare by land and sea—these shifting factors vied with the forces of geography and of race to produce communities like no others in the world. The truce with Spain in 1609 distinguished in the Netherlands between two states, the seven Dutch provinces, predominantly Teutonic and Protestant, which claimed and for the time being enjoyed complete independence, and the mainly Catholic south, mixed in race and language, surpassing the north in manufacture and in ancient wealth, which remained

The
Dutch Con-
federation

The
Seventeen
Provinces
Unique

Division
in 1609

a dependency of Spain. The dividing line between the two followed in the main their greatest rivers—Meuse and Rhine—and these did much to shield seafaring Holland and her associates from Spain or any other continental foe.

Rise of
Dutch
Power

When the truce of 1609, for a term of twelve years, was concluded, many human factors which had contributed to this solution still retained their power. By the side of Maurice there had emerged his patron and preceptor, the statesman Oldenbarnevelt, who disposed of the province of Holland, and through Holland of the Dutch States-general. Thanks to his patriotism and insight, and to the respite after the downfall of the Armada, the Seven achieved a great measure of unity in 1589. Maurice, the soldier, had become 'Stadholder', the 'Lieutenant' of an imaginary king, over six provinces, and the Dutch States-general, swayed by Oldenbarnevelt, practically ruled the state. A happy co-operation, rare in the history of any people, prevailed not only between the Dutch statesman and Maurice but also between both of them and William Louis, the Stadholder in Friesland (Frisia), the kinsman of Maurice, and, like him, an able soldier.

From 1590 onwards, the Spanish war, despite many dangers and some defeats, had turned to the advantage of the Dutch. They had made conquests, both south and east, while rejecting overtures to join the submissive southerners, and in 1596 had joined with France and England in an equal alliance against Spain. More conquests followed, so that in 1598, when Franco-Spanish peace exposed them to fresh onslaughts, the Seven Provinces were strong enough to hold their own. The Spanish infantry, indeed, ranked as invincible, but these small and mutinous forces could bring them no great advantage over Maurice and his mercenaries. By sea the Dutch were far superior to the Spaniards, whose colonies they could invade, and whose fleet, in 1607, they destroyed in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. Intent on colonial profit, especially from their new East India Company (1602), their merchants pressed for the temporary peace which Spain was willing to concede.

Politics,
c. 1609

Temporary peace in 1608, when negotiations at the Hague began, meant accepting, perhaps for ever, the severance of the northern provinces from their neighbours and

kinsmen, particularly those in Flanders and Brabant. It meant also granting to a discouraged and exhausted enemy the opportunity to renew his strength and perhaps to gain fresh allies. After the event, it is easy to perceive how much hung on the life of the ageing Henry IV, whose menace might well incline the Habsburg sovereigns to interrupt all other struggles. A penetrating statesman would divine two other dangers that premature peace would bring. If the once united Seventeen provinces split into halves, they courted absorption by their greater neighbours, Germany and France. They also dared two more immediate dangers—discord at home and a renewal of foreign war. Their progress, indeed, has astonished historians no less than those who witnessed it. A population which in 1572 was reckoned as less than a million and a quarter had been doubled by 1621. The newly established manufactures of textiles employed some 600,000 of the Dutch, while their fisheries became more lucrative than ever. A fleet of 10,000 ships carried merchandize to the annual value of some £40,000,000, and, among many other benefits, brought wheat and timber, hemp and iron, copper and furs, which all passed through the Sound. Since 1602, the consolidated East India Company had been building an eastern empire, soon to be matched by a similar structure in the western Indies. To contemporaries it seemed that Norway was the Dutchman's forest, the Rhenish and southern French river-shores his vineyards, Germany, Spain and Ireland his meadows, Prussia and Poland his granaries, India and Arabia his gardens. Amsterdam, far surpassing Antwerp, had become the commercial capital of the whole world. The wealth thus acquired, moreover, was preserved and multiplied by the Dutch retention of a simple and economical way of living.

Peace promised, and not in vain, to make the Dutch achievements in art, in learning and in thought well worthy of what they had accomplished in commerce and in war. With Spain two years of negotiation were ended by a promise mediated by the French and English. The Dutch were treated by the Spanish Government as equals: both sides were to keep what they occupied in 1609: the religious and colonial questions were passed over: instead of a final peace, a twelve years' truce was agreed on. This invocation

Dutch
Progress

The Truce
of 1609

of time to dispose of the worst obstacles to peace was facilitated by a secret Spanish undertaking to respect Dutch trade. But continued peace depended on a complex international situation, and peace at home, it soon appeared, depended on the continuance of war abroad.

The
Foundations
of the
Republic

In 1609, agreement with Spain had been fiercely opposed by many sections of the Dutch people. Calvinists could not relish friendship with the Most Catholic King, nor merchants with the owner of the Indies. Many officers in the forces naturally clung to their careers. A characteristic of Dutch history which later became traditional, moreover, was already prominent. It embodied the dilemma of every federation—discipline or dangerous freedom. While in war the provinces turned to the House of Orange, in peace they preferred complete local independence. The great abilities of Oldenbarnevelt were wasted during war, and he headed the party of peace. Maurice and William Louis, on the other hand, were bitterly opposed to an interruption of the victorious struggle.

In an age of feeble communications, to send a courier from the Low Countries to Madrid involved many weeks' delay, while the questions at issue were both novel and difficult. To make peace with rebels and heretics who were also trespassers in her empire abroad and competitors in her trade at home must in any case have taxed the diplomacy of Spain. When in addition the Dutch were far from unanimous, agreement might seem impossible. The decisive factor, it could be argued, was simply the temporary aggressiveness of France.

Peace, even though temporary, would imply disarmament, for a commercial people could hardly tax themselves to hire mercenaries whose services might never be required. And disarmament would open the door to fresh internal struggles in a new and ill-compacted nation.

To continue the war, on the other hand, would both prolong the operation of forces which promised future advantage, and would clear the way for much immediate profit. At the moment, the brilliant progress of the Dutch in transferring to themselves the profits of the eastern empire formed by Portugal was to be followed by a similar appropriation of the Americas then ruled by Spain. A Dutch West India

Company was on the stocks, and this required that Spain should remain an enemy. It was absurd, moreover, to represent the Dutch as exhausted and impoverished by war, when, as all might see, they had never been so thriving. With Antwerp paralysed, the trade of the seventeen provinces passed through their hands, and they were licensed pirates on the ocean and on many seas.

These obvious profits, moreover, were perhaps surpassed by others which could not be estimated in gulden. The new state, whose boundaries had been drawn by the fluctuating struggle, was full of discords stifled or toned down only when war necessitated co-operation to maintain the national existence. Monarchy and aristocracy, Protestantism and Catholicism, Calvinism of mutually hostile schools, centralization and local independence—these were but a few of the rivalries that peace would evoke and stimulate. Was not continued war less bellicose?

The Dutch Government, again, embodied the desire of the citizens to preserve the mutual independence of the Seven United Provinces. This was rendered difficult, if not impossible, by the immense preponderance of Holland as against the rest. From Hoorn and Enkhuizen, then busy sea-ports, through Haarlem and Amsterdam to Leyden, the Hague, Delft, Rotterdam and Dordrecht, this province offered a scene of wealth and activity which could hardly be equalled by all the rest combined. It was closely associated, moreover, with Zeeland, whose many islands and waterways led to those conquests south of the Meuse which the Seven Provinces held in common. It was observed that while 1 per cent. of the Dutch revenue was contributed by Drenthe, the percentage of Holland was 58.

The foundation of their liberty, none the less, was regarded by the Dutch as local independence. While they entrusted currency to the central government, the states kept judicature, war and peace, and taxation strictly in their own hands. History having taught them the perils of mob rule, the leading towns at least had established self-renewing senates to control their administration. In time of war, the whole Union was too small and too exposed to admit of conflict of interests and of faction. In time of peace, however, unity might be threatened by jealousies between sea and land,

country and town, one province or city and another, rich and poor within a single town. The infusion of Jews and of anti-Catholic zealots from the southern Netherlands increased the risk of quarrel. But the chief and peculiar perils continued to be religious discord, jealousy of the House of Orange, and the temptation offered by a rich small state to unscrupulous Great Powers.

Arminian
Question

Between 1609, when Maurice was compelled by Oldenbarnevelt to accept the truce with Spain, and 1625, when he died, the part played by the Dutch in Europe was fluctuating and involved. Peace abroad implied religious strife at home, and the death of the mild Arminius in 1609 meant that the strife would be embittered. Calvin's terrible teaching of predestination found many unflinching supporters in a nation born and bred in the life or death struggle with ultra-Catholic Spain. A great majority of the Reformed clergy and of the predominant Protestant laity were fanatical 'Counter-remonstrants', condemning as sinful the Arminian 'Remonstrants', who had asked for the protection of the states of Holland. In 1610, none the less, this protection was granted.

The same year, however, changed the political position of the United Provinces for the worse. That Spain had been impelled towards a truce which admitted that the Dutch were something more than impious rebels was due to the evident and imminent danger from Henry IV. Now, in France, the assassin's stroke had installed a Spanish Queen-mother in power, while the Julich-Cleves succession threatened to embroil both the Germans and the Dutch. Julich and Cleves, whose duke died childless in 1609, lay, as Mr. Pearsall Smith has succinctly shown, 'like an apple of discord between the great Catholic and Protestant powers'. If Catholic, they would cut off the Dutch from their allies; if Protestant, the Spanish Netherlands from the Empire. The Emperor therefore attempted a precautionary occupation, and Henry IV, an invasion, which was to be helped by a Dutch army and by 4,000 English. In spite of Henry's murder, the allies drove the Archduke Leopold from Jülich, and established the Lutheran claimants, Brandenburg and Neuburg, in joint possession of both duchies. In 1613, however, their quarrel caused the Elector to turn Calvinist,

and the Prince, Catholic, while both strove for possession of the whole. The Dutch garrisoned Jülich, thereby provoking a counter occupation by Spain. Once more Maurice and Spinola stood opposed, but diplomacy strove hard at Xanten to avert a European war, and a temporary partition was arranged (1614).

It may seem strange that so crazy a constitution as the Dutch should survive the smallest shock whether in peace or war. Dutch cohesion in the thirty years of war with Spain and the Dutch eminence achieved by 1609 are inconceivable, indeed, without the character and talent of Jan van Oldenbarnevelt, 'the real founder of the Dutch Republic'. His enemies, as a judicious admirer must admit, 'were not without grounds in ascribing to him haughtiness, avarice, intolerance of other people's opinions, greed of power' (Edmundson). Such defects turned differences of opinion and of interest into hatred, and caused the Dutch to stain their records with a crime surpassing the judicial murder of Sir Walter Raleigh. For it was Oldenbarnevelt who, by sheer ability and patriotism, had gained control over their mainspring, the states of Holland, and had made that selfish body the wise servant of the common weal. Despite the inevitable rivalry between the House of Orange and the burgher aristocracies, despite also the certainty that the rigid Calvinists would denounce Calvinists less rigid than themselves, Oldenbarnevelt secured great power for Maurice, and for twenty years inspired Dutch victory over Spain. It was he who successfully curbed Leicester, who formed the epoch-making East India Company, and who, scorning the slander that he was in the pay of Spain, achieved the truce of 1609.

Oldenbarnevelt, indeed, stands out so strongly in the history of the Dutch Republic that it seems strange that, since Motley, no biographer has given us a more 'ocular view of him as a fact among facts'. His high talent and strong character, his vigorous personality and unfailing influence during the war, his devotion to William the Silent and to toleration, his astonishment and wrath at his condemnation—all these are emphasized, but the total portrays a force rather than a man. His management of both home and foreign policy, above all of finance, his unswerving

constancy and courage, and his reconciliation of the monarchical and republican principles for the struggle against Spain entitle him to be called the founder of the Republic, while the party spirit which inspired his execution in old age shows how amazing his earlier achievement must have been. Maurice however, did not shrink from declaring that Oldenbarnevelt, no zealot in religion, was in the pay of Spain, and even that he aimed at restoring papal doctrine. Many condemned his reluctance to support the Huguenots, thereby affronting France. Commercial men, too, disliked a policy which frustrated a Dutch West India Company to supplant the Spaniards. In 1617, therefore, when Maurice proclaimed himself a Counter-remonstrant, the Stadholder had much to gain.

While Germany moved towards a revival of the religious struggle, Holland was torn by unrestrained sectarian strife, now complicated by the growing feud between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt. Every year widened the rift between the Dutch Protestant Counter-remonstrant majority and their opponents. In 1611 the Counter-remonstrance itself, with a claim for ecclesiastical independence, was published, and the other provinces were invited to join in outweighing the States of Holland. In 1612, however, these assumed the offensive, coercing several clergy. In 1613 they rejected the proposed national church synod. Early in 1614, strengthened by a favourable opinion from James I, they themselves formulated the teaching permissible with regard to predestination, condemning both the doctrine that God created some men unto damnation and that man could win salvation for himself by works. Within the limits thus laid down by law, clergy and people might hold lax or rigorous opinions.

The resolution of 1617, justly termed 'the sharp', decreed an almost incredible disharmony for the Republic. The states of Holland, a province itself in a minority among the Seven, were supported by only a minority of the inhabitants. The Counter-remonstrants and Catholics of Holland doubtless far outnumbered the dominant Remonstrants. The Stadholder and Amsterdam were also in opposition. Yet the States stood pledged, since December, 1616, to raise 4,000 soldiers for the enforcement of government

decrees. Now the Sharp Resolution decreed that the commanders of the national army should co-operate with the local authorities in the defence of local independence in religion. Maurice, who had lately used force at the Hague to provide a church for the Counter-remonstrants, was bound by his office both to attend and to obey the assembly which passed the resolution. With characteristic obstinacy, independent municipalities on both sides prepared to defend their views, while the country was flooded with threats and libels, from which Oldenbarnevelt suffered most.

'The
Sharp
Resolution',
1617

The year 1618, stained by the death of Raleigh and by the Bohemian insurrection, witnessed also a Dutch *coup-d'état*. In July, Maurice struck at Utrecht, Holland's chief supporter. He came as the agent of the States-General, in necessary insurrection against the Dutch constitution. Without attempting to resist the national army, Utrecht turned Counter-remonstrant. A month later, Maurice, secretly authorized by the States-general, arrested Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and other Remonstrant leaders. Throughout the Republic their party was driven from office. Some ten months from the outset of Maurice's campaign, after a strict and even brutal imprisonment, Oldenbarnevelt was put to death. The same irregular tribunal sentenced Grotius to imprisonment for life, and his escape in the character of a chestful of Arminian books lightens for a moment this gloomy chapter of Dutch history.

Death of
Oldenbarne-
velt

Meanwhile the famous Synod of Dort (Dordrecht) had established the unity and prepared the tyranny of the Dutch Established Church. It was at once the first of those national synods which the captive Oldenbarnevelt had so strenuously opposed and an assembly of the Calvinists of Europe. English, Scottish, Swiss and German divines formed more than a quarter of the participants, but the only Remonstrants present appeared merely as defendants. The outcome of more than 150 sessions during the winter and spring (1618-19) was that this Counter-remonstrant synod reached agreement on doctrine and paved the way for an onslaught against the Remonstrants. They were unable, indeed, to break down the vested interests of laymen in patronage. But they could and did expel their Remonstrant rivals and reduce them to the level of Dutch Catholics, whose existence was tolerated,

Synod
of Dort

but who could not hold office and possessed no right of worship.

Death of
Maurice,
1625

The progress of the German war, which spread from Bohemia to the Rhine and to the northern plain, and the resumption in August, 1621, of the struggle against Spain, filled the remaining years of Maurice, who died in 1625. King in all but name, he felt the lack of Oldenbarnevelt's statesmanship, and did not attempt to interfere further with the republic which his victim had organised. It is doubtful, indeed, whether the murdered statesman, had he lived, could have turned the truce into a peace with Spain. Of Philip's conditions, he might have favoured Catholic toleration, but the opening of the Scheldt was a difficult demand, and to quit the Indies almost unthinkable. Such at least was the cause for which the Dutch fought on, while the Habsburg triumphs, culminating in 1629, could not but heighten the zeal, the confidence and the intransigence of Spain. The death of Maurice in 1625 left the outlook for his country far from bright. Breda was on the point of surrendering to Spinola. England, outraged by the Amboyna massacre, and passing under the rule of Charles I, could not be counted on for assistance. France, indeed, was now steered by Richelieu and in 1624 had become their ally. But besides the insecurity of a compact with a Catholic power ambitious to rule the Netherlands, the Dutch had allied themselves with a government whose foremost task was to bridle their fellow-Calvinists the Huguenots. Maurice's brother Frederick Henry (1584-1647), who succeeded him as Stadholder and Captain-General, seemed to be threatened with a continental triumph of Austria and of Spain.

To the sixteen years between the truce of 1609 and the death of Maurice may be ascribed the increased divergence of the Dutch from the life and spirit of their southern kinsmen. With a Church whose Calvinism was unified and accentuated, they gradually became more Puritan and less appreciative of what Catholicism had to offer. A rigorous sectarianism, even if not carried to persecution, did not favour reunion with the south, and for centuries the Netherlands remained divided.

CHAPTER IX

THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

IN ordinary parlance, the Thirty Years War comprises some three decades of the history of Europe. From Columbus to the atomic bomb, that history fills five centuries, in each of which a new chapter seems to begin between the fourteenth and the twentieth year. Luther's pronouncement at Wittenberg in 1517 is followed at intervals of almost exactly a hundred years by the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, the downfall of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, and the beginning of the first World War. Wars of the seventeenth century, however, in sharp contrast with those of the twentieth, were in Europe a merely local plague, and one from which few years were wholly free. That of 1618 to 1648, indeed, spread by degrees to many regions, wrecked much of Germany, and was ended by a most far-reaching and constructive peace. But it by no means monopolized the contemporary history of Europe.

In 1618, Europe was full of tensions. Two of these, arising one from the rivalry of churches, and the other from the imperfections of the Imperial constitution, in that year became acute in Bohemia. But at the same time Europe teemed with unsolved problems, from the allegiance of Portugal to that of Sweden, and from the future of the Dutch to that of the Christian subjects of the Turk. In 1648, likewise, Britons, Frenchmen, Spaniards and Poles—all were denied the gift of peace. Between 1618 and 1648, moreover, the central war had varied in its objects, its actors, and its theatres, while disconnected struggles had also raged, and many momentous European achievements had lain outside the military sphere.

The complexity of the theme must find due acknowledgement in our survey of the years of war. For at least a quarter of a century, the struggles between Catholics and Protestants and between Bourbons and Habsburgs claimed

Character
of the War

Its
Treatment

the forefront of the European stage. Those struggles, however, could not occupy the minds of Europeans with the exclusiveness and continuity that the world-wars have imposed on their descendants. A treatment which suggests that both governments and their subjects had many concerns besides those of the war is essential for historic truth.

As all the world knows, however, in 1618 a war broke out in Bohemia which soon inflamed first Germany and then the greater part of Europe. Posterity regards this 'Thirty Years War' as primarily a war about religion, and in this posterity is right. To settle matters of belief and conscience with swords and guns, however, seems absurd, and no religious war has in fact been waged without some further motive. An eminent historical analyst, Preserved Smith, declares that, in most of their ideas, European Catholics and Protestants were at this time almost the same. Both worshipped the same God. Both believed that man has a never-dying soul which after death would be punished or rewarded for disobedience or obedience to the precepts of the incarnate Christ. To both, the authority of the Scriptures was sacred, and the Eucharist was the appointed meeting-place between themselves and God. Both, in his view, equally detested reason.

The
Religious
Conflict

To many Catholics and Protestants in 1610, however, men of the other faith were tainted—themselves doomed to eternal punishment and endangering their whole tribe by disobedience to God. Much may be learned from the Spaniard captured by the Dutch who offered, if his life were spared, to worship the devil, as they did. Few wished to slay their neighbours for heresy, but fewer would disobey their prince when he directed them to go to war. His own motives, indeed, might not be unmingled. But few princes, if any, in that age were callous hypocrites, masking their greed and ambition with a religious zeal of which they felt nothing.

Aids to
Peace

Twice in the decade preceding had the threatened conflagration been averted, first by the successors to Henry IV, and then by the powers interested in the disputed Jülich-Cleves succession. Although traces still remained of the chivalrous delusion that fighting was the proper employment

for a gentleman, and although a warring state could lawfully draw recruits from beyond its borders, several of the earlier and later aids to war were at the moment lacking. The feudal system was in decline ; the age of peevish nationality had not begun. No race knew or cared enough about its neighbours to jeopardize its own peace by seeking to destroy them, while wars of trade or of empire overseas had yet to come. There were sovereigns, indeed, who loved war for its own sake, or who coveted fresh territories, or aspired to serve God by destroying heretics. None of them, however, disposed of a great standing army, and none could secure the sums necessary to create one without the consent of the Estates. Such were the frail defences of the peace of Europe.

On the other hand, discords and dangers which had given rise to many wars still menaced peace. Beyond the frontiers of Europe lay Muscovy and the intractable Turk, with the growing peril of collision between European adventurers, in distant continents and islands. Europe itself was filled with the rivalries of its ruling houses—Bourbon and Habsburg chief among them. Scandinavia and Poland afforded scope for two seemingly incurable conflicts, Italy and Germany, for many more. Mutual distrust deepening sometimes into mutual horror, kept Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists apart, and arrayed against each other Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox and Uniate. Economic changes disturbed the course of trade and industry, apparently to the profit of few and the loss of many. Throughout Europe, in short, no firm foundation for a lasting peace existed.

The Augsburg compromise of 1555, which empowered the German princes to make their dominions Catholic or Lutheran as they pleased, was therefore stable only in the hands of princes who were moderate men and had at their head a moderate Emperor. Like every compromise, moreover, it would be endangered if the approximate equality of power between those who made it passed away. And by 1610 the situation which produced the Peace of 1555 had changed beyond recognition.

During the first two decades after the great settlement of Augsburg, the Imperial crown was worn first by well-trained statesmen, Charles V and his brother Ferdinand, and then by Maximilian II (1564–76). This rare Habsburg condemned

Causes
of War

The
Settlement
of 1555

Disappear-
ance of
Moderate
Men

Catholic
Reaction

the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and left the Pope in doubt as to whether to prefer the Holy Roman Emperor or the Turk. But when, in 1576, Rudolf II succeeded, the Germans lost any Imperial restraining hand upon Jesuit aggression. Soon the Catholic reaction, triumphant at the Tridentine Council, became incarnate in Ferdinand of Styria, the rising hope of the Habsburg family. Rudolf, a recluse of doubtful sanity, never married. Matthias (1612-19), his brother and heir, was renowned for what some called weakness and others moderation. But it was probable that at no distant date both uncles would give place to Ferdinand, the devout and honest pupil of the Jesuits, whose mission was to banish heresy from the Empire as he had banished it from his own possessions. Bavaria, indeed, had already shown the way. Donauwörth, a strongly Protestant city, was made Catholic by force in 1608, and next year its ruler, Maximilian, formed a League of Catholic princes under the patronage of Spain. United in doctrine, in discipline and in obedience to the Pope, the German Catholics were passing confidently to the aggressive. With God's help and the resources of the Spanish empire, the poison of Luther and Calvin might everywhere be purged away.

Protestant
Disunion

The Protestants had no such unity or inspiration. Two generations earlier, when Poland seemed to be turning Protestant, and Vienna was almost a Lutheran city, it might seem that Luther's dream of Christian unity and no more Popes was coming true. But, since the days of Trent, every year made it more apparent that Luther's mind was Teutonic, not universal, and that the Lutheran princes, who had gained wealth and power by driving Rome from their dominions, were for the most part devoid of missionary zeal.

Often, indeed, the keenest animosity of the Lutherans was reserved for the followers of Calvin. Admitting that Scripture bade them love their enemies, they declared that the Calvinists were not *their* enemies but God's. In Marian days, as a golden cup commemorates, English fugitives tainted with Calvinism could find no shelter until they reached Frankfort-on-the-Main. Just as the followers of Luther had claimed to be the purest Catholics, so at a later date the German Calvinists passed themselves off as truly Lutheran. Had this been valid, Germany in 1610 would have

fallen into two fairly equal halves. The Protestant north, tintured upon its flanks by Catholics, but strengthened by Würtemberg and Baden, would have balanced the Catholic south, with its admixture of Protestants and Bohemian Brethren in many of the Habsburg lands. But Lutheran detestation of the Calvinists almost halved Protestant strength, isolating in particular the dominant House of Saxony, which shrank from common action with them.

For two generations after the Peace of Augsburg, however, it grew ever clearer that Lutheranism had shot its bolt, while Calvinism might hope to become universal. The Teutonic Luther could be understood and followed by Germans and by their cousins in Scandinavia, Holland and England. Thanks to the Hanse League of traders, many Germans had settlements in northern Europe and of these not a few turned Lutheran. But the clear and logical Calvin could inspire not only Germans but Frenchmen, Netherlanders, Swiss, Poles, Czechs and Britons, rousing them everywhere to a crusade for pure religion. Huguenots, Cameronians, Covenanters, Beggars of the Sea—these most indomitable fighters were Calvinists. Their grim enthusiasm sprang from their sense of a new and inspiring vocation, to serve Almighty God as individuals uncontrolled by priests. In Germany the forward movement due to the Jesuits was thus confronted by a forward movement due to Calvin. In 1608, the Elector Palatine and Christian of Anhalt had organized their fellow-Calvinists in a Protestant Union. Thus the Catholic League of Maximilian had a forerunner in the opposing camp. It was significant that when Lutheran Brandenburg and Lutheran Neuburg quarrelled over the succession to the western duchies of Cleves and Julich and sought militant allies, the one turned Calvinist and the other Catholic.

In 1610, it is true, a new age seemed to begin. The Dutch had achieved a twelve years truce with Spain. Henry IV of France perished on the eve of invading Germany, and European politics lost their greatest master. With Protestant Union and Catholic League in mutual defiance and Cleves-Jülich a burning question, it was rash to expect the outworn settlement of Augsburg to keep the peace. For some years, none the less, no new convulsion happened. In great part,

Death of
Henry IV
(1610)

Europe's uneasy calm must be ascribed to the general mediocrity in high places. The age of incomparable Popes had given place to such men as Paul V; that of great Spanish sovereigns to such as Philip III. Elizabeth was merely parodied by James I; Henry IV by a feeble minister and queen. The thrones of Sweden and Poland were filled by jarring monarchs of the House of Vasa. Internal faction convulsed the Dutch, while leaderless Russia had to fear foreign conquest. Denmark indeed had found in Christian IV her most enterprising sovereign, but even along with Norway her numbers were far too small to take the lead.

Outside the Empire, it is clear, for the moment no strong force existed which might counteract any loss of equilibrium within its bounds. Meanwhile every year showed more clearly that the equilibrium achieved at Augsburg was doomed. An impartial and learned Protestant, Bishop Stubbs, has denounced 'the hypocritical and rapacious intolerance of seventeenth-century Protestantism'. While Catholic German sovereigns persecuted, their Protestant coequals annexed every bishopric within their reach. The Diet of 1608 had broken up in confusion, because Ferdinand of Styria proposed that the lawful status of 1552 should be in fact observed. The latent antagonism between the members of the two confessions was emphasized and advertised by the Protestant rejection of Pope Gregory's new calendar. What unity could there be among states which were living in different weeks or months because of their differences in religion?

Uneasy
Peace
(1610-18)

The years 1610 to 1618, of course, comprised notable events in non-German Europe, and even in the Empire some progress was attained. In France, where the Italian queen-mother and the Italian Concini held sway, Louis XIII was in 1614 declared of age to govern. The last States-general before the Revolution met (1614) and in 1617 the queen-mother was banished and her minister murdered. Louis XIII, however, replaced the greatest of modern French kings by the least impressive, and until Richelieu's advent, France suffered an eclipse. In Sweden, the great Gustavus succeeded his father in 1611, and in Muscovy, two years later, a popular uprising set the House of Romanov upon the throne, but the course of general history was not immediately

affected. Even in Germany, the dangerous Cleves-Jülich question, adjourned by the murder of Henry IV, was settled, or at least adjourned again. In 1614, by the peace of Xanten, Brandenburg and Neuburg agreed that for the time being the inheritance should be divided.

Meanwhile, the long rivalry between Rudolf and Matthias had been ended by Rudolf's death in 1612. A weak and childless Habsburg now ruled the Empire, but the vital question was, who was to follow him on the throne? Philip of Spain, grandson of Charles V, was eager to present Europe with a new and greater world-Empire. Could aggrandised Spain succeed where Charles himself had proved inadequate?

In the succession to the Holy Roman Empire, as in ^{The Empire and the Jesuits} almost all great European questions of the day, a vital part was played by the Society of Jesus. History was then, and not then only, the outcome not seldom of a handful of leading men and women upon whom the Jesuits might set their mark as tutors, and whom they might serve as ideal envoys, selfless, adroit and often unavowed. At this moment, Jesuits kept on the throne of Poland a king, Sigismund Vasa, who curbed the Polish Protestants. They had trained both Ferdinand of Styria and Maximilian of Bavaria. Now Maximilian and his Catholic League prepared to support Ferdinand as successor to Matthias, thus largely determining the future of the Habsburgs and of Europe.

That future, however, was shaped in the first instance by events in a region which was racially and in part constitutionally non-German, Bohemia and the adjacent lands.

In Bohemia, where war now broke out, the elements of ^{The Bohemians} a conflagration were more numerous than elsewhere. Most rulers, it is true, cared as little whether the racial origins of their subjects were Slav or Teuton as whether their hair was black or red. But it cannot be denied that by race and by geography, as well as by constitutional law, Bohemia was sharply divided from the Empire. Severed by mountains from Austria, Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate and Saxony, the men of the rich encircled plain inherited not only a Slavonic language but also much of the impulsiveness and otherworldliness which distinguished the Slavs from their ancient Germanic foes. The Bohemia of Hus (c. 1370-1415), had been a pioneer in theological rebellion. When the

seventeenth century began, although many magnates and high officials remained Catholic, the great majority of the nation were Protestants of various schools. From the Utraquists who, following Hus, claimed for the laity communion in both kinds, through the Lutherans and 'Bohemian Brethren' to the militant Calvinists, they were steadfast foes of Rome. In this, and in the constitutional consequences to which their attitude gave rise, they led the so-called 'lands of the Bohemian crown', Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia.

The
Bohemian
Constitution

This anti-Roman trend, in the age of the militant Catholic reaction, naturally arrayed many Bohemians in opposition to the Habsburg claim to rule them by hereditary right. It could hardly be denied either that their crown had formerly been elective, or that for many generations the reigning Emperor had worn it in virtue of his descent and office. The defects and the rivalry of Rudolf and Matthias had led in Bohemia to a display of Protestant force, and, in July, 1609, to the Emperor's reluctant and insincere surrender. The 'Letter of Majesty' then secured to the Protestants of Bohemia and Silesia the most ample religious rights. Their political claims were further asserted by the deposition of Rudolf in 1611, and in 1615 by the imposition upon his successor, Matthias, of the Bohemian language as official.

The
Succession
Problem

The question of a successor to the childless Matthias brought to a head the persistent difficulties of both the Bohemian constitution and religion. At a moment when the tension in the Empire was obviously increasing, Ferdinand of Styria, cousin of the King-Emperor Matthias, had become renowned as an uncompromising and militant Catholic. Yet in June, 1617, Matthias and his high officials procured his coronation as King-designate at Prague. His acceptance of the Letter of Majesty reduced the outspoken critics to Martinitz and Slawata, on the one side, and on the other to the extreme Protestants represented by Count Matthias Thurn. Thus a great country, predominantly Protestant in belief, and closely associated with the Empire, had accepted the sovereignty of a Catholic crusader who was likely soon to occupy the Imperial throne.

Signs of
Conflict in
the Empire

At this time signs abounded that the religious truce which since 1555 had kept Germany free from civil war, was breaking down. The exchange by the Elector of Brandenburg

of his Lutheran allegiance for the more militant Calvinism could not be unimportant, when so much depended upon moderation. More and more Catholic rulers were pupils of the Jesuits, and perhaps no Jesuit pupil could wholeheartedly believe that a political pledge was binding when to honour it would prejudice the Church. In Bohemia, the towns of Braunau and Klostergrab provided cases of collision between the claims of Protestants to build churches and the application of governmental force to prevent it. Bohemians were perhaps the least amenable race in Europe to such infractions of their chartered rights.

At this point, the personality and reputation of King Ferdinand became first-rate factors in the history of Europe. So considerable, indeed, was his part in the two decades which followed his election that some historians have been tempted to exaggerate his inherent greatness.

‘Jealous, bigoted, implacable’, wrote Bryce, ‘skilful in forming and concealing his plans, resolute to obstinacy in carrying them out in action, the House of Habsburg could have had no abler and no more unpopular leader in their second attempt to turn the German Empire into an Austrian military monarchy.’

While his courage and devotion are as conspicuous as his contemporary importance, however, it is difficult to reconcile such a characterization with what is known of the affable little sportsman who year by year sent wine to the Saxon Elector and compared their bags of game. ‘A slow, laborious, friendly man, with a sense of duty and a certain strictness of private life, but without initiative or imagination,’—such was Lord Acton’s verdict. In the Bohemia of 1618, however, anticipation of Ferdinand’s rule did much to impel the Catholic oppressors to stand fast and the Protestant nationalists to resort to violence against them.

The Letter of Majesty, however, was incompatible with the succession of such a prince as Ferdinand, whose motto was, ‘Better a desert than a country filled with heretics’. Already experienced in war, he was allied with the Jesuit-trained Maximilian of Bavaria, and served by an unknown military genius, the Jesuit-trained Bohemian noble, Wallenstein. The disputes about church-building at Braunau and Klostergrab in the north and about church-going throughout Bohemia had taught the Protestants to trust to no Habsburg

for religious freedom. In 1617, a summons to elect the uncompromising Ferdinand warned them that their chartered rights were insecure. They none the less consented to crown him as their king, and next year he became a candidate to succeed the dead Matthias as Emperor. Meanwhile the Catholic rulers of Bohemia grew more aggressive.

The De-
fenestration

Catholic aggression, of course, challenged would-be aggressive Protestants both within Bohemia and outside. At Prague, their trusted leader, the German soldier Count Matthias Thurn; in wider Germany, the Protestant Union, led by Prince Christian of Anhalt—these vigorous men combined to expel the Bohemian Habsburgs and give the Elector Palatine their crown. This fascinating young ruler of Heidelberg was commended to the Czechs both by his Calvinist principles and by their hopes that as James I's son-in-law he might bring them support from Britain. On May 23, 1618, the fairest capital in Europe witnessed an amazing crime. Thurn and his friends then deliberately hurled from a window in the royal castle at Prague the two hated Catholic ministers of the Crown. With them an innocent secretary was doomed to die, and his plaintive 'What have I done to the gentlemen that they thus throw me out of window?' deserves to be recorded.

In the long run, the lawless violence of the so-called Defenestration of Prague recoiled upon Thurn and his fellows. The fall of at least fifty feet was meant to kill, and the victims were also fired on. But, thanks to wadded cloaks and a convenient dunghill, all three escaped alive, and their co-religionists could not but believe that God had wrought a miracle. For the moment, however, the revolution seemed triumphant. The Czech majority was Protestant and, save in Bavaria, Protestants swayed all the surrounding states. In Transylvania the half-savage figure of Prince Bethlen Gabor, a veteran warrior, threatened the Habsburgs, while beyond his realm lay 'the Lutherans' last shelter', the warlike Turks. The rebels, indeed, took the offensive, and Vienna was saved only by the devoted constancy of Ferdinand and the opportune arrival of a slender reinforcement.

Pause
before War

The Defenestration of Prague, as all agree, initiated a great war in Europe. Fully fifteen months passed by,

CONFESSIONAL DIVISIONS OF GERMANY (1618)



however, before the European Protestants and Catholics fairly faced each other in Bohemia. That kingdom, indeed, proved swift and firm in proclaiming its revolution. To defend its liberties, a directorate of thirty was at once appointed, and a mercenary force decreed, while the support both of the sister provinces and of foreign powers was eagerly solicited. A notable contribution from without was the release by Savoy of the great mercenary, Mansfeld. Silesia rallied to the Protestant cause, but in the Empire only the Elector Palatine showed real sympathy. The Catholics at first proved hardly more successful. Ferdinand, their rising hope, was endangered both by Mansfeld and by Bethlen Gabor, and bravely faced impending ruin in Vienna. Time, however, fought on his side, for both Catholics and Habsburgs had a fundamental unity which in 1619 their opponents lacked.

Ferdinand
and
Frederick

In August, 1619, while Bethlen Gabor marched into Ferdinand's new kingdom of Hungary, that monarch was elected Emperor with no dissenting voice. He then learned, however, that, a few days earlier, his Bohemian subjects had deposed him. The Elector Palatine, Frederick, whose vote had been cast for Ferdinand as Emperor, did not scruple to accept the Bohemian crown. Early in November, Frederick and his Elizabeth were reigning light-heartedly at Prague, while the Catholic and Protestant forces mustered for at least a central European struggle.

The interest of Spain and other foreign nations in the contest, and the importance to all Christians of religion, already suggested that more than the Bohemian crown might be at stake. With Catholic reaction militant, no Protestant region or race could feel secure. At the same time, the conduct of Thurn and Frederick taught every Catholic ruler what Calvinism might imply. At such a crisis, indeed, the personality of Ferdinand was of the first importance.

Frederick, prime agent in the war, ranking high among the German princes, and at Heidelberg occupying the cross-roads of Europe, in spite of all his charm and virtue, has been flatly and not unjustly written down a fool. The Bohemian adventure was his own pig-headed choice, and he proved futile as a ruler, as a statesman, and as a diplomat. Christian of Anhalt, the chancellor to whom he owed his

education and his English marriage, was a virtuous man who lacked that realism which is the first essential of a statesman. Neither the Protestant Union, which he created, nor his alliances, Dutch, English, Savoyard and German, justified any of his expectations. John George of Saxony, clinging obstinately to his rôle of *deus ex machina* until his strength was surpassed by that of rising states, had great virility but little intellectual power. His neighbour of Brandenburg, George William, was the weakest in a long series of Hohenzollerns.

In the autumn of 1619, when Ferdinand and Frederick confronted each other in clear-cut rivalry for the Bohemian throne, and all its 'lands' deposed their Catholic King, Frederick, indeed, had no thought of an Imperial revolution. He sincerely believed that their struggle was between two claimants to a dignity which lay outside the Empire, and that, although his opponent had been elected Emperor, he himself was no breaker of the German peace.

Frederick, however, could not escape the consequences of a singularly great position. Both the Palatinate and Bohemia were key-posts in the latent or open conflicts of contemporary Europe. On the eve of the renewal of the Spanish war against the Dutch, Heidelberg flanked the vital route from the Habsburg lands to the battlefield. Both Frederick's electoral dignity and his possessions roused the cupidity of a far more formidable prince, Maximilian of Bavaria. While Calvinism as a militant creed surpassed that of Luther, it provoked many Lutherans as much or even more than the time-honoured church of Rome. In Frederick's coronation these men saw a crime against the Imperial constitution, one Elector traitorously encouraging the subjects of another to depose their rightful lord, for the unlawful profit of a usurper. Frederick, indeed, had been slow in yielding to the tempting offer. He could convince himself that God willed him to accept, but it was certain that many important counsellors doubted his wisdom. Among them were his father-in-law, James I, most of the members of the Protestant Union, and many Palatinate dignitaries. It was anomalous indeed that an untried—and in spite of his virtue, intelligence and charm—an insignificant young man should be able to plunge Europe into war.

European
Significance,
1619

Catholic and
Protestant
Strength

As master of Bohemia, however, Frederick would give the Protestants a majority in the Electoral College, while imperiling the growth of a Catholic Austrian monarchy. These dangers and the threat to the Imperial constitution sufficed to array many solid enemies against him. Maximilian of Bavaria, the army of the Catholic League under Tilly, contingents or subsidies from the Pope, Spain, Poland and the Italians—all these, together with the Lutheran, John George of Saxony, overshadowed the Bohemians and their scanty friends. Bethlen Gabor, indeed, had conquered much of Hungary before making a truce with Ferdinand. The Turkish factor must also be reckoned with. While the Dutch sent money, volunteers came from England, and a few German princes gave Frederick their support. But the outworn Protestant Union proved a broken reed, and a formidable Spanish threat from the Netherlands menaced the Rhenish Palatinate. Thus when, in the summer of 1620, the tide had turned, it flowed ever more swiftly against the unstable Bohemians. Maximilian and the League army cleansed Lower Austria of sedition, and in September entered Bohemia. Early in November, Tilly, with Maximilian in his camp, attacked the Bohemians at the White Hill, close to Prague. The shock of his attack sufficed to rout the covering army, and to drive Frederick and his family from the capital. A few months later, the remnants of his temporary kingdom were lost. Insignificant perhaps by comparison with the contemporary voyage of the *Mayflower*, the victory of the White Hill was as decisive as a battle can be. Frederick, styled in derision 'the Winter King', fled by Silesia and Brandenburg into Holland. The Protestant Union was broken up. Bohemia became a hereditary Catholic realm, the Protestants being first disfranchised and then, in 1627, expelled. The Catholic German trampled on the Czech.

The
White Hill

War in
the West,
Bohemia
Subdued

While the Winter King was thus overthrown by Tilly in Bohemia, his hereditary power was crumbling in the Palatinate, both Lower and Upper. In 1620, Spinola marched south and arrived at Mainz. Before the winter, he went far towards conquering the Upper Palatinate, while its Dutch and Hessian allies failed to induce the Heidelberg government to resist. Next year, when the Protestant

Union dissolved, when Spain resumed her war with the Dutch, and when Sweden began hers with Poland, Frederick became an exile, and his friends and Bohemian subjects paid the price of their rebellion. In Bohemia, death sentences were relatively few, but the confiscation of estates was enormous, and Wallenstein became only the most conspicuous among those enriched by this punishment of treason. At the same time the Protestant realm was simply made Catholic by Ferdinand's unsparing force. Silesia kept its liberties, Lusatia, now ruled by John George of Saxony, did the same, but Moravia shared Bohemia's fate. Bethlen Gabor gained peace and compensation in Hungary for his exertions.

Of Bohemia, destined in the nineteenth century to be reckoned the brain and heart of the great Austrian empire, it could be said that, within a decade of Frederick's aggression, 'the hand of Ferdinand, which cut into shreds the Letter of Majesty, seemed at the same time to have severed the sinews of the nation's vitality' (Ward). It remained to be seen how far the struggle now raging in Germany proper would extend and what would be the effect upon it of the widespread strife between foreign powers. It was far from immaterial that, while the Protestant Union dissolved, the Catholic League persisted, that Duke Maximilian of Bavaria aimed at supplanting Frederick both as a territorial ruler and as an Elector, that militant Spain was now ruled by Olivarez, and that difficulties religious and political paralysed both France and England.

In 1621, Tilly and Maximilian, supported by the Imperial condemnation of Mansfeld, had subdued the Upper Palatinate and pursued the famous free-lance far towards the west. The campaign of 1622, therefore, was likely to determine the fate of the Lower or Rhenish Palatinate, and sundry German Protestants, backed by Dutch cash and English volunteers, supported Frederick's cause as if it were their own. United, they disposed of some 70,000 men, but, by the early summer, the victorious Tilly had driven the Elector into exile. Heidelberg and its sister fortresses fell to the Catholic forces. While Mansfeld and his fellow-*condottiere*, Christian of Halberstadt, sold their swords to the Dutch, who were now hard pressed by Spain, the Lower Palatinate

Westward
Extension
of the War

shared the fate of Bohemia. It was hard to say where the militant Catholic reaction would be halted, or by whom.

Campaign
of 1623

The year 1623, in which English policy was conspicuous for the mission of Prince Charles and Buckingham to Madrid, began with a meeting at Ratisbon between the Emperor and the German Princes. The outcome, shocking both to the Protestants and to some Catholics within and without the Empire, was to bestow upon Maximilian, for his lifetime, the territory and title of the banished Elector Frederick. So artificial and unpopular a conclusion, arrived at while Catholics and Protestants were fighting in the Low Countries, and Bethlen Gabor preparing a new attack, held out no hope of a religious peace. The interest of the *condottieri*, of the Calvinist princes and of the Danish King, on the other hand, prompted a further war. For both political and geographical reasons, the Protestant Lower Saxon Circle, comprising Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Holstein, Bremen and Magdeburg, now seemed likely to become the field of battle, and its members met at Brunswick to form an army of defence.

Northward
Extension
of the War

The fears of the Protestants were realized when, in execution of the Emperor's commission to subdue the disturbers of the peace, Tilly crushed Christian of Halberstadt at Stadtlohn (August, 1623). This heavy blow caused Christian to flee, while Mansfeld occupied himself in England. Soon afterwards, however, Bethlen Gabor's invasion was foiled by a Fabian policy. Frederick's aggression had now been chastised, his abettors dispersed, and Lutheran loyalty re-emphasized, while Ferdinand showed no sign of becoming a crusader. In a word, after six disturbed years, Germany seemed to offer no prospect of a great convulsion.

The War
Widening
(1624)

In 1624, none the less, the war showed signs of developing into something wider than a German religious struggle. It was already closely connected with the kindred conflict between the Dutch and Spain, where the decline of the monarchy continued under Philip IV (1621) and Olivarez. Their evasion of the English marriage set English policy free. In the last days of James I, the desire of the English court and nation to restore the exiled Frederick and Elizabeth was not concealed, though they disagreed upon the method. While the King wished for triumphant campaigns in Germany, waged by some continental power, Parliament looked first to

THE GERMAN WAR 1618-1629



a strong fleet and a new Armada. The Lutheran kings of Scandinavia, moreover, could not remain indifferent to a war which threatened their own independence, but also offered them opportunities of aggrandizement on German soil. Christian IV of Denmark was a scion of the German House of Oldenburg, while Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, his youthful rival, had married a Brandenburg princess. The ancient feud between their realms had been composed for the moment by the mediation of James I, in 1613, and with him, as the foremost Protestant monarch, they now negotiated for help to the Protestant cause. But Gustavus, the abler and wiser King, aided by the cautious Axel Oxenstierna, proved far more exacting than his impetuous senior the Dane, and James perceived neither his military genius nor his wisdom. The German war therefore entered upon its Danish phase.

Denmark
and France

Meanwhile, however, a power far greater than Denmark or even Sweden was moving from the Catholic camp towards the hostile coalition. France was returning to the ways of Henry IV. In 1623, with Urban VIII, the rare spectacle of a pro-French pope was seen, while Richelieu had lately become a cardinal. In 1624 the greatest minister in her history became supreme in France. For eighteen years, a prince of the Church was to prevent a Catholic triumph, and, after his death, his will continued to fashion Europe. It would be unhistorical, indeed, either to credit Richelieu with an immediate control of politics, or to suppose that politics were produced by conscious policy alone. In that age many statesmen sought the guidance of astrologers: the Defenestration was supposed to foretell the fall of Babylon: and not a few found inspiration in the great comet which flamed over Heidelberg. But in the spring of 1625, the marriage, by Urban's leave, of Charles I with Henrietta Maria showed that the Catholic monarchy of France again set politics above religion. Thereafter Richelieu became ever more influential with the King and made the monarchy in turn ever more influential with the nation and with foreign powers.

Richelieu
and the
'Danish
Phase'

In 1625, with the intrusion of Christian IV of Denmark, the war entered upon its eighth campaign and its third successive phase. First the aggression of the Calvinists had

been chastised. Then the German Lutherans had been endangered. Now Protestant Europe, whether Calvinist, Anglican or Lutheran, must struggle for its own existence, and for a time it did so with marked want of success.

Meanwhile, slowly and painfully, there was rising in France a power which was destined to transform both the basis and the outcome of the German struggle and the whole history of Europe. While the Danish intervention ended with the Emperor's triumph, and the Swedish rescued his Protestant foes, Richelieu was gaining an authority incomparable with that of the Danes, the Swedes or even of the Habsburgs. While we trace the 'Scandinavian' phases of the war, we must keep in mind the momentous revolution which the Cardinal was bringing about in France.

CHAPTER X

RICHELIEU TO 1631

Richelieu
and Europe

UNTIL Richelieu's advent, we repeat, France was practically in collapse. After his ministry, and thanks to him, she stood on the road to European domination. While, on the one hand, he grew to be the supreme disposer of France, on the other he is the unrivalled interpreter of the art of government in seventeenth-century Europe. More than any other man, for two-thirds of the century he shaped the politics of Christendom. But his road to power was long and toilsome, and he had hardly reached complete assurance before he died. Hence it is necessary to follow his rise with the utmost care, and to separate the several threads of which his policy was woven. At the same time we must face problems of still wider import. Could this creator of history be described as the child—the embodiment—of the French nation? Was his appearance inevitable, or a mere historic chance? Without him, what course could or would France have followed? Such problems both complicate and dignify our study.

The year 1624, which changed the ministers of France, was destined thus to sway the history of Europe. To please his foolish mother, Louis XIII, a far from able king, recalled from exile his rejected servant, now Cardinal de Richelieu. The outcome, succinctly stated, proved to be the establishment of strong monarchy in France, her defiance of the formidable Habsburg league, and the frustration of the reconquest of Christendom by Rome. Richelieu himself died in 1642. But by his own ideas and efforts, he had already created a France far stronger than before, and had altered the strength and destiny of every state in Europe. Spain and Germany, Scandinavia and Italy, England, the Dutch and Poland—these and the lesser powers would all have been different in physique and outlook but for his eighteen years of rule. Without Richelieu, the German war

must have taken another course and the Age of Louis XIV is unthinkable.

Few men so powerful have been so hard to penetrate. Alike by art and nature, Richelieu contrived to remain inscrutable. A slender form in the rich robes of a high ecclesiastic, a pointed aquiline visage yellowed with unceasing ill-health and toil, an unsmiling and laconic business manner—these marked the statesman, with few friends and no party of his own, whose long continuance in office amazed the courtiers. To fathom and to sway the politics of all Europe by limitless correspondence, his days and nights might seem too short, and it was fortunate that his royal master could not relish his society. Yet the harassed minister, often threatened by dismissal or assassination, found time to create an army and navy, to reform the administration and to compose volumes for the guidance of his successors.

The secret of his pre-eminence, without doubt, was concentration. France, he held, must be supreme in the world; and her monarch her own unquestioned master. The foremost obstacle was Spain, a power at first too strong for her to challenge. This dictated the association of France with Protestants, Dutch and English, Scandinavian and German, and therefore the inevitable postponement of the restoration of Christian unity. It dictated also the destruction of Huguenot separatism, but the preservation of Huguenot worship. 'If there be a God', said the Pope when Richelieu died, 'he will have to smart for what he has done, but if there is no God, he was certainly an excellent man.' His successful postponement of the Catholic triumph gives the explanation. Yet religion was to him the master objective, and Italy the very heart of the world. But to attempt to make France and northern Europe Catholic at once would be the height of folly. It would mean subjecting Christendom to the House of Habsburg, that is, to political and religious tyranny. In opposing this, he had the support of the Pope himself, as well as of all the forces which could be deemed progressive. The way to an enlightened Catholicism, he perceived, lay through the regeneration of France. Let the force of France be concentrated in her tolerant monarchy, let Spain be abased and Germany divided, and

Europe could be led towards a harmonious and inspiring future, free from Catholic Leagues and Frondes, from Presbyterians and Habsburgs.

Thus mysteriously a new historic force is born; and a rival to the triumphant Habsburgs foreshadowed. Happily for the student of history, the Cardinal has in no small degree explained himself in his writings. His aphorisms may disclose what he believed and what he wished posterity to believe of him. Valuable as autobiography, they are often invaluable as a summary of the political science of the early seventeenth century. We may therefore precede the narrative of French achievement under Richelieu by some study of his problems and principles drawn from his own writings. A French biographer, none the less, declared that among his own countrymen the Cardinal was so famous as to be well-nigh unapproachable.

His
Aphorisms

The first foundation of the happiness of a state, said Richelieu, was the establishment of the reign of God. This principle was evident to all and was supported by many examples. Fortunately for France, the Cardinal declared, her King was virtuous and religious. He should, however, be guided by reason and avoid the violent reconversion of Huguenots who had strayed from the path of safety. It would be foolish to destroy the wheat with the tares. In secular matters, on the other hand, clemency had often been the bane of France. Rewards and punishments were the chief resources of the ruler, but whereas virtue might be its own reward, the well-timed punishment of one should deter many others. 'Have a method but not a system', was in effect his advice to a ruler. 'You say that you have your mother's dryness: above all things beware of wounding with the tongue'—thus he admonished Louis XIII.

The
Choice of
Ministers

None could know better than Richelieu either the strength which a king could receive from 'ministers who recognize only justice and spare no one', or the danger to such servants from those who, though powerless for good, were powerful to do evil and to calumniate them with success. Favourites might easily convince the King that a general who won battles, or a minister who pleased the people, was his rival. By 1620, he already held that men who had rendered a successful aspirant no service did not hesitate to clamour

His Own
Principles

for his aid. In February, 1630, he wrote: 'Tis my glory to be everyone's target in the King's service. Thank God, I have not a single enemy on my own account, and have offended no one save to serve the State. From this I will never flinch, whatever befall me.' To pay the Prince of Orange for his auxiliaries in 1640, he offered his plate and jewels, saying that rather than break his word he would sell his shirt. To desire only justice, and to say frankly what he desired, was his maxim, and he held it more glorious to win back a dozen enemies than to ruin one.

Scores of pithy aphorisms on the art of government illuminate Richelieu's correspondence. Secrecy is the soul of business: listen much and say little—such was his advice. Great affairs require (1) concentration, ignoring petty gains; (2) obstinacy, for they never lack great difficulties; (3) secrecy, and (4) fertility in expedients, so as never to be at a loss. To set private passions above the public interest is a crime. Nothing is so dangerous as to fear nothing from the enemy. Stifle factions at birth, or they may prove the first spark in a conflagration or the first crack in a river bank. The Christian should immediately forgive the transgressor, but the greatest glory of a state lay in just punishment for an attack. The one should leave vengeance to God, but 'the chief duty of kings is the repose of their subjects, the integrity of the state and the reputation of their government'. They should therefore punish offences against the State so severely as to guard against any repetition.

Christianity
and Politics

The Cardinal launched a flood of aphorisms against those who charged him with inhuman severity. 'To make a law and not carry it out', he declared, 'is to authorize what you wish to prohibit.' 'Just as clemency is a princely virtue, so justice is a virtue of the State, whose safety matters more than that of private persons.' 'Tacitus says that nothing upholds the law so much as the punishment of those whose quality is as great as their crime.' He himself, when exiled to Avignon in 1618, had said nothing against his own banishment, together with his relatives, on mere unfounded suspicions, 'because great stakes sometimes require such stern, even violent, examples, to frighten everyone into doing his duty'. 'In times like these', he wrote in September, 1639, 'it is impossible to do merely what people like. We can

His
Self-defence

only take care to confine ourselves to the least offensive course.' In great storms, he had long ago perceived, the cargo must be thrown overboard to save the ship. In a corrupt or weak-minded age, the virtuous would survive less easily than scoundrels.

His View
of France

Richelieu, indeed, gazed with gloomy eyes upon the France which he laboriously impelled towards greatness. Men he found impenetrable, inconstant, hypocritical and often malignant. Women, he held, must keep silence in the state, as in the church. Reason alone should guide a ruler, but women were swayed by nature to follow their inclinations. 'As men employ their powers for good; so women do for evil.' 'They are strange animals,' he wrote in August, 1638. 'We sometimes think that, as they can do no good, they cannot do much harm: but I protest upon my conscience that nothing is so capable of ruining a state.' Such maxims lay bare the scars which Marie de' Medici and Anne of Austria had left upon his soul. Great kings, he held, should always have several strings to their bow. To put up with one injury invites a second. The reputation of the state ranks first of all: without it, all the men and the gold in the world are of no avail. Once lost, it cannot be regained. Sometimes, for the sake of reputation, things otherwise inexpedient must be done.

The Springs
of French
Policy

Such aphorisms show all later ages how high Richelieu's birth and his experience had taught him to pitch his note when formulating the policy of France. As he continues to distil his wisdom for his successors, the springs of his own policy and the traits of his character and of Louis' can be discerned.

Generosity, the Cardinal insists, is the sharpest spur of kings. They should not always insist upon the full rigour of the law, and should never punish except when compelled by the need of averting a great evil. But to pardon everything is far worse. Nor should they resent it if good counsels turn out ill, or distrust in small matters those whose advice they take in great. Blame from a king discourages more than all his benefits can kindle zeal. He should act like the king-bee, who bears no sting. He may sometimes claim blind obedience, being often compelled to take measures which only the event can justify. If some of his subjects are bold

enough to check his plans by tearing his servants in pieces, he must punish severely, or else offend against God and risk his own ruin as well as theirs.

Before his great career had fairly begun, Richelieu affirmed that, since kings and queens were the living image of God, their smallest graces far surpassed all the affections of men. With more experience, he held that it was sometimes hard to persuade them to be served aright. He urged his master to check aggression, both by frontier fortresses, and by galleys and armaments at sea. The King, he maintained, wished for no exchange, because he would only acquire such lands as need compelled and justice would allow, while no consideration would induce him to yield an inch of what his predecessors had acquired. If, he declared in the last year of his life (1642), these predecessors had bought repose by sacrifice, the least his enemies could do was to renounce a part of what they had thus acquired.

His View
of Royal
Persons

Richelieu had himself gained power by seeking it with rare tenacity. His unrivalled talent and moderation had kept him long in office, a tower, it seemed, reared upon shifting sand, and he knew the courtier's life from every angle, best from that of a minister of state. Thus, taught by experience, he expounded with frank realism the inner secrets of seventeenth-century administration. An office-seeker, he confessed, must be persistent. Having at last made his way to court, he will keep in his master's sight, and accustom all the circle to regard him as one of themselves. With rascals, he will speak as frankly, in appearance, as with honest men, noting how their lips may profess friendship when their countenance discloses envy. No man who has enjoyed royal favour thinks that it can rightly pass to a successor. When he has lost it, all that he does is blamed.

His Ripe
Experience
and Theory

Governorships remove their holders from explosions of royal wrath. None the less, they are a kind of usurpation, and the King may at any time dismiss their holders. Appointment to rule the state is like a death sentence, except that the former is due to merit and the latter to crime.

The first duty of the governor, Richelieu declared, is to give himself wholly to the public. He, who died the wealthiest man in France, laid it down in February, 1629, that he ought to seek his fortune only in the enrichment of the state. A

minister who does his utmost for his master has much to fear from failure: still more one who for his own profit has neglected the public interest. If he succeeds, however, much private gain may be allowed. He should listen much and speak little, take risks when much is at stake, and regard the censure of evil-doers as his real praise. While he should think only of his master's interests, the master must consider his own.

Medicine and
Statecraft

From medicine, which the Cardinal respected, he drew an interesting analogy with statecraft. Most of the Spanish conquests had been effected by Viceroy, and, as the doctor's share in a cure surpasses that of the apothecary or surgeon, he who forms and contrives a great design deserves more glory than he who carries it out. A few weeks before his death, he said that all great rulers identified ill-will against their chief ministers with indifference towards themselves.

His
Patriotism

In spite of all her shortcomings, failure to breed tolerable successors to the Great Henry chief among them, it was France that inspired his life. 'France', he maintained, 'has always clearly shown that she would make no truce or peace apart from her allies.' 'Whatever may befall, it will never change the immemorial will of France for the repose of Christianity.' 'France desires only what she can claim with justice.' 'This warlike nation has always been the support of oppressed princes.' These were his axioms in his last years, when he longed with unspeakable passion for the end of the war, and was not afraid to pray God to punish those who obstructed peace. At the same time, he was ready to chastise those who said as much in public, since their discourse could not fail to encourage Spain, and to demoralize the weaker allies of France. To guard the peace when made, he advocated a general league of Christendom for several years, during which all should be bound to combat any breach of its provisions.

Richelieu
and
Henry IV

The accession of the great Cardinal to power in April, 1624, plainly signified a reversion to the policy of Henry IV in Europe. The converted Huguenot and the promoted churchman were at one in setting royal power above religion, and in regarding Habsburgism as the enemy to be combated at any cost. The fourteen years which had passed since Henry's death, however, had necessarily altered the con-

ditions under which his work could be resumed. Domestic discords had not completely neutralized the natural tendency towards improvement. But subjects who are gaining wealth often grow less obedient, and as the memory of the great deliverer faded, the monarchy was certain to lose in inspiration. A dull foreign queen-mother, seditious princes, tyrannical favourites, a barren Spanish queen, a shy and wooden king—how could these make good the loss of Henry?

The French, indeed, were a nation prone to monarchy, France and the rise of monarchy had long been the mainspring and Monarchy the measure of their own. But monarchy itself, we must remember, was still an institution far less powerful than that which, thanks to Richelieu, the following generation was to know. That truth was incarnate in the Edict of Nantes, and in the spectacle of great French generals fighting against the Crown. Mr. Belloc has well stressed three of the greatest differences between French monarchy as Richelieu found it and as it later became. In his day, the administration of justice and both local and central government were only indirectly connected with the Crown. The influence due to the highest of courts and the most pervasive of patrons had not yet been acquired by the King. The armed force of the nation, indeed, when assembled, was wielded by him, but the nation was seldom so assembled. Even when summoned in his name, the regiments were mustered, equipped, and paid by their own commanders. The royal revenue from taxes, moreover, as the history of English shipmoney demonstrated, was capricious and exceptional. The enrichment of the Crown was perhaps Richelieu's greatest contribution towards the ascendancy of France.

By contrast with Henry, however, Richelieu could not escape from twin defects over which his triumph may well be the most convincing proof of his greatness. He was not good-humoured, and he was not the King. Henry had proved a hundred times the power of gaiety in winning disaffected Frenchmen. Richelieu could penetrate their characters and motives, but he lacked the light touch and the human sympathy which could gain their hearts. A grim realist, toiling always beyond his strength, he might secure allies and instruments, but could hardly hope for friends. Ministers, moreover, roused the resentment of most

Frenchmen, and the jealousy of all who felt that, if the King wished for a deputy, his choice should fall upon themselves. These commonly included all the Princes of the Blood and most *grandeecs*. Richelieu's ill-wishers, moreover, could not but be encouraged by the peculiar inscrutability of the King. Louis had certainly begun by disliking the stern and intrusive Cardinal, and Richelieu, in turn, was long uncertain whether the King would not rid himself of the complaints of his relatives by dismissing his detested servant. That, after more than six years in office, his downfall should be taken for granted on the Day of Dupes (November 11, 1630) shows the handicap which he must bear. Even if he could become convinced of his master's selfish steadfastness, the frail King's support was based upon a life which might prove shorter than his own.

Outlook
in 1624

In April, 1624, then, Richelieu wielded an imperfect and uncertain power in a threatening France and Europe. To draw up a comprehensive inelastic plan would have been the height of folly. But, as we have seen, he possessed well-matured ideas of what France needed at home and abroad, and firm principles as to how he must serve the Crown. First and foremost stood the need of checking Spain, where Olivarez had achieved a dangerous revival. The expanding German war and the anomalous policy of England added a score of baffling complications, only less challenging than the latent rebellion of the Huguenots. All the problems confronting France were concentrated for a moment in the Valtelline, a territory linking Milan with Tyrol and lately occupied by Spain. This valley of the Adda, northward of Lake Como, has been justly styled in 1624 the most important geographical point in Europe. Peopled by Catholics, but owned by the Protestant Grisons, it had lately been stained by 'a sort of minor St. Bartholomew', which on religious grounds could hardly pass unavenged. Protestant powers, indeed, dwelt far away, but France, Savoy and Venice often ranked as politically Protestant, especially as against the Habsburgs.

The
Valtelline
and the
Huguenots

Thus it came about that the Valtelline, where Richelieu found papal troops in occupation, constituted a key-position in the struggle for expansion and mutual envelopment between France and Spain. In Catholic hands, it enabled Spaniards and Austrians to unite without Savoyard acquiescence. It

also formed a link between the dominions of Spain in Italy and in Franche Comté and the Netherlands, thus menacing the expansion and even the security of France. Together with the problem of the doubtful succession to Mantua, it raised the whole question of hegemony, perhaps even of monopoly, in Italy.

Late in 1624, Richelieu contrived to expel the papal troops from the Valtelline without a breach with Spain. Such a breach, indeed, must have been fatal to a minister who had no power comparable with the Spanish at his back, and in the Queen-Mother a patron to whom Spain was an idol. The Huguenots, moreover, might at this time have been described by a formula the converse of that which was often applied to the Cardinal. Fearing above all things a strengthened monarchy, they were Protestant at home, but, in their influence, Catholic abroad. Through the year 1625, while the Danish King swayed the German struggle, Richelieu must array the forces of Louis and his Protestant allies to subdue the mutinous Protestants of France. This painful renewal of the French religious wars originated in a direct attack by the Huguenots upon the Crown, whose ships they seized within a Breton harbour.

Early next year (1626), both wars were ended, but on terms which showed the straits of Richelieu's government. Substantially, the rebellious Huguenots lost little beyond some lives and property, destroyed in their unsuccessful campaign. Spain, by a treaty agreed on at Monzon in Aragon under papal influence, consented to the destruction of her forts in the Valtelline, and to the restoration of the French right of way. But the joint guarantee by Spain and France of the Catholics in the valley could not be welcome to Savoy and Venice, since, without an energetic stand by France, North Italy must find Spain overwhelming. The Monzon treaty signified that Richelieu was still too weak, both in the court and in the country, to dare a major crisis, and, above all, that the treasury of France could not support a fresh campaign. On the other hand, the fact that in Henrietta Maria England now had a French queen might well add strength to her brother, Louis XIII.

From the treaty of Monzon to the Day of Dupes, that is, from May, 1626 to November, 1630, the fate of Europe

The
Valtelline
and the
German War

Intrigues
in France

was bound up with the manifold intrigues in France. Gaston of Orleans, Henry's worthless younger son, some of the great King's bastards, Luynes' widow, Mlle de Montpensier, the great Bourbon heiress, eventually, once again, the Queen-Mother—such were the chief ingredients in a cauldron which never ceased to threaten the Cardinal's power and life. His antidotes were unceasing vigilance by himself and his well-chosen spies, a just appraisement of all the moves and forces of foreign powers, and the maintenance of an impressive efficiency and reserve, which might sustain his influence with the King. The Day of Dupes may have proved that while Louis lived, the authority of Richelieu could not be broken, but in the meantime the Edict of Restitution (1629) had revealed the Emperor as triumphant in the field of Europe. With Denmark abased, England futile and becoming anti-French, the German Calvinists crushed, and the greatest of her Lutherans immovable, who was to stem the mounting Catholic tide?

The great Cardinal would not hesitate, when his hour had come. He had already struck down one conspiracy, and had received, both from Louis and from an Assembly of Notables, assurances of support. At midsummer, 1627, however, a new storm had threatened to overwhelm him. While Louis, still childless, lay sick, Buckingham launched against France the English fleet, the Huguenots and Lorraine, with Savoy and Venice waiting the appropriate moment to join the coalition, and Spain not the less dangerous because a nominal ally. The great fortress of La Rochelle seemed to be doomed, but Richelieu's energy gained a long-drawn but glorious victory. Before this could be achieved, indeed, he learned that the Queen-Mother had come out against him, that the war of the Mantuan Succession had begun, and that the important fortress of Casale was in peril from the troops of Spain.

Richelieu's
Triumphs,
1628-9

The capture of La Rochelle at the end of October, 1628, and the conveyance of the King to Italy in March, 1629, formed the most glorious chapter in Richelieu's career. Boldly refusing to be immobilized by the Huguenots and the malcontents of the court, at the moment of the Emperor's greatest triumph he defied the armaments of Spain. By legal right, the French Duke of Nevers had

succeeded to the Duchy of Mantua and the Marquisate of Montferrat, thus establishing French power in two key-points of northern Italy. Rival claimants, however, appeared, among them for Montferrat the Savoyard Duke, and Spain attacked the vital fortress of Casale. But, by their bold march, Richelieu and Louis terrified Charles Emanuel into joining them—a move which saved Casale, and set them free to throw their strength against the Huguenots once more.

The character of seemingly 'religious' wars could not be better shown, nor the Cardinal more amply vindicated, than by the fact that in 1629 the Huguenots were close allies of Spain. In return for Philip's subsidies and soldiers, they stood pledged to decline a separate peace, and to tolerate Catholicism in the independent state of which they dreamed. By terror in attack and moderation in his demands, however, Richelieu swiftly ended both the war and the independence. The treaty of Alais, northward of Nîmes (June, 1629), made the Huguenots normal citizens of France, with entire freedom of religion.

Thus fortified in France and Italy, at peace with England, and admirably served by two great diplomats, Father Joseph ^{Outlook in 1629} and Charnacé, Richelieu might hope to give France strength enough to check the Emperor, without a clash with Spain. Even the Queen-Mother, who had long ceased to be his ally, admitted that her son still needed 'the yellow-faced arrogant invalid' for his foreign policy. In September, he had gained a pregnant success by effecting a truce at Altmark between the Swedes and Poles. But much remained to be done before France could strike for her own interests at the Habsburgs, to whom those interests were poison. At court, the Cardinal had bitter enemies, notably Gaston, who now sought shelter and influence in Lorraine. More urgent still, the Spaniards were again at work on Mantua. It was reckoned that they had 18,000 of their invincibles in Milan, and that the Emperor, shocked at the French intrusion, was sending some 27,000 more. Savoy declared for their alliance. No wonder that at the year's end Richelieu, wielding the fullest powers, was quitting Paris for the war, and that he even secured exemption from that daily reading of the breviary which marked his priestly office.

Trials and
Triumph
of 1630

Thus 1630, a great epoch in the German war, became for Richelieu the hardest in all his life. Stroke after stroke bore witness to his immense exertions. Again he conveyed his King to a distant battle-field. The Cardinal began by seizing Pinerolo on Easter Sunday. Louis continued by conquering Savoy and entering Italy. Then, however, he fled from plague to Lyons, and Richelieu dared not let him go alone. In July, while Spinola attacked Casale, the Emperor's troops took Mantua. Then Charles Emanuel died, and his son, swayed by his marriage with a French princess, though remaining nominally hostile, prepared for a change of side. A fateful intervention proved to be that of the future Cardinal Mazarin, as agent of Pope Urban's mediation before Savoy was conquered. Richelieu took his measure, with incalculable consequences for France. It was Mazarin who now, early in September, arranged for a six weeks' truce.

While the complex and fluctuating Italian war thus paused, however, new and great struggles raged beyond the Alps. The epoch-making advent of King Gustavus in Germany, prompted in part by Richelieu, had taken place in June. The Electoral Diet of Ratisbon, influenced by Richelieu through Father Joseph, had followed in July. The Diet, thanks in great measure to Richelieu's diplomacy, refused to appoint the Emperor's son as his successor, while Ferdinand was driven to dismiss his own great general, Wallenstein, and to hand over the command to Tilly, who obeyed the Catholic League. The cause of Richelieu, in whom the Catholic Princes saw an ally against a usurping Emperor, thus triumphed in Germany so amply as to draw success in Italy in its train. Cramped and lamed at Ratisbon, and invaded from Sweden, Ferdinand could do no more beyond the Alps, and the Habsburg campaign collapsed. An agreement signed at Ratisbon, perhaps too readily, by Richelieu's agents, saved Casale, and entitled the French to profit from Mantua and the Valtelline. It gave Mazarin the occasion for the most spectacular act of his career, for he flung himself between the armies to proclaim their warfare at an end.

A fortnight later, on November 11, Richelieu passed equally unscathed through a still greater danger, the so-called

Day of Dupes. So marked was his superiority to his would-be rivals, that he could not hope to fall from power and yet remain alive, inevitably imperilling his successors. Since his appointment in 1624, indeed, the Cardinal had amply proved his greatness both in peace and war. Despite the confusion and weakness of France, he had given England a French rather than a Spanish queen. He had crushed the Huguenot rebellion, intervened successfully in Italy, reached an understanding with the Pope, and prepared to launch the Sweden of Gustavus Adolphus against the triumphant Empire. But not even he could retain the support of the Queen-Mother, that egotistic Catholic fanatic, together with that of the ailing King, who esteemed but could not love him. In the autumn of 1630, many of the royal family and of the magnates were confident that in a few weeks Louis would be dead, Richelieu executed, and the worthless Gaston of Orleans married to his brother's widow, Anne of Austria, and steered by the Queen-Mother.

This *débâcle* for Richelieu and for France was averted by two of those accidents which mock our view of history as an ordered evolution. At the end of September, after the King had been prepared for death, an abscess burst and his immediate peril was dispelled. Richelieu could therefore venture to disavow a French ambassador who had accepted a treaty with the Emperor. But the Queen-Mother, who had nursed her son in his illness, now felt her influence strong enough to demand that Richelieu be cashiered. Confident that she would convince her son, who had refused to receive the Cardinal, she arranged for a private interview in Paris. By her command, no third person was to be admitted, and every door to the conference-room must be made fast. Unaided, the King might well have lacked the strength to resist her. A moment more, it seemed, would change the fate of Europe. The downfall of Christian IV and the issue of the Edict of Restitution had shown the strength of the Habsburgs and of the Counter-reformation. The fall of La Rochelle had shown the weakness of the Huguenots. Add French to Habsburg monarchy, and Protestantism might have been swept at least from Continental Europe.

But, as the Queen-Mother lamented, one obscure entrance

The Day
of Dupes

to their chamber had been forgotten, and this Richelieu found unsecured. The most punctilious of royal servants, he was moved by the boundless danger to defy his master's prohibition and to enter. At the sight of her enemy the Queen-Mother broke into wild abuse, until the King's inborn dignity drove him from the palace. With Louis thus unapproachable, and Richelieu meditating flight, however, the Queen-Mother and all the court believed that the hated Cardinal had lost the day, and they did not conceal their expectations. But a royal summons to Richelieu which, they supposed, heralded the *coup de grâce*, signified in reality the triumph of Louis' good sense and gratitude. Reproaching his incomparable servant for offering to resign his post, the King ascribed his mother's conduct to evil counsellors, and called for renewed collaboration.

The
Swedish
Alliance

The triumphant Cardinal did not spare his foes. Within a few months, the rival ministers were imprisoned or put to death, the Queen-Mother banished, and Gaston a fugitive in Lorraine. In January, 1631, by the treaty of Barwalde, Sweden became the ally of France. Thus heartened, the German Protestants united with the Swedes and with each other, while the sack of Magdeburg by Tilly's Catholics was answered by the triumph at Breitenfeld, where, as it seemed, the Almighty had embraced the Reformation. In November, Prague fell into Saxon hands. Meanwhile French politics had prospered in Italy also. Thanks in no small degree to Richelieu, France had swiftly advanced towards the day when she could match her forces with those of Spain and become the arbiter of Germany. In 1632, moreover, Richelieu put down Gaston's revolt, not sparing Montmorency, the proudest scion of the ancient nobility of France. For a full decade more the Cardinal was destined to make France and his royal master great, while the unlooked for birth of sons to Louis safeguarded the dynastic future. By that time, the Habsburgs were exhausted and the French well on the way to military power. Richelieu's own authority was emphasized by the new dignity of 'Cardinal-Duke'. Henceforward, so long as Louis reigned, he need fear only assassination or failure.

CHAPTER XI

THE GERMAN WAR: SCANDINAVIAN PHASES, 1625-1632

WHILE Richelieu was on the way to transform European politics by creating a new French power, the monarchy of Scandinavia successively intervened to protect the German Protestants against the Habsburgs, and to gain security or aggrandizement for themselves. In 1625, Christian IV of Denmark engaged in his great adventure. King Christian, a German Duke in Holstein and head of the Lower Saxon Circle, was a man of exuberant vitality, beloved by masses of his subjects whether Danish, German or Norwegian. In earlier days the husband of a Brandenburg princess and victorious over the rival House of Sweden, he used the German struggle to seek aggrandizement in Germany, Bremen and Verden, promising control of important waterways, were secured for his younger sons. By his energy he then impelled the Danes to a war from which they saw little hope of gain. This very year (1625) indeed, the Protestant cause suffered a triple rebuff, for the English failed by land and sea, a Huguenot uprising was suppressed and, after a long siege, Spinola recovered Breda from the Dutch. Most ominous of all, a new factor on the Imperial side appeared in the person of Count Albert Wallenstein.

That mysterious Catholic hero of the war was a noble Wallenstein Czech of Jesuit education. Enabled by profitable speculation in confiscated Protestant estates to raise a private army, Wallenstein chose to devote it to rescuing the Emperor from his dependence on the Catholic League. But, as time went on, it became ever more apparent that the condition of rescue must be the adoption by Ferdinand of statesmanlike toleration. The prescription, however—a masterful but tolerant monarchy—was to the taste neither of the zealot Emperor nor of the ambitious Catholic princes, and less than a decade proved Wallenstein too great for his generation.

Danes and
Swedes

In 1625, however, when some 25,000 Danes menaced Germany while the Swedes abased the Catholic Sigismund in Poland, the danger from Wallenstein to his employers could not be foreseen. All that was evident was that, without expense to the indigent Ferdinand, a new army had appeared beside the forces of the League. Next summer (1626), while Gustavus invaded Polish Prussia, the two victorious Catholic armies made their junction. Wallenstein had triumphed over Mansfeld at the Dessau Bridge, westward from Luther's Wittenberg, and Tilly, amid the western hills, smote Christian himself at Lutter. Such a defeat was doubly demoralizing to a king who believed that Christ in person had bidden him proceed. It was followed, in 1627, by the irresistible invasion of Holstein, of Slesvig and of the whole peninsula of Jutland. For the moment, Danish sea-power shielded the great Danish islands and Copenhagen against the invaders. But Wallenstein was full of plans for a Catholic fleet which should dominate the Baltic, and his enthusiasm was shared by the Emperor and by the King of Spain. Habsburg sea-power would threaten the very existence of Protestantism, the more dangerously that England had shown herself too weak to send Christian the promised aid. Only the Baltic fortress of Stralsund stood between the Catholic conqueror and mastery of all the Hansard coast, and Wallenstein, ambitious both for himself and for the Emperor, swore that he would take the city, though it were chained to Heaven.

Their common peril banished for the moment the secular antagonism of the Scandinavian powers. In the autumn of 1627, the Swedish Diet met. It showed that Gustavus and his free people were at one. They formed a secret committee to strengthen his hands in combating what they recognized as a mortal challenge to the north. 'With Denmark for Baltic freedom' was a policy in which the Swedes and their sovereign heartily agreed. In 1628, despite the claims of the unfinished war in Polish Prussia, Gustavus sent help both to Christian and to Stralsund. In part provoked by this, however, the enemy resorted to measures which transformed the character of the whole war.

The Peace
of Lübeck,
1629

Early in 1629, Christian was astonished and allured by the prospect of what he justly termed a golden peace. To detach the Danish king from Sweden and to emancipate

himself from dependence upon the League, Ferdinand, by this Peace of Lübeck, returned the conquered provinces. At the same time, the Catholic victory—for the Danish irruption into Germany had failed—was celebrated by a resounding demonstration of Imperial power. The Edict of Restitution published in March, 1629, may with reason be regarded as an outstanding landmark in the war.

The Peace of Augsburg, as we have seen, had attempted to stereotype the religious situation of 1555. Since men were concerned about their souls, and princes also about their revenues and powers, this arrangement could hardly last for ever. It was much that in the Empire the Thirty Years War should be preceded by sixty years of religious peace. Few Protestants could refrain from secularizing and appropriating Catholic funds which none of their Catholic subjects survived to enjoy. The most active of the Protestants, those who followed Calvin, had gained no rights by the Peace, and could not be expected to revere it. But there were also many Lutherans who, consciously though perhaps reasonably, had infringed the settlement, and whom Ferdinand in his weaker days had left undisturbed. Now he used his new-found strength to proclaim a return to the status of 1552—a moment at which Catholic holdings were even greater than at Augsburg.

Although the ordinance was not at first applied to John George of Saxony and other Lutherans, it was rumoured that they would soon be attacked, and that Catholic rights would be restored to what they had been when Luther rose. What the Protestants had peacefully enjoyed for three-quarters of a century, it seemed, would be confiscated for the use of Catholics, of whom there might be none in their dominions. 'Besides the almost incalculable number of religious houses, no less than two archbishoprics and twelve bishoprics, hitherto in the undisputed possession of Protestants and inhabited by an exclusively Protestant population, were at stake' (Winter).

Staggering as it might seem, the Edict of Restitution was no mere parchment proclamation. Issued by an Emperor who strove to banish every Protestant from his own estates, it was swiftly executed by Catholic commissioners, including many ecclesiastics. Behind them stood the victorious

Catholic armies, and the refusal of Magdeburg to obey brought Wallenstein himself against her. For three years, until, as it seemed, 'God Himself' turned Lutheran', the enforcement of the Edict went on. Though still postponed in its application to Lutheran princes, John George chief among them, it gave the contending forces a watchword in the next period of the war.

'The
Swedish
Period'

That period comprised the years 1630 to 1635, and by common consent is entitled 'Swedish'. It was the most glorious, eventful and decisive. The glory comes chiefly from the hero Gustavus Adolphus, the 'Golden King' of his adoring Swedes, who was at once a people's monarch, a brilliant warrior, a far-sighted statesman and a devoted follower of Christ. Perhaps no king in any country has ever equalled him in making the monarchy the embodiment of the nation. He perceived the weaknesses and perils of the Swedes, and averted them by conduct modest, bold and wise—meeting his people face to face for counsel, crowning their ancient freedom with new institutions, making regiments national, well-trained and well-provided, and himself sincerely Lutheran. Born in December, 1594, brought up to struggle with Poles, Muscovites and Danes, King in 1611, and, since 1625, invader and conqueror in Polish Prussia, he had learned both to lead an army and to plan a feasible campaign. Experience and innate genius alike enabled him to face the odds which confront a population so sparse as that of Sweden.

Europe
in 1630

The years of Christian's disastrous intervention had altered the conditions of any further opposition to the victorious Emperor. England, which in 1630 made peace with Spain, was absorbed in her own domestic troubles. It was therefore easier for Richelieu to repress the Huguenots, although they received financial help from Spain. The fall of their stronghold, La Rochelle, in 1628, proved irreparable, and Richelieu was free to uphold in Italy that French influence which Spain was determined to oppose. The succession in Mantua of a French Duke had provoked a host of counter-claimants, with the Emperor as suzerain intervening. Spain posed as his agent, and purchased the alliance of Savoy. The allies laid siege to Casale, but in January, 1629, Louis XIII and Richelieu, defying the winter, set out to succour its brave defenders. This they accomplished by

Changes
Outside
Germany

THE SWEDISH PERIOD 1630-1635



STANFORD, LONDON

vanquishing the forces of Savoy, and the war of the Mantuan Succession ended with a French triumph. Meanwhile the power of France was augmented by the withdrawal of the political privileges which the Huguenots had gained by the Edict of Nantes. Deprived of their cities of refuge, the French Protestants were in future to owe their religious freedom to the will of their lawful king.

Swedish
War with
Poland

While Christian IV was an adventurer, Gustavus was a statesman, trained both in war and politics by study and experience since childhood. In 1622, the true magnitude of his war with Poland had become apparent. The Polish struggle with the Turks was over, and, after losing many men, he failed to relieve or to reconquer Mitau. Three years of truce with Poland followed, while James I chose Christian rather than the more exacting Gustavus as the champion of the Reformation force in Germany. While the Danish King was marching to defeat, his Swedish rival could throw all his forces against Poland, this time with swift and wide success (1625). In January, 1626, at Wallhof, south of Riga, he gained a crushing triumph, fighting for the first time a pitched battle with his novel tactics. The Finnish cavalry on the right wing charged, with the support of the musketeers on foot, and the Poles fled in disorder. Livonia thus gained a rare repose. At the end of the century, through the agency of Patkul, she was to teach a Swedish king who lacked Gustavus' wisdom what disaster might follow the doctrinaire incorporation of an alien province overseas. Now, however, the transfer of the great estates to Oxenstierna and other Swedish magnates and respect for local custom, was sound policy, while measures to educate the Baltic Provinces, culminating in the foundation of Dorpat (Tartu) university in 1632, excelled what any other conqueror in that age attempted.

Influence of
German War

In 1626, the Polish war came to be inevitably shaped and swayed by the greater German struggle. Gustavus already felt what the downfall of Christian's intervention soon made clearer—that 'the papal deluge' was approaching Sweden's shores. From the Düna and the Neva, he transferred his attack towards the Vistula and the German border. His marriage in 1620 with a sentimental princess of Brandenburg had made him the brother-in-law of George William,

perhaps the weakest of the Hohenzollern Electors. This Calvinist prince held Lutheran East Prussia as a fief of Catholic Poland, and, in the mounting tempest of religious war, wished only to be left in peace. Gustavus, however, was intent upon securing the flank of the new attack which in 1626 he launched upon Polish West Prussia. He therefore bade his kinsman add to the fox's brush the lion's skin—advice which added point to his seizure, 'as a friend' and with East Prussian sympathy, of Pillau, the port of Königsberg, the ducal capital, renamed Kalningrad in 1946.

In West, 'Royal' or 'Polish' Prussia, Gustavus enjoyed Campaigns of 1626-9 in 1626 something like a triumphal progress. Jesuit Braunsberg, the focus of the Polish Counter-reformation, and Frauenburg, the near-by workshop of Copernicus, with many other towns, submitted, while the invader secured himself and menaced Danzig by a characteristic fortified camp at Dirschau (Tchew). Rich spoils taken from the Catholics were sent to Sweden. Danzig, however, the great Hansard city with its independent traditions and private army, steadfastly defied him, while Sigismund, buoyed up by Christian's German failure, refused any peace-terms that the Swedes could entertain. Gustavus, though thus balked of full success, had at least achieved experience, glory and a solid base. His enemy was not Poland but her king, and the Poles were wearying of the dynastic struggle.

The campaign of 1627 brought the Swedish King severe wounds and a few victories, chiefly at the expense of the Elector, whom he forced to desist from opposition. Danzig remained untaken, and, thanks to Sigismund, mediation failed. Wallenstein was now planning his Catholic Baltic Empire, while Sweden, inevitably his next target, became the Protestants' only hope. The English were divided; the Danes, defeated; the Lutheran Electors, seemingly immovable. In 1628, Sweden and Protestantism seemed to be at stake together.

At this crisis, Gustavus left no stone unturned to discover a means of bringing Sigismund to reason. He made one alliance with defeated Denmark, another with besieged Stralsund, raised his army to 33,000, attacked the Polish fleet in the Vistula, and vainly strove to entice the Poles to battle. Early next year (February, 1629) his deputy,

Wrangel, routed the enemy, but failed to take Thorn, while the Poles received great reinforcements from Wallenstein. Gustavus himself imperilled his life in a fourth campaign in Prussia, but with no more success than before. Such were the heroic but by no means triumphant preliminaries to a bargain which swiftly transformed the history of Europe.

Truce
of 1629

For, if Gustavus had failed to conquer, Sigismund had also failed, and now stood in the greater danger. Some of his lands had been appropriated by the foe, whose fortified camps defied all his endeavours. His subjects clamoured for peace, and Ferdinand, his ally, could not be trusted to respect his sovereign rights. The foreign mediators, with Richelieu's envoy Charnacé at their head, therefore found it easy to arrange a six years truce at Altmark, near the eastern outflow of the Vistula (September, 1629). Although when the envoys met neither side would be the first to speak, Sigismund recognized his Swedish rival as king, and agreed that Livonia and four important Prussian towns¹ should remain his. All other conquests were returned. Organized as a separate province under Oxenstierna, the ceded ports gave Sweden a large income from their customs dues, swelled as these were by similar dues from Danzig, Libau and Windau. Thus enriched, and guaranteed against attack by Brandenburg, Danzig and West Prussia, Gustavus could turn against the triumphant Emperor on German soil.

Race and
Religion

Before we follow Gustavus to Germany in 1630, we may note that his earlier wars give powerful aid to the student in estimating the contemporary values of Religion and of Race. It must not be forgotten that in these, as in most European wars, foreign mercenaries took a considerable share. But the savage struggle between Swedes and Danes was chiefly fought between Scandinavian Lutherans who could understand each other's language. Each was eager to annex the other's land, in the well-warranted expectation that the conquered inhabitants would not hesitate to change their allegiance. Christian IV was already lord of the Norwegian nation and of many Germans, while Gustavus had inherited the ancient and alien domain of Finland.

The Polish struggle, less venomous but more enduring, was of a different type. While Gustavus had acted as,

¹ Elbing, Braunsberg, Pillau and Memel, with their districts.

above all, a national king, Christian had imported a dynastic tinge and a greater reliance upon foreign hirelings. But to the Poles Sigismund was the monarch elected by a jealous aristocracy. His dynastic war against Sweden became in part a Catholic crusade, and in part a struggle to defend Poland's prestige and Polish fiefs of great value. As king, however, he could neither inspire his armies nor his people. Gustavus was father of his Swedes as well as a notable innovator in warfare. Technically, his innovations have been summarized as limiting the use of cavalry to shock tactics, sheltering the musketeers with pikemen while they reloaded, and contriving to treble the volume of cannonfire. But he may be deemed 'the first modern to blend the three elemental principles, security, mobility and offensive action' (Hart). While these new tactics of Gustavus also counted for much, his personality goes far towards explaining why the Swedes could fight successfully beyond the Baltic against a proud and warlike people far richer and more numerous than themselves.

The racial contrasts which perplex the twentieth century The Racial Factor were nowhere more pronounced or less effective than in the battlefield of the warring Swedes and Poles. Estonia, which the Swedes acquired in 1561, and Livonia, the new and rich prize of King Gustavus, were both alien colonies, still, for several centuries, to be owned and ruled by the descendants of their German conquerors. Their languages were unintelligible to Poles or Swedes or Germans or to each other. Their religion was what their masters chose to make it. Among them the Reformation, by establishing a married clergy, worked an important social change, for it created a class of educated and industrious Baltic Germans. But, through many changes of allegiance, Estonians and Letts dwelt side by side, with the town of Valka on the sharp dividing-line between them, until the twentieth century, homaging the doctrine of Race, enabled them for a few years at long last to prove their real worth by independence.

The advent of Gustavus in Germany, at midsummer Day of Dupes 1630, was attended by two further changes in the politics of Europe. Of these one enhanced the power of France and the other menaced that of the Emperor. Louis' brother, the Duke of Orleans, and his mother, who was devoted to

Spain and to the Church, turned against Richelieu and produced the famous Day of Dupes, November 11, 1630, when Paris believed that the Cardinal's rule was over. The outcome was the abasement of Richelieu's rivals and the strengthening of that monarchic unity which has always been the chief necessity of France.

Fate of
Wallenstein

Meanwhile, in Germany the Emperor showed himself unable to support the architect of his own novel greatness. Wallenstein, now Duke of Mecklenburg, was creating an Imperial military power which threatened to reduce all other forces and potentates to insignificance. Ferdinand possessed in full measure the hereditary Habsburg gift of ingratitude, while his general was free from the bigotry which was the Emperor's passion. The outcry of Maximilian and other potentates who felt that Wallenstein robbed them of their due importance could not lack influence upon a father who needed their help in establishing his son in the Imperial succession, and who chafed under his general's restraining hand. Church and State combined to depose Wallenstein, and he made no effort to preserve his power. His army was united with that of Tilly.

Gustavus
in Germany,
1630-2

Gustavus, meanwhile, had been aided by Richelieu to adjourn the struggle with Poland on good terms, and he entered Germany far better trained and supported than his Danish predecessor. Yet he came without a single ally in what, if it could be prolonged, would be the first truly European war—a David challenging the Goliath of Habsburg world-dominion. It could be argued, indeed, that with the Peace of Lübeck the German war had ended. The insurgent Protestants and their would-be saviour had failed, and the remaining Protestants had no desire to take up arms. Gustavus had striven in vain to induce Christian to decline the Lübeck peace, to secure the aid of Bethlen Gabor, now his wife's brother-in-law, and to win from France an alliance on equal terms. But he had convinced his own people that Sweden must conquer or perish; he had swelled their forces to some 76,000 men, more than half of whom were natives, and a solid fleet; and he might reasonably expect that the victims of Catholic and Habsburg aggression would not leave their would-be deliverer quite unaided. It was easy for German Lutherans to regard their Swedish brother as a

heaven-sent deliverer, and not a few miraculous tokens of divine favour for Gustavus were noised abroad among the people. At midsummer, with 13,000 men, he knelt upon the soil of Usedom. The Protestant crusade had begun.

A chequered twelvemonth was yet to pass before the Swedes fully revealed their strength. From the day of the invasion, however, they showed an energy, a purpose and a discipline which might supply the place of numbers. They set themselves first to make their base impregnable and then to seize successive German river-lines, the railways or motor-highways of that age. Before Gustavus came, the Swedish garrison of Stralsund had conquered the adjacent isle of Rügen. The King added Usedom and Wollin, while his 13,000 followers swelled to more than 40,000. The aged and pacific Duke of Pomerania, Bogislav XIV, was forced to admit the Swedes to Stettin, and himself to quit the country. But by comparison with what the Catholics had achieved, these were remote successes, and the great Protestants, Saxony and Brandenburg, were not disposed to side with foreign invaders against their Emperor. Where the well-disciplined Swedes took possession, the German people welcomed them as Lutheran brethren, but their feelings had no influence upon the princes. In his cavalier dealings with Pomerania, on the other hand, Gustavus was interfering with a duchy which Brandenburg expected to inherit.

Early in 1631, however, the tide seemed to flow more strongly in Sweden's favour. Soon after Gustavus landed, the Catholics had shown their indifference to a threat which they rated as less even than the Danish by dismissing Wallenstein, thus halving the Catholic army. At the same time Magdeburg, a Free City, and that the greatest and strongest in northern Germany, was brought by its Administrator to league itself with Gustavus. Force might perhaps give him the Oder; conviction hinted that through Magdeburg he could hope soon to gain the Elbe. All his strategy was swayed in that direction.

January, 1631, brought the Protestants an ally which was to prove far greater than the Pomerania or Magdeburg which they had gained or the Saxony and Brandenburg which they might hope for. Richelieu, now master of the Huguenots, and triumphant at the Day of Dupes, had done

Swedish
Triumphs,
1631

French
Alliance

much through Father Joseph to move the Diet against Wallenstein. Next, through Charnacé, he achieved a Franco-Swedish alliance. The French, seeking a catspaw against the Habsburgs, were wise enough to accept the jealous King's demand for full equality, naming the two powers first by turns in the agreement and not insisting on the secrecy of this pact with heretics. The treaty negotiated at Barwalde, in eastern Brandenburg southward from Stettin, pledged Sweden to five years of war, with a force of 36,000 men, France paying a great annual sum towards their maintenance. Germany was eventually to be restored, and her Catholics from the first to enjoy toleration. Bavaria, the friend of France, must remain inviolate. Such a compact between Catholics and Protestants lowered the claims of both camps to be crusaders. France, a power tolerant but Catholic, clearly sought political gains, and Sweden, an intolerant Protestant aiming at lands in Germany, became her associate. While to Sweden Denmark showed herself less friendly than of late, Catholic Venice, the Calvinist Dutch and Anglican England all soon offered help.

What Gustavus lacked was any general movement of the German Protestant princes in his favour. Lukewarmness or worse remained the characteristic of both Saxony and Brandenburg. A Protestant conclave at Leipzig debated from February until early April without reconciling Lutherans and Calvinists, or forming an effective league of princes. A few resolute men, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the Dukes William and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, left Leipzig in disgust and went home to arm. The remainder, with their quivering neutrality and protests against Restitution, only encouraged Ferdinand, who looked forward to an Empire wholly Catholic, but their manifest contempt for Gustavus warned the King to rely only upon himself. While the veteran Tilly assembled the scattered Catholic forces, Gustavus strove to join with those of threatened Magdeburg.

Fall of
Magdeburg

The strategic complications of a winter campaign gave Gustavus the mastery of the Baltic coast and promised him the line of the Oder. To draw off the besiegers of Magdeburg, he threatened Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and early in April took it by storm, not without rape and pillage. The weighty river-line was thus in Swedish hands, and the road to Berlin

lay open. But the news that Frankfort was lost caused Tilly to retrace his steps, and to strain every nerve to master the key-fortress of Magdeburg before the Swedes could arrive there. His strongest aid was the seemingly invincible neutrality of the two Electors, which made a Swedish march to Magdeburg too hazardous for Gustavus to undertake. By May, the besieged citizens were clamouring for surrender. Gustavus, by force and threats, gained the alliance of Brandenburg, but Saxony remained obdurate. The Elector neither desired nor dared to join a foreign intruder against the Emperor. On May 20, Magdeburg was captured by storm. The Catholics, shouting 'Jesu and Mary', had taken the defenders by surprise.

Ten stern campaigns had already brought untold suffering to the Germans, but the tale of Magdeburg horrified all Europe. Despite all that Tilly could do, the victors looted, raped and slaughtered until the city, with its wooden dwellings, was suddenly and mysteriously destroyed by fire. The fire, which the soldiers combated in vain, robbed the prize of its value as a base and treasure-house. It also increased the bitterness of the struggle, and went far towards making German neutrality impossible. A month later, by marching into Berlin and threatening his brother-in-law with cannon, Gustavus gained the fortresses of Brandenburg and her alliance. Tilly, who meanwhile had vainly menaced Hesse, and who was in urgent need of supplies, must return to Magdeburg after two wasted months. His generalship, much hampered by a diplomatic background of rare complexity, contrasted sharply with that of his opponent. The year since Gustavus landed on German soil had comprised the most consummate strategy of his whole career.

Both sides now competed for Saxon aid. John George, ^{Saxon} a famous toper but a cool and virile statesman, had calculated ^{Alliance} that his strength was to sit still. His army and his wealth, he hoped, would yield him greater profit if Tilly and Gustavus were to bid against each other for his alliance. But the summer of 1631 was waning, and Tilly at least could not afford to wait. At Werben on the left bank of the Elbe, north of Magdeburg, Gustavus had made another of those fortress-camps which madden generals eager for a decisive blow. Superior Catholic manpower merely forced Tilly to an earlier retreat in order to seek supplies.

Before the end of August, Ferdinand's army had accomplished a feat of persuasion which Gustavus had found too hard. By turning southwards to invade his Electorate if he would not disarm, Tilly forced John George to appeal for help to Sweden. In return, the Saxons gave the King the chief command until the emergency should be over. Tilly's invading hordes therefore captured Leipzig, only to find Gustavus and both Electors arrayed against him. By count of heads, the battle-stained Swedes and glittering Saxons far outnumbered the Catholics, and in generalship Gustavus was no less superior. On a brilliant summer morning, by Breitenfeld, Catholic reckoning August 18, by Protestant the 7th, the August, 1631 great hosts met in the open country round Breitenfeld, some four miles north of Leipzig. The dense masses of the Imperial army posted on higher ground and following Spanish practice, were confronted by small mobile squares of cavalry interspersed with musketeers, Gustavus' new formation. So well-drilled were his musketeers that they could maintain for many hours a well-directed fire three times as fast as their opponents. The light artillery proved no less superior.

The Saxons who formed the allied left, however, had had less experience than Tilly's men who faced them, and, when the battle was two hours old, they almost lost it. A hot fire followed by a wild charge of Croat horse hurled John George into a flight which bore him 15 miles away, though his Saxons paused to plunder the Swedish baggage. Meanwhile, the seeming victors had flung themselves upon the Swedish left, but the squares stood firm, heartened by the ubiquitous King. Finally, when a change of wind stifled the foe with dust, Gustavus launched his reserves of cavalry upon the height where stood the hostile cannon. Their onslaught cut off the horse from the foot, and mastered the guns, which were then turned upon the enemy. The rout was complete and the pursuit deadly. Tilly, gravely wounded, fled first to Leipzig and then to Halle. For the moment at least, Catholic Germany lay at Gustavus' feet.

Effects on
Europe

Breitenfeld, indeed, rightly takes rank as one of the decisive battles of the world. The tide which Gustavus thus reversed in Germany was everywhere else at least changed in direction. Spain soon resumed her downward path; the Dutch, lately victorious over an Armada, secured their

independence ; England gained freedom to work out her constitution undisturbed. Since Gustavus had exalted Sweden, Richelieu, his great partner, could more swiftly exalt France. The Emperor was flung back upon the support of Spain and of the princes nominally subject to himself. More remotely, Poland was impelled towards her decline and Muscovy towards her rise, while the Turk could snap his fingers at the notion of a Christian crusade. From western Iberia to the Pacific, history was deflected by an afternoon of fluctuating struggle between some 75,000 Christian soldiers. ' Lord, what is man that Thou art mindful of him ? ' the historian may well exclaim.

One real though incalculable consequence of Breitenfeld was its effect upon contemporary opinion. Why had God allowed His servants to be thus shamed by heretics ? zealous Catholics might reasonably inquire. On the other hand, the growing conviction of Gustavus that no hazard of his person would prove fatal made him even more reckless than before. A triumph so resounding could not but strengthen Louis' confidence in Richelieu, the supreme factor in the politics of France and Europe, on the morrow of the Day of Dupes. It was certain that Catholic soldiers, from the generals to the rank-and-file, would for some time to come lack confidence in the outcome of a pitched battle with the Swedes. All this is implicit in the dictum of historians that after Breitenfeld Protestantism could never be extinguished.

Gustavus himself correctly summarized the situation in the words, ' We may go unhindered where we will '. For the moment at least, neither in Germany nor outside was there any force that could oppose him. The beaten Imperialists had fled far to the north-west and to the south-west, halting only on the Weser and at Nordlingen, which lies between Regensburg and the upper Rhine. The victor might perhaps dream of a Protestant Empire, of which he himself should wear the crown. It is certain that he favoured a league of Protestant German princes, with a north German coastal province as the reward of its President—himself. The Protestants of Europe looked for a march upon Vienna, to expel or dethrone his rival.

Such expectations, however, ignored complexities in the Gustavus' position of Gustavus, which neither he nor Oxenstierna could Possibilities

overlook. First and foremost, he must not hazard his communications with Sweden. Saxony, Brandenburg, Denmark, Poland—which of them could be trusted? Only Swedish forces would adequately guard the rear. Wallenstein, again, might be induced by good terms to collaborate, but who could guarantee this? Richelieu, moreover, was always in danger of dismissal by a Catholic king, whose family included zealous Catholics eager for Habsburg success. To the Cardinal, Louis' heir, Gaston of Orleans, far more than Ferdinand, seemed the arch-enemy, and Sweden counted for nothing by comparison with France. It was therefore politic for Gustavus to send the Saxons to attack Ferdinand's position in Bohemia, while he himself marched south-westwards down the 'Priests' Lane' into Franconia. There he could live on the fertile country, while he freed and rallied the persecuted Protestants, and kept in touch with his ambitious Catholic ally.

Germany
after
Breitenfeld

From October until Christmas, 1631, accordingly, Gustavus and the Saxons went their several ways. Von Arnim, the Elector's deputy, ascended the Elbe into Bohemia, and in November captured Prague, whence Wallenstein had withdrawn at his approach. Gustavus, meanwhile, roused the rapture of the German Protestants by his irresistible march through the lands of their clerical and lay oppressors. Erfurt, Würzburg-on-the-Main, Hanau, Aschaffenburg, Frankfurt—such was his route. Soon the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel joined him, and while Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar seized Mannheim, the King crossed the Rhine to Mainz. The later phases of his march had affronted Spain, while the fortification of a camp at Mainz which his soldier's eye dictated was a move that Richelieu could not welcome. But in 1632 Gustavus could point to seven Swedish armies firmly planted on German soil, to the life-line from Sweden well secured, to hosts of soldiers about to enter his service, and to crowds of German supporters, both high and low. In himself he surpassed the Emperor as much in Teutonic type as in talent and charm. Early in the new year, his queen came to his camp, embraced him and declared him 'her prisoner'. No other mortal could ever make such a claim.

Meanwhile negotiations had determined that the war should be resumed in 1632. Gustavus' plan for a German

league could not be welcome to the French, whose interest required a Germany within which they could interfere. Since May, 1631, France had been the ally of Maximilian of Bavaria, who counted on her to safeguard his spoils in the Palatinate. Maximilian now renewed his alliance with the unbending Ferdinand, a step which decreed the continuance of the struggle.

The exiled Frederick had made a solemn entry into Mainz, and there were secret negotiations between the Swedes and Wallenstein, who had been bred a Protestant and always remained a statesman. In November, however, he was approached by Ferdinand, and self-interest, diplomacy and religion combined to indicate his path.

It was the menace of a new assault by Tilly that deter- Campaign
mined the first strokes by Gustavus in 1632. of 1632
The rescue of the Protestants in the south-west had ranked high among his motives, and for this the moment, it seemed, had come. While driving Tilly towards the Danube, he received a rapturous welcome in Nuremberg, where Lutherans could still worship in a church with every Catholic symbol undisturbed. Having entered Maximilian's Bavaria, he crossed the Danube, and found Tilly strongly posted beyond its tributary the Lech. The Swedish cannonade and onrush, however, gave the general a mortal wound and scattered the Bavarian defenders, Augsburg, on the great trans-Alpine route, acclaimed Gustavus, and Munich with all its stores fell into his hands. The army reached Lake Constance and the Alps, and an Italian campaign was mooted. Such was the sweep of Swedish victory.

Meanwhile, however, the danger from Wallenstein had ripened. After months of negotiation, that incomparable master of mercenary war had undertaken to free the Empire. His name sufficed to recruit soldiers of many nations. A devoted friend journeyed on his behalf to Poland and brought back 3,000 horse and 4,000 foot. All the recruits were liberally treated, well organized and well equipped. Soon Wallenstein was the absolute master of a devoted army 40,000 strong. He recovered Prague, drove the Saxons from Bohemia and made for Nuremberg, thus threatening to sever Gustavus from his northern base. The Swedish King therefore quitted Bavaria and encamped near Nuremberg, where Recall of
Wallenstein

for nine weeks he was confronted by the forces of Wallenstein and Maximilian combined. In vain he bargained with them for a peace that should confirm his power in Germany. Early in September, disease and famine drove him to assault the Imperialist camp, but the outcome was a bloody failure. A fortnight later, the beaten King marched away, returning to the Danube.

Death of
Gustavus

Disease and famine had not spared Wallenstein, who in mid-October flung himself upon the Saxon Elector. Leipzig fell, but Gustavus, with a speed that confounded the enemy, marched to rescue his ally. On November 16, after delay from the wintry mist, the armies engaged at Lutzen, south of Leipzig. In a fluctuating struggle, some 12,000 were killed or wounded. When Wallenstein at last retreated, the body of Gustavus lay naked under a heap of dead, and a child not six years old was Queen of Sweden.

The dead King was deeply mourned by his own subjects, whose greatest hero he remains. Their love and admiration were shared by thousands of German Protestants. The Pope even said a mass for the opponent of the domineering Habsburgs. To Richelieu, on the other hand, his death offered relief from an intractable rival. If his own superstition or reckless pride had doomed him to death, thus making France the arbiter of Europe, it must lower his rank in history. That mystery can never be fully solved, for no Swedish survivor saw him fall, and of his many wounds one hinted at assassination. We know, however, that he scorned to be 'a king in a box' and, like some other great commanders, counted on supernatural protection.

A further mystery, which also hampers our efforts to estimate Gustavus' greatness, arises from ignorance as to the precise terms upon which he would have concluded peace. Some think him so much the soldier that no peace could attract him. The horrors which Germany was suffering when he died, however, were such as to make any man a criminal who prolonged them without good reason. Towards Sweden, Gustavus proved himself a matchless benefactor. He raised her self-respect, increased her social and political well-being, perfected her administration, and guarded her against foreign foes. German Protestants, whose race, language and outlook he largely shared, loved him and might

have found him no less beneficent. He was one of those rare beings who irradiate and warm their company, and it has been noted that when he died the stream of song in which contemporaries had voiced their aspirations suddenly ceased to flow.

Supreme humanity of this kind constitutes in a king an undeniable claim to greatness, but hardly to the foremost rank among the great. That is reserved for rulers who see most deeply into human needs and accomplish human betterment on the grandest scale. A German religious settlement based on mutual toleration by the Princes, and secured by a Protestant league protected by the King of Sweden, might have given at least a welcome respite from the wars. It would have balanced the intolerant Habsburg Emperor by a lord of Pomerania who disposed of an invincible army and cherished beneath his pillow the work of Grotius on the Law of War and Peace. Two or three decades of such a rule might conceivably have healed the scars of war and dried up its fountains.

That vision, however, was too unsubstantial for the world of 1632. None but a Gustavus could have ranged Germany, even for an hour, under the sway of two *de facto* Emperors, each inspired by zeal for his own confession. Except perhaps the fugitive Elector Palatine, no great German prince had shown the least desire to obey the King of Sweden. His remote and thinly-peopled dominions formed the basis of his power, and required in normal times the chief of his time and care. The transfer of Pomerania must further that Swedish Baltic empire which affronted Denmark and every other considerable maritime state. By land or sea or both, the plan or dream of Gustavus challenged the resistance of almost all Europe, not least that of Catholic and ambitious France. Great as a man, a soldier and a king of Sweden, Gustavus as a European statesman falls far short of greatness.

The proud inscription, *Moriens triumphavit*, on the tomb in Stockholm's Westminster Abbey is, none the less, a tribute to much more than victory at Lützen. In Sweden at least, Gustavus' soul went marching on. The new queen, Christina, was a child. Her mother, as the King himself declared, had no initiative. Devoted to his memory, carrying his heart on all her journeys, the Brandenburg princess could give no

Gustavus
and the
Future

strength to Sweden. But though the 'Swedish' army, like others, declined into a plundering, irreligious, mainly mercenary force, both war and government were managed by the men whom Gustavus had chosen and inspired. Oxenstierna hastened to Germany with full powers to represent the civil government, while his son-in-law, Gustavus Horn, was promoted from the late King's second-in-command to his successor.

Changes
in Sweden

In due course a constitution devised by Gustavus and Oxenstierna was adopted by the Estates. This, the so-called Form of Government of 1634, placed Sweden at the head of Europe as a well-ordered constitutional country. The various departments, justice, army, navy, diplomacy and finance, were each entrusted to a permanent 'College' under a great officer of state. These five chiefs with some fifteen others formed the standing Council, which during Christina's minority substantially ruled the country. Unity was maintained by the dominant influence of the Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, while the recently reorganized local government secured the ordered freedom of the country, with the nobles in the foremost place. With such an organization, Sweden could endure fifteen more years of war and play a great part in the reconstruction of Europe.

CHAPTER XII

THE GREAT WAR, 1632-1635

WHEN Gustavus fell, the romance and idealism of the great war passed away. By this time, neither Protestants nor Catholics, neither Habsburgs nor their enemies, could look for total victory, nor was it easy to find terms on which the Swedes could either quit Germany or remain there. They possessed, indeed, an army which, although a source of danger to themselves as containing an ever smaller proportion of Swedes by birth, had grown in numbers, while Gustavus' pupils never failed to supply good generals. In Oxenstierna, Sweden possessed the only statesman who could replace his friend the King. Alone, however, the Swedes and their German allies could hardly hope to conquer the Habsburgs, supported as these must be by many zealous Catholics. English and Dutch were absorbed in their own affairs. Only if France set politics above religion was a Protestant triumph possible. The Swedes
and
Richelieu

This situation placed the future of Europe in the hands of the Cardinal-Duke. This must be remembered when he is judged severely for failing to reform the internal organisation of his own state. Although taxation, it is urged, climbed gradually to many times what he had found it, the clumsy, inequitable, wasteful system of collecting it went on. The States-general were not summoned, and the Parliaments, though increased in number, were not trusted or reformed. Talented officials must confine themselves to carrying out the Cardinal's will. Though at heart devoted to the Church, and as severe a judge of the Jansenists as charitable to the Huguenots, he did not check the manifold abuses, in some of which, indeed, he conspicuously shared. The Napoleonic Cardinal employed great ecclesiastics in the army, and was himself a pluralist and absentee. Duelling he condemned but failed to abolish, and an impolitic severity marked his reprisals against those who attacked his rule.

France
in 1632

Richelieu's defence may well be based on the legal maxim, *Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia*. The sick man, who had once offered a bribe to the Almighty if He would cure his headache in a week, was forced every day to spend all his strength upon his urgent duties. To please a chilling King, to frustrate the domestic opposition, to make head against the vast Habsburg power—this triple task claimed all, and more than all, his vital force. When at last he was driven to an open war with Spain and Austria, it was evident how much France had yet to learn of military art and practice. For him, 1632 was dominated by the royal names Gustavus and Gaston, the ally whom he financed but could not control, and the enemy who roused civil war against him. Gaston, indeed, mustered not only the forces of Lorraine, but Frenchmen of Languedoc under Montmorency. But Richelieu's tolerant treatment of the Huguenots kept most of them from rising, and the great ducal name of Montmorency could not save its bearer from the scaffold. Gaston made a third flight, this time to Flanders, and the glorious death of Gustavus added to Richelieu's freedom. The finest brain in Europe wielding the growing force of the richest state might gradually outmatch the Habsburgs.

The diplomatic struggle which followed Gustavus' death admirably illustrates the complex background of the war. In this religious conflict, few indeed attained to the crusader's level of a Father Joseph, a Sigismund, or a Ferdinand II. Some who determined policy, Gustavus and Richelieu chief among them, were moved in varying degrees by unselfish motives of religion and love of country. Several, however, obeyed the inscrutable but largely selfish promptings of personal preference and ambition. Among them Wallenstein ranks first, but Christian IV, John George of Saxony and Maximilian of Bavaria had already proved themselves like-minded opportunists.

Further
Diplomatic
Struggles

From Lützen, Wallenstein, a soldier of fortune, who owed the Emperor nothing, had fallen back into Bohemia and resumed his obscure negotiations. One thing was certain, that he would not favour the intrusive Swedes. Of Christian IV, eagerly proffering his mediation, the same was no less true. John George, for many reasons Wallenstein's hope and target, had always roused and justified Swedish

mistrust. With Gustavus, the corner-stone of the Protestant league had vanished. Oxenstierna must be prompt and skilful if the new campaign was not to bring Sweden isolation and collapse.

To keep his two Electors, the Chancellor tried both bribery and reason. George William accepted for his son, the future Great Elector, the flattering offer of Queen Christina's hand. Then, hurrying to Saxony, Oxenstierna bargained and exhorted face to face, but failed to break off the Wallenstein negotiation. It remained to assemble the four Protestant Circles at Heilbronn, whither John George declined to come. In April, 1633, after five weeks of negotiation, the Chancellor succeeded in his task. Once again, it was agreed, Sweden was to lead the German Protestants to battle. Gustavus' death thus brought no invitation to John George to fill the vacant place. The French, however, by skilful diplomacy and superior wealth, contrived to gain a joint protectorate with Sweden.

The Heilbronn negotiations had made one thing certain —that the desolating war would be continued. While the union with the German Protestants was wider and closer than any that Gustavus had achieved, it was discounted by the mounting influence of France. Sweden might limit her aims to a good peace, safeguarded by cessions in Pomerania. But Richelieu must wish for war, a Habsburg war which could make France once again a military power, with a strengthened frontier towards the east, and influence extending far beyond her borders. The more this war was waged by Swedes and German Protestants, the easier would be her task.

No estimate of the forces arrayed by the League of Heilbronn would be complete, however, without some indication of the grim realities which lay behind. Had the interest of England in Protestant Germany succumbed to her own controversies and to the death of the Elector Palatine? What was to be expected from the Dutch, seeking peace by aggression against the Spanish Netherlands, or from the stricken Netherlands themselves, now ruled by Philip's younger brother? How long could Richelieu, in league with Protestants, combat the Emperor without incurring open war with Spain?

The
League of
Heilbronn,
1633

Background
of the War

The answers to such questions were inevitably complicated by uncertainty as to how high-placed men would comport themselves when called upon to play a leading part. The Brandenburg Elector was struggling in waters too stormy for his strength. The Saxon hated the Swedes, and only Von Arnim kept him from open treason. The future Ferdinand III, the dear son on whom the Emperor's hopes reposed, had grown up a stranger to the militant Catholicism of his father, but he was swayed by his Spanish wife and by his own ambition to lead a victorious army. More than a dozen years of widespread and cruel war could not have passed without the rise of a new generation, or without some change in the outlook and vigour of the old. Maximilian, already Duke of Bavaria for five-and-thirty years, aggrandized, experienced and the friend of France, still complicated every situation. The same was true of the pro-French Pope, Urban VIII.

Wallenstein's
Assassination

The riddle hardest to solve and most vital to the immediate future, however, was that of Wallenstein. Did he seek peace or war? If war, whom would he fight, and with what expectations? It was strange indeed that such questions could be asked about the greatest impresario then living. That ill-health kept him from a decision is possible: that his lodestar was personal profit may be deemed certain. At Lützen, he had lost his disciple Pappenheim, the eager soldier who had spoiled Tilly's plans, but who remained the darling of that army on which Wallenstein's strength depended. Thenceforward his surly inhumanity remained undisguised. It was emphasized by the futile and costly warfare of 1633. While the Spanish forces drove the Swedes from the key-position of Breisach, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar captured Ratisbon itself. When winter came, the Emperor was beseeching God for deliverance from his general. Soon the deliverance was to be effected by a startling crime.

Wallenstein, indeed, could no longer disguise the differences which severed him not only from the Catholic League, but also from the Emperor. Although his personal ambitions may not have reached the height supposed, it is certain that he did not mean to be utilized either to make Maximilian supreme in Germany or to enforce the Edict of Restitution. Deserted by many of his men, suspected of designing to

join the Swedes, banned by the Emperor and broken in health, he and his intimates were murdered by Irish and other officers in February, 1634. Ferdinand's son and namesake, with Gallas, later surnamed the army-wrecker, then led the army from Bohemia to the south-west, where jarring Heilbronn generals strove to relieve Nördlingen. The two Ferdinands, from Austria and the Spanish Netherlands, outnumbered them. The outcome of a battle in which no native Swedish regiment took part, was a Catholic counter-part to Breitenfeld. One general, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, fled; the other, Gustavus' lieutenant, Horn, was taken prisoner. The League of Heilbronn was dissolved: the cause of the south-western Protestants seemed hopeless: the lukewarm John George of Saxony came to terms with the Emperor, and sought, with many of his countrymen, to end the German War.

Their agreement at Prague, ratified in June, 1635, was adopted by almost every German state. It represented the effort of the German nation to settle its own religious differences, and to resist intrusion by any foreign body. That a German war had still a dozen years to run must be ascribed to French and Scandinavian politics. When the Germans announced their peace, Richelieu and Oxenstierna had revised their pact and France had declared war on Spain.

The Peace of Prague sought refuge from abstract and impracticable principles in a set of bargains. The primary cause of war had been the claim by princes to possess the lands of the Church. It was now agreed that the actual holder in November, 1627, should be the lawful possessor until 1675. Within that period, claimants might bargain away their rights, or sue in the Imperial tribunals for possession. Justice was safeguarded by an equality in number between Catholic and Protestant judges in the Chamber Court, while for the next forty years the Edict of Restitution was practically suspended. Saxony, which had saved Ferdinand from the Elector Palatine, was rewarded with Lusatia, and the Archbishopric of Magdeburg was also to be Saxon—when the Swedes could be driven out. Those who acceded to the Peace bound themselves to help to recover foreign conquests. The rebels of 1618 were to be punished, and Frederick must forfeit the Palatinate. In parts

of Silesia, Lutherans were promised toleration, but the remaining possessions of the Emperor gained no religious rights. No specific mention of the Calvinists was included. Henceforward the Empire was to have but one army, that of the Emperor.

The Peace of Prague, welcomed by almost all the Germans, came near to ending the war. The Swedes, left with hardly a German ally save Hesse-Cassel, were eager for peace on reasonable terms, and Oxenstierna was the soul of reason. This year, at Stuhmsdorf, he renewed the truce with Poland for a further six-and-twenty years, paying for it by evacuating Polish Prussia. He held, indeed, that, both as compensation for her outlay and for the security that her protection would afford the German Protestants, Sweden should retain parts of Pomerania—a condition that Brandenburg, which claimed the inheritance, strenuously opposed. The negotiations, however, seemed almost assured of success when John George, inspired by Ferdinand, broke them off. Oxenstierna and his countrymen chose war rather than dishonour, and, in October, the struggle was renewed. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, heavily bribed by the French, was fighting for a principedom in Alsace, and it fell to Baner to face the Germans upon the Elbe.

The Peace of Prague may be regarded as a belated but sincere attempt by the Germans to settle, or at least to adjourn for a generation, a German civil war which had plagued them for some sixteen years. The attempt failed, mainly because peace ran counter to the interest of foreign powers, among whom the chief was Richelieu's France. As all the world knows, thirteen far-reaching campaigns were to follow that of 1635 before the Peace of Westphalia could end the German struggle. Every year since its outbreak had naturally made the war more onerous to Germany, since her original reserves of strength and fortitude must decline, and the licence of the soldiery must increase. Exhaustion and degradation were reciprocal in their effect. The discipline and inspiration of Gustavus formed merely a short-lived and sectional check upon an inevitable and terrible deterioration.

Burden
of War on
Germany

To envisage rightly the place of the war in history, we must remember how war differed from what our own generation has had to face. As compared with the twentieth

century, the seventeenth was an age of tiny armies. In the Thirty Years War, to array 50,000 for a single encounter with the enemy was a considerable feat. At Breitenfeld the Protestants had perhaps some 45,000 men; at Lützen, 25,500; and at Nördlingen, a still smaller number. More, if indeed, so many, could not easily be armed, fed and paid. The number of mouths was increased by a mounting proportion of women camp-followers, and, as the war went on, even of soldiers' children. Those who fought were for the most part volunteers, or the serfs of nobles who volunteered. Although poison was unlawful, they were protected far less than three centuries later by any rule of law, but they could often save their lives by taking service with the enemy. In war, as in peace, to fall into the surgeon's hands was dangerous, while not a few campaigns were influenced by some variety of plague.

This warfare, however, miniature as compared with ours, unless abnormally prolonged, must leave great tracts of country almost unaffected. A campaign of some six months waged by perhaps 200,000 relatively immobile men, could not soon devastate a land as wide as Germany. But where the armies marched, the countryside might suffer in a degree now unapproachable. With twentieth century wealth, manpower and communications, the utmost desolation may be made good in a few years of peace. But a thousand ghastly traces were there to prove that the seventeenth century had no such opulent reserves. The ox-plough and the flail meant that, without a relatively large agricultural population, no considerable crop could be produced, and that few save the actual toilers could be fed from it. In time of peace, a great part of every harvest was stored up until the next year's produce had been safely gathered in. Some employers of labour, indeed, acquired unpopularity by forcing on their subordinates food hoarded two years before. When an invading host descended on a village, it became more and more likely, as the war dragged on, to seize the villagers' whole store of food, together with all useful household effects. Not seldom the women were outraged, the children tortured, and the houses burned. Survivors might seek shelter in the nearest town, but they were by no means sure to find it. Some took service with an army, and some roamed

the country as freebooters. In a word, a fraction of society was dissolved.

The later reconstruction demanded a sustained colonial effort for which the materials might long be lacking. Men, animals, tools, materials, food, shelter—all these essentials must be assembled before a new life for the village could begin. One year without a crop would refresh the land, but several must mean a reversion to wilderness. If Bohemia fell to a fifth of its former population, and Germany to perhaps one-half, the explanation may be found in these simple economic conditions of a bygone age. Both the ascendancy and the policy of such princes as the Great Elector of Brandenburg were largely due to the war-time devastation.

CHAPTER XIII

THE WAR TO 1648

FROM 1633, when her French alliance was renewed, Sweden had led the Protestants of the League of Heilbronn. Richelieu meanwhile had overwhelmed Lorraine, thus strengthening his eastern frontier. A more daring stroke, alliance with a great fellow-sufferer, Wallenstein, was foiled by the murder of February, 1634. But the reverses in that year suffered by their allies benefited the French by territorial cessions which buttressed their anti-Habsburg line. Basel, Lorraine, Coblenz—such were the outposts which Richelieu had gained without as yet declaring war. At the same time his diplomacy had averted the danger that the Dutch would come to terms with Spain.

Nordlingen, however, gave the Germans their chance to escape on reasonable terms from a ruinous war, which, after sixteen years, neither Catholics nor Protestants could reasonably hope to win. If Restitution had been made impossible at Breitenfeld, Nördlingen made dictatorship of the Reformation in Germany an idle dream. The compromise treaty of Prague (May, 1635) expressed the wishes of the Germans. To Richelieu, on the other hand, it spelt disaster. France, robbed of her German allies and acquisitions, might well have been left to face Spain without a single ally. Utilizing the recent abduction of one such, the Elector of Trèves, by Spain, Richelieu therefore sent a herald to Brussels with a solemn declaration of war. At long last the incompatibles, Spain and France, Richelieu and Olivarez, were open enemies.

Notions of national instinct and destiny, with the usual complexity of the international situation, have veiled the stark significance of 1635. In that year, it may confidently be asserted, the future of both France and Europe turned upon the action of one man—Richelieu. What other potentate or body among the French could carry out, or even frame, a policy? The royal family, the great peers, the

War
between
France
and Spain

Huguenots, the Parliaments, the high ecclesiastics, the soldiers—not one seemed capable of leading France. Even seven years later, when the great Cardinal ceased to live, the nearest approach to a successor was an Italian. While skilful pupils, d'Avaux now prominent amongst them, could negotiate at his direction, none but he could plan and guide the diplomatic, military and administrative campaign. What Richelieu chose and did in 1635 shaped history for a generation.

Spain and
France
in 1635—
Richelieu's
Responsi-
bility

The power that France defied was that of Spain, backed by the potential alliance of the Austrian Habsburgs. Spain, it is not superfluous to repeat, comprised Portugal, the Spanish Netherlands, the Indies, Franche Comté, the major part of Italy and claims to the allegiance of the Dutch. Her troops were reputed invincible, she suffered from no religious divisions, and the Emperor was the kinsman and associate of her king. France, on the other hand, could hope for few allies save Protestants, while her own Protestants were a source of danger, and most others were weary of the war. Although her foes disposed of many seasoned soldiers, she had been long absorbed in far less instructive civil strife. Her armies would thus at first find difficulty in making full use of the abundant manpower, the interior lines and the open fertile country which offered them obvious advantages.

Richelieu
and War
after 1635

Richelieu's resolve to fight doomed his own land, as well as others, to untold sufferings. To prolong the German war, to complicate it with invasion by armies still known as Swedish, but composed of freebooters rather than of Swedes, to expose France herself to invasion—such outrages call for a strict and convincing defence. This can only rest upon the imperative needs of the nation, and Richelieu's politic moderation in giving them satisfaction. All that France must naturally wish to be—independent, secure, free to solve for herself her problems both in Church and State, endowed with undisputed access to the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the ocean—all this was threatened by the empire and the ambition of Spain. Spanish victory against the Dutch, against Savoy, Mantua and Venice, Habsburg victory against Sweden and such Germans as still clung to France—these were well-nigh certain, and they would leave France encircled and enslaved. Louis was a frail monarch with no

THE WARS AND TREATIES 1635-1648



STANFORD, LONDON.

expectation of a child, and nothing was more likely than that Spain would tamper with the succession. French policy could not be to sit still.

Richelieu's aims were clearly formulated. Apart from his own continuance in office, which was secure only so long as he remained indispensable to the King, they were in substance those of the great Henry, ripened by five-and-twenty years of strife. Royal autocracy, tolerance for harmless though unconverted Huguenots, France Catholic but not subservient to the Pope, alliances untrammelled by religion, above all, defiance of the Habsburgs—these principles were common to the two great men. Richelieu, in addition, had drawn up a definite scheme of strengthened frontiers furnished with 'gates into the neighbours' dominions', and progress had been made to the eastward and in the neighbourhood of Savoy. The remainder of his life was spent in carrying out this policy by force of arms.

Franco-
Habsburg
War of
1635

In 1635, France tasted early victory near the Meuse, from Toul to Liège, but her chief success was diplomatic. Inducing Poland to make a twenty-six years truce at Stuhmsdorf with Sweden, and influencing Denmark to keep the peace, Richelieu prevailed with Oxenstierna to take French subsidies, and to prolong the German war. A vast force of Frenchmen, more than double that arrayed by Henry, was mustered, but, to the disgust of King and Cardinal, great numbers soon returned home. The royal army shrank to a band of noble volunteers and foreign hirelings. Thus the early success in the north did not continue, but was balanced by gains in the east which fell to the Duke of Lorraine. The naval superiority of the Dutch fleet and Richelieu's combined, moreover, was put to inadequate account.

Next year (1636) worse followed. While victory attended the allies in Italy, a hostile combination invaded northern France, reached Compiègne and threatened Paris. Richelieu however, rallied and roused the people, and the towns raised men and supplies for France. The enemy was checked, and the recapture of Corbie gave its name to a campaign which fever, plague and famine had made fatal to the countryside. In this war, indeed, France experienced something of the suffering which her policy was forcing Germany to undergo.

Next year, the friendly dukes of Mantua and of Savoy died, and in Italy the French were thus forced to the defensive. In February, they had seen the Emperor peacefully succeeded by his son Ferdinand III (1637-57), whose election Richelieu had for some time averted. But the German ally of France, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, overran Franche Comté, the fleet drove the Spaniards from the Lérins Islands, off Fréjus, and Frederick Henry of Orange recaptured Breda. On the other hand, Ehrenbreitstein, the key fortress which looks across the Rhine to Coblenz, and the whole Electorate of Trèves about the Moselle, were lost by France. More ominous still, since the war had become a contest of endurance, some peasants in the south-west rose against the war taxation.

In 1638, however, Richelieu and France began to triumph. Both deemed the heir born 'almost miraculously' to the French King a symbol of coming greatness. On the advent of the future Louis XIV, soon to be followed by a second son, the incompetence and the easy treason of Gaston ceased to keep Richelieu in peril. With such sources of happiness, the loss of Father Joseph, his other self, became bearable, the more so as it was preceded by Bernhard's capture of Breisach. The siege of Breisach, the wellnigh impregnable Habsburg key-fortress on the right bank of the upper Rhine, illuminated the essence of the widened war. What had been a war of religion in Germany and Scandinavia was growing into a war of aggrandizement between France and Spain. Richelieu's diplomacy and bribes, contrasting with the Emperor's reluctance to make Pomerania a Swedish fief, prolonged the Franco-Swedish pact when Oxenstierna had shown readiness to envisage peace. The Habsburg troops were twice defeated, but Bernhard had no means of carrying the place by storm. From August until December, the Imperialists held firm, devouring corpses rather than yield their charge. At last they could do no more, and at one stroke the allies cut the roads which led from Italy to the Netherlands and from France to southern Germany. Now, indeed, Bernhard, a scion of the Saxon House, might naturally set up a new and formidable German principality, giving no security that the French would always be allowed to cross the upper Rhine. For the second time within seven years, however, a foreign ally who had become too powerful

French
Progress
in and
after 1638

French
Progress
by Land
and Sea

was removed from Richelieu's path. Bernhard expired at thirty-five, and his brothers sold their inheritance to the French. Strengthened by a powerful army, Richelieu was now master of Alsace, and the Spanish highroad from Italy to the Netherlands had been broken.

Triumphs
of 1640

By comparison with the golden heritage of Bernhard, Habsburg successes on the Moselle and in north-west Italy were of small account. Far more significant were the naval victories which 1639 brought France and Holland, to the practical destruction of the Spanish fleet. In the Channel and upon the coast of England, indeed, van Tromp wrought damage which recalled the fate of the Armada. In 1640, moreover, the triumphs of 1639 were reiterated on every hand. The straits into which the French widow of Victor Amadeus of Savoy had fallen were utilized by the French to conquer her duchy for themselves. As the result of several campaigns with and against its foremost masters, their latent capacity for war was now beginning to appear. No longer could Louis lament to Richelieu the levity and the cowardice of his subjects. Harcourt, their leader in north Italy, proved the first of a great series of French generals which lasted at least till Blenheim (1704). A desperate struggle drove the Spaniards from Turin and promised the reconquest of Piedmont.

In the northern battlefield, moreover, 1640 brought the French a brilliant and promising success. They captured Arras, they seized the whole province of Artois, and they thus broke the bulwark of Flanders and secured Paris against invasion. From the Spanish Netherlands, right round the coast to Spanish Italy, the French and Dutch naval victories aided their forces on land. The paralysis of England, where the Long Parliament now assembled, formed a safeguard against interference from the north. The truce with Sweden made by the young Elector of Brandenburg was another welcome set back for the Habsburg cause. The greatest trophies of Richelieu's diplomacy, however, were the events in Iberia, which seemed to portend the disintegration of Spain herself.

Minority
Races
in Iberia

To the northward of the great region which geography, language, religion and history combine to endow with a certain unity, lie two districts in which some of those factors

fail. West of the Pyrenees stretches a coastal strip which is peopled by the Basque race. Eastward, from the district of Barcelona to some distance beyond the mountains, the Catalans, a race with an organization far older than that of Spain, inhabit the Mediterranean coastline and its hinterland. Conscious of their separateness from their French and Spanish neighbours, but accepting the supremacy of Spain, they had defended Roussillon against French troops in 1639, but quarrelled desperately with 'foreign' troops, especially those from Naples, which Spain quartered upon them. In 1640, they rose against Spanish conscription. Richelieu was ready to offer French protection for themselves, and French guarantee of their traditional liberties, in return for their allegiance, and on these terms a treaty was made in January, 1641. Catalan partial independence was destined to last for some sixteen years.

Meanwhile, behind the leading figures in the war, important developments in sentiment and interest had modified some of the secondary factors. The young Elector of Brandenburg, though a sincere Protestant, lacked any other loyalty, and might at any time turn against the Emperor. His power as yet was small, but the Dutch were rich and formidable both by sea and land, and their policy showed signs of variation. So long as Spain remained their bugbear, they must court the Orange dynasty and France. But when, as now, Spain was an enfeebled power, cut off by land and sea, they saw in their former saviours only a threat to their own liberties and independence. When Spain was weak, indeed, trade relations always drew the Low Countries towards her.

Meanwhile in Portugal, which never ceased to resent the annexation of 1580, Olivarez' attempt at administrative fusion aided Richelieu's incitements to revolt. The Portuguese nobles declined to march against the Catalan rebels, and in December, 1640, politely escorted their Savoyard vicereine to the frontier. Her bodyguard had been routed; the Duke of Braganza was acclaimed as King John IV; and it seemed that neighbouring provinces might also rise. Portugal and her remaining colonies, at least, became firm allies of France. Richelieu's year of triumph was completed by the birth of a brother to the Dauphin. The French

Richelieu
Triumphant
1640-2

army, which, it is reckoned, he had raised from 12,000 men to more than twelve times that number, went on to conquer Roussillon and to secure all fronts against any dangerous reaction by the enemy. The Swedish allies triumphed. The French fleet grew more powerful. Richelieu's own methods for simplifying and centralizing the administration, for repressing the licence of the nobles and upholding toleration, remained in force. His own wealth and magnificence even increased.

In so complex an amalgam of strife, the preferences of rulers and the variation of interests constantly modified the action of the combatants. The death of the Duke of Savoy (1639) produced a civil war. The accession of a young Elector caused Brandenburg to withdraw. France could now depend but little upon Swedish help. The two powers, none the less, renewed their alliance, and, in December, the Habsburgs, urged on by Brandenburg's desertion, accepted their proposal for a peace conference. The scene, Münster and Osnabrück in Westphalia, was agreed on, with the following Lady Day as the opening date. The terms were to include a general amnesty and the re-enforcement of the Peace of Prague.

During 1641, however, Richelieu's power grew ever greater, and his will to aggrandize France by war did not relax. In France herself, the right of the Paris Parliament to supervise royal edicts was assailed. In England, where Strafford was condemned to death, events moved fast towards a civil war. The Irish, murdering British colonists by thousands, inflicted a new problem on the distracted realm. Torstensson showed signs of ending the temporary paralysis of the Swedes, and thus restoring to Richelieu the advantage of a matchless striking force in the heart of Germany. When with 1642, the final year of the Cardinal's lifetime dawned, the greatest triumphs of his whole career seemed possible. The King at heart was all his own, and in the suave Italian, Mazarin, he had found an unrivalled prop and pupil. Should not the barriers against France in the Netherlands and in Italy be swept away, and at least the German Habsburgs be forced to concede a triumphant peace?

Richelieu's
Last Days

The Cardinal-Duke's closing years, none the less, were disturbed by the unquenchable hostility of his foes. In

1641, the young Duke of Guise launched a rebellion from Sedan, with the support of the Habsburgs and of the Duke of Lorraine. The threat to Richelieu seemed formidable, but a shot which killed the royal Duke of Soissons dispelled the danger. Sedan was the price of pardon. Next year, however, when the King was ailing and the Cardinal prostrated by ill-health, his brilliant *protégé*, the Marquis of Cinq-Mars, strove to depose him with the aid of Spain and of Gaston. Despite his mortal sickness, Richelieu penetrated the plot, attempted in vain to bribe Cinq-Mars into renouncing it, convinced the King of the treason, and gained from him what amounted to a delegation of royal power. This he used with his accustomed politic severity. Gaston, who submitted, was reduced to private life, Sedan was confiscated to the Crown, Cinq-Mars and his young confidant de Thou immediately suffered death.

At the same time, tidings of foreign successes poured in from every side. The submission of Roussillon to France promised to roll back the Spanish frontier to the Pyrenees. The English King had drawn the sword upon his Parliament. Portugal was maintaining in arms her new-found independence. A French company prepared to colonize Madagascar. Above all, in Germany the brilliant generalship of Torstensson turned the scales against the foes of France. In the spring, he crossed the lower Elbe, invaded Silesia, and even made an irruption into Moravia. Then, having retired before the Imperialists into Saxony, he won a desperate battle on the classic field of Breitenfeld. With Piccolomini, his best general, thus defeated and his own estates in danger, Ferdinand must entrust his remaining forces to Gallas. But in December, 1642, Richelieu's career of victory was ended. Before the year was out, he had followed Cinq-Mars and de Thou to the grave. Iron to the last, he advised the King to make Mazarin his successor, and denied that he had ever had any aim save to serve God and the State. The Queen-Mother had died less than six months before, and, within six months of Richelieu, Louis followed. But the Cardinal had gained in full measure the triumph of which Henry dreamed, and he had made it difficult, perhaps impossible, for France to forsake his path. A symbol of his victory was the fall of Olivarez in the first days of 1643.

Richelieu
and
Mazarin

Richelieu, dying at fifty-seven, had prevailed with his stricken master to instal in his place the newly made Cardinal, Mazarin, then forty years of age. For different reasons, neither Louis' son, nor his brother, nor his widow could conceivably become the real ruler of France. The choice of Mazarin was made after the closest scrutiny of a diplomatic career that extended from the Italian's army days through the treaty of Monzon (1626), the treaty of Cherasco (1631), and long periods of diplomatic service, both as papal nuncio at Paris and as minister of France in Rome. The onslaught of Cinq-Mars in 1642 proved him Richelieu's best tool and closest ally.

The selection of Mazarin indicated an immense confidence by Richelieu both in his own system and in the ability of his successor. Louis XIII, it was clear, had not long to live, and soon, therefore, a child of four or five would become king. That would give the regency to Anne of Austria—a middle-aged Spaniard of little talent, and far from friendly to the Italian. Neither the scattered royal family nor the great nobles had any love for either Cardinal, while, neither within France nor outside it, had Mazarin a party of his own. Richelieu, born a noble, long a prince of the Church, vastly rich, and supported by a well-trained band of agents, was trusting a comparatively obscure foreigner to conquer power and to use it for the good of France. The outcome was to be perhaps the most convincing proof of his penetration. Richelieu, though majestic and aloof, had been a Frenchman, and one whose life had compelled him to know more than a little of many parts of France. Mazarin, newly naturalized and without such sources of information, might well assume that the system which brought Richelieu and France their amazing triumphs must be the best. He would therefore lack wish or power to change the state from what the great minister had left it—a moderate monarchy, more tolerant than any other in religion, the strongest in Europe in army and navy combined, but aiming rather at security and influence than at a swollen empire. Richelieu's France, as the *Intendants* and the French Academy gave proof, was progressive, but it respected, perhaps too strongly, the social and financial heritage of the past. The skilful use of diplomacy, backed by the lavish expenditure of public

funds, would be a policy as natural to Mazarin as to Richelieu. In the nature of things, however, the Italian must think more of himself than of a country not too grateful to him for making it his own, while his appetite for riches proved insatiable. That he continued to sign himself 'Mazarini' suggested that he retained hopes of gains from Italy, possibly of the papal chair. How such a statesman in five years steered France towards the Westphalian Peace must next be briefly told.

The first moves of the new *régime* all pointed towards conciliation. Gaston and the body of the dead Queen-Mother, with the most prominent among the exiled nobles, were soon brought back to France. Mazarin, notoriously supple and winning, bent all his powers of fascination to conquer Anne of Austria. His success was such that later it was supposed that they had secretly become man and wife. In April, the King's testament proclaimed that, while Anne was to be Regent, and Gaston her Lieutenant-General, both, as well as Mazarin, would be members of a council of seven, in which the majority would decide. This decree, designed to make Gaston harmless, received endorsement by the Parliament.

Mazarin's
Necessary
Conciliation

When, however, on May 14, 1643, the stricken King at last ceased to breathe, the councillors, in Mazarin's absence, flattered the Parliament by applying for the cancellation of this decree. Thus the new Queen-Mother became unqualified Regent, with Gaston as her lieutenant and Condé as his deputy. On the same day, Mazarin was confirmed as Chief Minister, while Condé's son Enghien, by his splendid victory at Rocroi, went far towards dispelling the military prestige of Spain. The new *régime* had thus acquired a most valuable military success, and in a Bourbon, later known to fame as Condé, a general superior to any whom the Habsburgs could produce. Mazarin at once used Enghien's talents to capture Thionville, (Diedenhofen), on the Moselle, and, later in the year, gave the relics of Bernhard's army to the Protestant-born Viscount Turenne, reckoned by Napoleon the greatest French general before he himself appeared.

French
Strength
and
Weakness

Richelieu's army and Mazarin's generals might render the new ministry superior to the foreign enemies of France. In the peace negotiations now beginning, Mazarin and

Richelieu's other pupils were unlikely to be outmatched, or even equalled, by foreign diplomats. But the French soon proved that the jealousies and intrigues which had paralysed Henry's successors awaited the successors of Louis XIII. Within a few months of Rocroi, François de Vendôme, Duke of Beaufort, had gathered round him many resounding names in a faction known as The Importants, and prepared to assassinate the Cardinal. Early in September, however, when victory at Thionville had further strengthened the administration, Beaufort was imprisoned, and The Importants melted away. The root of the disease, however, the reluctance of many to endure Mazarin for the sake of France, remained undestroyed.

Campaigns
of 1644-7

The campaign of 1644 took on a colour, at that time novel, but destined for sixty years to grow more and more familiar—that of triumph by land for the French. Leagued with the Dutch, they captured towns on the Netherlands border, while Enghien and Turenne overcame the Austrians on the Rhine. From Breisach to Coblenz, all the left bank fell to France. As the Swedes had made good their sudden stroke of 1643 in Denmark, the Emperor and the Bavarian Elector were in 1645 hedged in dangerously by the French and their allies. A reverse, some 60 miles east of Mannheim, inflicted on Turenne in May gave temporary ease. In August, however, by a desperate struggle near Nördlingen, Enghien and Turenne drove off the Bavarians and regained the town. Next month, the Swedes forced the Saxon Elector to a truce which made them masters of the Elbe and Oder, while Denmark could not escape a humiliating peace. The French and their allies, it was clear, had only to hold firm to be victorious against the Emperor.

The Imperialists, none the less, were experienced combatants holding interior lines, and nothing that Mazarin could do would rob them of a local superiority, if they chose to concentrate upon the east. Thus, in 1646, the Swedes were actually driven from Bohemia. Then, however, the French joined them in attacking Bavaria, and the distress of his fertile Electorate convinced Maximilian that he must treat for peace. In March, 1647, at Ulm, both he and the Elector of Cologne concluded a truce with the allies, and to this the Elector of Mainz acceded. Their secession drove

the infuriated Ferdinand to claim that the Bavarian troops should take their orders from their Emperor, and in September the Elector actually rejoined him. Two months sufficed to induce a fresh withdrawal.

Meanwhile, however, the position of Mazarin and of France had become less easy. Spain, as the following decade was to prove, had by no means abandoned hope of victory. Even a glorious war could not commend itself indefinitely to the French nation, which already owed more than four years' revenue, and lacked an equitable and economical system of taxation. The Cardinal's Italian name sufficed to invigorate the intrigues against him. Perhaps worst of all, the obvious rise of French military strength, and her success in isolating and advancing in the Netherlands, was transforming the Dutch fear of Spain into a new and well-founded fear of France. By a series of victories of which they boasted, the French had almost reduced the Spanish Netherlands to the district between Antwerp and the line of Bruges, Ghent and Namur. Already threatened by the pirates of Dunkirk, French since October, 1646, the Dutch took fright at the reported design of Mazarin to acquire the Spanish Netherlands, perhaps in exchange for Catalonia.

With the Emperor fighting a losing battle, and England plunged deep in civil war, the United Provinces had no possible protector against the mounting power of France. The events of a quarter of a century, since the end of the Twelve Years Truce, had made it needless for them to combat further the claims of Spain to their allegiance. Despite all Mazarin's attempts at persuasion, the majority of the Provinces broke their pledge and in January, 1648, made the separate Peace of Münster. For a full year, indeed, this French disaster had been foreseen. The campaign of 1647 showed that without the Dutch, and with Enghien (now Condé) and Turenne far away, France and Spain fought in the Netherlands on equal terms.

In 1648, to win peace without aid from the Dutch, Condé was recalled from Catalonia. Soon, however, a fourth plague descended upon the Cardinal. What neither the Emperor, nor the Dutch, nor even Spain could accomplish, the overthrow of his government, was threatened by the grandees of France in a new rising known as the Fronde. This

Spanish-
Dutch
Treaty of
Munster

The New
Fronde

gained strength from the adhesion of place-holders, lawyers, townsmen—all eager for revenge on an administration which threatened their privileges and their importance, while outraged churchmen demanded that France should put down the English rebels. Condé was summoned to Paris, but returned to win the crushing victory of Lens (August, 1648), on the very eve of the Parisian rising.

France and
Westphalia

'The Peace of Westphalia and the Barricades'—Mazarin's triumph and his seeming overthrow—'arrived at the same time'. On the one hand to name only the most outstanding acquisitions by France, 'the three bishoprics', Metz, Toul and Verdun, were ceded in full sovereignty, Lorraine abandoned and Alsace, Breisach and Philippsburg relinquished to her. The French, thus aggrandized and fortified, moreover, gained the right to negotiate with any German power. Such was the splendid harvest which Richelieu sowed and Mazarin not less skilfully garnered in. It was preceded by the revolt of the capital to avenge the arrest of the leaders of the Parliament, notably Broussel, and the royal family was twice compelled to take flight. The people felt that the price of victory was 'an impoverished nation, an empty treasury, the domination of usury, the paralysis of law, a precarious tyranny' (Ward). This they were not prepared to pay. For years, 'Down with Mazarin' became their watchword.

Other
Struggles,
1643-8

Such was, in outline, the struggle between France and Spain. It was accompanied, however, by war with the German Habsburgs, which comprised also a sudden struggle between the powers of Scandinavia. A French invasion of southern Germany was repelled by an Imperialist victory at Tuttlingen, in November. Meanwhile the English Civil War was raging, and the early successes of the Cavaliers were rousing the more solid forces of London, the eastern counties, and the Scots. Whatever the issue, the Continent seemed for a time secure against British interference. At this juncture, with Imperial delegates actually awaiting the Peace Conferences, the struggle took a turn as dramatic as unexpected. In November, 1643, the Swedish invaders of Germany suddenly flung an army upon Denmark.

Swedish
Attack on
Denmark

Ever since his own failure, disguised by the Peace of Lübeck, had been followed by the triumphs of Gustavus,

Christian IV had gazed with mounting wrath upon the advance of Sweden. A settlement which left his rival a military power with provinces beyond the Baltic must wound Danish pride and menace her security. How could the lord of Copenhagen trust such a power to respect his provinces on the Scandinavian mainland, or his profitable sovereignty in the Sound? Christian therefore pressed for his own appointment as mediator between the Emperor and Sweden. The Swedes complained that he also helped the Queen-Dowager to quit their country, maltreated their merchantmen, and intrigued with their enemies against them. It appeared, indeed, that the incurable rivalry of the two powers for strategic and commercial advantage in the Baltic always tended to make them foes. The Sound Dues were Christian's own perquisite, and he ruthlessly exploited his legal rights. Both the payments in respect of ships and of their cargoes rose so steeply that the estimate of some 229,000 imperial dollars for 1637 became over 616,000 for 1639. In the latter year, saltpetre paid 77 per cent. of its value. Sweden's exemption was not shared by her empire, itself threatened when Christian seized on Ösel. His measures, however, inclined the Dutch, who suffered most from them, to an anti-Danish attitude which favoured Sweden. The outcome of Swedish grievances, old and new, was a secret order to Torstensson, whom it found in Moravia vainly challenging drunken Gallas to a battle.

Danmark
Invaded

Torstensson marched forthwith, but six strenuous autumn weeks passed by before his staff learned whither they were bound. Christian's suspicions were not aroused until mid-December, when the Swedes invaded Holstein. In January, 1644, they had conquered Jutland, while Horn, set free by an exchange of captive generals, soon struck at the Danish provinces beyond the Sound. Masters of both the mainlands, the Swedes might be aided by ice or by the Dutch navy to seize the intermediate islands and subdue the King.

This daring plan, however, was checked by the lack of ice and by the stubborn defence of Malmö, across the Sound from Copenhagen. It was foiled by the energy of Christian, despite his sixty-seven years and far from sober habits. Having first driven off the Dutch squadron, he waged an heroic battle against the Swedish fleet, and thereby, in July,

shattered the design of a sudden conquest of Denmark. His tenacity, and his heroism when severely wounded, endeared not only himself but the monarchy to his subjects. Denmark, none the less, was outmatched by Sweden and the Dutch, while Gallas failed to give effective help. The autumn of 1644 saw Danish disaster at sea, Gallas impotent, both in Holstein and further southward, and a flood of French successes on and beyond the Rhine. Condé and Turenne captured innumerable towns, Mainz chief among them, and by their wise humanity reconciled the people to French conquest. Of the changes in many lands during 1644—the death of the pro-French Urban VIII, whom the feeble Innocent X succeeded, the majority of Christina, the increasing fame and weight of Cromwell, victor of Marston Moor, in England, and of Montrose in Scotland—several were pregnant with later influence, but none could change the immediate progress of the war.

Prospects
in Europe

In 1645, it seemed that the only practicable road to peace, coercion of the Habsburgs, was being firmly trodden by their embattled foes. The impending surrender of the Danes would free the brilliant Swedish leaders for conquest in Germany. What that meant was shown in early March, when, at Jankowitz, south of Prague, a desperate battle gave Torstensson a shattering victory. The earliest newspaper of Sweden boasted that the Emperor fled thrice as far as Charles V had fled from Innsbruck. Aided by Rakoczy, the victor then menaced Vienna, but the Transylvanian proved untrue to his pact with France. Sickness in his own small force and Austrian wealth in manpower then forced Torstensson to retreat. Meanwhile, the Peace Congress, at Münster, and at Osnabrück, had entered upon its ceremonious course, and the negotiations between Swedes, Dutch and Danes were ripening into a treaty. In August, this was signed at Brömsebro, near the frontier between Danish and Swedish provinces.

Peace of
Brömsebro,
1645

At Brömsebro, Oxenstierna secured the open degradation of her rival from 'dominion' in the Baltic Sea. The Danes conceded mutual free trade and extended to the Swedish empire the ancient exemption of the Swedes from customs dues in the Sound and Belts. At the same time they abjured three menaces to the new order. The coastal province of

Halland fell to Sweden for thirty years, together with Jämtland and Harjedalen, Norwegian lands on the Swedish side of the mountain backbone of Scandinavia, and Gotland and Ösel, important Baltic islands. Their simultaneous peace with Denmark left the Dutch to ally themselves with Sweden for forty years. Sweden could now, more wholeheartedly than ever before, throw all her strength upon Germany. The victory of the gout over Torstensson, however, robbed her of her best general, while the rise of Cromwell and the spread of revolutionary ideas might introduce an unfathomable factor into Europe.

The campaign of 1646 was therefore double. In northern Germany the diplomats fought for terms; while in southern, Campaigns
in Germany the armies fought for provinces. Torstensson was replaced by Wrangel, a grim warrior whose motto was 'Who takes, has'. The plunder still visible in Swedish castles preserves the memory of this phase of the war, while strategy was sometimes governed by the quest for an undevastated countryside. The first object of Swedes and French was to unite in southern Germany and thus detach Bavaria from the Emperor. If he were isolated, his hereditary lands might be conquered one by one. In 1646, Wrangel and Turenne, the capturer of Trèves, joined forces in Hesse and marched together to the Danube. Mazarin's hopes of securing Maximilian's neutrality having proved delusive, his thriving Bavaria suffered a devastation which at last turned his thoughts towards peace. It was time, for eight-and-twenty years of war had left the impoverished German remnant to the mercy of the 'Swedes' and French.

The eleven grim years of torment since the Peace of Prague had proved that an isolated pacification of Germany was impossible. Besides the mediators, Sweden and France at least must share in the making of the peace, and its terms must be such as would alienate no power in Europe. Religious differences, it had long been evident, would survive the war, and, in the judgement of some, would occupy the leading place. Pope Innocent X could not treat Catholic and Protestant as equals, and Sweden, a monarchy founded upon the Reformation, would find too Catholic an atmosphere unbearable. Before the Scandinavian war eliminated Christian's mediation, it had been agreed that the Emperor Peace
Congress of
'Westphalia'

should negotiate with the Swedes at Osnabrück and with the French at Münster, some 30 miles away, where the papal commissioners rejoiced in a stately cathedral with the bones of the heretic Knipperdolling hanging on its outer wall.

Since the essence of congresses had long been assertive pride, while communications were poor and the political situation unstable, years passed before the plenipotentiaries could even reach the two Westphalian towns. The Congress actually began on June 1, 1645, when the French and Swedes presented their demands. Some nine months later, the religious grievances were added, and they proved still more exacting. Its use by Charles V had made French the language of diplomacy, but some plenipotentiaries still wrote and spoke in Latin, and the Jesuits were not without influence in an assembly in which only England and Poland, Russia and the Turks failed to be represented. The participation of some 66 Estates of the Empire, the Protestants at Osnabrück preponderating, almost submerged the envoys of the really powerful states. A curious feature was the participation of a special spokesman of the Swedish army, now mainly hirelings.

Final
Campaigns

The course of the final campaigns, none the less, proved that, if any peace were possible, it would be better than none at all. Spain, indeed, dissented, firmly refusing peace with France, but even Spain recognized the independence of the rebel Dutch. To the Swedes, 1647 brought mild alternations of fortune, but endless marches, with their accompanying devastation. Swabia, Bohemia, Saxony, Hesse and north-western Germany were scourged in turn, while the profit of the year to the French was mainly a new withdrawal of Bavaria from alliance with the Emperor. Early in 1648, however, Turenne and Wrangel joined forces in the south. The vast size of the united hosts, with their camp-followers, male and female, drove them to Swabia for supplies, and at Zusmarshausen, in May, they triumphed over the Emperor's force. A ferocious campaign in Bavaria followed, while a small Swedish detachment entered Bohemia and laid siege to Prague. In November, when the news of peace interrupted a struggle on the bridge the war had thus reached the scene of the Defenestration. Thither it had drawn a prince whose warlike exploits and progeny were to astonish

Europe for the next seventy years—Charles Gustavus of Zweibrücken (Deuxponts) soon to be King of Sweden.

While the German and Scandinavian struggles thus painfully approached their close, the time had come at last to end the eighty years' contest between Spain and the rebel Dutch. These had shown themselves strong in the diffused and versatile talent of their population, in its wealth and sea-power, in the hereditary efficiency of the House of Orange, and in the fact that, with Europe in convulsion they could hardly lack allies. They were, none the less, a small and unwarlike nation, whose principles offended many greater states, and whose wealth and lands many rivals must always covet. England was shocked by the Amboyna massacre of 1624, and under Charles I was too deeply absorbed in her own affairs to champion Calvinism. Richelieu remained a Prince of the Catholic Church. In 1628, indeed, the Dutch captured the Spanish Plate fleet, and next year they set out to conquer Hertogenbosch, only to be cowed by a counter-invasion. The invaders, however, were repulsed; Hertogenbosch, despite elaborate defences, fell; the Southerners were disgusted with Spain; and the foes of the Habsburgs showed themselves ready to assist the rebels, so as to keep their Spanish war alive. Thus Frederick Henry and his cosmopolitan army were compensated for the adverse effect of Holland's tendency towards non-cooperation. The worst enemy of the Dutch, indeed, in their rôle as would-be deliverers of the Netherlands, was their fanaticism. The spirit which had doomed Oldenbarnevelt to death prompted their refusal to the conquered southern Catholics of any public exercise of their religion. Without the co-operation of the South, however, the Dutch could not achieve reunion. They even lost the opportunity, which the triumphs of Gustavus offered, of rousing the whole South to join them on terms of both political and religious freedom. In August, 1632, after repulsing a dangerous Habsburg attack, the Stadholder and the English took Maestricht. At that time, France might perhaps have acquired the Walloon provinces, while the Dutch absorbed those where their own tongue was spoken. But the French failed to move; the English intrigued for an independent southern state; and, with the death of Gustavus, the golden moment vanished. Many

Dutch
Strength
and
Weakness

The Dutch
and the War
since 1632

interests, some Dutch included, demanded for the South the retention of Spanish sovereignty, which could be trusted at least to curb its progress. In 1633 and 1634, the Stadholder carried on only languid campaigns. Next year, the Dutch accepted the French alliance (1635).

Franco-
Dutch
Alliance

The alliance of February, 1635, concluded within six months of Nördlingen, signified the acceptance by the Dutch of the management of their war by France. It provided that if the South failed to free itself swiftly with their help, French and Dutch would carry out partition. The dividing line which the two powers accepted could not, indeed, please all. It violated feelings for unity of language, for uniformity of religion and for profitable preference in commerce. Although Frederick Henry accepted it, he, like others, could not be enthusiastic. He fought ten more campaigns (1635-44) but, partly through ill-health, accomplished nothing great.

Van Tromp

Until 1639, indeed, the Dutch partner in the alliance had been conspicuous chiefly for rebuffs and failure in administration. Dunkirk, a veritable pirates' nest, could not be cleansed of the southern allies of Spain. The five federated admiralties of the United Provinces proved inefficient. The English claim to 'a closed sea', however, provoked a proud response, while from 1636 onwards, Tromp gained abiding fame as a doughty head of the navy. In 1639, the great Spanish fleet tried to take refuge off south-east England, only to meet destruction at Tromp's hands. His ships, it was said, had seemed to grow of themselves, and to be filled at once with sailors. Next year, the Catalans and Portuguese revolted, while Arras fell to the French.

Rocroi

Still, however, complete victory eluded the allies. By flagrantly violating English neutrality, Tromp had stored up trouble for the future. Four more campaigns added nothing to the fame of Frederick Henry. But to France, now steered by Mazarin, 1643 brought the epoch-making triumph of Rocroi. To Spain and her Netherlands, on the other hand, the downfall of the famous Spanish infantry in that battle was as demoralizing as would be a panic among the English Guards. Within two years, the allies were threatening Antwerp. At the same time the disasters

of Spain weakened the coalition against her; for the Stadholder and his people did not wish to have France omnipotent.

The Dutch, none the less, were still handicapped more heavily than any other combatant by their constitution. Frederick Henry, surrounded by a court that was rather French than Dutch, had acquired many elements of hereditary monarchy, but not enough to concentrate in his hands the full strength of the Republic. Although he was royal enough to match his son with the daughter of Charles I (1641) and to hope to become the father-in-law of the Prince of Wales, he could not openly intervene in the English civil war. Holland, by far the greatest of the Seven United Provinces, had no mind to suffer any encroachment upon her own sovereignty. When, in the new war between Sweden and Denmark, the Stadholder favoured Denmark, he found the men of Amsterdam hot advocates of Sweden. The outcome was that the Sound Dues were relaxed, but that Sweden checked Dutch trade in the Baltic.

While in 1644 and 1645 the French pressed on with their conquest of the southern Netherlands, Frederick Henry accomplished little in the field, and delayed the appearance of Dutch delegates at Münster. At the same time, as probably was inevitable, rifts in the Franco-Dutch alliance began to appear. France, after all, was a Catholic power, and the Dutch a federation which frowned on its Catholic subjects. The French even urged their allies to be more tolerant. France was a unified monarchy; the Republic, a fluctuating conglomerate of semi-monarchic and aristocratic states. French policy was framed by Mazarin; Dutch policy might sometimes be marked 'parentage unknown'.

When 1646 began, the Dutch, soon to be glorified by the capture of Dunkirk, had been for more than ten years the ally of France; and Frederick Henry, Stadholder for more than twenty. Five of the seven provinces had made him their regent, and he was in supreme command by land and sea. So great a power could not but challenge the republicans, the more dangerously if supported by the growing strength of France. In February, it was revealed at Münster that France, Spain and the Stadholder had combined to further a peace settlement which would make

Frederick
Henry and
Long-drawn
War

Waning
Spanish
War

Catalonia Spanish, the southern Netherlands French and Antwerp Dutch. If this were realized, the Stadholder could dominate his country.

Frederick Henry and the French denounced the scheme, while Spain had probably been insincere in suggesting it.

The Portuguese revolt, none the less, confronted Spain and the Dutch merchants with a common danger. The States of Holland, displaced their Stadholder and worked for peace, while the French, with Tromp's help, captured Dunkirk. Early in 1647, the death of Frederick Henry ended his venal though sometimes glorious rule, and his son, William II, who succeeded to his dignities, could not dominate events. In April, 1648, the States-general, deserting France, ratified their treaty of Munster with Spain.

Treaty of
Munster

This treaty ended the eighty years' war on thoroughly illiberal terms. Spain, indeed, abandoned all claim both to the Seven Provinces and to the 'Generality lands' which they had conquered. This southern extension of Dutch territory the Seven Provinces held in common. But the greedy merchants gave these neither special religious toleration nor even a self-government like their own. Thus mutilated, the remaining southern provinces must fight on with Spain against France, until, more than ten years later, those powers also made peace. Had not the Dutch deserted their allies, however, much more of the south would have fallen to the French. Already their perception that France might be a useful friend, but must be to them a dangerous neighbour, was becoming a dominant factor in their policy.

CHAPTER XIV

THE WESTPHALIAN PEACE

IN Westphalia, meanwhile, three years of eager bargaining produced what has been proudly termed the fundamental pact of modern Europe. Its signature was hastened by Condé's brilliant victory over the Spaniards at Lens in August, 1648. The Peace was indeed comprehensive and not unreasonable, and for a century and a half it was not swept away. To compose for a continent the disputes which, throughout thirty years, had brought ever-increasing ruin, and to initiate the rule of law formulated by Grotius—these were indeed rare services to mankind. We must attempt a brief survey of the evolution and content of a body of treaties whose mere text would fill a volume.

The treaties of 1648 formed the greatest landmark in the political history of the seventeenth century, and perhaps the greatest in the record of modern times. The Peace of Westphalia not only ended three decades of complex struggle; it also unmistakably marked a change in the character of the European society. For the medieval theory of Pope and Emperor, the Peace substituted a family of equal independent territorial states. It was henceforward to be assumed, indeed, that these states were born to be friends. Wherever and whenever necessary, diplomatic representatives were exchanged between them, and were regarded as sacrosanct. To imprison one of them on the outbreak of war marked the barbarism of the Turks, a power lying outside Europe and fundamentally hostile. Europeans traded with one another, except for good cause, and likewise admitted each other's subjects to their realms. But their religion henceforth admitted of no outside interference, unless such was desired by the individual state. The Pope influenced only those countries which welcomed his intervention, and the Emperor was merely the senior among the sovereigns of Europe.

Prolonged
Negotiations

This great result, with a vast array of specific bargains between states, issued from negotiation between June, 1645, and September, 1648. The plenipotentiaries appointed by the warring powers numbered several hundred. At Münster, where, broadly speaking, the Catholic powers negotiated with the Swedes and Dutch, two mediators appointed by the Pope and Venice received and forwarded the delegates' submissions. Thus in June, 1645, the French submitted peace proposals to the Imperialists, who replied in the last days of the year. Three weeks sufficed for the French to make a verbal reply (January, 1646), and the interchange continued until mid-September. Then the two parties agreed on a statement drawn up by the mediators. In June, 1647, the Imperialists sent a draft treaty, to which in July the French replied by a counter-draft. In November an arrangement was arrived at, but in April, 1648, memorials were sent in by Strasburg, Hagenau and ten Alsatian towns. Only in September, after more than three years of discussion, was the final adjustment of the treaty made.

The negotiations with Sweden were almost equally prolonged. Those within the Empire began, late in 1645, with the consideration by the Protestants, at Osnabrück, of the Imperial reply to the Swedish proposals, and with the discussion of their religious and political grievances. These were soon embodied by Magdeburg in a document which formed the subject of Imperial criticism, and which was followed by a conference between Ferdinand's persuasive friend Trautmansdorff and Salvius, an able representative of Sweden. The German negotiations, however, could not produce any union strong enough to sway the resolute Emperor, and in the end the sword decided.

Defects of
Diplomacy

The length of these discussions, when most belligerents were hungering for peace, was due to more than one mistake in the arrangements. Well-qualified diplomats were few, and the congress habit had yet to be acquired by states. Many representatives came to Westphalia burning with self-importance, and most were ready to go all lengths rather than endure the smallest affront to their official character. In a distant field, this had led to trickery which might well be the *reductio ad absurdum* of such pride. It had been carefully arranged that the jealous representatives of two

sovereigns should dismount at the same moment, leaving the precedence of their masters undetermined. One, however, contrived to have himself supported in a servant's arms, so that his rival suffered defeat by first setting foot upon the ground. Within Germany the ingenious convoker of a conference had on occasion arranged that all should stand, thus averting a probable rupture as to where and in what order they should be seated. Such traditions as that which made English monarchs style themselves 'King of France' grievously obstructed friendly meetings. Two generations later, a conference-room with as many doors as delegates was built to avoid disputes. Disputes about precedence led even to struggles between the embassy servants which sometimes cost human lives.

Diplomatic difficulties, however, were of far less effect in hindering peace than was the fact that in the Thirty Years War no truce or armistice was concluded. A combatant, it is obvious, will desire to end a war more eagerly when it turns against him than when he expects to win. It may, of course, also be true that those who direct policy are swayed by some private interest which is not that of their nation. Thus while a few high-placed Swedes wished for the continuance of a struggle which brought them gain, their queen urged peace so that she might reign without Oxenstierna. Maximilian of Bavaria, who sought to profit by various alliances, viewed with tolerance the continuance of a war which spared his own dominions. Some of the diplomats, moreover, found residence in Westphalia to their taste, and were in no hurry to be gone. None among them was of such calibre as by his influence to sway the Congress towards a peaceful conclusion.

Political
Obstructions

The warmongers, however, were supported by the master-hand of Mazarin. In 1630 it was the political interest of France that had revived the war, and in 1645 the same force kept it alive. When the Elector of Brandenburg had consented to divide Pomerania with the Swedes, and had espoused Louise of Orange, and when Ferdinand had accepted the notion of transferring Alsace to the French, Mazarin might well decide that peace would be advantageous. For the moment, however, he was in the grip of unmanageable forces. Early in 1648 the Dutch made peace with Spain,

Mazarin

thus completing their own independence and shielding the Spanish Netherlands against the French. Turenne and the Swedes then took the bit between their teeth, and hurled themselves on prosperous Bavaria. At home the Fronde was threatening. Many endings to the war were still possible. In fact, however, a hurried end to the Congress was effected and France turned to the Barricades.

The war, as we have seen, had broken out because the religious settlement of 1555 no longer satisfied the states and churches of the Empire. Failing a decision by Bohemian civil war, the combatants called in foreign armies, and, thanks to France, Catholic but anti-Habsburg, the clear-cut division into Catholic and Protestant camps came to be abandoned. Finding their land a mere battleground for foreign ambitions, the tormented Germans patched up the compromise of Prague (1635) but failed to satisfy Sweden and France, their creditors, for services rendered under arms. A decade more of ruin made peace at almost any cost indispensable, and German zealots, both for religion and for family aggrandizement, paid Oxenstierna and the shade of Richelieu a sufficient price. Such, with the necessary adjustments in Germany, was the basis of the Westphalian treaties.

Swedish
Provisions

Sweden since 1629 had expended much and claimed still more, while with perhaps the foremost soldiers in the world she held in pledge wide German coasts and provinces. But she had been dependent upon subsidies from France, and her population was too small to nourish a great standing army. It would have been madness, therefore, for her to cling to Silesia, or to any other province inaccessible by sea. Parts of Pomerania thus remained her first demand, but during the struggle the whole duchy had passed by hereditary right to the Brandenburg Elector. The Empire, consequently, incorporated the Swedish sovereign as an Imperial prince, and, in effect, bought parts of Pomerania for Sweden at the price of Imperial compensation to the Brandenburg Elector. Sweden thus received western Pomerania with the islands of Rugen and Usedom, which, as the coming of Gustavus had shown, assured her a base on the German coast. The section of eastern Pomerania which lay beyond the Oder also passed to her entire, secured by the great river-port of Stettin and the island of Wollin. Farther westward, the

Baltic port of Wismar became hers, and technically so continued until the twentieth century. Still farther to the west, beyond the sphere of the Danish monarch, though Bremen city remained independent, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden gave her the control of two more German river-mouths, those of the Elbe and Weser. Five million dollars covered the cost of the Swedish troops within the Empire, which they did not evacuate for some two further years. Her conquests on both sides of the Baltic swelled the population of the Swedish monarchy by perhaps one-third, and promised an impressive revenue from port-dues and customs. But conquests in Poland, Denmark and the Empire had given her rulers the fatal habit of waging war, and two generations later the over-strained warrior-state collapsed.

France stood on a wholly different footing. Rich, ^{French Provisions} populous and compact; Catholic, though combating the menace of Catholic powers to Europe; with Philip, rather than Ferdinand, as her chief enemy, while tempting Habsburg provinces adjoined almost all her frontiers; she had waged a war of conquest with unbounded hopes. The peace of 1648 made her, like Sweden, its guarantor, though not a member of the Empire. True to the wise principle of clearing away futile relics of bygone days, the bishoprics and cities of Metz, Toul and Verdun were recognized as wholly French, just as interference with the republics of the Swiss and Dutch was finally renounced by the Habsburgs. Pinerolo and Breisach likewise passed to France, and she gained the right of garrisoning Philippsburg, on the right bank of the Rhine. All this was clear, but the chief rewards of France, unhappily for the future peace, were in many points ambiguous. What was the status of the constituent members of the region now styled Alsace? Some were subject to the Emperor, others, notably the bishopric and free city of Strasburg, were 'immediate' vassals of the Empire.

'While the King of France undertook to respect the liberties and the immediacy to the Empire, not only of the Bishops of Strassburg and Basel, but also of all the other immediate Estates in both Upper and Lower Elsass, including the ten free towns, he did so on condition (*Ita tamen*) that the rights of his sovereignty should not suffer from this reservation. The clause gave rise to much alarm at the time' (A. W. Ward).

Louis XIV was to prove the alarm well-founded.

German
Provisions

Although the Austrians may have conferred upon her some rights that they had never themselves possessed, France beyond question gained immensely from the Peace which Mazarin accomplished and Richelieu had inspired. Not only were her frontiers notably enlarged, but beyond them she gained a legally paralysed neighbour. In Germany the constitution of 1618 was restored, but Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist Estates were to be entirely equal, with an Imperial tribunal half Catholic and half Protestant in composition. Changes specified in the Peace itself were of course exempted, and the religious complexion was to remain as on the first day of 1624. Any Estate might ally itself with whom it pleased, provided that the alliance was not hostile to the Emperor or Empire. Rulers were free to determine the religion of their subjects, but these gained the right of emigration. The son of Frederick of the Palatinate received the Electoral dignity and the Lower or Rhenish estates, while the Wittelsbach house of Bavaria gained a new (eighth) Electorate and kept the Upper Palatinate.

Other claimants there were who received compensation by which history was not much affected. But one, Frederick William of Brandenburg, later styled 'the Great Elector', was distinguished by the vigour and tenacity of his negotiations, and by the impress of his character and career upon the Hohenzollern House and its nineteenth-century empire. A sturdy, stern-visaged, choleric man, a sincere Protestant but otherwise careless of truth and honour, simple and economical in his normal way of living, but clumsily pompous when interest seemed to demand it, he was destined to ride roughshod over his subjects' rights and without scruple to call in the French against the Emperor. At the Peace Congress he had a just claim to compensation, for his heritage of Pomerania must be depleted to satisfy the Swedes, but he showed that if not satisfied, he would not have shrunk from re-kindling the war. Eventually he secured the bishoprics of Halberstadt and Minden, with the archbishopric of Magdeburg in reversion. That prize would go far to remedy the normal poverty of Brandenburg, then deepened by widespread devastation.

The relative weight of secular and religious considerations

at the Congress was suggested by the settlement devised for Osnabrück, where Catholic and Protestant were to hold the bishopric by turns. Some burning questions were frankly committed to the future, so that the long-sought general pacification need not be indefinitely delayed. Such were the succession in Jülich-Cleves and Berg, and the much-disputed status of Donauwörth. The Emperor's own tribunal could not be reduced to any rule, and the Pope's protests against the sinful concessions to heretics were ignored. 'Null, void, invalid, unjust, iniquitous, inane, reprobate, damnable' was a fine collection of abusive epithets for a feeble cleric to proclaim—yet no one paid attention. Throughout the Empire the vast majority rejoiced at the return of peace, which only Germans of middle age could recollect.

The
Peace of
Westphalia
as a
Landmark

To ratify the Peace of Westphalia, and to fulfil its immediate demands, almost two years were needed. By midsummer 1650, however, the Germans, freed from foreign armies, could turn to the restoration of their ruined country. In some regions laymen were allowed two wives apiece, while only the elderly might become monks or nuns. Not seldom, civilization, for the time being, had perished.

While the Germans were engrossed in peace-making, momentous changes had been effected in several regions outside Germany. To name the Fronde and the Barricades is to hint that for some years after 1648 Europe lacked a leader. France was made impotent by her own hand, and who could take her place? Half-way through a century conspicuous for the rise of monarchy, a short stage was reached from which strong international leadership was almost entirely absent. After Westphalia, Mazarin and Cromwell were still struggling for power in France and Britain. Louis XIV was a child, and Philip IV an inglorious and harmful king disguised by no great minister. Alike in Sweden and in Poland the fruitful Vasa line had produced crowned incompetents. Pope and Sultan showed themselves ineffective. Tsar and Emperor, like the lords of Denmark, Savoy and Portugal, were no more than mediocre. William II, scion of the House of Orange, whose beginnings promised greatness, died in 1650, at twenty-four. The Swedish heir-apparent, later Charles X, and Frederick William of Brandenburg, 'the Great Elector', were notably forceful men, but

Outlook
in 1649

for the moment their environment restrained them. It seemed as though an age of warfare had exhausted leadership in Europe. Napoleon at his zenith profited by a somewhat similar paralysis of contemporary kings and princes.


The most protracted negotiations in the congress history of Europe had ended, none the less, with a comprehensive peace. Long-tortured Germany breathed a sigh of relief, and, though some Protestants were gravely disappointed, the majority thanked God for their preservation. The Dutch, at last beyond all question free, the Swedes and French, counting their ample gains from war in Germany, could turn to new careers in a novel Europe. Men, young in 1610, who had fought out the problems now disposed of, were giving place to their war-hardened sons. Let us briefly survey the European problems which were now emerging.

Problems
of Europe

We must first remember that the Peace of Westphalia was by no means the Peace of Europe. Spain and France were destined to a decade more of war, and, for some years, civil strife in France could not be ended. Upon the outcome of the Franco-Spanish war rested the fate of many regions and of many alliances. Who was to govern Portugal and the Spanish Netherlands, Navarre, Catalonia, Roussillon, north Italy and all the region between the French frontier and the Rhine? England, moreover, was still effectively nullified by civil war. In January, 1649, the King's execution, and in September the massacre at Drogheda, showed which party was gaining power, and how they were prepared to use it. The Scots, the Irish and the English followers of Charles II must be subdued, however, before the new Commonwealth could play its part in Europe. It might be that the England of Fox and Baxter would count for more in history than that of Cromwell.

The Empire

Westward of Germany, then, in the near future, peace could hardly be expected. Within the Empire, some two years must pass before the Swedish armies were to be withdrawn, and the Swedish empire in Germany fully inaugurated. A problem of still greater importance was the working of the new German constitution. Even though the Catholic and Protestant princes had abjured their mutual crusading, while the Pope had largely lost his power, German peace and patriotism were by no means safe. Foreigners, in the shape

[illegible]

SPANISH HAPSBURGS
AUSTRIAN
BRANDENBURG PRUSSIA
SWEDISH TERRITORY
BOUNDARY OF THE EMPIRE.

of Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and, above all, France, could ally themselves with the emancipated rulers, and in some cases even claim a share in the deliberations of the Diet. The King of Denmark, where Frederick III (1648-70) had succeeded the veteran Christian IV as Duke of Holstein, sent his representatives to Ratisbon, where they would meet the representatives of Queen Christina, now lord of Pomerania. If either human nature or precedents during the Thirty Years War were any guide, Bavarians, Saxons, Brandenburgers and Palatines alike would be swayed by the interest of their own dynasties, rather than by regard for Germany, for its Emperor, or for religion.

Scandinavia

On the side of Scandinavia, the peace of Europe had for the moment little to fear. Christian's son lacked his father's fatal energy, and confined himself to endeavouring to check the overweening power of his Danish and German nobles. Sweden, with Danish and Norwegian provinces in her peninsula like hostages for Frederick's good behaviour, was now too great a power to be challenged by Denmark, which had been humbled both at Lübeck and at Brömsebro. Her own outlook, however, was by no means bright. After the death of her great King, the popular liberty which he cherished had been jeopardized and in part destroyed by war. The plunder of Germany, the Swedish development from a remote and simple nation to a nation housing many foreigners and an ambitious aristocracy—this Europeanization had been dearly bought by inordinate war taxation and by the loss of immemorial freedom. Magnates who had acquired Crown lands, and who wished to cultivate them by serf labour, were threatening the very basis of the Swedish commonwealth. The danger was increased by the extraordinary character of the Queen.

Queen
Christina

Christina (1632-54) seemed to have inherited the instability of her flighty and sentimental mother. Though far from luxurious in dress, and unbending in her rejection of love and marriage, she heaped the national resources upon her favourites so lavishly that the patents came to contain a clause 'provided it be not already given to someone else'. Thus the wise administration of Oxenstierna was replaced by the capricious rule of a learned but unpractical autocrat, strong-willed indeed, but fascinated by the unusual. Refus-

ing to espouse her cousin, the martial Charles Gustavus, she gave him high command in the latest stages of the war, and in 1649 forced the Council to accept him as heir to Sweden's crown. Within five years her secret conversion to Rome, and her longing to live in southern lands, were to bring about her abdication. From 1650 onwards, discontent with the magnates and with taxation found vent in popular clamour for a resumption or 'reduction' of the alienated Crown estates.

Eastward of the Empire, 1649 saw dark clouds thick on Muscovy the horizon. Under the second of the Romanov dynasty, Alexis (1645-76), Muscovy was developing into the power which, half a century later, would storm the barriers designed to keep it out of Europe. Differences of religion, indeed, did much to hold it back, as was shown when the sister of Alexis failed to espouse the brother of the King of Denmark. While the Western powers were signing the Westphalian peace, the young Tsar was facing a revolt in his capital, and other towns demanded that he himself, not those about him, should wield his sceptre. Hence, in 1649, Tsar, patriarch and council of nobles agreed that the legal chaos should be remedied by a printed code. The representatives of some 130 towns met for this purpose, and, on their petition, the Tsar proclaimed the Code of 1649. This won the approval of the gentry and burghers, but was unpopular with the nobles, the clergy and the lower classes. Muscovy, in essence, remained an extra-European power.

The Peace of Westphalia left Italy still a region rather than a state, or even a collection of recognized and independent states. The temporal and commercial empire of Venice, the ambiguous policy of Savoy, the land and sea connections with Spain and the spiritual empire of the Papacy chiefly linked the peninsula with the wider world. This link was plainly seen in the struggle which still raged for the repulse of the Turks from Candia or Crete, the most conspicuous of the remaining Venetian dominions overseas. The Venetians, attacked by a fleet which the boastful Turks described as the terror of the world, and almost unaided by the Christian powers, strained every nerve to help the invaded island, and countered with vigour in Dalmatia. While Mazarin lived, hope might be entertained that Christendom

would be marshalled against the Turks, an expedient earlier recommended as a way of escape from the Thirty Years War. As it proved, Crete resisted until 1669.

Masaniello Of the remaining Italian powers, only the House of Savoy, which, as its change of capital from Chambéry to Turin had shown, was becoming more and more Italian, could follow a truly independent policy. Italy, especially northern Italy, must remain for many decades a battleground between France and Spain. The passions and aspirations that lay beneath its seeming acquiescence had been amazingly revealed, however, in Naples, during a few hectic weeks in the summer of 1647. The rebellion of Masaniello, an eloquent hawker of fish, then gave a unique insight into the mind and temper of the south Italian masses.

Ten years earlier, indeed, the chronic disaffection of the Neapolitans against their Spanish masters had taken shape in a dangerous intrigue with France. Let the French help the Duke of Savoy to mount the throne of Naples, receiving Savoy and Nice as their reward, and the hated Spaniards would be expelled for ever. But the plan was discovered, the Duke of Savoy died, and the course of the greater war carried the French northward instead of south. It was reserved for the Italian Mazarin to revive the tempting notion. In 1646 the French seized several Tuscan ports, with a view to the isolation of the Spanish south Italian dominions.

Masaniello
and Naples

Again, however, events in the northern theatre diverted the French from Naples, while in 1647 a *gabelle* on fruit robbed many Neapolitans of their most important food. Early in July a mob pillaged the fruit-carts at the city gates and drove the Viceroy to take sanctuary. Soon Thomas Aniello ('Masaniello') found himself at the head of a gigantic insurrection. This spread from Naples over much of southern Italy, but claimed to strike at the corrupt officials, not at their Spanish King. It succeeded, for the Viceroy cancelled the *gabelle*, and Masaniello swore solemn oaths guaranteeing due performance.

With almost incredible unwisdom, however, the *gabelle* was still imposed upon the provinces which had not revolted, while the strangest rumours of the Government's intentions prevailed. The people therefore made Masaniello dictator,

and his conduct became such as to suggest that the Viceroy had maddened him by poison. After a few days of insane freaks by the mob and their dictator, and many hundreds of executions, Masaniello himself was murdered. The strangest scene in his ten days' career, however, was yet to come. The funeral of his dismembered corpse was conducted by several thousand priests, and an enormous crowd joined in the procession. A miracle rivalling that of the annual liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius marked the occasion. For the severed parts of Masaniello came together, and he gave the enraptured multitude a saintly blessing.¹

The Neapolitan revolt continued, and in December the Duke of Guise gained the throne. Within four months, however, Don John of Austria recovered Naples for Spain, with the goodwill of those citizens who had anything to lose. In 1649, therefore, Naples was quiet, while France herself was paralysed by civil war. Savoy, at the same time, was governed by Charles Emanuel II (1648-75), a weak-willed prince dominated by his pro-French mother. Exhausted by long civil strife, the country was in 1649 incapable of patriotic exertion. Since Spain and France were still at war, the French kept Turin, Pinerolo and four other fortresses, while the strongest of all, Vercelli, remained in Spanish occupation.

Neither the Papacy nor any temporal Italian state could in 1649, or indeed for many later years, redeem the peninsula from its character of ineffectiveness and of decay. Ruler after ruler could only be described as weak, while France treated Italy as a pawn in her struggle with Spain, and Spain as a dependency from which to hope for military advantage. The 'negative nationality' prompting union against foreigners with kinsmen unloved in time of peace, which in earlier centuries had impelled the Italians against foreign invaders, however bitter were their quarrels among themselves, seemed now to have given place to an apathy only broken by mass-revolt against some new taxation. The commercial aristocracy of Venice and the half-foreign dynasty of Savoy alone showed fleeting gleams of Italian independence.

¹ See also below p. 298.

CHAPTER XV

EUROPE, 1649-1661: THE DUTCH

THE Westphalian treaties had left peace in Europe preponderant over war, and for a moment they seemed to have made possible a real family of nations. All students will recall that, after a dozen years, this prospect began to pale before the menace of the Caesarism of the King of France, on which the remainder of our narrative will chiefly turn. The salient features of those years must now be noted.

Limitations
on
European
Peace

Europe, we must remember, by no means brought from Westphalia a comprehensive peace. The sighs of relief breathed by the Dutch, the Germans, the Scandinavians and many more could not be echoed by great masses of the remaining peoples. Britain was approaching her sternest hour. Spain could not bring herself to satisfy the demands of France. The French themselves were distracted by the Fronde, while a series of catastrophes was about to shake the foundations of the Polish state. A new peril, the presence of countless thousands who lived by war, soon made itself apparent. But for her recent escape from a still more widespread and dangerous fever, Europe could have perceived in these years no suggestion of a general peace. With no exaggeration of the attainments of Westphalia, we may review the chief states one by one.

The
Dutch
Zenith

Peace of
Munster

In not a few activities, indeed, the smallest power in Europe occupied in 1649 the foremost place. The Dutch Republic, almost conquered sixty years before, had now brought its seemingly interminable war of liberation to a triumphant close. At Münster, Spain yielded all for which she had been fighting for almost a generation. The terms of the treaty suggest a friendly separation between a mother country and a dominion which has grown up into a mature and sovereign state. Mutual free trade, boundaries as the war had left them, mutual respect for trading markets—these, with unlimited Dutch independence, were the fruits

of victory, and of the threat to Spain from France. Most conspicuous of all, the Scheldt became a closed channel, Spain thus renouncing the best of all her natural waterways to the profit of artificial Amsterdam. Such was the triumph to which three great Orange princes had led their fertile nation. The European rebels against Spain, and their conquests in the Indies, made chiefly at the expense of the Portuguese, were now recognized as an independent empire. Rich, federal, Calvinist and unsurpassed upon the sea, boasting in Amsterdam 'a double Venice', defeating mother-countries in their own colonial markets, the Republic was unique among the states of Europe.

The question of the political future of so novel a power at once arose. Spain, impelled to the Münster surrender chiefly by her war with France, and by the danger to her own Netherlands from the hostile French and Dutch, lay remote from Holland both by sea and land. France, England and the Empire, on the other hand, were neighbours deeply interested in Dutch politics, and the internal unity indispensable to a war of liberation must be in peril from the moment when that war attained its close. Small size, strong passions and advanced development—these classic characteristics of the city-state marked the new nation, and they did not make for strength or internal peace.

The danger to Dutch unity was notably increased by the incongruity between the province of Holland and her associates in the federation. Seven states, of which one is stronger and richer than the rest combined, can never form a happy egalitarian union. When, as since the death of Frederick Henry in March, 1647, the Lieutenant is a very young and ambitious supporter of continued war, the outlook is dark indeed. Stadholder William II, urged to autocracy by his Stuart wife, was suspected of the most far-reaching revolutionary designs, both domestic and foreign. To supersede the crazy constitution of the Republic by a strong Orange monarchy, and to join with France in partitioning the Spanish Netherlands—such were the natural dreams of an able prince, and they might well alarm the Spaniards and the Opposition.

The year 1650, therefore, was marked by a struggle between the respective forces of centralization and of provincial

Prospects
of the
Dutch

Party
Struggles

independence. For financial reasons, the Dutch provincial Estates were determined to reduce the army. A strong majority among them held that there was constitutionally not one Dutch army but seven, that each Province might dispose of its own force, and that, even when considerably reduced, the army of Holland would cost more than that province could afford to pay. Some held that in time of peace mercenaries and even a Stadholder or a Captain-General formed a needless danger to the state. During the summer, at the request of a majority in the States-General, William of Orange and a commission visited the towns of Holland in order to undermine the opposition.

Nine towns, however, refused assent to the Commissioners' demands, and Amsterdam declined to admit either the Stadholder or his colleagues. Further negotiation having failed, William, inspired perhaps by Mazarin's example, carefully prepared a *coup d'état*. At the end of July, a few arrests, aided by memory of Oldenbarnevelt's execution, and by preparations for the siege of Amsterdam, cowed the Opposition. The Dutch and French, it seemed, might now dictate to Spain, and perhaps restore the King of England. Early in November, however, William untimely died, from small-pox ascribed to overstrain while hunting. Soon afterwards a son was born to him and his English bride. At thirty-eight that son was to become William III of England.

Triumph of
States-rights

While the infant's relatives quarrelled over his guardianship, the States-rights party triumphed. Holland declined to be governed by a Stadholder, and the provinces shared with the States-General the command of the federal army. The real government of 'the Republics' was henceforth to be the Estates of Holland. Amsterdam even received a money grant for her expenses in resisting the late Stadholder's attack. Power thus fell into the hands of the provincial magnates of Holland, and the Calvinism which had been approved at Dort was reaffirmed. Such was the system, or lack of system, which was all that the Dutch could oppose to a new and deadly threat of foreign war.

Conflict with
England

The new war, waged by sea alone, broke out with England. The commercial and colonial rivalries, which were conspicuous in the East Indies, had been sharpened by the execution of the English King and the banishment of his heir. In

October, 1651, England's demands for ceremonial honours in waters claimed as her own were followed by a Navigation Act directed against the carrying trade of their rivals.

The Navigation Acts, a series in which the act of 1651 is most conspicuous, did much to shape the history of the maritime, commercial and colonial age then springing into life. The return of a strengthened England to a weakened continent was to be deeply influenced by this new 'palladium' of her liberty, which several successive powers found detrimental. It was in part provoked by a recent Dutch treaty with King Frederick III, ratified in March, 1651, which pledged Denmark not to reduce the Sound Dues in favour of any other power. But it was also preceded by a proposal paralleled only in 1940, whereby England offered amalgamation with herself to a neighbouring continental power. The spring and summer of 1651 therefore demand a careful chronological review.

When Charles I had been two years dead, his son was crowned at Scone, but with small prospect of regaining Britain or Ireland, unless by some unlikely turn of fortune. The execution of a king, however, had thrilled all Europe, and many among the Dutch were contemptuous and resentful. Sea-power, as the hold of Charles II on the Scillies proved, was of the utmost importance to England, while the prolonged commercial friction with the Dutch was aggravated by their new threat to her commerce with the Baltic. At a time when English finances were strained, and the Stuart peril not averted, a strong link with the other great naval power would change a dangerous situation into one which might be called impregnable. The Dutch, like the Cromwellians, were Protestant extremists who had rebelled successfully against their king, but who lacked that security which a union between the two sea-powers should afford. Such a union would make it impossible for any Catholic power to reach England, while the Ironsides and any mercenaries who could be brought by sea would augment the defensive strength of the Dutch. They had already suffered not a little from Royalist privateers.

Early in 1651, therefore, the Parliament made a great effort to conciliate the Dutch, and to convince them of the advantages of union. The existing suspension of mutual

Dutch and
English

English
Quest of
Union

diplomatic relations was brought to an end, while, in March, nearly 250 richly-clad Englishmen composed an embassy which journeyed to the Hague. They found the mob suspicious, and it was said that at their approach little Prince William fell into convulsions. Further complications arose from the visit of a squadron under Van Tromp to the Scilly Islands, and from an English diplomatic negotiation with Portugal, a state against which the Dutch were on the verge of war. Only after a month punctuated with insults to the embassy by the populace did the Dutch agree to a closer union with England.

The
Anglo-Dutch
Union
Project

It was next laboriously debated what degree of closeness should be prescribed, the Royalists meanwhile joining in the insults to the embassy. While the Dutch assemblies considered a perpetual confederacy, England urged also the cancellation of the new treaty with Denmark, affecting as it did her vital import of the raw material of ships, and the training and maintenance of her seamen. For a whole month a treaty drawn up by the Dutch was discussed by their many councils. The upshot proved to be a proposal for a close alliance, but with no surrender of the right to shelter persons declared by England to be her enemies. This frustrated the close incorporating union which the Parliament desired, and, after three months at the Hague, the embassy departed. The Dutch none the less desired that the negotiation should go on in England.

The
Navigation
Act of 1651

In December, after six months' preparation, the Dutch embassy sailed up the Thames. Their reception was magnificent, but they faced an altered situation. After Worcester, Charles II had fled to France, and in Scotland and Ireland his partisans had been defeated. Civil war no longer checked the development of the English fleets and commerce. In October, within a week of Worcester, the Navigation Act had challenged foreign competition, above all, that of the Dutch. The rule henceforth prevailed that foreign goods must enter England, and English goods depart thence, either in English ships, with crews at least half English, or in ships of the producing country. This struck hard at a small state which maintained itself by carrying foreign goods in more than a thousand vessels. The administration of the Act, moreover, made it yet more offensive. English cruisers

seized Dutch ships upon the high seas, and brought them into English ports for examination. Worst of all, by the so-called letters of marque, the English empowered private owners to arm their ships and act as units of the navy. Such profit-seekers had scant respect either for coastal waters or for the due courtesies of the sea.

In January, 1652, while the Dutch embassy was pressing hopeless demands for reparation, a grave and tall young Dutchman of the highest character, a scholar practising law at the Hague, was beginning to come to the front through obvious merit. This was John de Witt, a statesman destined for nearly two decades to sway the policy of his country. The first half of the year, however, was filled by the embittered claims and counter-claims, by rapid naval armament, and by the sudden outbreak of a war.

Although the new Dutch navy could be formed only by five independent and jealous Boards of Admiralty, Van Tromp with some fifty sail put to sea in May. His mission was to defend Dutch ships against all interference, shunning, if possible, the coast of England, and striking his flag in English waters only when outmatched in force. Although the Dutch desired no war, a combination of ill-winds, misjudgment by the admiral, and accident, brought a collision with Blake off Dover, in which the English had the advantage. Such was the obscure beginning of a struggle which could only end with the triumph of the island nation.

But though the Dutch on land might be derided, and although they were fighting for no inspiring principle, none could doubt or despise either their tenacity or their skill at sea. Between May, 1652, and April, 1654, a dozen battles took place, with the balance on the whole favouring the English. Although the Dutch cut off their opponents from the Baltic, and beat them in the Mediterranean, a war with England was bound to destroy or at least disturb the commerce which had given them strength. Their country could show nothing like the number of the ports which studded the long English coast-line, nor like the administrative unity of the English navy. In the last days of the Long Parliament, indeed, England was not free from constitutional troubles, but her trend was towards at least a temporary

War with
England

quasi-monarchy under Cromwell. The course of politics abroad, moreover, seemed to ensure non-intervention by foreign powers. Germany was sick of warfare, Spain had but lately quitted the north, and in France the Fronde led even to a short-lived alliance with Spain. No Protestant state could at the moment interfere, and Catholics might well be content to see the Protestants destroying each other.

Alternations
of Success

In 1653 the Dutch lost a merchant fleet near Calais, and a fishing fleet with its protecting warships off the Orkneys. While De Ruyter saved a convoy, the duel between Van Tromp and Blake proved so disastrous to the Dutch that their great admiral was superseded. In October they lost a pitched battle in the Downs, and many captains fled. Dutch discontent took shape in a movement for unity under William III, now almost two years old. 'Although our Prince is still so small, Stadholder he must be for all', sang many Orange partisans. Especially in Zealand, the multitude knew no politics save devotion to the House that had established their Republic. Van Tromp, however, was recalled, and he severely defeated Blake off Dungeness in December. His broom at the masthead in the narrow seas summarized the results of his success.

Early in 1653, however, the reorganized English fleet found him convoying 150 merchantmen to Holland. A three days battle followed, and only the genius of the Admiral averted a disaster. While the Dutch, always handicapped by their lack of unity, were preparing anew, John de Witt, now in the highest office, urged on a secret negotiation. The English, however, knew too well the weakness of their enemies, and the fluctuating war continued. Before midsummer, off the Flemish coast, Van Tromp and his ill-found fleet were beaten, and it seemed that the United Provinces might be invaded. To new peace offers Cromwell replied that God desired Anglo-Dutch co-operation to free the world from Rome, and that, as friends, the two states might regulate the commerce of the world. The Dutch, however, preferred to strive once again for victory. In August they lost a desperate fight off their own coast. Some 26 ships and 6,000 men were missing, and Van Tromp himself was killed, but Monk's blockade was broken.

John de Witt, though not yet thirty, had now accepted what was in effect the headship of the state. Thanks to his statecraft and to the English losses, the Orange movement was kept under, a desultory war maintained, and peace negotiations continued. Cromwell, who became Lord Protector in December, had always desired peace and the creation of a great Protestant alliance. His terms, however, placed in the forefront the stipulation that the House of Orange should be for ever debarred from office. This demand, and others only less galling, jeopardized the negotiations, but De Witt prolonged them with consummate skill. In April, 1654, a treaty was signed at Westminster, and by great exertions it was ratified forthwith. Soon both nations were rejoicing that they were at peace.

De Witt
and Peace

That peace, however, had been procured by a strange and secret trick. While Cromwell insisted above all on permanent Orange exclusion, many Dutch could not stomach such an affront. A treaty embodying it would not have gained their approval. De Witt therefore induced the Lord Protector to sign the treaty by undertaking that the Dutch would pass a law 'secluding' the Orange House from office. This the States-General refused, but De Witt procured instead a secret engagement by Holland to the same effect. Though it served its immediate purpose, nothing could have demonstrated more clearly the defects of the Dutch constitution, or the divisions between great sections of the nation.

Question
of Orange
Exclusion

Apart from the strange and sinister achievement of Exclusion, the Anglo-Dutch treaty was memorable solely because it may be held to mark the beginning of Dutch decline. Only by complete unity could the small Republic maintain its eminence in Europe and in the world. The Anglo-Dutch war had shown how strong the larger combatant might expect to become, and how disunited was the smaller. The terms of the treaty, apart from conventional promises of peace and concord, were favourable to England. The Dutch consented to observe the ceremonies which she demanded at sea, and to compensate her for the massacre at Amboyna. Many other commercial and colonial disputes were referred to a joint commission, and, failing a swift agreement, the Swiss Protestant Cantons were to arbitrate. The treaty constrained the Orange party by the provision

that no one who refused to swear to it could hold the highest civil or military office. Thus relieved and strengthened, De Witt could devote himself to making the Republic as strong as its exaggerated federalism would allow.

CHAPTER XVI

FRANCE, 1648-1661

WHILE the Dutch and English were striving to settle their own forms of government and were struggling for primacy at sea, something like a pause occurred in the traditional conflicts of Europe. Neither the Emperor nor any other German could immediately break the hard-won peace of 1648, or at once attempt fresh conquests. In Sweden, though the roots of her strife with Denmark and with the Polish Vasa had not been cut, the exhaustion of the nation and the eccentricity of Queen Christina made for an uneasy truce. Spain and France, indeed, were still officially at war, and therefore Italy could not be perfectly at peace. But without the Emperor, Spain must become neither formidable nor aggressive. Yet though she failed to regain Portugal, and in 1649 entertained notions of peace with France, her pride prompted the absurd demand of all that France had conquered from her as its price. With little real danger from Philip IV, however, the discontented in France might attack their own half-foreign government and strive to seize its power.

The Frondes, so-called in mockery from a childish game of flinging stones and decamping, united widely-diverse elements of opposition to the *régime*. The *Parlements*, encouraged by the success of the wholly different Parliament in England, attempted by uniting to check absolutism in legislation. The aristocrats, male and female, sought offices, estates and adventure. Both resented the rule of an Italian cardinal as the agent of a Spanish queen, whom scandal declared to be his wife. It was certain that Mazarin was of humble origin and that he sought to conceal the fact. When he placed on his coat-of-arms the fasces of an imaginary lictor ancestor, the Parisians declared that everyone knew that the rod, axe and halter were his deserts. His financial

French
Politics
and War

gains and his costly nepotism at the expense of France inflamed the capital and the magnates against him.

Mazarin
Attacked

In the summer of 1648, the *Parlement* fought a constitutional battle against a regency which loaded the French with taxes. At midsummer, Mazarin felt unable to forbid representatives of the sovereign courts to draw up a programme of reform. On their report, the *Parlement* took the unprecedented step of abolishing the *intendants*. To this the Crown replied by substituting a half measure in the same direction. For several weeks the contest continued on these lines, the *Parlement* aiming at financial reform and the reduction of arbitrary power, while the Crown conceded as little as possible, especially of authority to make new laws.

The triumph of Condé at Lens, however, where he routed the Spaniards in August at small expense, emboldened the Crown to arrest the honest and kindly Broussel, who had led the Opposition. Paris immediately rose. The narrow streets were closed by some 1,200 barricades, and Queen and Minister besieged. In this rebellion the news from Naples played its part, for rebellious Frenchmen idealized Masaniello. Within a week, the brilliant intriguing Cardinal de Retz procured the release of Broussel. A fortnight later, Anne and Mazarin fled to Rueil, Richelieu's château within six miles of Paris, and there, despite his scorn for Mazarin, Condé joined them. Soon Mazarin slipped away, leaving Condé and Gaston of Orleans to bargain with the spokesmen of the *Parlement*. The outcome was that the former demands were substantially conceded, and the King, for the moment a constitutional monarch, re-entered Paris on the very day on which the great Peace was signed. It was significant, however, that Mazarin had not been dismissed.

Royal
Flight

The Regent and her Minister, indeed, had no intention of a virtual abdication, and soon disputes with their seeming conquerors were rife. In the first days of the new year, Queen-Mother, King and Cardinal withdrew slightly farther west, this time to Henry IV's château at St. Germain-en-Laye. The memory of that winter flight was deeply graven on young Louis' mind. To it may be ascribed his distrust of Paris, and much of his dignified reserve towards his people.

The *Parlement*, on the other hand, disobeyed the royal command to quit the capital. There it raised funds and

troops, while De Retz brought the clergy to its side. Menaced by Condé and by troops which the Peace of Westphalia had set free, Paris appealed to the provinces, and joined with a host of discontented magnates. The Duchess of Longueville, who was Condé's sister, and their brother the Prince of Conti, were foremost in a brilliant but unprincipled crowd, whose leaders strove to ally with Spain, and welcomed invasion from the Netherlands. Their obvious levity, the Spanish danger, the judicial murder of the English King and the approach of a veteran force under Turenne all helped the patriot President Molé to end the costly and unpromising strife. The Crown confirmed its former concessions, while bribes bought off the outstanding rebels. By April, 1649, the Peace of Rueil had terminated the open rebellion, bridled the *Parlement*, and secured the retreat of the invaders.

It was unlikely, however, that concessions thus obtained would heal the deep-seated infirmities of France. The *Parlement*, the capital and the aristocrats had still their several ambitions, and Condé, the triumphant general, desired above all else to supplant Mazarin. Both he and the Minister remembered the decree of 1617, which barred the office to foreigners on pain of death. To end the confused play of forces and to secure his own position, Mazarin now struck at his most dangerous foe. Before recording his attack on Condé, however, we must dwell on other factors in the struggle.

The Fronde
Protracted

In the days of the Cardinals, France was unique in Europe for the influence upon her history which was exercised by women. While the chaste successor of the rake Henry filled the throne, and while Louis XIV lived through boyhood, a half-century rare indeed in French history passed by, for there was no royal mistress. But Queen-Mothers, by activity or indolence, affected policy, while an intriguing band of great ladies, Chevreuse and Longueville the foremost names among them, fought for their private ends. Gaston's tall and rich daughter Montpensier, known as '*la grande Mademoiselle*', personified this female influence in 1652, when she bombarded Turenne with the guns of Orleans and saved that city from the Government. Such influences must, in part at least, account for the conspicuous indifference

Personal
Influences

of Paris and of the nobles to the wars with the Emperor and with the King of Spain.

The inspiration of an extraordinary man, however, may have been the chief factor in rousing Paris to combat in the Fronde. Gondi, in 1651 Cardinal de Retz, a small, dark, ill-made, short-sighted, clumsy ecclesiastic, who, as coadjutor to his uncle their archbishop, had won the Parisians by gifts and eloquence, led the movement against a *régime* which had scorned his offers of assistance. He had the satisfaction of driving the Court from the capital, and, for a time, of banishing Mazarin, his target above all else. Unlike other leaders of the Fronde, he never consented to ally himself with Spain, while both his later career and his famous memoirs prove him a really able man.

Spain

Where, the bewildered student may well inquire, Where all this time was Spain? Philip IV still wore the Spanish crown, and as lately as in 1644 he had been leading his forces in the reconquest of Catalonia. In retrospect, it is true, the defeat at Rocroi in the foregoing year marked the beginning of a real military decline. That, however, could not be evident to contemporaries, and in 1644 both peninsular Spain and Italy fought with energy and with conviction. Philip's finances, moreover, were then less inadequate than usual. France seemed hopelessly divided, and Turenne, the ablest soldier whom she had yet produced, served on the Spanish side. Yet Spain conquered nothing vital, and in 1653 Philip's opportunity had gone by. Mazarin could then unite France and create in Europe an anti-Spanish coalition.

Philip IV

The blame for this waste of opportunity must in part be laid upon the King. Philip was neither a great general nor a firm and tenacious monarch. With some artistic and literary endowment, he had thrown the burden of ruling upon others and followed pleasure. But Spain now lacked outstanding men, and, after dismissing Olivarez early in 1643, he could find no better confidant than De Haro, the fallen minister's less gifted nephew. Philip's own spurt of energy and success was followed by two domestic disasters—the death in 1644 of his queen and, two years later, of his only lawful son. A brilliant bastard, Juan José (Don John) took command of the fleet and armies, while Philip, his father, turned to vice for relief from depression. Although,

in 1656, Don John shared in a victory over Turenne, the trend of Spanish arms was downwards, and the nation counts 44 defeats in a reign which lasted as many years (1621-65).

Such was the outcome of failure to crush the divided French during their civil war. It is more than doubtful, however, whether Spain was still capable of a great aggression. Her peace with the Dutch after the campaign of 1647, while it deprived France of an ally, may be ascribed to conscious weakness. The rebellion of Portugal remained unpunished; the Spanish Netherlands and Catalonia, in danger; the dominions in Italy and beyond the ocean, a burden. Population was declining; government remained cumbrous and slow; the Armada had never been avenged. The Catholic faith imposed on Spain enormous burdens without securing Habsburg support in time of need. To all this may be added the fact that aggressive warfare demanded a generalship and preparation which few governments could provide. Mazarin regained power because Spain was not among them.

From stimulating speculations, such as what must have happened to France had Spain and England been different from what they were, or how far her success was due to the instinct or destiny or genius of the French nation, we turn to a simple narrative of what occurred.

In January, 1650, the Crown, aided by De Retz, arrested Condé and his chief associates, while Turenne and other magnates took to flight. But several provinces, especially Guienne, revolted, and the great Marshal, in league with the Spanish Netherlands, actually menaced Paris. Mazarin rushed hither and thither and gained victories, only to find that nobles and *Parlement* had leagued against him. The weakness of monarchy in France in the thirteenth year of Louis' life was shown in February, 1651, when Mazarin fled from the capital and released Condé for its defence. The minister, knowing the widespread detestation of himself, sheltered in Germany until the storm abated.

Neither Condé nor any prince or faction, however, could displace the lawful King or Regent, nor even prevent Mazarin from continuing to inspire the administration. In September, 1651, Condé joined the rebels in Guienne. The amazing situation, with Paris menaced from the south by Condé and the French, and from the north by Turenne and

Progress of
the Fronde

the Spaniards, ended with Turenne's return to his allegiance. Mazarin, the bugbear of the *Parlement*, resumed the reins: civil war continued: at midsummer, 1652, Condé and Turenne fought a desperate battle close to Paris. Turenne, urged on by the boy-king, prevailed, but the Parisians took Condé's part and saved him. Paris was none the less divided, and a second self-exile by Mazarin turned the scale. While Condé joined the Spaniards, whose conquests ranged from Dunkirk to Barcelona and Casale, the Parisians, in the autumn, gave Louis the victory over his *Parlement* and over France. Early in 1653, Mazarin again returned, having transferred his unpopularity to the vanquished Fronde. Fouquet, the Royalists now hoped, would restore the shattered French finances. Next year, a victory at Arras marked the ascendancy of Turenne over Condé.

French War
with Spain
in 1653-5

In 1653, the foremost task of France was to repel the onslaught of the Spaniards from the Netherlands, aided as it was by the Duke of Lorraine and by Condé, who had given them a new route to Paris by capturing Rethel on the Aisne. Thanks to Turenne, the campaign yielded only Rocroi to the invaders, while the recovery of Rethel blocked their future path. This was the first appearance of Louis XIV in the field, and his success, repeated in 1654, undoubtedly affected the future history of Europe.

Campaign
of 1654

In 1654 the enemy attacked in Artois, only to be defeated by Turenne, after others had captured Stenay in his homeland. In these years and those which followed, the victory of Condé and the Spaniards might well have rekindled civil war in France. Meanwhile, however, new factors were at work in Europe. Cromwell had mastered England and designed to attack her enemies, while the Dutch had yielded to him in making peace. Charles X ruled in Sweden and was also bent on war. The Tsar found that the time was ripe for an attack on Poland. Brandenburg now possessed a standing army, and her Elector would not stand idle. France needed all her diplomatic and military skill.

Civil and
Foreign War

For fully six years (1649-54), indeed, the history of France is strangely compounded of war with the great Spanish empire and a confused struggle at home. While foreign mercenaries serving Mazarin ravaged the countryside which they were paid to defend, men and women with the

proudest names fought recklessly for their ambitions. By grim experience, the French were taught to look to monarchy for salvation, and their King grew up to manhood with the bitterest distrust of his people. Until the dawn of victory in 1653, France was forced to make sacrifices in each of the main theatres of war.

French losses, indeed, were mainly due to the fact that her two most eminent commanders often fought on different sides. As the first nobleman of France, and the adored brother of the irresistible Madame de Longueville, Condé might claim an influence superior to that of the Spanish Queen-Mother and her Italian minion. In October, 1648, he had much to do with the constitutional surrender to the Fronde in the Declaration of Saint-Germain. It was impossible, however, both to abolish Richelieu's machinery and to preserve the strong monarchy which was the Cardinals' goal. It likewise proved impossible by gifts of lands and offices to content the autocratic Condé. Early in 1649, while Turenne was marching on the capital, it was Condé who helped to buy off his troops, thus forcing him into exile. In April, however, as it seemed, a new general compromise had been effected.

Fluctuations
of French
War and
Politics

This arrangement, known as the Treaty of Rueil, from Richelieu's palace, whence the court had blockaded the capital, freed Mazarin from an earlier condemnation, and was followed by a general cessation of violence. Now was the time to strike at Spain in earnest, but Turenne, and, as it proved, Condé also, were not available. Instead of victory over Spain, the Court found itself committed to many expeditions against rebellious regions in France. In August, 1650, while the Government subdued Bordeaux, Turenne was able to terrify Paris with his Spanish army. In December, Mazarin drove him away, only to find that in his absence Paris had been roused against himself.

Early in 1651, the Cardinal fled to Cologne, whence he could adroitly direct his party to play upon the jealousies among the nobles and their prejudice against the *Parlement*. With Mazarin absent Condé at first seemed all-powerful, but in September, when the King entered his 'teens and formally came of age, friction had developed into insurrection. Turenne, on the other hand, refused to fight against a lawful

and regnant King. He was soon to find himself at war with Condé, now the pledged ally of Spain. Such was the whirlpool of history in France.

In 1652, when Condé hoped to make Cromwell the ally of a French republic, and drew close to Paris after victory on the Loire, he engaged in a fluctuating struggle with Turenne, and accepted service under the *Parlement*. Again, however, Mazarin, who had returned in January, 1652, retired from France, and governed through the Queen, by correspondence. Turenne, however, could keep the Spaniards in check, while the futility and suffering of the war made the French more and more reluctant to support the Fronde. In October, when Louis again ruled France from Paris, the Duke of Lorraine and Condé both retired. The second Fronde collapsed: Gaston withdrew: De Retz was imprisoned: many leaders were exiled: Condé was proclaimed a traitor: the *Parlement* found itself debarred from politics. Thus in February, 1653, Mazarin could once more return to Paris and proceed to quench the embers of rebellion. Towns, Bordeaux the chief, returned to their allegiance, while Harcourt, who had ruled Alsace as an independent principality, was reduced to obedience early in 1654. The Second Fronde left Mazarin and the monarchy stronger than before.

French
Latent
Strength

The strength of France, indeed, was proved by the failure of Spain to profit by the unique opportunity which the Fronde had offered. Barcelona and fortresses in northern Italy and in the Netherlands had indeed been taken, but Turenne, fighting on behalf of France, usually proved stronger than Condé, commissioned to fight against her by the King of Spain. Mazarin won over the Lorrainers, and, after years of endeavour, gained the English Commonwealth as an ally. In 1658, French and English under Turenne routed Don John and Condé at the Dunes, and England thus acquired Dunkirk. Many fortresses in the Netherlands then fell to the allies.

Meanwhile, the new and mediocre Emperor, Leopold I (1658-1705) stood pledged to cease from aiding Spain. Mazarin's diplomacy also made use of the Peace of Westphalia to place France at the head of the League of the Rhine, a widespread confederation of German princes to uphold the

treaties of 1648. Exhausted and palpably outmatched, the Spaniards wisely offered peace, which a marriage between their Infanta and young Louis XIV might guarantee. Such a union, indeed, had been a dominant object with the French ever since 1654, and no one could deny that a peace thus buttressed might be stable. A territorial settlement, as the event proved, was by no means hopeless. But, for some years, two great obstacles blocked the way. Philip IV had as yet no son, and a French husband of the Infanta must therefore inevitably menace the independent Spanish succession. Condé, moreover, had done so much for Spain that it seemed impossible either for France to restore his former dignities or for Spain to be content with a less ample reinstatement. The war, therefore, went on, and France incurred new obligations towards her ally, England.

Political
Complica-
tions

In 1657, however, the future Charles II of Spain was born, and soon Philip's queen was again declared pregnant. The royal line therefore seemed secure enough to warrant a peace with France, of which every campaign emphasized the necessity. But Spanish honour still required Condé's reinstatement, and to this French policy and pride long dictated a refusal. At last, however, Spain was allowed to purchase what she could not bring herself to forego, while France escaped the replacement of the great traitor in office. The negotiations gave Mazarin the greatest opportunity of his life to show his diplomatic skill and patriotic self-sacrifice. For the chief obstacle to peace lay in the King's honest love for the Cardinal's own niece, and, to serve France, he declined the glittering prize. A patent negotiation for a Savoyard match may be ascribed to his wish to put pressure upon Spain.

Thus, after months of negotiation, the war begun by Richelieu was ended by Mazarin, when his own career was drawing near its close. The Peace of the Pyrenees (November, 1659) summed up and occasioned so much history that its content must be somewhat minutely stated. The leading motive of European history for many years was the self-assertion of the French. Whatever her dumb masses might desire, the aim of a strong monarchy marching towards what might be deemed their natural boundaries, and strengthening itself with fortifications, sally-ports, unrivalled armaments,

Peace
of the
Pyrenees

and well-contrived alliances—this was common to Henry, the Cardinals and Louis XIV. The marriage, the renunciations and the acquisitions of 1659 form perhaps the greatest landmark in its progress.

The Iberian settlement assumed the continued independence of Portugal, but pledged France to give her no help beyond good offices with Spain. It improved the frontier by giving France Roussillon, Cerdagne and Conflans on her own side of the Pyrenees. Maria Theresa, the French queen-elect, renounced all claim to inherit Spain, but her dowry was fixed at a sum which it was unlikely that Spain could pay. This sum, 500,000 crowns, might be regarded as the legal 'consideration' for the renunciation of her inheritance. No one could suggest or expect that a Spanish Infanta should marry without either dowry or reversionary rights. France, for her part, renounced her holdings beyond the Pyrenees in Catalonia, and made some concessions in Franche Comté. Breisach and the ill-defined territory called 'Alsace', however, remained in her hands. The Duke of Lorraine was restored, on condition of ceding several towns to France, and of giving that power, which on three sides hemmed him in, a general right of entering his duchy.

In Italy, Spain regained what she had lost, though the twofold Habsburg threat was certain to throw the Italian princes into the arms of France. The most complex problem of the peace concerned the territorial assignments in and near the Netherlands. There the Spanish diplomats had gained no small advantage by their alarming suggestion that Spain might cede a few strong fortresses to Condé. France retained Artois, but without St. Omer and Aire. In Flanders, her chief acquisition was Gravelines; in Hainault Landrécies and Philippeville; in Luxemburg, Thionville and Montmédy. Rocroi, le Catelet and Linchamp she recovered at the peace.

Mutual
Goodwill

A definite and even elaborate attempt was made, moreover, to establish and secure peaceful intercourse between the two nations by liberal provisions for its exercise. 'Most favoured nation' treatment for their subjects, the establishment of consulates, the prohibition of trade in munitions by each with the enemies of the other—such stipulations bore witness to a real wish for lasting co-operation. It was even

agreed that, in case of a rupture between them, their subjects should have six months' grace to return home, and that no more reprisals against their persons or their goods should be authorized, unless to vindicate the law. The Dukes of Savoy and Modena lost no territory through their alliance with France, while Condé, now Governor of Burgundy instead of Guierne, recovered all his dignities and estates.

However sincere and moderate a settlement, the Peace of the Pyrenees formed, none the less, a clear and striking landmark in the rise of France and in the descent of Spain. To Louis it brought a faultless wife, loving, gentle and, though a Habsburg, by no means devoid of beauty. His father-in-law remained the foremost of kings, lord not only of Spain, the Netherlands and Italy, but of rich possessions in every other continent then known to Europe. Canary Islands and Moroccan ports, the Philippines, many of the West Indies, Mexico, California, almost all South America except Brazil—these gave Spain an incomparable empire. Her court was still the mirror of monarchy: she had still a Calderon and a Murillo: her people had not lost pride in their country, their monarchy, their religion and themselves. None the less, on all sides there were traces of Spanish decline. The first half of the seventeenth century had probably reduced the population from some 6,000,000 to less than three-quarters of that number. The disdain of the nobles for work, the expulsion of profitable heretics, and the inordinate multiplication of celibate ecclesiastics sapped the country's revenues and resources. Philip III had been the last effective Spanish king, and the succession of able ministers, which had included Olivarez and the joint architect of the Peace of the Pyrenees, De Haro, had now been broken. A singular ill-fortune had decreed that, while a brilliant series of men of talent was exalting France, the Spanish throne should be filled from 1621 to 1665 by an inferior monarch and then, for a generation, by one whose accession almost prejudiced monarchy itself.

While Philip IV still reigned and Louis XIV came to manhood, Mazarin approached his glorious end. The long-awaited French triumph at the Pyrenees was his supreme achievement, and opposition to him melted away. The delirious people idolized the King whom he had created,

and who, though not devoid of jealousy, fully recognized his tutor's greatness. Mazarin, whom a few years earlier the *Parlement* had proscribed, now received its humble congratulations. In his closing years, the peace with Spain and the King's marriage did not exhaust his contribution. In 1659, when Charles X of Sweden had stirred up a nest of hornets, Mazarin majestically flung the mantle of France over her ally. Thanks to his intervention, aided by England and the Dutch, Sweden negotiated for peace—with Denmark at Copenhagen, and at the monastery of Oliva, near Danzig, with Austria, Brandenburg and Poland. Early in 1660, Charles X died, and twin treaties gave his country an honourable peace, which in the following year comprised Muscovy also. Thus Mazarin secured the structure which Richelieu and Gustavus had built up. Meanwhile the son of the French princess Henrietta had regained the throne of England. Here also the Cardinal created a good understanding, marrying Charles II to Catherine of Braganza, the Portuguese infanta, and his sister Henrietta to Louis' brother, now known as the Duke of Orleans. A French princess, moreover, espoused the Duke of Tuscany, and, ten days before his death, Mazarin could rejoice to see a satisfactory settlement of the disputes between France and the Duke of Lorraine.

The Cardinal's death in March, 1661, was a landmark in the history of both France and Europe. He left a king, whom he had trained and married, endowed, in great part by him, with almost boundless possibilities of domination within and without the kingdom. Within France, Mazarin had preserved and developed Richelieu's creation of a strong military force, an unrivalled diplomatic service, and a dominant administration. He could also leave the King a vast fortune, which Louis regally declined, and superb instruments of government in his pupils, Colbert and Lionne.

Mazarin's
Achievement

At the same time it is undeniable that the internal defects which, four generations later, brought about the French Revolution, remained unredressed and unchallenged by him. The Revolutionaries registered an historic judgement when they scattered his remains.

The problem of his greatness, always difficult when the answer turns on diplomacy, is doubly difficult when the

diplomat has been imported from abroad. Cannot such a State servant plead that he must be judged by his success in giving his adopted country what she has herself set out to gain? No Frenchman looked to Mazarin for the reform of the Constitution. He was unable even to carry into effect new building regulations designed to check the overgrowth of Paris. But if, as seems indubitable, he saved France from anarchy and formed both Louis and his agents, then the whole foreground of the years 1648 to 1715 owes its outline and colour to him. In Lamartine's manner, but with substantial truth, he has been extolled as the statesman who 'adopting no party but acting as the neutralizer of all, after not only vanquishing but binding them hand and foot, ended by carrying them, repentant, submissive and obedient, to the feet of a king only fourteen years of age . . . He made both King and reign'. 'Mazarin died', declares Lavissee, 'with one hand supporting the Crown of France and with the other almost grasping the Keys of St. Peter.'

Such achievements, of course, imply no title to supreme beneficence. For both France and Europe, in the long run it might have been better if Mazarin had never quitted Italy. Temporary chaos often leads to ultimate progress along a better road than the untempered monarchy of Louis XIV, and Mazarin may well be numbered among those who provoked the Revolution. A statesman who by mere ability, however, creates the strongest power in Europe, and sways her history for more than two generations, can hardly be denied the title of eminent, and eminent in a very rare degree.

His eminence was obviously the greater because, to an almost unique extent, it was his own. Richelieu, indeed, divined his ability and used him, doubtless initiating him into many mysteries of their common craft. Richelieu, moreover, gave the resurgent monarchy several resounding victories over its French rivals, and gained the necessary time for its Habsburg rivals to choose irrevocably their downward path. But Richelieu, despite many alarms, wielded the unshaken authority of a King of France, while Mazarin must base his power only on a commission from the dwindling authority of a half-foreign Regent. Louis XIII could be deposed only by death. Anne of Austria, offspring

of the national enemy, might be thrust from office by royal rivals, and must in a few years give place to her full-grown son. To guide France, the Italian upstart needed an address superior to that of the long-tried French noble.

In estimating Mazarin's greatness, however, two special difficulties must be overcome. What were his secret relations with the Queen-Mother? and how far was the success of French foreign policy his own?

Mazarin
and Anne
of Austria

It is certain that between May, 1643, when Louis XIII died, and the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, Mazarin's position depended on the support of Anne of Austria. From September, 1651, indeed, the legal minority of Louis XIV was at an end. The boy-king, however, hardly desired to rule before his twenty-first year, and even then was far too wise to pull down the admirable props which sustained his growing power. These, the Neapolitan ecclesiastic and the neglected Spanish queen who had admired Buckingham, were said to be in secret man and wife. Such a union, indeed, had much to tempt Mazarin, and even more to tempt the Queen, an ageing lady who might well be dazzled by manly beauty and caressing ways. The tone of their correspondence, which made much use of cipher, has been held incompatible with any but the closest relationship, while the seeming impossibility of a Catholic marriage with a Cardinal is disposed of by the statement that Mazarin was only in minor orders. On the other hand, it may be urged that he had administered Extreme Unction, a priestly office, and that no indication has ever been given as to where, when, or by whom the alleged marriage was performed. As a young man, the Cardinal had been something of a rake, and with him, in sharp contrast to Richelieu, the Church seemed merely a profession. While at first he took great pains to secure his own all-importance with the Queen, in later years he showed none of Richelieu's nervousness as to the continuance of royal favour.

Mazarin's
Foreign
Policy

The question how far the success of foreign policy is due to the skill of a minister forms one of the most difficult in history. Wisdom in choice of aim, intellectual ability, strength of character, persuasiveness in speech and writing—these factors of success can be appraised. Too often, however, success is made the criterion, and well won is still

well shot. A moment's reflection will show that most problems of foreign policy are highly complex and largely secret, and that unless all is known the statesman's skill can be only guessed at.

In Mazarin's case there would be wide agreement that most of his main aims were chosen well. His chief contribution to French history was to secure the adherence of the government to Richelieu's system. Where he struck out in a new direction, however, as by advocating a Spanish match which should join the southern Netherlands with France, Mazarin met with no success. But Richelieu's 'powerful idea of the State', his toleration, his preference of national power to prosperity, his quest of 'gates into her neighbours' dominions', his creation of overwhelming forces supported by royal factotums—all these were already well-tried notions. They were now practised with a 'soft and purring gentleness' which made for a national unity such as Richelieu's thunders could hardly have achieved. From 1648 to 1660, every great international agreement was a triumph for Mazarin and for France.

CHAPTER XVII

EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE, 1648-1660

A. THE EAST

WHILE the Empire, for years to come, must cherish the Westphalian Peace, the Emperor's neighbours to the eastward might well be moved by different considerations. The history of Turks and Hungarians, Poles and Russians was swayed by forces which the Habsburgs could not hope to control.

One of our most fascinating problems, is that of the causes which make states alternately strong and weak. France has been described as 'going from resurrection to resurrection for a thousand years'; Spain, as a land of astonishing collapses and equally astonishing recoveries. In 1649, it might seem that Spain was in danger of collapse and that the Holy Roman Empire had declined beyond hope of recovery. Poland and Russia, Sweden and the Dutch—all were powers that within our period alternated between strength and weakness, while in England history seemed almost as unsteady.

Turkish
Defects and
Weakness

But if some Christian states seemed to be failing, there was good reason to suppose that the Moslem enemies of Christian Europe were in no better case. The days when a Solyman could shatter Hungary were long since past, and the inherent Turkish defects could not be disguised.

Turkish
History
from 1632

Two centuries after Westphalia, however, the trenchant Palmerston declared the assumption of Turkish degeneracy to be absolute nonsense. In 1649 there were signs that a similar statement might well be made. Between 1632 and 1640, the reign of Murad IV had shown that the defects of his empire were not too deep-seated for a vigorous ruler, at least for the time being, to overcome. The ambitious Janissaries could be coerced; the corrupt officials, put to death; and the aggressive Persians, taught to respect the Turkish army. When, in 1640, however, Murad had drunk

himself into an early grave, his feeble brother Ibrahim succeeded. Eight years later, Ibrahim's indignant subjects deposed him, and, with the sanction of the Church, slew him and installed his infant son Mahommed IV (1648-87). Was not the dynasty impossible?

Ibrahim, none the less, had proved that the most debauched and profligate of Sultans could not reduce the Turkish State to impotence. In 1642, Azov was recovered from its Cossack conquerors by a vast array of Turks and Tartars. Attacks upon the Venetian island of Crete followed. In 1645, when Alexis Romanov mounted the throne at Moscow, the Sultan's forces seized the harbour of Canea. A great army was then landed, and Candia soon became the only hope of the Venetians. Although their rule was detested by the Cretans, however, they defended Candia for more than twenty years, several times counter-attacking successfully by sea.

The long defence of Candia suggested that the Turkish State was indeed decaying. During the earlier years of Mahommed IV, moreover, its weakness was increased by a struggle for power between the mother and the grandmother of the Sultan. At the same time Algiers and Tunis, two of the Barbary pirate states, were achieving virtual independence. They had long practised piracy with so little regard to Constantinople that the Western powers were wont to attack them without declaring or expecting a Turkish war. In place of the feeble and venal governors who might bribe the Turkish rulers to appoint them, the garrisons of Algiers and Tunis had come by degrees to elect their own chiefs, or Deys, without even a formal reference to the Sultan. It soon became clear, indeed, that the Barbary states were no match for Blake and the fleet of England, but their defection amounted to a palpable weakening of the Turkish power.

Christian feuds, however, prevented every European state from taking advantage of the unquestionable Turkish weakness. The Emperors of East and West, the King and Republic of Poland, the Papacy and the potentates of Italy—all had good reason, for the moment at least, to leave their natural enemies in peace. To the Muscovite the Baltic was more important than the Black Sea, while the Habsburg faced the repair of Germany, and not adventure. Poland,

The
Kiuprili

thanks to the Ukraine Cossacks, was soon to encounter 'the Deluge'. All recent history had proclaimed the impotence of the Pope. Such was the situation when Mahommed's mother, having put his grandmother to death, appointed as Grand Vizier an Albanian of seventy, who had risen from the imperial kitchen. This man, Mahommed Kiuprili, represented the third generation of a family which had settled in Kiupril, a small town in Asia Minor. He had already been commissioned to govern Damascus, Tripoli and Jerusalem, and had done it well.

Kiuprili, a born reformer, accepted the high office in 1656, only on condition that both Church and State would ratify in advance all measures that he might find necessary. Thereupon, with ability, energy and justice, he proceeded to reform the Turkish administration and to make war by sea and land. Wrongdoers, civil and military alike, were strangled by thousands. The siege of Candia was carried on with vigour, while Kiuprili showed how great were the Turkish resources by making a simultaneous attack on Transylvania.

Transylvania

Dangerously placed between the Habsburgs, who claimed all Hungary, and the Turks who ruled more than two-thirds of it, Transylvania had kept the independence which Bethlen Gabor defended in the Thirty Years War. Its people of mixed descent, Magyar, Saxon and Roumanian, clung to the religious and national freedom which the Habsburgs had assailed. Like many of the Balkan peoples, they even preferred the tolerant Turks to proselytizing monarchs trained by the Society of Jesus. Bethlen had been followed by George Rakoczy (1629-48) and he by his son George II, whose mother continued the enlightened government of his predecessors. George himself, however, aimed at a greater throne, and allied with Charles X of Sweden in his attack on Poland. Unhappily for this eastern imitator of the Savoy dynasty, his patron was recalled to deal with Denmark, and the foes of Transylvania, Polish, Austrian and Russian, easily forced him to retreat.

Kiuprili strove to utilize this situation in order to avert George's intrigue with Turkish vassals on the Danube, and to regain his country. In 1658, despite the protests of Leopold I, the Turks established their own nominee in place

of George II, who fell in battle near Grosswardein (1660). Next year, however, his lieutenant, John Kemenyi, was elected Prince, and Austria sent her notable general, Montecuculi, to give him aid. Kemenyi almost destroyed a second Turkish puppet prince, but, early in 1662, himself perished. Meanwhile the aged Kiuprili had also died (November, 1661), to be succeeded as Grand Vizier by his son Ahmed, an almost perfect ruler (1661-76). Less than two years later, in 1663, the latent war with Austria broke out. A struggle which had begun in Transylvania was for many years to dominate eastern Europe and powerfully to influence the West.

Austro-Turkish War

Meanwhile what had lately been the great and glorious Polish Republic had reached the verge of troubles which have earned the name of 'the Deluge'. Since the establishment in Poland of elective monarchy, an institution rightly described as a beacon of warning in History, and especially since the acceptance of the *liberum veto*, which allowed a single deputy to annihilate the work of a parliamentary session, she bore in her bosom the germs of mortal sickness. This might be discerned when in the very century of monarchy she showed that her chief concern was to fortify her aristocracy against monarchic competition. But her paralysis from these internal causes was slow in growth. The Polish Vasa could not claim the crown by hereditary right, but Sigismund III was in fact succeeded by his son Ladislas IV.

Ladislas IV (1632-48)

The year 1632, which witnessed the death of Sweden's greatest king, was thus conspicuous for a contrasting change in Poland. In that 'republic', a greater monarch than Sigismund, and one far better loved, replaced his father without substantial opposition. If any king could rescue tottering Poland, it was he. Neither old nor very young, experienced, genial, rational, open-minded, a ruler, a sportsman and a warrior in one, Ladislas in normal times might have maintained the Republic at the level of eminence that she had reached. Breeder of great men and architect of toleration, Polonia might with general goodwill have remained the shield of Europe against Tartars, Turks and Muscovites.

Ladislas IV 1632-48

The times, however, had ceased to be normal. By 1632, Sigismund and new European forces had already made the vision unattainable. 'The King of the Jesuits' not only substituted persecution for toleration, but had embroiled

Polish Difficulties


Poland almost incurably with Sweden, and, by inclining towards Austria, had challenged the Emperor's numerous enemies. Neither Brandenburg nor Richelieu's France, neither the Transylvanians nor the German Protestants, could view this Austrian orientation with indifference, while it tended to align with the Muscovite against Poland the Muscovite's natural enemy, the Turk. Yet in spite of all Ladislas captured Smolensk early in 1634, and made a good peace with the Tsar. Instead of turning his arms against Sweden, however, he was compelled to confront the aggressive Turks, until his fame and the peace with Moscow for a time at least quenched their ardour.

The reign of Ladislas, (1632-48) coinciding with the second half of the Thirty Years War, became conspicuous in Poland for great designs, but also for their failure. Suave, vigorous and high-minded, the King sought to assert his hereditary rights in Sweden, to restore religious toleration at home, and to lead a victorious crusade against the Turk. Current forces, however, were too strong for him, and he failed even to connect himself with England by marrying the daughter of the Winter King. In 1635, Richelieu countered the Peace of Prague by arranging the Truce of Stuhmsdorf, which promised to keep Poland and Sweden at peace for twenty-six years, thus enabling the Swedes to fight on against Ferdinand. The truce at least caused them to withdraw from Prussia, but, for religious reasons, Ladislas could not follow it up by a close alliance with France. Although he was distinguished for friendly toleration, the Catholic tide in Poland flowed more strongly, and in 1637 an Archduchess became his queen.

Austrian
Marriage,
1637

The Austrian alliance led neither to a renewal of the Polish war with Sweden nor to the general mediation of the Polish King. Bent on that crusade which must form a grand defensive war for Poland, Ladislas again gravitated towards the French alliance, and in 1645 espoused a princess of the French house of Gonzaga. In spite of his own ill-health and the death of his only son, the King eagerly pressed forward a project which might both bring him glory and solve the dangerous problem of the Cossacks. Feeling, perhaps, that a heterogeneous and Orthodox military force in the distant Borderlands was dangerous to the insolent Catholic

NORTH EASTERN EUROPE c. 1661



Poles who ruled them, Ladislav, without due regard for the rights of the Polish diet, urged an aggressive Turkish war. His last days, therefore, were clouded by constitutional strife, and by the outbreak of a Cossack rebellion which threatened to disintegrate the Polish state.

John
Casimir
Vasa
(1648-68)

Ladislav left no son, but his brother, John Casimir, succeeded. The flagrant abuse of the *liberum veto*, moreover, had not yet reached its height, and, when it did so, in and after 1652, the device of changing a Diet into a 'Confederation', would sometimes preserve the more reasonable triumph of a majority. The race of worthy Polish kings, moreover, was not yet quite extinct.

In 1648, however, a comparatively feeble Vasa, fit rather for the Church than for the State, faced the most dangerous situation since that of 1410, when Poland saved herself from the Germans by the sword. Now, the relief of having a foolish woman on the throne of Sweden, and in Germany a weak and unwieldy Empire, was outweighed by the rise of unprecedented dangers in the east. The might of the future Russia had not yet appeared, but in the Ukraine, or borderland, a class of warriors flourished which was long to tax the statesmanship of eastern Europe. These were the Cossacks, a name of Turkish origin given to a body which owed its existence to the intolerable conditions created or threatened by the invading Tartar hordes. For some two centuries, Mongolian ruffians, unchecked by bribes, had ravaged and enslaved in the Ukraine. From Kiev to Podolian Kamieniets, fortresses were built against them, but the Tartar peril checked the cultivation of a vast area of fertile land. This artificial desert, indeed, kept Muscovy and the Turkish empire far apart, for the Sultan was the overlord of the Tartars.

The
Cossacks

The Ukraine, however, offered a double attraction which many hardy Poles and other adventurers found irresistible. To enjoy a rich countryside and one free from aristocratic tyrants, young men would arm themselves and become settlers, despite the risk of an invasion. Much of their livelihood, indeed, came from sources which the Tartars could not destroy. The Slav, it has been observed, remained, two centuries later, a primitive agriculturist, preferring livestock to the plough, and livestock is not immobile. Still

less could the hordes deprive the Cossack of the wax and honey, the furs and eggs and fish, which the hunter could have for the taking. Bands of hardy armed men might defend themselves and sometimes even plunder the Tartars in their turn.

The immense plains on either side of the lower Dnieper formed an ideal habitat for roving bands of freebooters. Geography forbade strong government from outside, while the neighbourhood of the Tartars gave an excuse for the existence of armed bands of Christian frontiersmen to hold them back. Adventurers and landless warriors flocked to these Borderlands, the preponderance of Lithuanians imparting a strong tinge of Orthodox belief, and of resentment against Polish petty tyrants. As, in the ordinary course of nature, more permanent settlements arose, the 'Zaporogian' lands beyond the Dnieper cataracts were organized into an autonomous body politic to defend the Polish border. This body, with its half-dozen registered regiments, elected a 'hetman' or viceroy of its own, and enjoyed substantial independence.

The history of many countries has shown, however, that, as in South Africa and western America, such independence cannot be long maintained. Soon Cossack freedom grew trebly offensive to the Poles. It contrasted with the serfdom which the gentry maintained; it clashed with the Roman Catholic revival; and, by leading to Cossack attacks upon the Turks, it embarrassed and endangered the Crown. In the 'thirties, sporadic Cossack rebellions arose.

By this time the Cossacks were divided between those 'registered' as holding land in return for military service, and those who clung to their unfettered freedom. Neither class could win the approval of a Diet based on privilege. The years 1638-48, conspicuous for national prosperity in Poland, were years of Cossack brooding over the suppression of their several revolts, the abolition of the unregistered, and the reduction of the rest to 6,000 households living under strict control. In 1646, indeed, King Ladislas tried to turn them to strange account. When the Diet refused supplies for the war that he desired against the Turks, he secretly offered to restore their liberties, if they would provoke a Turkish attack and thus force his subjects to defend the country.

Rebellion of
Chmielnicki
(Khmelnysky)

Bogdan or Bohdan Chmielnicki, unlike the vast majority of the Cossacks, was a gentleman and something of a scholar. Promoted by the King, he was outraged by Polish officials and sought a war of vengeance while Ladislas still lived. This was to be waged by Cossacks and Tartars in alliance, and in April, 1648, he was elected hetman to carry out the great design. In the following month he gained a great victory, launching a terrible servile war at the moment when Poland lost her King. The squires and other Catholics of Volhynia and Podolia were massacred wholesale, priests being hanged before their own altars, each alongside a Jew and a hog. These atrocities were amply repaid by the Poles, though perhaps with less imagination. Such were the earliest tragedies in a complex and bloody civil war.

In the autumn of 1648 John Casimir had the support of Chmielnicki and espoused the widowed queen. Since the Cossacks had routed a proud and splendid Polish army, concessions to them were inevitable, and both the moderation of the hetman and the ambiguous conduct of the Tartars offered hopes of successful negotiation. But social and religious differences told against a Polish-Cossack state, and a royal victory at midsummer, 1651, failed to re-establish unity.

The
Cossacks
and Moscow

In the course of the next three years, the dimensions of the Cossack problem were revealed. It was a time, indeed, when almost every state was suffering. In Poland the evils of the crazy constitution were aggravated by the devastation in her productive Borderlands, while no agreement between King and hetman would persuade the Cossacks to resume the gentry's yoke. Germany was only beginning to labour at a post-war reconstruction which demanded many years. The Turks were on the verge of a court revolution; the Muscovites were exhausted by their recent wars. In 1654, when Christina's abdication brought an aggressive warrior to the Swedish throne, Chmielnicki convinced the Cossacks that they must secure themselves by accepting a protector. This, they cried, could only be the Tsar, whose eastern Orthodox faith they shared. Alexis promised them a large autonomy, and did not allow its non-fulfilment to nullify their allegiance. Poland thus lost her Zaporogian Cossacks on the eve of her greatest storm, while Muscovy, without

exertion or design, achieved one of her greatest conquests. The Russian belt which kept southern Poland from the sea deeply influenced after-history.

Next year (1655) Charles X and Frederick William of Poland Brandenburg seemed to have Poland at their feet, and a ^{Invaded} partition of the Republic among her neighbours was apparently unavoidable. It was averted by a national rally against the heretics, which was characterized by the dedication of the Polish people to the Virgin. Austria gave powerful aid; Denmark allied herself with the foe of Sweden; Brandenburg was bought by the cession of East Prussia. The early death of Charles X paved the way for the Peace of Oliva (1660), which involved Poland only in the cession of Livonia. Seven years later a truce with the Tsar at Andrusovo (1667) involved the cession to him of the lands beyond the Dnieper, and, for a time at least, also that of Kiev. The Republic, however, remained a state vast in territory and allied with Louis XIV, the western monarch who now began to menace Europe.

Meanwhile a foe more deadly than any foreign state had ^{Polish} revealed itself in the internal dissensions of the Poles. Their ^{Disunion} seemingly incurable aristocracy had alienated the Cossacks, and some great Lithuanians had seceded. The concept of the Diet as an assembly of plenipotentiaries, any one of whom could frustrate the work of a whole session—this 'liberum veto' had begun to be so abused as to make parliamentary government a farce. It might perhaps be offset by electing the King's successor while he reigned, and thus avoiding the usual dangerous interregnum. The proposal, however, caused a rebellion, and could not be pressed. In September, 1668, John Casimir resigned the throne, and the Polish Vasa ended.

B. THE NORTH, 1654-61

In the meantime, the strength of other factors in the fluctuating problem of the north had undergone startling change.

While France was reaching her advance in power and ^{Sweden} England tending towards the recall of her lawful king, the ^{under} Swedes had been writing some of the strangest pages in their ^{Christina,} 1644-54

own amazing story. Westphalia marked Oxenstierna's fall from office, and the beginning of some six years' misgovernment by Christina, queen from 1632 to 1654, and since 1644 of age to govern. Child of a supremely great and ambitious king and of his unbalanced Brandenburg queen, in a realm disorganized by a war which had vastly aggrandized the nobles, she ruled without any of the restraint which marks an ordinary monarch. In an environment which 'overstrained her mighty soul, the throne of Gustavus Adolphus seemed to her too lowly, his realm too narrow, his faith too simple, his people too barbarous, and all the north a chilly wilderness'. (F. M. Franzén). Having impoverished the Crown and declined a politic marriage with her cousin, Charles Gustavus, she forsook Scandinavia for Rome. There, as a Catholic, she revelled in cultural activity for many years, and her grim profile still adorns St. Peter's.

Charles X
(1654-60)

In 1654, therefore, Charles Gustavus was elected King of Sweden. Never more true than in the next six years was Geijer's aphorism, 'The history of Sweden is the history of her kings.' While France fought on against Spain and drew England in, while Germany began to savour her long-sought repose, the North formed a world of its own, which the stocky little warrior-king Charles X kindled into general strife. The young King, who as a Swedish commander in Germany had learned much both before and after the Peace, began by a statesmanlike capital levy upon the wealth gained by the nobles since the death of the great Gustavus. Such 'reductions' of estates alienated but now deemed indispensable to the Crown, were destined deeply to affect the fate of Charles' heirs. He himself, for a few years, had the powerful collaboration of Oxenstierna's son, a chancellor not yet thirty. To King and Chancellor the question of war or peace seemed hardly doubtful, for Sweden had much to gain by war, and unemployed warriors from many lands would aid her in any field. But where to strike was not so evident. Muscovy, however fettered, menaced the future of all powers which, like Sweden, aspired to Baltic empire. Denmark, after a mere decade of peace, watched once again for an opportunity to humble her conqueror and regain her lost possessions. The strong monarchy to which her Frederick III (1648-70) aspired would be far more formidable and tenacious

than the ramshackle selfish oligarchy over which Christian IV had reigned. Charles and Oxenstierna, however, took up the challenge of John Casimir, Polish king from 1648 to 1670, who had inherited the Vasa claim to Sweden, and refused to recognize his distant kinsman as her king.

To strike at Poland would be the more opportune because Poland. it was torn by faction, while the revolted Cossacks, Greek Target of Charles X in faith, naturally looked to Muscovy. John Casimir had no ally, but a warlike prince, the Brandenburg Elector, would be so deeply concerned in a war between Sweden and Poland that his alliance might reasonably be hoped for. While Brandenburg itself bordered on Great Poland and Swedish Pomerania, the Elector's fief of East Prussia, hemmed in by Polish provinces, lay on the land route of a Swedish march from Livonia towards western Poland. The Calvinist Elector, unbiased towards either intolerant Lutheran Sweden or the only less bigoted Catholic Poland, found his interest singularly obscure.

In 1655 Charles struck at Poland by a pincer movement Extra-ordinary Campaigns, 1655-7 from Pomerania and Livonia. He himself took Warsaw with ease, and, brushing John Casimir aside, seized Cracow and was acclaimed as king. Reinforced by the troops from Livonia, he then conquered not only Polish or Western Prussia, but also, in spite of the Elector and his army, East Prussia as well. Visions of a continental empire stretching from Finland to western Pomerania dazzled his gaze when Frederick William became his ally and vassal. But Europe could not be blind to this Swedish peril, while the Polish people rose against the little band of foreign heretics and robbers. Not for the last time it appeared that when Warsaw falls, a Polish national war begins.

Next year (1656) Charles showed the world what courage and energy could and could not accomplish. First, in the depth of winter, he led a small army to the Carpathians, and, when threatened with engulfment, hacked his way back to northern Poland. Meanwhile the Poles took Warsaw, and the Muscovites invaded Ingria. Next, with his cautious ally the Elector, he routed more than twice his own numbers in prepared positions covering Warsaw, and regained the city. A few thousand soldiers, however, could not occupy spacious Poland, and only the stout defence of Riga and

other fortresses saved Charles' Baltic provinces from the Tsar. He himself was forced to purchase the continuance of the Elector's grudging aid by granting him East Prussia as a sovereign state.

In 1657, however, a sudden challenge from the north provoked perhaps the most staggering exploit in all the history of Sweden. Charles, while in Prussia, received news that an Austrian army had come to rescue Poland, and that Denmark had declared war against him. His answer was to evacuate Poland, except for a few garrisons in Prussia, and to lead 8,000 picked men into Pomerania. The Elector accepted his departure as a signal to join the enemy, and welcomed Austrian defenders. But Charles, joined by Wrangel and unchecked by the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the father of his queen, staggered the Danes by a sudden conquest of Jutland. There he was cooped up by far more numerous foes, but in the new year (1658) the terrible cold froze the Danish crossings and gave him a way of escape. Fünen, between the two Belts, was reached with difficulty, but then subdued with ease. This proved the climax of the whole adventure, for between the Swedes and Zealand stretched an island route which included the Great Belt, with its nine miles or more of questionable ice. The ice bore, and Charles, with no effective opposition, fulfilled his boast that he and Frederick would talk together in good Swedish. Their meeting was in fact conspicuous for revelry and seeming affection.

Peace of
Roskilde

Before February, 1658, was over, the Peace of Roskilde, Denmark's Westminster, brought Sweden to the climax of her glory. The two realms bound themselves to deny the Baltic to all hostile fleets, and later the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Sweden's natural ally against the Lord of Royal Holstein, was made independent of the Danish King. The Danish provinces in southern Scandinavia passed finally to the Swedish Crown, and with them Bornholm, flanking the sea route between these provinces and Pomerania. Norway, moreover, was notably dismembered by the cession of Trondheim country, the very cradle of the Norwegian race.

Charles'
Second
Danish War

In the same year, 1658, however, the new-made peace was broken. To resume the continental war and chastise Brandenburg, as Charles and his people deemed necessary,

Sweden must be secured against a Danish war of revenge. When the Danes demurred to a demand that they would guard their own waters against the Dutch, Charles made a sudden onslaught on the Zealand shore. Borrowing words from Job, Frederick declined to quit Copenhagen, declaring to the enraptured citizens that he would die in his own nest. They too resolved to face the terrible Swedes, and toiled by thousands to fortify their city. When all seemed unavailing, a Dutch fleet fought its way through the Sound, and the Swedes retreated. Jutland meanwhile was rescued by an army of Poles, Austrians and Brandenburgers, the last-named led by their Elector. The Danes, moreover, were victorious at Trondheim, and the people of Bornholm crushed their novel rulers.

In February, 1659, Charles strove once more to profit by the ice which immobilized the hostile ships from Holland. Copenhagen, however, beat off the storming Swedes, and from England the new Protector, Richard Cromwell, was impotent to send help. With victorious armies from the mainland drawing near, Charles could only convoke the Estates and plan an attack on Norway. In February, 1660, he died, leaving a solitary son, only four years old, to succeed him.

The accident of Charles X's death at thirty-eight, follow- Death of Charles X
 ing hard upon that of Cromwell, helped to make 1660 as
 momentous an epoch in the north as in the south did the
 Peace of the Pyrenees and the death of Mazarin (1659-61).
 Peace of Westphalia, Peace of the Pyrenees, Peace of Oliva Peace of Oliva
 —these three attempted, not unsuccessfully, to frame a new
 and better Europe. The third, named from a Cistercian
 convent close to Danzig, where Swedes, Poles, Imperialists
 and Brandenburgers came to terms, was supplemented by
 Swedish treaties with Denmark, the Dutch and Muscovy.
 Their general moderation promised well for the future of
 the north. At the same time it could not escape the French
 mediator, who powerfully influenced the negotiations, that
 Poland and Sweden, if reconciled, might be useful allies of
 France against the Habsburgs.

As in Westphalia and at the Pyrenees, some antiquated anomalies were cleared away. John Casimir at last abandoned his claim to the Swedish throne and his rights over

the Swedish conquests in Livonia. This Baltic province, with its German magnates and Estonian and Lettish population, became a granary of Stockholm and a bastion of Sweden against the Russians. Conquests lately made by Muscovy from Charles X were prudently given back, as were Trondheim and Bornholm by the Swedes. The Swedish conquests in southern Scandinavia, however, were fully retained by their new possessors. On her own side of the Scandinavian mountains, Sweden thus reached her natural frontier.

Danish
Revolution,
1660

This painful sacrifice of fertile Danish lands almost within sight of Copenhagen roused the Estates of 1660 to revolution. They turned, not against the King who made the Peace, but against the nobles whose self-seeking had left Denmark almost defenceless. Clergy and Burghers joined to overcome, partly by violence within the Diet, the opposition of the Council and the Nobles. Frederick III, hero of the defence of Copenhagen, became a hereditary king, ere long perhaps the least controlled in Europe. The Swedes meanwhile, overriding the testament of Charles X, confided their own regency to a council appointed by the Estates. Thus at the moment when Charles II returned to England and Louis XIV was about to assert himself in France, the Scandinavian balance was restored.

War and
Progress,
1610-60

For the next half-century and more, until his death in 1715, Louis XIV was to occupy the forefront on the stage of Europe. Looking back over the half-century now closing, we seem at first sight to see little but a dense cloud of war. Besides the complex struggles known as the Thirty Years War, the historian must contemplate wars between France and Spain, and between Spain and the Dutch, civil wars in Britain and Italy, wars between Dutch and English, Swedes and Danes, Poles, Austrians, Brandenburgers, Dutch and Muscovites, with Turkish and much other less conspicuous strife. While Gustavus Adolphus ranks as a hero, other outstanding warriors are relatively few. Crimes, on the other hand—the Defenestration, the execution of Oldenbarnevelt, the treacherous assaults of 1643 and 1658 upon the Danes, Cromwell in Ireland, Richelieu in France, the murders of Henry IV and Concini, Wallenstein and Charles I, the infamous cruelties of the Thirty Years War—these and many more suggest that this half-century was an inferno.

Moreover, as all the world knows, the wars of Louis XIV, of Sobieski, of Charles XII and of Peter the Great follow forthwith, and, while they raged, Frederick the Great was born. What effect had this unceasing slaughter on the ascent of man?

To ask the question is to hint the answer. Man's inborn instinct to improve himself and his surroundings may be obstructed by war or famine or pestilence or other calamity, but cannot be extinguished. In 1610 men already rejoiced in Shakespeare, and were on the point of receiving the Authorized Version of the Bible. Rubens was painting and Don Quixote capturing the world. Men of science soon discovered sunspots and invented logarithms, while sailors explored the polar seas, and the Church fought a hopeless battle against Copernicus and Galileo. Frederick's aggression in Bohemia coincides with Kepler's proclamation of a new Law and Harvey's demonstration that man's blood circulates in his veins. Legists, historians and philosophers were not sterilized by the march of armies, and no year passed without some cultural advance. Although within a decade the peace restored at the Pyrenees and at Oliva was disturbed by Louis' War of Devolution, the historian can find no broader platform from which to survey the past half-century of the ascent of man.

CHAPTER XVIII

EUROPEAN CULTURE, 1610-1660

Politics and
Science

HISTORY', said Lord Acton, 'embraces ideas as much as events, and derives its best virtue from regions beyond the sphere of State.' In the years which we are now surveying, the glories of European culture far surpass those of politics. Richelieu and Mazarin, Gustavus and Cromwell, Louis, William and Peter—these are indeed great contemporary names in government and war. Since those who bore them ceased to live, the fame of some of them, notably Richelieu and Peter, has risen higher than during life. None, however, failed to influence deeply that state-life which conditions every human activity. So long as Europe remains Europe their fame must endure.

Factors
of Progress

In thought and art, on the other hand, renown may come long after death, and Mr. Birrell has piquantly stressed the astonishment of certain proud Englishmen had they been told that they were living in the age of Milton. From the standpoint of human progress, however, it would be hard to say that any or all of the sovereigns and statesmen named outweighed the single name of Isaac Newton. Thinkers and teachers, writers of poetry and prose, painters and architects, financiers, merchants and explorers—on every side the period bristles with names which we now regard as among the foremost in our history. Some among those thus outstanding in our first half-century may be briefly indicated here.

In the early years of the seventeenth century, four separate revolutions were transforming the outlook of mankind. The first of these in point of time was, of course, that unceasing progress in discovery whose greatest classic was Columbus. Mankind was on the march, to new regions and even to new continents. Columbus and the group of which he was the cynosure were swiftly followed by those religious reformers among whom Luther and Calvin bore

the most famous names. Europe was still faced by many years of costly struggle before her Christian peoples could attain to mutual peace and at least to a regional toleration. At the same time, new civil governments must be built up to steer the new states, whose growth in wealth and population, and whose emancipation from international control, called for an authority more powerful than the old. The weakened Church required a strengthened State.

The fourth revolution, one which could not fail to influence and sometimes to dominate the other three, was taking place within the sphere of knowledge. At long last, Aristotle, Ptolemy and 'the Ancients' were being challenged, and in great part superseded, by living men, whose talents were not inferior to their own. In little more than a century, as Rouse Ball has shown, by an extraordinary extension of knowledge, to which all the leading nations contributed, a group of workers had made itself ever memorable in the history of science, while modern mathematics and physics have been built on the foundations which they laid. From new contrivances in arithmetic and algebra to the most exalted theories of existence, the thinkers of Europe were questioning the legacy of the past and expanding human wisdom.

The connexion between the conquests of science and those of politics varied from case to case. The invention of logarithms or decimals might increase human output incomparably beyond what some addition to the refinements of astronomy could at once accomplish. A great and learned Victorian statesman once amused the astronomers by offering them, in all good faith, a simple contrivance which had proved useful in calculations at the Treasury. In earlier days the educated world had been less divided by specialization. The greatness of some of the most subtle philosophers, however, was not fully perceived until they had long been dead, while others lived on only through their influence on men who could give practical effect to their ideas. The secret discovery of radar by a single nation may well have changed world-history.

During our period, an unprecedented advance was made in many fields of knowledge, and at its close the educated section of the European nations knew much that was hidden when the seventeenth century began. How partial had been man's progress may be appreciated by a moment's

Theory and
Practice

reflection on the state of medicine in 1715, despite the work of Harvey, and on the state of transport, despite the development of canals. It is significant that in 1616 an edict of the Inquisition condemned the teaching of Galileo that, as Copernicus had discovered, the earth moved round the sun. The philosopher submitted, and the condemnatory edict, though perhaps 'virtually repealed' in 1757, was never disavowed. More than three centuries later, however, the phenomenon observed by him in 1581 in the cathedral at Pisa was reproduced in a Leningrad cathedral, as a lesson to ecclesiastics.

Astronomy

Copernicus had died in 1543, and Tycho Brahe, his disciple, in 1601. Their lives and those of Galileo (1564-1642) and Kepler (1571-1630) showed that astronomy was indeed a living science before the seventeenth century began, and that men of different races, Polish, Danish, Florentine and German, could freely co-operate for the advance of truth. Galileo, whose versatility was almost worthy of Michael Angelo, when the new century began, was establishing the first principles of dynamics and had already constructed a thermometer. In 1609, perfecting a Dutch invention, he produced his telescope, and within a year had thereby made astronomy fruitful and himself famous and even rich. Educated Europe, if its conscience allowed, could now behold an altered firmament. The riddle of the Milky Way was solved by gazing on it through the glass; the moon became a mountainous landscape illuminated by solar rays reflected from the earth, and Jupiter's satellites displayed a miniature solar system. The incomparable harvest of 1610 yielded also fresh knowledge of Saturn, Venus and the spots upon the sun, while Venetians beheld their ships when far beyond unaided vision.

Attitude of the Church

The authority of scripture, however, was not to be impugned by tricks with lenses. In 1616 the Inquisition declared against the propositions that the sun remained at the centre of the world, and that the earth rotated daily. Galileo, a sincere Catholic, promised to conform, but sixteen years later published an aggressive dialogue, and paid the price by penance and recantation. His biography thus gives a clue to the battle which raged for many generations between theologians and men of science. Scientific victories

on fields where proof was possible evoked still greater obstinacy in conflicts which turned on probability, while the fear of being or seeming anti-Christian drove Christian philosophers into unworthy compromise. The great work of Grotius for a law of nations was placed upon the Index of Books Prohibited. To make the earth both rotate and remain stationary, Descartes devised a vortex system, while Spinoza's monads called forth the fury of the orthodox.

A single citation from the science current in 1638 ^{Pseudo-science} may show what progressive thinkers had to overcome. A rheumatic and learned visitor to Bath, famular with continental waters, then summarized contemporary opinion on the cause of such rare lymphatical properties as these possessed. Some, he explained, 'impute it to wind or air or some exhalations shut up in the bowels of the earth, which either by their own nature, or by their violent motion and agitation, or attrition upon rocks, and narrow passages, do gather heat and so impart it to the waters.' Others ascribed this balneal heat to the sun or to quicklime, or to 'a subterranean fire kindled . . . upon sulphury and bituminous matter'.

Dr. Jordan, however, 'goes to work like a solid philosopher'. He finds that minerals

'have their seminaries in the womb of the earth replenished with active spirits, which, meeting with apt matter and adjuvant causes, do proceed to the generation of several species, according to the nature of the efficient, and fitness of the matter. In this work of generation, as there is *generatio unius*, so there is *corruptio alterius*, and this cannot be done without a superior power, which by moisture dilateth itself, works upon the matter like a leavening ferment, to bring it to its own purpose. This motion . . . produceth an actual heat . . . not a destructive violent heat, as that of fire, put a generative gentle heat joined with moisture, nor needs it air for eventilation. . . . While minerals are thus engendering in their liquid forms . . . they impart heat to the neighbouring waters. So then it may be concluded that the soil about the Bath is a mineral vein of earth; and the fermenting gentle temper of generative heat that goes to the production of the said minerals, doth impart . . . this balneal virtue and medicinal heat to those waters.'

Such disquisitions afford an insight into the average mind of contemporaries far greater than do the great philosophical achievements. What scientific principles can rival in influence the stock argument of early seventeenth-century theologians that the seeming absurdity of their

Carpenter's
Geography

precepts was designed by God to test His creatures' faith? In the same way, a successful contemporary manual should reveal more of the atmosphere and technique of early seventeenth-century education than much generalization could convey. Carpenter's *Geography delineated forth in two books, Containing the spherical and topical parts thereof*, written by a Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, and printed in 1625 by the 'printers to the famous University', is therefore an historical document of no small value. Nearly 600 close-packed pages, steeped in classics and theology, and not shunning the citation of Hebrew, reflect the taste of the time as shown in many contemporary histories and books of travel, while the whole shows how men desired to learn and teach.

A stately dedication to a great noble and a score of rhymed couplets addressed to the book itself supplement the usual elaborate analysis of contents.

'Thou may'st perhaps be merchandise for slaves
Who sell their authors' wits and buy their graves.'

—thus the volume is apostrophized—

'Thou may'st be talk for tables, used for sport
At tavern meetings, pastime for the Court.'

An elaborate classification was in that age the first essential. 'Geography, whose object is the whole earth', Carpenter divides into Spherical and Topical. Spherical geography, he says, is either primary or secondary. Primary spherical geography considers the terrestrial sphere either as it is natural or artificial—'in the artificial sphere representing the natural unto us, which is either common or magnetical'. Primary spherical natural geography, on the other hand, considers first the principles whereof it consists, to wit, matter and form, and second, 'proprieties arising out of them'. These 'proprieties' are either (1) real or (2) imaginary, such as the circles and lineaments of the globe. The 'real' are assigned in respect of either (1) the earth itself or (2) the heavens, comprising 'the site stability and proportion of the earth in respect of the heavens'. The former—the 'real proprieties of the earth itself'—are either 'elementary, as the conformity of all the parts concurring to the constitution of the sphere', or magnetical. These last are divided between 'partial, as the coition, direction, variation,

declination', and 'total, as the verticity and revolution'. The curiosity and patience of the early seventeenth century need no stronger testimonial than the book's success.

Secondary spherical geography, in Carpenter's view, handles such matters (again meticulously divided) as the measure of the earth, zones, climates, parallels, races and 'distances, which are either simple, wherein is considered the longitude and latitude of places', or 'comparative, wherein two places differing either in longitude or latitude, or both, are considered'.

Having thus tamed the reader, the geographer sets out to explain to him the globe on which he lives. In the terrestrial sphere, he says, there is more earth than water. Its diameter of about 7,200 miles is so great as to forbid any equality between them. 'If any man suppose some of the quantity to be abated, because of the spherical swelling of the water above the earth, whose circle must be greater than that of the earth'—that may only challenge a modest abatement. On the other hand, in spite of the industrious navigations of Portuguese, English and Hollanders, and of Columbus the Italian, 'wittily compared to Noah's dove', (*Columba*), a great quantity of undetected land, as Seneca predicted, awaits the industry of this age. Also, if earth and water challenged an equality, 'questionless the whole earth would prove over moist, slimy and unapt for habitation'. As Aristotle teacheth us, water, being thin and fluid, requires a hard and solid body whereon to support itself.

Both the two elements of earth and water, with all other bodies arising out of their mixture, and with the air, ^{Centre of the Earth} which is wrongly supposed to be light, incline and approach to the centre as near as they can. This centre, Carpenter declares, is an imaginary point in the midst of the terrestrial globe, to which all the parts are conformed. It is not an attractive point, with the power of the lodestone, but a mere respective point, to which the bodies direct their course. When earth, water and air compete to reach it, the earth, being the most compact and ponderous, gains the day. Yet the water and air are in their natural places, for nature, which directs them towards the centre, has a secondary intention 'that the bodies should so settle and conform themselves, as that each of them should obtain a

place according to his degree of massiness and^d weight'. Owing to the right motion of heavy bodies to the centre, the terrestrial globe is round and spherical—a proposition 'of great use, and one of the chiefest grounds in geography'.

Thus far, and when Carpenter goes on to prove the earth to be the centre of the universe, we may think his fears for the fate of his book somewhat unnecessary. Partial—or even total—motions magnetical will hardly be used for sport at tavern meetings, nor will latitudes and longitudes yield much pastime for the court. In the second book, on topography, however, he becomes more human.

The
Astronomers

The weaknesses, the vicissitudes and the achievements of a man of science in the early seventeenth century could hardly be more vividly portrayed than by the life of Kepler (1571–1630). A sickly child, orphan of a decayed Wurtemberg gentleman, he embraced the opinions of Copernicus, and, at twenty-three, found himself professor of astronomy at Graz. His studies then led him to inquire 'why the number, size and motion of the planetary orbits were not other than they are'. Much mental wrestling produced the following discovery :

'The earth is the circle, the measurement of all Round it describe a dodecahedron; the circle including this will be Mars. Round Mars describe a tetrahedron; the circle including this will be Jupiter. Describe a cube round Jupiter; the circle including this will be Saturn. Now inscribe in the earth an icosahedron; the circle inscribed in it will be Venus. Inscribe an octahedron in Venus; the circle inscribed in it will be Mercury.'

A few years later, Kepler was collaborating with Tycho Brahe in the service of the Emperor Rudolf, who commissioned them to draw up new astronomical tables. His colleague's death and the Emperor's failure to pay his salary drove him to practise astrology, and to include an astrological treatise among his writings. In 1609, however, he published his greatest work, his *New Astronomy*. He had discovered that Mars moved in an elliptical orbit, with the sun placed in one of its foci. In 1611 Kepler published his *Dioptrica*, reprinted in London in 1653. This work included a description of

'the astronomical telescope with two convex lenses which was his own invention and . . . greatly superior to that of Galileo, from its admitting in front of the eye-glass micrometer wires for measuring distances in the

Map of the East Indies region, showing the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and surrounding islands. The map is oriented with North at the top. Major landmasses labeled include Persia, Arabia, Egypt, China, Siam, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Moluccas, Philippines, and New Guinea. Numerous cities and ports are marked, such as Agra, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Batavia, and Macassar. The map also shows the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. A legend in the bottom right corner identifies the map's source: Portuguese (dashed line), English (solid line), Spanish (hatched line), and Dutch (dotted line). The map is attributed to Dirk Hartog.

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heavens. He proved that spherical surfaces cannot converg^d rays to a single focus' (Sir D. Brewster).

Descartes

The name of Descartes (1596-1650) is one which awed the learned and the would-be learned of the seventeenth century, and which has never ceased to interest their successors. Estimates of his achievement have varied between homage to a divine genius and contemptuous classification among outmoded cranks. His six *Meditations*, published in 1641, a translator declared thirty years after the master's death, made him deserve the name of a Creator. For mankind had 'a rude and indigested chaos of errors and doubts' until his divine spirit moved upon the waters, and produced clear and distinct light, and by its aid other branches of truth, 'till at last, by a six days' labour, he establishes the fair fabric . . . of the intellectual world on foundations that shall never be shaken. Then sitting down . . . he looks upon this his offspring and pronounces it good'. Our great Encyclopaedia, on the other hand, rules that, within a few years of this panegyric, the only remnants of Cartesianism in England were 'an overgrown theory of vortices, which received its death-blow from Newton, and a dubious phraseology anent innate ideas, which found a witty executioner in Locke'.

The philosopher's life, however, was beyond all question interesting in itself and of value for the light that it throws upon his age. Of undiluted French descent, he had sufficient means to travel, and he visited every European country north of the Pyrenees. Though educated by the Jesuits, and himself a professed Catholic, his adopted home was Holland, a choice in part dictated by the fact that the men of Amsterdam were too busy moneymaking to concern themselves with him. 'I could live here', he declared, 'without ever meeting anyone.' Cautious, even timid, he yet served in several armies, and was present both at the White Hill battle, and at the capture of La Rochelle. Seventeenth-century warfare, with its sieges, its winter-quarters and its freedom from tiresome intruders, favoured his studies, which consisted in a few hours of introspection every day, rather than in argument and many books. He believed that in 1619, while wintering on the Danube, he had experienced the revelation of a new approach to knowledge.

Two other salient features of his temperate and reserved disposition must not be ignored. While he cherished a few close friends, he cared little for social or family intercourse. The advent of a well-loved natural daughter was and remains a mystery. On the other hand, as a courtier he was most supple, and thereby incurred his death. When the Fronde had rendered futile his obedience to a summons to court, he accepted an invitation from Queen Christina of Sweden, and abandoned his cherished lateness of rising to be with her at five on winter mornings. Thus he perished in Stockholm (February, 1650).

Ever since his schooldays, Descartes had felt it his vocation to discover the principles underlying all activity and to write them down. Fencing, music, algebra—such were a few among the themes of many treatises that resulted. Music was presented as a science of mathematical proportions which gave sensations of pleasure. Mathematics being, as he said, the easiest, would perhaps furnish a key to unlock both its own secrets and those of nature. Our Lady of Loretto, if promised a pilgrimage, might aid the enterprise. The philosopher gave and kept the promise. In the same spirit he set out to discover the secrets of the Rosicrucians, but failed. In mathematics, however, before 1637, he succeeded in solving the problems of geometry by the symbols of algebra, a prelude to far greater conquests.

Versatility
of Descartes

Late in 1621, while exploring the north-west of Germany with his valet, Descartes took boat in Frisian waters. The boatmen supposed them to be foreign merchants, who would be unavenged, and planned to slay them for their moneybags. Suddenly, however, the young master stood up, drew his sword, and made it clear that he was prepared to use it,—thus saving both their lives. A few years of further travel, in which he saw Rome and spoke slightly of Galileo, and a short residence amid growing fame in Paris, preceded his migration to Holland in 1629. There he studied metaphysics, optics, anatomy, chemistry, physiology and astronomy, and, had not the Inquisition unexpectedly condemned Galileo, he would have published a treatise based on the assumption that the earth moved round the sun. Horrified at the thought of opposing the Church, however, he eventually compromised by making an unmoving earth, like a passenger

lying motionless in his bunk, submit to the motion of a vaster system. Such was his compromise between the theologians and the truths of science.

In June, 1637, Descartes issued in the French language a quarto, 'Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the Reason and seeking Truth in the Sciences'. The system thus proclaimed is illustrated by three appended essays, on the dioptric, meteors and geometry respectively.

Cartesianism

The achievement of Cartesianism, the philosophy which was the outcome of this modest volume, was the triumph of the modern spirit over tradition. Banishing all deference to the beliefs which men had happened to acquire, Descartes searched 'both in our consciousness of God and our consciousness of the world, for the links by which they are bound to the consciousness of self' (Caird). 'Everything must be doubted', for even the propositions of geometry may be tricks played upon us by some unearthly power. We must begin at the beginning—'I think, therefore I exist'—and build inexorably upon that foundation. Such was what Mahaffy styles 'the trumpet-note for the resurrection of the human mind from the death of formalism'. Descartes, while modestly inviting correction, confessed that he did not believe that there were three lines in his book which could be changed.

The dozen years remaining to the philosopher were spent in developing and defending his clear-cut system, while others fought more noisily for and against it. Using the best of Harvey and other progressive thinkers, he had furnished the unbiased with the means to attain a new vision of man's mind and body and of the world. His religion, however, remained that of his nurse, and in it he hoped to die as tranquilly as he had lived. Calvinism he hated, but the justice of eternal punishment he would not discuss. Himself the most purely philosophical of modern Christians, he was indebted for the completion of his work to a philosopher far more detached than he—the Jew Spinoza.

Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) has been styled the Moses of materialists and free-thinkers. His brief and relatively obscure career was to bring him the homage of Germany in the two centuries which followed his own, and in 1927 acceptance as their prophet by the Soviet Union. His

forum was Amsterdam, where his parents found sanctuary from Spain, and where their well-educated son became an eager disciple of Descartes. This led him to abandon Israel, and in his twenty-fourth year he was solemnly excommunicated by the heads of the synagogue, whose offers and threats he had scorned. His answer was to become Benedict Spinoza, at once rationalist and mystic. Perfect freedom for thought and study was his lifelong aim. To achieve this freedom, he ground glass for optical instruments, gaining a sufficient income from a necessity for philosophic investigation which had also engaged the attention of Descartes. His tools and a few books and pictures formed the sole material wealth of a career which knew hardly any relaxation save tobacco and the tormenting of flies and spiders. He accepted a small pension from John de Witt, and, when his benefactor was murdered, was only restrained by his landlord from a public protest. Declining to become the pensioner of France or a Heidelberg professor, he remained a simple lodger in modest Dutch households, sometimes suspected of atheism or of treason.

Spinoza's chief works were published after his death. Tardy Fame
of Spinoza Like his *Treatise on Politics and Theology* of 1670, they were promptly banned in Holland. A full century passed before his name gained respect in place of execration, and his 'bold identification of spirit and matter, God and nature', replacing Descartes' dualism by a single substance comprising both the Creator and matter, 'finding the solution of all contradictions in a theory of absolute identity', could not widely influence the generation which followed his death. Men clung to Descartes, with his priority of mind to body and absolute dependence of both on God. It is a twentieth-century philosopher, attempting to reveal him as an Eastern religionist, who can describe him as 'the last powerful expression of universalism in the West . . . a world-historic figure like Buddha or St. Paul'.

Blaise Pascal (1623-62), an ailing French gentleman who Pascal died before he was forty, had already proved himself an ornament both to his century and to his race. One of those youths who rediscover mathematics for themselves, before he was sixteen he had written a work on conic sections so weighty as to be pronounced by Professor Chrystal the

foundation of the modern treatment of that subject. The differential calculus and the theory of probability also owed much to him. His greatest fame, however, springs from two contributions to theological controversy, one thrown off in haste and the other never arranged or published by himself. These prove him to have been a stylist unequalled since the fall of Greece, and an earnest and inspiring seeker after truth. Within some fourteen months, he composed the eighteen *Provincial Letters* (1656-7) which dazzled France and marked an epoch in the history of Jesuits and Jansenists alike. Less than six years later, he was dead, but in 1670 his *Thoughts*, extracted from a mass of manuscript, were given to an astonished world.

Many verdicts upon Pascal's works and their author have been proclaimed, but his motives at least seem indisputably to have been of the highest. 'He was far from perfect,' declares a deep student of all that he accomplished,¹ 'he was headstrong and impatient, he long clung to the things which he came to think were hateful; but his mind was aflame for Truth, and his heart athirst for Christ and His poor.' While theories of the universe have changed, and some theological tenets have faded, true holiness still moves mankind, and that Pascal embodied. In November, 1654, a midnight vision of the living God filled his soul, and until death inspired all his actions. A record of this divine call was found close to his heart. The influence of the revelation upon a mind prone to obedience was reinforced in March, 1656, when his little niece threw off an abscess which had been touched by a thorn from the Saviour's crown. It took shape in the plan of his *Thoughts*, a glowing synthesis of moral and historical proofs of Christian truth. The student who had once been an ardent Jansenist wept with joy when he received Extreme Unction, and died as he had lived, a devoted and triumphant seeker after God. No century in modern times has wholly lacked apostles. In the seventeenth they were perhaps most numerous, and none was more 'apostolic' than Pascal. When Europe could already read *Leviathan*, and must face its incarnation in Louis XIV, she needed the potent antidote that he could best supply.

¹ Rev. Dr. H. F. Stewart (1914).

CHAPTER XIX

LOUIS XIV, 1661-1668

NOT earlier than in 1659 and not later than in 1661, a new epoch in European history unmistakably began. The Peace of the Pyrenees, the Peace of Oliva, the English Restoration, the death of Mazarin, these are but the foremost in a galaxy of great events which changed the tempo and the course of Europe. But while almost every power, not least the Turkish foe of Christians, rose or fell with more than normal speed, one claimed an attention which left but little for the rest. Within a few years, France, under her young king, rose to a height never yet approached since the days of Charlemagne or of Caesar. Instead of that Family of Nations which might seem the logical outcome of the Westphalian Peace and its supplements, Europe must face the claim of a single potentate to a mission from on high to rule the world. Hence we must study first the machinery through which, at least in the initial stages, this Divine Purpose must be carried out. What was the administration which Richelieu and Mazarin had bequeathed to their crowned successor?

Imminent
Rise of
France

The measure of the Cardinals cannot be taken, nor the work of Louis rightly understood, without some understanding of the complicated government of France. This from time to time her rulers patched, and they always strove to speed and guide it, but they never even planned a comprehensive reform. Hence the physical centralization and expansion of France, and the growth of various sections of society, were not adequately reflected in the constitution. Between the deaths of Henry and of Louis XIV, much new wine was poured into the old bottles.

The French
Administra-
tion, c. 1660

When Mazarin died, the King, of course, had many other ministers, with great variety of function. The Chancellor could in theory wield the sceptre in case of need. His appointment was for life, with the power of refusing to seal

any act of which he disapproved. He was assisted by Ministers of State, who likewise kept their title until their death, but who attended the Council only when summoned by the King. The work of administration, however, was entrusted by His Majesty to four Secretaries of State, who divided the realm between them, and also had charge of certain departments of national business—foreign affairs, war, the King's household, the clergy and the Huguenots chief among them. The finances had their own superintendent, and, in the days of Mazarin, their administration by Fouquet had become a scandal.


Councils, moreover, were numerous and of great importance. A High Council or Council of State, in which the King presided over his ministers, met seven times in a fortnight, and reviewed the policy of the kingdom. It also acted as the highest court of justice. The fortnightly meeting of a somewhat larger body assisted the King to consider the domestic problems of France. A third Council, that of Finance, also presided over by the King, met twice weekly, and exercised far-reaching control over taxation. Yet another and a larger body, sometimes called the Privy Council, brought the Crown into close touch with questions of justice. Here the King seldom sat, but the meetings were held almost daily. In contrast with the smallest Council, which merely advised its master, this made a formal record of its proceedings.

Imperfect
Unity of
France

The central government was thus complex, and in some respects antiquated and ill-defined. Its efficiency must obviously vary greatly with the character of the King. An able and upright Councillor, none the less, was not confined to a pigeon-hole, but enjoyed wide scope for study and for action. Against this advantage, however, must be set the effect of that mass of ancient provinces of which France was still composed. The Bretons were Catholics, but their tongue had nothing, and their manners indeed but little, in common with the native French. The inhabitants of Languedoc were likewise unassimilated. Language was far from uniform, and Huguenotism, though less hostile than of old to Church and King, drove a great wedge of separation into southern France.

The lack of French unity was hourly attested by the sur-

WARS OF LOUIS XIV 1648-1715



STANFORD, LONDON.

Parlements
and
Intendants

vival of the *Parlements*, both of Paris and of many Provinces. The *Parlement* of Paris, as a law-court, was composed of four separate chambers, for different kinds of judicial business, while its famous claim to refuse to register a royal ordinance could be overridden only by the 'bed of justice', a sovereign fiat of the King. In ninety years from 1443, seven Provincial *Parlements* had been set up—at Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Aix-les-Bains, Rouen and Rennes respectively. In 1620 Béarn had acquired a *Parlement* at Pau, followed in 1633 by the creation of another at Metz for the 'Three Bishoprics', Metz, Toul and Verdun. Provincial Estates were still more numerous. These usually comprised clergy, nobles and commoners ('the third estate') and met, annually or at greater intervals, on the summons of the King. While the provinces recognized that their duty demanded the voting of taxes, they might claim a theoretical right to refuse, or to couple the vote with a recital of their grievances. For administrative purposes the Crown replied by creating large units known as the Generalities, and establishing within them pervasive officials of its own, the famous *Intendants*. These were not men of birth or fortune, but by such they were detested as the aggressive watchdogs of the Crown. The advent of Louis XIV was to herald a vast development of their activity.

Taxation

The section of the government which most distressed the mass of Frenchmen was that which was, or which should have been, concerned with taxes. Unhappily, however, that mass was for the most part dumb. Nobles and clergy, officials of the court and state—these could make their voices heard, but they were exempt from taxes. Their service to the state was rather to fight, or work, or pray for it, leaving payment to a downtrodden and humble class. For several reasons, moreover, the taxes were more onerous than might well have been the case. The Cardinals ever and anon had recourse to bribes, when confronted by domestic enemies or in need of foreign allies. To raise these sums, they must sell offices or make special levies, always prejudicing or taxing the same non-exempted section. The accursed *taille*, even in the *pays d'état*—that third of France which remained less immediately in contact with the Crown—was a heavy burden on the industrial and agricultural classes on whose

land and houses it was paid. But in the *pays d'élections*, the seventeen *généralités* without ancient immunity, these wretched men were fleeced by Government officials, often corrupt, and backed by bailiffs and soldiery. During the reign of Louis XIII, the *taille* had grown almost fourfold. The inevitable consequence was that some idled and drank, since they had no incentive to attempt to save, while others threw dust in the eyes of the tax-gatherer by pretending to be more wretched than they really were. Occasionally, indeed, disaffection culminated in a rising, like that of 1630, when Languedoc, Provence and Dauphiné fought to retain their status as *pays d'état*, or when four of the *pays d'élections* rose severally in Richelieu's last seven years.

Besides the *taille*, the unprivileged paid the less onerous *gabelle*, a tax on salt, while the customs and excise, known as *aides*, were due from the whole nation. Loans, sometimes forced, were levied on a vast scale, with the prospect that the State would cut down the rate of interest and that the capital value would decline. Meanwhile the monarchy itself was largely financed from the King's own income, his lands and forests and feudal rights all playing their part.

The army, whose needs must constantly augment taxation, was raised by commissioning the gentry to enlist companies or regiments from the swarm of mercenaries who were eager to serve. Thus during the reign of Louis XIII the land forces grew to almost five times the strength (some 34,000 men) that Henry had deemed necessary for his far-reaching plans. Foreign war naturally increased the soldiers' numbers and individual wages, and, as the cavalymen had each a mounted attendant, the cost of a French army multiplied many times over. Louis XIII really enjoyed camp life and battle: his son deemed it a royal duty to take the field and put the presumptuous enemy to flight. The King's personal preference came in course of time to influence the choice of the enemy, the battlefield and the mode of warfare. Fortresses in the Low Countries imposed the shortest journey from the capital, and the least strain from inconvenient manœuvres or unforeseen attacks.

Under such royal patronage, the French army created by Richelieu steadily advanced towards primacy in Europe. Civil officials, enforcing rules of conduct and ensuring pay,

The French
Army and
Navy

Forces
by Land
and Sea

went far to maintain its discipline. Meanwhile the fleet, or rather fleets, since the privately owned sailing-ships of the Atlantic and the Channel had little in common with the galleys of the Mediterranean, likewise owed their development to Richelieu. Upon a strong French fleet must depend trade with the Levant, the severance of Spain from Italy, trans-oceanic trade and settlement, and political relations with the Dutch and English. From 1626 France also possessed the germ of those commercial companies which played so great a part in the seventeenth-century history of other nations. The names of Champlain and of Madagascar indicate the trend of her progress overseas. In peace and war alike, France under Richelieu gave proof of her capacity for eminence of every kind. Almost all, however, depended upon that monarchy which was the Cardinal's long-sought goal.

Louis
Replaces
Mazarin

On March 9, 1661, when Mazarin died, a new epoch both for France and Europe began. The Cardinal's greatest achievement may well have been that he taught his young master both how to rule and how to wait for action until his preceptor had departed. At twenty-two, Louis had never shown the slightest eagerness for power, or for the systematic toil which power demanded. Since Henry IV, the last royal toiler—and he a fitful one—full fifty years had passed, and courtiers smiled when Louis declared that ministers should henceforward report to himself. He spoke, however, from mature determination, which the labour of more than half a century could not shake. From the first, no important step could be taken without his sanction, and no man gained office who could be supposed to dominate the King. Such dependence did not favour the rise of able servants, but Louis always believed in himself and remained their master. *Le Roi Soleil* must be the only luminary and the vital source of France.

King-
worship
in France

By nature prone to monarchy, and educated by the Cardinals in the merits of centralized rule, the French were eager to flatter and to adore their king. Louis, half a Habsburg and accustomed to the king-worship which etiquette prescribed in Spain, withstood remarkably the incessant stifling incense, but could not escape unscathed. A being more than mortal, with a code of morals different from that

which his subjects must obey—such, in a measure, was the King in his own conceit. His ‘I have almost been obliged to wait’ is classic. ‘We must all die’, said the preacher, and, seeing that Louis showed discomfiture, added hastily, ‘That is, almost all.’ The separate religion of the Huguenots became *lèse-majesté*, like the republican constitution of the Dutch. Frenchmen hastened to ascribe to their king all their triumphs in arts and sciences or on the field of battle, and to declare that his will must be sovereign throughout the world. He at least acted as though no treaty could stand in its way.

Such king-worship and royal self-delusion of course ripened only with the passage of many years. In 1661 Louis was notable for dignity and grace, a handsome youth who had gained a faultless bride in the Infanta, and who in Lionne, Le Tellier, Colbert and Louvois possessed admirable and docile servants. Fouquet, the Superintendent of Finance, however, was rich, corrupt, powerful and perhaps dangerous. Against him, therefore, the King contrived a *coup d'état*. Masking his purpose by a friendly visit, he caused Fouquet to be deported by overwhelming force and confined for life in Pinerolo. At the same time he encouraged his *protégé* and kinsman, Charles II, to espouse Catherine of Braganza, and with her the cause of Portugal, the successful rebel against Spain. Such was his bearing towards King Philip, his sworn friend at the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and now the father of his queen.

The next year, 1662, gave even more striking proofs of Louis' determination to advance French power and prestige by every means, with a view to outdistancing Spain. From his connexion with our Charles II he drew profit at every turn. In an age when statesmen and jurists contended hotly for a ‘closed’ or an ‘open’ sea, England's dearest object was to be acknowledged mistress of the waters round her shores. The power which kept down pirates might claim a certain authority over near-by seas. Louis, however, refused to dip the French flag to the English ships in these waters, thus insisting on the freedom of the seas. From England, on the other hand, he gained the precedence for his own ambassador over that of Spain, and the retrocession of Dunkirk for the sum of £200,000. An insult to the French

Louis' Early
Promise

Louis'
Assertiveness

ambassador in Rome was severely visited upon the Pope, both by exacting an ample apology and by occupying Avignon, the majestic papal city on the Rhône. Church and State, sovereigns and peoples, within France and without—all must defer to the Great Louis' will.

Measure
of his
Greatness

A French historian has declared, with mordant irony, that Louis XIV may have been a great king, but that no one would call him a great man. Bolingbroke, on the other hand, styled him an unequalled Actor of Majesty, who enriched the very concept of monarchy. It is certain that until his death in 1715, that is, during a tenth of what are called modern times, France centres upon his person, and Europe centres upon France. Although Holland may have given the world more of immediate value, while Britain sowed more fruitful seed, although the progress of mysterious Russia or even petty Brandenburg may have in time surpassed that of resplendent France, although the contemporary movement overseas will perhaps prove to have been the most pregnant of all, none the less by common consent the age bears Louis' name. Chronologically, its history divides into three almost equal phases. First, Europe gradually learns what is implicit in Louis' France, and dimly perceives that his new order contravenes her own desires. Next, William of Orange undertakes to organize resistance, and to reinforce the opposition on the Continent by gaining England. Lastly, in the supreme crisis of the Spanish Succession, the France of Louis XIV suffers a long-drawn and qualified defeat.

'The Age of
Louis XIV'

His
Assistants
and
Principles

The first phase, in which the Great King gradually reveals himself, extends from the death of Mazarin to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1661–85). In these, his best, years, from early manhood to middle age, Louis steers France with the aid of several able assistants whom he finds ready to his hand, Colbert the most notable of all. That unassuming, unattractive bureaucrat, nicknamed 'the north wind' by the courtiers, not only took the weight of administration upon his shoulders, but also contributed invaluable suggestions for improvement. He served a master who regarded service and adoration as his own due, and whose every action was the outcome of long study begun years before Mazarin died. God, Louis held, designed that all power should be wielded by His anointed, and that the moral laws which bound his

subjects should not apply to him. Hence, beside the neglected Spanish consort, whose death, as he finely said, was the first sorrow she had caused him, he maintained a series of mistresses, whom the capital knew and envied, and whose children were ennobled as of right. The exercise of this special moral code for a King of France was consistent with the decorous submission to the demands of the Church which Louis practised and enforced upon his court. Religion, of course, must expect no influence over policy, and the Most Christian King allied on all sides with heretics—Dutch, English, Swedish and German—against his Catholic brethren. From the first moment of his personal rule, likewise, he assumed superiority to any law or custom which bound a prince who makes war to declare his grievance and his purpose before launching an attack. Secret preparation and a sudden spring offered advantages which must not be sacrificed to a convention.

A king of France, Louis held, must be always regal, completely master of himself, and, whenever he appeared, adored by those who saw him. He took pride in quitting the hunt at its climax, thus marking his superiority to ordinary human weakness. To avoid making royalty cheap, he removed himself from the neighbourhood of Paris, expending vast treasure and the lives of thousands in creating the splendours of Versailles. As the reign wore on, he sought more often what he always coveted, the glory of a conqueror in the field. This, however, involved unregal toil and sweat before and during battle, while at sea the elements showed majesty no respect. In a siege, however, the lord of Vauban, the incomparable engineer, need venture less. Louis could be informed when the fortress was ripe for falling, and at his stately appearance it duly fell.

With some professional hypocrisies and foibles, however, Louis' Louis combined much talent and matchless taste. His ^{Talents} mastery of diplomacy was proverbial. His diplomatic corps, well chosen and well trained, brought France advantages as great as those that she had owed to Richelieu, and thus enhanced the King's glory. By judgement or by intuition, moreover, he chose the right moment to end a war, and the right demands to make without forfeiting his early repute for moderation. In daily life his taste and grace won much fame

and many hearts. No king could better compliment the victorious general or condole with the defeated. St. Simon, his most vivid chronicler, declares that the finest act of his reign followed the insult of a Gascon, who broke his sword in the presence of the King, crying out that he would serve him no longer. Louis thereupon strode to the window and flung out his cane, saying that he would be sorry to strike a gentleman.

His
Inherited
Prestige

Two rare conditions favoured Louis as a King of France seeking aggrandizement. Thanks to the long predominance of the Habsburg House in Europe, its rival dynasty, the Bourbon, had gained the reputation of a champion of the humiliated and of the oppressed. Kings of France were the allies of the English, of the Dutch and of the Portuguese, as they had been of Catalans, Savoyards, Scots and Swiss, of Swedes and of countless Germans. The League of the Rhine on one flank, the French *clientèle*, Sweden, Poland and the Turk, upon the other—such was her antidote against a Habsburg Empire endangering the liberties of the nations. Twenty years of Louis XIV barely sufficed to rob France of this ancient reputation.

Weakness
of Europe

When Louis set out to gain his ends, moreover, every other considerable nation was under a cloud. In mighty Spain, both monarchy and people were in decline. From 1665, when the almost imbecile Charles II succeeded Philip IV, the succession question grew ever more insistent. The Empire, paralysed by the convulsions that ended in 1648, but still in dignity the foremost state in Europe, had likewise fallen into notably feeble hands. From 1658 to 1705, Leopold I proved himself the most complete nonentity among the Emperors of three centuries. While playing skittles, it is said, he complained that the rain was falling into his mouth. ‘Your Majesty might perhaps do well to close it’, was the reply, and the counsel was accepted. In England the fervour of the Restoration and the struggle with the Dutch helped for a quarter of a century to maintain Louis’ client kinsman upon the throne. In Holland the defects of the Constitution exposed the Republic to the insults, as well as to the threats, of the most proud of neighbours. When it came to blows, the French King actually demanded that every year the Dutch should send him a gold

medal inscribed with thanks for allowing them to retain the independence that his ancestors had enabled them to acquire.

The secondary states of Europe, moreover, did but little to relieve the prevailing drabness of the picture outside France. In Brandenburg, it is true, Frederick William, by naked force and policy as unscrupulous as Louis', was earning the title of the Great Elector. As yet, however, Brandenburg was a petty and largely a ravaged state, and the Elector long sought profit from the French alliance. Sweden in the 'sixties and 'seventies, under a regency of nobles, sank to the level of Louis' hireling, and tempted Denmark by her seeming weakness. Poland was falling a victim to the excessive aristocracy of her constitution. Nowhere in Europe could Louis desecrate a check, still less a rival.

French power and predominance, however, had founda- Strength
tions more enduring than the mere temporary weakness of of France
other states. As William III was to prove, the emergence of a single statesman of the first rank might deprive Louis of his seeming invincibility. France, none the less, was now by far the strongest state in Europe. The army of Turenne, organized by Louvois, fortified by Vauban, and supplied by Colbert from the most fertile and populous of kingdoms—such a force must have been formidable, whoever ruled. But a king who himself could and would govern doubled French strength forthwith. If their king suffered a Prince of the Blood to act for him, the people's loyalty was cooled, and the royal family almost certainly divided. A dominant minister, as Richelieu and Mazarin had found, must be exposed to jealousy and plots, and must live in constant fear of supersession. Only the King could command obedience from all, and he alone might expect the loyal co-operation of all classes. Unity, secrecy and speed—such were the endowment which Louis, when he succeeded Mazarin, gave to France.

French achievement, however, was the fruit of others French Ad-
besides the King. As we have seen, France possessed a ministration
highly organized though far from perfect governmental machine. Louis chose the men of whom it was composed, and it was steered by him alone. But on its structure and strength the power and speed of his successive strokes

depended. Thus the great political decisions, which Frenchmen must reverence as the decrees of a God-given king, were in fact thrashed out by the hierarchy of councils already enumerated. Each comprised members of the rank of Minister, Councillor, 'Master of Requests' (lawyers) and Secretary. Under them the Crown was served by numerous officials, among whom the famous *Intendants*, or Sheriffs, were chief. These last had been gradually evolved to meet the domestic needs of France, and upon them the normal administration largely depended. Opposition to the Crown could be met by *lettres de cachet*, or deportation.

Colbert

Down to his death in 1683, most branches of the French Government were pruned and vivified by Colbert, an unassuming tradesman's son from Reims, whose outstanding ability Mazarin had rightly valued. He soon held almost countless offices of state, and some have found in him the only civilian in Louis' service, after Mazarin's death, who attained to real greatness. It is certain that, while enriching himself and aggrandizing his relations, he served his king and country with an industry and acumen unsurpassed in contemporary France and probably in contemporary Europe. Much of his daily fifteen hours of toil was devoted to increasing French wealth, and to ensuring that a greater fraction than before reached the treasury. Although he could not rise above the delusions of his age, which held that bullion was what mattered, and that when two parties made a bargain the gain of one must be the other's loss, he could look far afield for new enrichment, and could breathe energy into both industry and trade. Though forced by war to borrow, he contrived that the burden of the interest payable should not increase, while he augmented the gross royal revenue by well above one-third.

National
Wealth
and Power

The history of Europe for a century, indeed, had shown at least a suggestive coincidence between the wealth of nations and their power. The decline of Spain and Venice, the rise of Holland and England, yielded, in Colbert's view, lessons which France should follow. Her taxes, of course, must reach the treasury without unlawful depletion by those who gathered them. But that was a mere beginning of the plan which, in the King's place, Colbert would have imposed on France. Shocked by the numbers and the wealth of mere

passengers in the ship of state, especially ecclesiastics, he besought his master to reduce his subjects, so far as possible, to four classes only—agriculturists, merchants, soldiers and sailors. Thus, he declared, Louis could become master of the world.

Colbert's actual contribution, besides a well-informed and vigorous administration, comprised a vast advance on and beyond the sea, and not a little in the way of culture. He felt what many kings and landed counsellors had forgotten, that France was formed by nature to be an amphibious power. Her lengthy coastline, bordering on several seas, mutely protested against rulers who saw only that their capital lay in a plain and dangerously near the frontier. With some exaggeration, he declared that while France had no more than six hundred ships, England had six times as many, and Holland some sixteen thousand. His remedy was a carefully planned conscription, together with a fleet of galleys manned by the utmost severity of justice. Men condemned by the courts became galley-slaves, often for life. The resultant sea-power secured French commerce in the Mediterranean and French dominions in America and the Indies.

While Colbert gave Louis inspiration, the elaborate French system of government by Councils in which lawyers predominated was strengthened by several other outstanding servants of the King. Le Tellier, like many more of them a man of humble origin, was an outstanding War Secretary, under whom Colbert had already served. Lionne, in Mazarin's day a diplomat of renown, was well qualified to shine as Foreign Secretary. In the case of Louvois, Le Tellier's son, eminence was unquestionable, but the strength that after 1662 his energy as War Minister gave to Louis was offset by the influence of his ruthless character and bellicose advice. The King was by nature and policy so reserved and inscrutable that the springs of his actions can seldom wholly be laid bare. But Louvois unquestionably procured him a strong army and urged him in the direction of his natural perversity to use this matchless weapon in conquests, made for his own glory and the strength of France.

The history both of France and of Europe for the next half-century, indeed, demands some account of this new and

Other
French
Ministers

Louvois and
the Army

potent factor, the French army as Louvois made it. Hitherto there had been a nucleus, indeed, of Household troops around the King, but only a miniature standing army, either of conscripts or volunteers. The nobles had been wont to buy military posts for themselves or their dependants, and to raise soldiers by recruiting-sergeants from their tenantry and from many other sources. Such men were armed by them and paid for by the Crown. The evils of the system may easily be conceived. Imaginary soldiers in the ranks, so that the noble could draw more pay, useless soldiers garrisoning small inland towns, serving-officers with little control over their men, barriers of all kinds severing the army from the Crown in war-time, a general dispersal in the winter, pillage habitual, desertion frequent—such was the ‘system’ which Louvois set himself to break down.

Louvois

The reformer, indeed, did not call upon the Crown to forego the purchase-money for commissions. But he compelled those commissioned to fulfil their engagements, and deputed vigorous assistants to cover the defects of the incompetent. Uniform, at first confined to foreigners in the French service, became universal. Efforts were made to improve on the slow musket and heavy pike, while the artillery and engineers were transformed. French fortifications became the finest in the world. At the same time the victualling of the troops and the creation of magazines showed Louvois at his best. Where their opponents were forced to live on the countryside, the French had the superior mobility that stores of fodder can confer. Inspector-General Martinet and Vauban’s bayonet are household words. They commemorate Louvois’ innovations and those which followed. If for many years the French usually proved victorious, it was not so much from natural superiority as from intelligent organization.

Colbert and
the Navy

If it be true that the sea always betrays the enemy of the Anglo-Saxon, the chief cause is the same. In the seventeenth century, despite the deeds of Drake and Hawkins, sea-power followed no predestined flag. Richelieu had been Admiral of France and the creator of a substantial fleet, but under Mazarin and Lionne this declined. Colbert found ships and galleys in decay, while excellent French-born seamen served the Dutch. His boundless energy sufficed for this

great task, as for so many more. He became more than the Louvois of the navy, for he could not, like Louvois, draw upon the wisdom and the sympathy of the King.

From 1665 Colbert, assisted some seven years later by Seignelay, his vigorous and ambitious son, toiled systematically to win the mastery of the seas. The wealth which he had accumulated in the treasury enabled him at first to purchase ships abroad. Thereafter, however, galleys in the Mediterranean, and great ships upon the ocean, were to be built by Frenchmen from timber grown in France. The galleys, armed with mortars, were manned by human cattle from many lands, with criminals and Huguenots rowing side by side in chains. The great ships, built and furnished with the best materials in France, were manned in advance of the army by a methodical conscription of the coastal population, and supported by ports and fortresses on shore. Rochefort was transformed by Colbert from a 'fortified rock' into a great naval station; and Brest, created out of nothing. At Hâvre, at Calais and, above all, at Dunkirk, his genius conceived and carried out great new constructions. Two regiments of marines, commanded by men of gentle birth, were schooled for service. Artillery and hydrography received the attention due, and the indispensable hierarchy of officers on sea and land came into being. Although the supreme dignity of High Admiral was reserved for royalty, Colbert himself, as Naval Secretary, appointed all the officers.

Thus while Louis and Louvois gave France an army invincible until Blenheim (1704), Colbert and his son made her for a quarter of a century mistress of the seas. Prolonged warfare, indeed, proved that to maintain supremacy both by land and sea must surpass the strength of any nation, and France never found the means to realize Colbert's vision of a second Dunkirk at Cherbourg. But, through some two decades at least, her combatant superiority was such as no state had yet enjoyed and even Napoleon could not regain. It was based on a strange coincidence between the temporary paralysis or preoccupation of every other nation and the possession by France of some half-dozen first-rate men, headed by Colbert and the King. This was the foundation of the seeming divinity of Louis XIV.

That divinity, we must clearly apprehend, was based upon

Colbert
as Peace
Minister

the collaboration of many outstanding Frenchmen. Colbert was chief among them, but others were far more conspicuous and more bellicose than he. Modest, patriotic, high-minded, clear-headed, almost incredibly laborious, he toiled to give France order, wealth and social justice. At one with his master in combating the local high-handedness of the nobles, he modestly protested against unnecessary wars, but by orderly finance and carefully developed trade and industry did much to render them successful. Thanks to Colbert, 'For a time the attention of the most powerful of European states seemed turned to the peaceful development of her own resources. Commercial and industrial progress was for the first time the chief object of a great nation's government'. (A. J. Grant). The always iniquitous farming out of the taxes was abolished, and the taxes themselves so skilfully adjusted that reduced rates soon brought in a greater revenue. By the revival, under protective tariffs, of old industries and the introduction of new, France was largely freed from humiliating dependence on neighbouring states for manufactured goods. In the centre at least, her own internal customs dues were swept away, while the Languedoc canal promoted internal transport. In founding great companies, with State assistance, for trading overseas, Colbert did not scorn to imitate the Dutch, though with far less than Dutch success. These peaceful struggles, like the literary creations which gave splendour to the 'age of Louis XIV', went on beside the wars and treaties which must be our first concern.

Louis' Wars

While Spain and Portugal still ruled over vast and rich colonial empires, while the Dutch held many profitable possessions and enriched themselves by trading with those which belonged to others, while the English, both consciously and unconsciously, were acquiring a great colonial position, while the neighbours of France thus enjoyed manifold greatness overseas, how did it stand with France herself? The French lived beside the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and bred good mariners, both leaders and rank and file. Familiar names, Champlain perhaps the foremost, recall their pioneer work abroad, especially in the Levant, in Canada and in the West Indies, while their colonial strife with Britain was to fill the eighteenth century. Yet when the personal rule of Louis XIV began, France had few possessions

overseas, and what she had were exploited by the Dutch and English. The French navy, in an age of piracy, numbered less than forty ships.

A brief chronicle will suffice to show how this humiliating situation had been created. What Louis did and what he failed to do for its redress must form an important factor in the estimate of his greatness. Fish and fur had tempted Frenchmen for several generations to cross the Atlantic, and, in 1534, Francis I sent an expedition which entered the St. Lawrence. Next year its leader, Cartier, reached the site of Montreal. No settlements, however, were organized, perhaps because of the religious wars which followed, perhaps because the rulers of France were not prepared to give their pioneers the necessary degree of independence. But although French thought inclined to regard a colony as a potential competitor with the mother-country, Champlain (1567-1635), who hinted at a Panama Canal, by 1611 had founded both Quebec and Montreal. A great explorer, a great friend of the Indians, and a great Frenchman, he sought above all things to convert the heathen, and to discover a new road to the East Indies.

Champlain's brilliant career was interrupted as often as politics ranged England against France. In 1632, however, when the French regained their Canada, it became possible for Richelieu to establish a trading company for its administration. Free trade with the mother-country, the transfer of a hundred colonists a year and strict Catholicism—such was the Canadian *régime* that lasted until 1663. But 'New France' had then gained in thirty years less colonists than had Virginia in eight, and in 1664 the problem was attacked anew. In that year Louis XIV granted a charter to a new company which comprised his possessions in America, both North and South, as well as those in the West Indies and western Africa. Within a decade this ambitious project was abandoned. Canada, none the less, was destined to remain French, and to seek by exploration to endow the mother-country with the basin of the Mississippi.

From the attractive possibilities of French empire overseas, we must return to the realities of Europe. Before we chronicle the deeds of the soldiers and statesmen, however, we must indicate a new power which was carefully marshalled

French
Empire—
Champlain

French
Art and
Literature

to assist them. France was inspired to dominate Europe, and Europe to offer less resistance, by the glory of French literature, French science and French art. In the great days of Holland, such a galaxy of artists as that comprising Rembrandt, Franz Hals, Jan Steen and Ruysdael sprang up of itself, inspired by the vitality and by the mounting riches of the nation. Spain in many fields, and England in poetry and prose, had already in turn headed artistic Europe. France, with her mellowing nobles and resplendent throne, assuredly did much to inspire that literary and artistic greatness which dominated the later seventeenth century. But, in her case, the State played a far greater part than in other lands, and artists of every kind were systematically pressed into its service. Louis XIV, declared Lavissee, a king who, all his life, posed before history like a model, demanded painters and writers to display his own heroic deeds. Flattery, pensions, even summonses to attend His Majesty on campaign, were lavished on them, and in France a Rembrandt sinking in poverty into the grave was unthinkable.

State Ad-
vertisement

With a somewhat different accent, Colbert pursued a like policy towards letters and learning, whose minister he might almost be said to have been. 'He ruled intellectual life by the same methods as he employed towards the treasury, manufactures and sea-power.' Artists and writers, he held, must cease to be clients of magnates and financiers. There must be only one Maecenas—the King. Trusting the judgement of a writer of pedestrian prose, he regarded poets as the best advertising medium for the Crown. Historians came next, and carefully chosen panegyrics on Louis were circulated in neighbouring lands. That unlearned King posed as a connoisseur of whatever in the world was rich or rare. Sculpture poured in from Italy, and the minister, resolved to create a French school of painting, kept a colony of students in Rome. From private societies he made the Academy, and the Academies of Science, of Architecture, of Painting and Sculpture, and the famous bodies that they became. Several existing provincial academies were promoted to be 'royal', and thus gained a new lease of life.

King and minister, determined that the French monarchy should lack no adornment, called manufactures of tapestry

and furniture into being. The *Gobelins* attained a world-wide fame. Music had for centuries enjoyed an organized self-government. This Louis, who was said to live to the strains of the violin, enriched by an elaborate hierarchy of his own, with the French-trained Florentine Lulli as its Music in France superintendent. Under Lulli, that fascinating hybrid the opera captured France. Thus 1672, the year of Louis' attempt to assassinate Holland, saw also the creation of the French Academy of Music, with Lulli as a national dictator. It was perhaps inevitable that, in France even more than in other countries, the novel energy and brilliance of civilization organized under royal academies should inspire contempt and dislike for the rude ages of the past. Louis' monarchy, like fascism, bolshevism and the Revolution, felt that its transcendent merit absolved it from obedience to an outworn public law. It was gilded by a band of poets, orators, prose-writers, playwrights and divines, whose united brilliance dazzled Europe.

This epoch-making activity was not unjustly summarized as the age of Louis XIV. The monarch who chose such agents, from Colbert to Lulli, and who endowed them with enthusiasm, means and power, might well have received that tribute for those services alone. A king is great if he selects the best men to serve the state, if he chooses the best possible aims, and if he so controls his agents as to evoke their most zealous and harmonious service, supporting them meanwhile with all his might. Such was the work of Louis in his earlier years. But, for good or for evil, it was coloured by the personality and preferences of a prince who held that the state should be the incarnation of himself. The results were diverse. On one side, France derived benefit from the genuine musical talent of her king. His delight in grandiose and costly palaces cost her much, but enhanced her dignity in an age which reverently admired them. But Louis' zeal for orthodoxy in religion, and for the pomp and excitement of war, though shared by many Frenchmen, proved in the long run ruinous to France.

Versailles, scene and symbol of an enchanted life remote from the realities of Paris, may exemplify the strength and weakness of *le Roi Soleil*. That unparalleled temple of monarchy, built in a poisonous desert, cost the lives of an

army and drained the treasure of France. A symbol of Louis' monarchy, its consequences have been styled more ruinous than all his wars. Begun when the Dutch war menaced her resources, its new and vast expense paralysed Colbert's undertakings. He

'sacrificed, to the last halfpenny, his provision for communications, reduced the despatch of colonists and soldiers to Canada and the other colonies, as well as the subsidies to manufactures, allowed his great companies to collapse, disturbed the order which he had established in the finances, resorted to murderous devices which provoked risings and their consequences—looting, slaughter and the galleys' (Lavissee).

Thus both the countryside and the army suffered, but when peace returned, the outlay resumed its earlier height. Versailles, it is not too much to say, was at once the temple and the scaffold of the King.

Effects on
France and
Europe

When the great days of Louis XIV are called to mind, the student cannot fail to perceive a cloud of fragrant incense adding yet greater majesty to his half-veiled gigantic figure. This cloud is the product of a thousand pens, some wielded by the immortal artists whom the world reverences among the foremost in the history of France. Racine, Boileau, Molière, La Fontaine, Bayle, Fontenelle—these and a score of their fellows magnified Louis merely by living in his reign. At that time, Frenchmen may declare, 'France was unanimously acclaimed the intellectual sovereign of Europe.' How far, we must ask, was this supremacy due to Louis, and what were its political effects?

It is certain that the autocrat prized the prestige that came to him from numbering such men among his subjects. To that end, as we have seen, he showered pensions upon them, favoured their activities, sent them to learn the arts of foreign lands, and formed them into learned institutions. It is certain also that he did not reject the deification which came to him from artists of many kinds, prose-writers, verse-makers, sculptors, painters, actors, medal-designers and the like. His own proud motto, 'Less than God but greater than the universe', gave flattery of himself *carte blanche*. A German may even contend that King and minister looked on literature as a stupendous and irresistible advertisement for the royal virtues. Thus Louis' bills of exchange, accompanied by gracious letters and skilfully bestowed, brought

himself and his policy most flattering tributes, not only from Frenchmen, but from insignificant foreigners, men of Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. He sustained the super-human virtues which they ascribed to him by refusing to allow hostilities to interrupt his care for literature and art. His majesty, indeed, was modelled on the heroes of antiquity, and his palaces at least paid tribute in their decoration to the divinities of Greece and Rome.

Such was the brilliance and majesty of French literary art, begun, indeed, before Louis seized the helm of State, but surviving even his exploitation, that Frenchmen can extol their country as, at least in literature, the nurse of every other European nation. The supremacy of their language in the intercourse of states, the ascendancy of their architecture, their pageantry, their manners—all these superiorities, incarnate in their king, conduced to unite the nation, and to give it that dauntless self-confidence and staying-power which the French had not by nature. Thus, although compulsion may sterilize, and flattery breed satire, Frenchmen revered their king, and foreigners looked up to France, until her misbehaviour forced them to change their view. Her failure to colonize on the English scale may well have resulted from the national conviction that no other land could replace the home of their fathers.

The wars of Louis XIV, a series destined to end only in Louis' Wars 1714, are usually regarded as beginning with the War of Devolution in 1667. In the six preceding years, however, Europe's hope that after Oliva, her third great treaty, she might enjoy a lengthy peace, had by no means been fulfilled. Louis was incomparably tactful with men and women but most haughty towards rival states. His high-handed treatment of England, the Pope and Spain, it is true, had not led to war, and for a time his bodily health seemed shaken. But, in 1663, war between Spain and Portugal reached a crisis, and next year the 'Sea-Powers', England and the Dutch, plunged again into a bitter struggle. Meanwhile, in 1663, a war, of which many Christian peace-lovers must approve, had broken out. Was this the Crusade to which some had looked for the restoration of European unity?

It was, indeed, a war waged by the Emperor against the The Turkish Turk, and some other Christian powers joined in, particularly Factor

Louis, the Most Christian King. Instead of Europe uniting to expel the Turk, however, a few interested states had combined to resist a Turkish attack on Austria. This, to check revolt in Transylvania, had been launched by the Grand Vizier Kiuprili, whose family were making the Turks once more a conquering force. France had still much to gain from Turkish friendship, but she could not refuse to succour the Christian Emperor, nor could Louis shrink from displaying his incomparable soldiers to the Imperial princes. In 1664, therefore, 6,000 picked troops under Coligny marched to the battlefield of St. Gothard, a hundred miles south of Vienna, and there contributed not a little to the Emperor's victory. The weak Leopold, however, quickly made a truce for twenty years, since their religion forbade the Turks a peace with unbelievers, and Louis hastened to patch up his profitable friendship with the Sultan.

France
and Spain

It is indisputable that at this time the future of France turned most of all on her relations with Spain. No other region in the world had for her the importance of that row of Spanish provinces which lined her frontier towards the east. At this she had nibbled with success, but Flanders, Brabant, Luxemburg and Franche Comté had not ceased to spell for Louis safety, riches and prestige. In the years of qualified peace since the treaty of the Pyrenees, he had bridled the Duke of Lorraine, whose duchy filled the gap between Spanish Luxemburg and Franche Comté. Much more, however, was needed, and Louis' actions had become a long fencing-match with those who spoke for Spain.

While Spain grew palpably weaker, and could not even conquer Portugal, the question of a successor to Philip IV pressed ever more strongly for solution. In 1660, when Louis married the Infanta, and she renounced her hereditary rights, her younger sister had been Philip's sole remaining child. Late in the following year, however, a sickly son, Prince Charles, was born to him. When his own reign closed, his son would naturally succeed him, though no one could suppose that the new tenure would be a long one. In such conditions, how should Louis safeguard France?

The Spanish
Succession
Question

One task, indeed, was obvious—to free his hands by invalidating his wife's renunciation. The contract embodying this was weak in that the dowry which was its purchase

price remained unpaid. It could also be challenged as having been made illegally by a minor and not confirmed when the heiress came of age. Mazarin may well have foreseen Spanish default. The renunciation, however, was embodied in a solemn treaty between two great states, while any claim that would allow France and Spain to become united would outrage European no less than Spanish feeling. Before the birth of Charles, Philip's ministers had negotiated with Louis for his abandonment of Portugal and England. Spain could not bring herself, however, to pay his price—the annulment of the renunciation, and the cession of Franche Comté, Luxemburg and more of the Spanish Netherlands.

The consequences of that failure to agree proved War of
momentous. Philip married his younger daughter to the Devolution
Emperor Leopold, with the stipulation that their second son should inherit Spain. Portugal, aided by France, triumphed over the decadent Spanish army and secured her independence. Louis, when the despairing Philip died, claimed from his Austrian widow several of the choicest districts in the Netherlands in virtue of the Right of Devolution. His legal argument, lately derided as affirming that 'What was good for a manor was good for a kingdom', rested on a custom in Brabant, the foremost among them. Brabantine law did not permit the offspring of a second marriage to dispossess the offspring of a first when their common parent died. The districts claimed, Louis argued, had vested irrevocably in his bride, whose renunciation was totally invalid. Encouraged by her confessor, the Habsburg Queen-Mother refused consent, and in 1667 Louis set out to obtain his so-called rights by force of arms.

For a ruler unhampered by scruples, the invasion could Ten Years
not have been better timed. Europe in 1667, by comparison of Change
with her condition ten years earlier, was so greatly altered in Europe
as to raise more than one question with regard to the causes, and Beyond
or 'laws', of history. Within a mere decade, several of the powers had changed not merely their rulers but their aims, their own relative importance, and their character. In 1657 England under Cromwell had been almost the arbiter of Europe. Ten years later the Dutch were in the Medway, and the English King was secretly the pensioned client of Louis XIV. In 1657 France was waging a doubtful struggle,

within a few days' march of Paris, against the Spaniards and a great French warrior prince. A decade passed, and the French King stood ready, at the head of a united nation, to attack and partition the Spanish Netherlands. In 1657 the Danish monarchy was one of the weakest in Europe. By 1667 it ranked among the most absolute, made strong by the Danish masses, who detested their own nobles. At the same time, its rival, Sweden, had exchanged a strong and militant monarchy for the ascendancy, under a boy-king, of a new and largely unworthy noble caste.

Outside the European society, the changes were hardly less complete. The Turks in their sensational return to aggression against Europe had survived St. Gothard, and were obviously superior to the Poles and the Venetians. The Muscovites, despite the varying fortunes of Alexis' reign (1645-76), had on the whole advanced their attempt to enter or re-enter Europe. Even if a religious conflict was ripening within their realm, Smolensk and Kiev had been regained from Poland, and the danger from Sweden was in abeyance, if not extinct.

Meanwhile among both great and secondary powers, other changes that promised to be fateful had taken place. The Great Elector now enjoyed every requisite of monarchic independence—a standing army, foreign alliances, supremacy over all persons and bodies within his domains, and emancipation from vassalage in Prussia. The sea-powers had fought a desperate battle, but it left them ready for union against any dangerous force in Europe. England, moreover, had gained in Portugal something like a client state. In 1675 France was on the eve of forming a Rhenish League to dominate the Empire. The Empire remained weak, but in 1667 the Rhenish League was dissolved. While Spain went steadily downhill, signs multiplied that other states perceived the danger which lay in the abnormal rise and policy of France.

Ten years, in short, had changed a Europe still nominally Habsburg into a Europe which must struggle long and painfully to escape becoming Bourbon, while, superficially at least, one-half of its leading members had reversed their course. The King who in boyhood had fled from his rebellious subjects was now, in early manhood, ready to inaugurate a new phase

of European history. The Age of Louis the Fourteenth was dawning. The Outlook
for Europe

In 1667, indeed, a more respectable case for warlike action might have been based on that union of Spain and Austria which then hung over France. Philip, as we have seen, had married his younger daughter to the Emperor in December, 1663, with the stipulation that their son should inherit Spain. Our knowledge that the son, when born, soon died, while the Spanish King lived until 1700, and Leopold until 1705, makes the contingency seem remote. All international politics for a generation, however, were influenced by the expectation that the sickly King of Spain would soon vacate the throne. This gave some shadow of excuse for a preventive move by France.

Louis' act of war, however, was the first of a series such as the next four centuries were to know only too well— Louis'
Aggression overwhelming force set suddenly in motion. In May, 1667, newly allied with Portugal and with several German princes, the French King hurled Turenne and perhaps some 50,000 troops into defenceless Flanders. His claim, supported also by a fantastic manifesto, embraced Brabant, Antwerp, Limburg, Mechlin, Upper Gelders, Namur, Artois, Cambrai and Hanault, with one-third of Franche Comté and half of Luxemburg. But how could Spain resist? The weakness of a state defeated heavily by Portugal had hastened Philip's death. The Queen was no genius, and her Austrian kinsfolk could give no help. Louis, indeed, had agreed with several German states to bar the path to Leopold. The Spanish Queen's dependence on her Confessor roused an adverse faction under Philip's active bastard, Don John. The Sea Powers were in the fourth year of a well-matched conflict, while Charles was the secret pensioner of France. Sweden and Denmark ranked as Louis' clients. His war-machine was wielded by Turenne, while the Netherlands had no army fit to take the field. It was not surprising, therefore, that first the chief towns of the western provinces, and then Franche Comté, were swiftly captured, or that in September a campaign begun in May came to a triumphant end. Louis himself had shared in it: his queen had visited the camp: Vauban, the incomparable engineer, had laid the foundations of his fame. Europe, however, had still to pronounce upon the action.

European
Reactions

Nothing annoyed Louis more than to find that, when he moved, lesser states composed their quarrels to unite against him. Now, however, from Scandinavia to Spain, the public opinion of nations outside France was shocked by her proceedings. The helpless Spaniards declared war. Some Germans renounced their pact with the invader. Opinion in Holland and England forced De Witt and Charles, as early as July, to make the Peace of Breda. Thus New Amsterdam became New York, and Surinam fell to Holland—for fear lest the French should reach the Zuyder Zee, and the English navy fail to hold that of France. The Swedes, too, rallied to the Sea-Powers. A strong coalition, it seemed, might restore to Europe at least the semblance of the rule of law.

Franco-
Austrian
Secret
Treaty,
1668

At this point, however, when the campaign of 1668 was still far away, the Emperor, the indispensable mainstay of such a coalition, suddenly came to terms with France. The initiative, it seems, proceeded from his side, though at Vienna, as elsewhere, Louis had able diplomats to work on rulers simpler than himself. Leopold, imperilled on the side of Hungary and Turkey, threatened by a French candidate for the Polish throne, outwitted by France in his efforts to rouse the Empire, and disheartened by the death of his only son, gave up the struggle, and in January actually signed a secret treaty with the French. This provided for the eventual partition of Spain, if its King should leave no son. In return for the promise of dubious and distant gains, Leopold pledged himself to immediate non-intervention, and accepted Louis' theory of Devolution. Before the second campaign began, therefore, something like a revolution in alliances had taken place.

Thus isolated, Spain in February made peace with the Portuguese, who now secured their independence. By that time, however, the European reaction against Louis was taking shape in the Triple Alliance of England, the Dutch and Sweden. But these powers lacked either the unity or the force to impose their will upon the conqueror. So moderate, indeed, were their proceedings, that some historians have believed that they really favoured France. They could in any case do nothing to check the lightning invasion of Franche Comté by Condé. A fortnight in February sufficed for the conquest of the province.

The thwarted Louis would not forget his betrayal by the Dutch, but for the moment, policy prevailed over passion. Instead of hazarding a great anti-Spanish campaign of 1668, in which he might have fought alone against three considerable powers and several of less importance, Louis accepted the Sea Powers' proffered mediation. He skilfully extracted from them a guarantee that, if Spain refused moderate concessions, they would join him in using force. In May, therefore, by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, France gave up Franche Comté, but retained, and soon fortified, many places on her exposed north-eastern frontier. Bruges and Ghent, Brussels and Namur remained to Spain, but the region which separated the French and Dutch frontiers had been halved by the recent wars.

CHAPTER XX
PROGRESS OF SPAIN, ENGLAND AND THE
DUTCH TO *c.* 1672

AFTER the peace of 1668, Europe, ever more and more influenced by France, approached a phase of history in which the prize came to be the Spanish empire, and the arbiter, Great Britain. In 1672 Louis sought to make himself irresistible by a sudden onslaught on the Dutch, the Pearl Harbour of the seventeenth century. To gain the necessary perspective, we may now briefly review the situation at that juncture through the eyes of Spain, of Britain and of the Dutch.

Spanish
Greatness

A. SPAIN UNDER PHILIP IV (1621-65)

The Spain which made the Twelve Years Truce with Holland (1609), and in the next year piously drove the Moriscos into exile, was, as we have seen, regarded by much of Europe as majestic, mighty and well governed. A powerful and patriotic Council, many held, secured, far better than casual kings and favourites, the abiding greatness of a state. Spain might for a brief period be short of cash, but her vast empire, her monopoly of precious metals and her invincible infantry must in the long run signify prestige and power. The thirty-eight years after Henry's death, however, showed that unworthy kings and ministers could overthrow even Spain. Philip III allowed his devotional instincts to deprive him of capacity to rule, while his favourite, Lerma, wasted or plundered the resources of the state. Before the King died, at forty-three, in 1621, Spain had made a miserable peace in Italy, and had most unwisely plunged into the German religious war. As the Council of Castile had lately insisted, taxation was such that population was declining, while the revenue was being squandered in grants and pensions, and swarms of nobles and clergy,

monks and nuns, merely dissipated the resources of the nation. Such had been the effect of an inadequate king, an unworthy favourite, and, it must be added, a defective public opinion.

Succeeding his father at sixteen, Philip IV was destined to rule for more than forty years (1621-65). The Spanish historian who commended his early essay as worthy of a mature man perhaps ignored certain possibilities of its extraction. But Philip was beyond all question an amiable prince with a taste for learning. It is therefore the more deplorable that he connived at his country's ruin by shirking business, and by allowing Olivarez to steer the state. That ambitious careerist, popular, until he became better known, for modesty, affability, wit and zeal for reform, had gained the young King's favour by unworthy means, and kept it by overthrowing every rival. When he seized power, only the Cardinal's robe saved Lerma's life, and other grandees were exiled or put to death. Retrenchment was practised in the royal household, in the dismissal of superfluous officials, in the reduction of ecclesiastics, and in sumptuary laws to combat luxury. But the reforms proved transient, and the mode of life of both king and minister soon became extravagant. A pamphleteer had the wit to compare Philip 'the Great' to a ditch, since the more one took away from it, the greater it became.

1621—The
New King

Olivarez
and
Richelieu

Meanwhile Olivarez was plunging Spain into an ambitious foreign policy. England was befooled with the pretence of Philip's willingness to arrange a Spanish match. France was insulted by downright bad faith in the question of the Valtelline. This was the more unwise because the submissive instincts of Marie de' Medici towards Spain were yielding to the unflinching steersmanship of Richelieu. Olivarez, indeed, stern, strong-willed and laborious as he was, might have ranked as a great minister if he had not made the greatest of ministers his foe. The bonds which connected Spain and France since their pompous double marriage in 1615, like the Catholic loyalty which they at that time shared, influenced the great Cardinal but little in comparison with French advantage. Judged by that standard, every move of Olivarez seemed to challenge France.

The fact that Anne 'of Austria' was the barren wife of Louis XIII, and Elizabeth of Bourbon Queen of Spain,

Franco-
Spanish
Antagonism

seemed unimportant, indeed, when weighed against the jarring interests of the two great neighbouring powers. Dynastically, they competed for the hand of the future Charles I. They were inevitably rivals in northern Italy, especially in the questions of the Valtelline and of Savoy. From the Basque country to Catalonia their racial difficulties stretched northward across the Pyrenees. To both, sea-power was vital. In the Low Countries, the security of France required that the Dutch rebellion should succeed, and the security of the Spanish Netherlands, that it should fail. From these Netherlands to Franche Comté, the French frontier was studded with Spanish dependencies, which she could not fail to covet, and which threatened or might threaten her safety. When to all this was added the reckless participation by Spain in a Habsburg crusade to transform the Empire, France might well feel that she could not look on unmoved.

For a time, indeed, Spain was shielded against French attack by the inferiority of the French forces, and their preoccupation with the Huguenot War (1625-9). Olivarez, therefore, although embroiled in three campaigns, felt strong enough to proceed with the work of Iberian unification. In Aragon, Valencia and Navarre, he reduced local privilege. With the Basques, however, he was less successful, and in Portugal and Catalonia disaffection was aroused, of which, in later years, France took full advantage. Failure at home, following on conspicuous failure in Savoy, might have enlightened Philip, but he remained unmoved. Spanish pride, religious fatalism and the forcefulness of his minister continued to delude him into an impolicy characteristic of seventeenth-century Spain.

Spain and
the Thirty
Years War

Soon the open clash which Richelieu had long avoided came about. As usual, the many threads of a complex foreign policy could not indefinitely be kept apart. The death of Isabella, one of those popular women rulers who had swayed the history of the Netherlands, was followed by the participation of her successor, Philip's brother, in the campaign against the Swedes and their German fellow members of the Heilbronn League. Nördlingen (September, 1634) effectively replied to Breitenfeld, the equally decisive stroke of three years before. The Spaniards thus shared

in determining that in southern Germany the Catholic Church should remain predominant.

Richelieu's reply to this conspicuous Habsburg triumph could no longer be confined to indirect participation in the war. He continued to check the Spanish Netherlands, indeed, by aiding the Dutch, but he also openly entered the struggle against Spain. Some early success, however, was followed by French reverses, and the war, which Germany was not allowed by France to end, became a grim competition between Spanish and French resources. In Spain, salaries and pensions were cut down and often left unpaid, while taxes were raised and private property exposed to confiscation. She had the satisfaction, in the campaign of 1636, of penetrating France and threatening Paris. But her money, her men and her leaders soon failed, while France, with far greater wealth and population, was ruled by the incomparable Richelieu.

From 1637, therefore, despite some rallying on the part of Spain, the narrative is that of her decline. In 1637 Spanish Decline five theatres of war displayed the superiority of the French and Dutch. Next year, in spite of some success in Italy, her homeland was invaded. Although that French onslaught failed, in 1639 Condé, the Bourbon father of a greater son, at the other end of the Pyrenees was launched against Catalonia. That province, fighting for itself rather than for the detested Castilians, gained a triumph which in part offset Tromp's devastating blow against the Spanish navy. In 1640, moreover, Portugal broke loose, and, as it proved, permanently regained her independence. Spain, in Major Hume's words, was by this time 'a prey to fatalistic despair, sunk into misery by unwise taxation'.

In no sphere, indeed, was Spain less wise and Olivarez more condemnable than in the economic. The precious metals were hers, but they were usually intercepted on the sea before they reached her. Crushing taxation prevented Spaniards from filling the agricultural void left by the Moriscos' extrusion. Spanish manufactures dwindled, and many goods were debarred from importation. The currency and prices were disturbed by the violence of inept decrees. Year after year the cost of war rose to fantastic excess over Spanish financial strength. The revolt of Portugal was

provoked by novel and crushing taxation. The historian must note with amazement that at such a time, with the throne filled by royal devotees, and the Church at once omnipotent and intolerant, the fine arts flourished and Spanish literature enjoyed its golden age. The splendours of the Prado at Madrid, a collection probably unrivalled in the world, afford a reason for the fatal Spanish pride.

Portugal
and
Catalonia

The 'three hours revolt', whereby in 1640 the Portuguese made the wealthy and indolent Duke of Braganza their King John IV, was accompanied by other movements which proved the ill-compacted character of Olivarez' Spain. His own kinsmen strove in vain for sovereignty over an independent Andalusia. The Catalans, who had distinguished themselves against the French invaders, rose in 1640, in a murderous revolt against Castile. When the King quartered troops upon them, the country-folk put the troops and their general to death. Olivarez, having vainly attempted to restore order through a popular Viceroy, invaded Catalonia, both from Saragossa and from Perpignan. The Catalans, however, defeated the northern invaders, and on the side of Aragon secured some help from France. When this was withdrawn (December, 1640), Barcelona bravely continued the revolt, making Louis of France Count of Catalonia. For sixteen years, indeed, the province was rather French than Spanish. In 1641 Olivarez made desperate and not unsuccessful efforts by land and sea to hold it, while Richelieu made it clear that the Catalans themselves must pay for its defence. Fortune fluctuated, but by Michaelmas, 1642, Roussillon had been definitely won by France.

Fall of
Olivarez
and Change
in France,
1643

The defeat proved fatal to Olivarez. The warlike King of France had shared in the campaign, and when French troops invaded Aragon, the warlike King of Spain resolved to take the field. Olivarez, for the first time conspicuously overruled, tried obstruction, and incited Cinq-Mars against the dying Richelieu. All this, together with the complaints of Philip's queen and the obvious misery of the people, shook the minister's hold over his master, and military failure brought about his fall. In January, 1643, he was dismissed from office, and, two years later, died a madman. His successor, for the King soon became no more laborious than before—was his nephew, De Haro, a duller but less

unamiable man. His rule in length approached that of Olivarez, and rivalled it in disaster.

The transition from Olivarez to De Haro coincides with a considerable change in the relations between Spain and France. The war, indeed, continued, but its auspices had suffered alteration. The France of Louis XIII and Richelieu became the France of Anne of Austria, Mazarin and the nascent Fronde. But it was also the France of Enghien (Condé), with Rocroi in 1643 to mark the new superiority of her army over that of Spain. Spanish history displayed the multiple struggle of an overburdened and failing empire against a stronger kingdom, centrally placed and superior by land and sea. Only French faction delayed and attenuated the triumph of Mazarin and his adopted land.

For some years after the fall of Olivarez, Spain held the advantage over France that her king could lead her in the field. But though Philip might evoke a spurt, he could not make the exhausted Spaniards win the race, nor could the Pope by diplomacy bring the French to accept reasonable terms and end the Catalanian war. The piety of both king and country, moreover, was taxed by the deaths in 1644 and 1646 of the Queen and of their only son, whose youth had seemed to promise an admirable reign. In 1647 Philip made his brilliant bastard, Don John, commander by sea and land, and in 1649 espoused a Habsburg bride, his own niece Mariana. The confessor, Father Nithard, who accompanied her from Austria, then gained growing influence in Spanish politics.

Although the negotiations in Westphalia held out some Spanish
Exhaustion hope of relief, the middle 'forties witnessed above all else the exhaustion of Spain. On the frontiers of Portugal, Catalonia and the Low Countries, a continuous struggle must be waged without the necessary funds. Fantastic taxes alienated the people but failed to supply the troops. A characteristic Spanish impost was that which placed the second storey of new houses at the disposal of the King. House-builders, it was calculated, would redeem their property by a payment. In practice, however, they escaped by building one storey only. More significant and tragic were the prohibitions of imports and the actual starvation which decimated several provinces of Spain.

Don John
and Revolt
in Naples,
1647

In July, 1647, Spain was confronted by the sudden revolt in Naples known as the revolution of Masianello. This throws much light on the mind of the masses and on the influence of Spanish war taxation. It arose from a sudden outburst of fury in the market-place against what seemed a tyrannical exaction levied in the Viceroy's name. Hence a demagogue, whom the humbler Neapolitans knew well, soon found himself at the head of a furious band of 15,000 men, with the Viceroy in flight before them. Neither religion nor the distant monarchy seemed to be in any way at stake, and the rebels spent their fury on those connected with the financial demands which menaced their daily food. The personality of Masianello could only deter the local nobles from connecting themselves with a movement led by him, and some even conspired against his life. Within a few days, he became a drunken tyrant, massacring his enemies and terrifying the Viceroy into promises of self-government which could not possibly receive fulfilment. A fortnight after the outbreak, however, on the morrow of his foul official murder, he had become a popular saint. Then, led by a time-serving noble, the revolt widened its area and its programme alike, so that the royal bastard, Don John, must bring to Naples a strong fleet and some 5,000 men.

Spanish violence now turned the rebels against the Crown. They slew or put to flight the army of Don John, chose a blacksmith as their leader, and in October, 1647, made Naples a republic. For some four months, the rebels based their hopes on France, and found a Doge in Henry, Duke of Guise, who aimed at independence. Mazarin, of course, could only turn away from such eccentric policy. Early in 1649 Don John restored the authority, and even the popularity, of Spanish monarchy in Naples.

Peace with
the Dutch,
1648

Meanwhile, fluctuating fortunes, but on the whole a downward trend, had still been the lot of Spain. In January, 1648, indeed, by a bitter sacrifice of her prestige, she averted a catastrophe in the north. To guard themselves against French ambition, the Dutch were eager that the Netherlands should not suffer conquest by France, and, if only Spain would abandon the theory that they were rebels, they had many reasons for becoming her real friends. At Münster, therefore, they broke faith with their ally, and by a definite

treaty ended a war begun in 1572. In making that treaty, Philip IV abandoned what his father and grandfather had bequeathed to him as a sacred duty. The great European settlement of Westphalia could not be shared by Spain, since concession to France was still unthinkable. But although her Habsburg kinsman had laid down his arms, the Spanish loss was outweighed by the gain from a France distracted by the Fronde. With Mazarin a fugitive and Turenne fighting on her side, Spain could even regain some of the fortresses captured from her by the French.

The Spanish advantage grew greater when the 'great' ^{Gains from the Fronde} Condé, the Enghien of Rocroi and later viceroy in Catalonia, actually became their commander in the Netherlands. In 1654 conquests there more than atoned for the loss by Spain of Bordeaux, but the secession of the still greater Turenne reversed the balance. In 1655, however, a treacherous onslaught by Cromwell's fleet, which gained Jamaica, showed that Spain had a new and dangerous foe. Next year, indeed, Condé and Don John, now viceroy, routed Turenne and relieved Valenciennes, which he had been besieging, but 6,000 Englishmen marched to his aid. From 1656 peace negotiations accompanied successful campaigning against Spain by the French and English. A substantial German force came to the relief of Philip, but the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) exempted it from going into action.

The strenuous negotiation of the Peace was followed by ^{Peace of the Pyrenees} that marriage between Louis XIV and the Infanta which was designed to secure lasting concord in western Europe. If Spain and France could remain united, who, indeed, could attack them? Habsburg family ties, moreover, would tend to widen this league for peace. A preface and an epilogue to the agreement were furnished by the problems of Portugal and Catalonia. The Portuguese, now ruled in the name of the boy-king Alfonso VI (1656-67), by his vigorous Spanish mother, had taken the offensive and routed De Haro, when he strove to relieve Badajoz (January, 1658). Three years later, when Spain could concentrate upon Iberia, Don John invaded Portugal from the east, while a second army threatened her from the north. But English co-operation, the fruit of Charles' Braganza marriage, foiled the attempt, and at this point De Haro died.

Portuguese
Campaigns

For a moment, indeed, it seemed that a Portuguese civil war might frustrate the efforts of the coalition. The Queen-Mother was driven from power, and Don John advanced to menace Lisbon. In June, 1663, however, he was routed, and fled to Badajoz. Two years later, under another commander, the Spaniards attacked again, and their overthrow by the allies hastened the death of Philip (September, 1665). It was characteristic of Spanish impolicy and pride that Spain was once again uniting with the Emperor against the Turks. While the French King meditated a new stroke in Flanders, the Spaniards could plume themselves only upon the fact that, after a protracted trial, the Catalans seemed to find their rule more tolerable than the rule of France.

B. ENGLAND

The appointed limits of our survey exclude a narrative of British history on the same scale as continental. Cromwell, however, had ended the absorption of this country in its own affairs. As in effect a military monarchy, and as a rebel state menaced from the Continent by a hereditary king, England must play a part which compels a brief survey of the previous generation.

Insularity

Considered as a constituent state of Europe, England in 1610 had by no means found her destined place. Some factors in her career, indeed, had been determined, and others were then taking shape, but that was all. The dominant fact, at least from the eleventh to the nineteenth century, was that Britain was an island. The 50,000 square miles south of the Cheviots were so near to the European mainland as to be spiritually inseparable from it, but so far away as to secure for them a civilization of their own. Henry VIII had been justified in claiming that England was 'an independent Empire'. Though a population perhaps a third or a quarter of the French, with the attitude of the Scots and Irish doubtful, might suffer yet another conquest, 1066 had in fact found no successor when the Armada sailed.

The five generations which preceded 1610 had done much to link England with the Continent, but also much to strengthen her independence. The Hundred Years War had seen an English empire rise and fall in France. Although

our kings retained the French title, that age-long chimaera ceased to trouble us. The Wars of the Roses showed the need for a strong central government, and this the Tudors furnished and maintained. The outcome of the English Reformation was both to strengthen insularity, for the Establishment was unique, and to afford religious reasons for extended intercourse with Europe. Jesuit activity and papal power threatened both England and several Continental States, while subversive religious sects were the enemies of every power. Meanwhile, as Hansards, wool-traders, companies, interlopers and explorers showed, England was sharing in the new activities of commercial Europe.

Since 1579, when the Dutch republic came into view, a hail of great events had deluged western Europe. The murder of William the Silent, the undaunted struggle of the Dutch, the violent convulsions in France, the tragedy of Mary, Queen of Scots, the menacing predominance of Spain, the advent of great Popes, of Jesuit missions, of far-famed explorers, of Drake and Raleigh, Elizabeth and Shakespeare—all these, with revolutions also in northern and eastern Europe, dazzled the denizen of a fast-changing world. The verdict of the Armada, however, was confirmed by after-history. Great men arose in France and Holland, while English prestige and power were ripened and enriched by time. When the Virgin Queen died, her subjects were ready to maintain the new place of England in the world.

James I, an unattractive foreigner with a foreign queen, could not, in that monarchic age, leave England unaffected. Proclaimed as King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, he was bound to be a considerable factor in them all. In France, of course, his influence arose, not from the empty title, but from the common interest between two neighbouring states both gravely threatened by Spain. Since Philip III was the ineffective son of an aggressive father, and England made peace with him in 1604, the strongest bond between the French and English remained until 1609 their common interest in the Dutch. Although King James had abandoned the rebels in 1604, the nation as a whole was on their side. The two powers joined as mediators to end the Dutch-Spanish struggle, and they united in a formal alliance with the Dutch for the duration of the twelve years truce. Since

England
and Europe
since 1579

England
and France

the militant Catholicism which inspired the Jesuits and Guy Fawkes was the bugbear of Protestant England, while in 1610 Henry had become the ally of the German Protestant Union, collaboration between France and England might appear secure. His death, it seemed, could not greatly change the interests which dictated their *entente*. Within a few years, none the less, his unstatesmanlike widow had shown what risks irresponsible monarchy could bring upon a nation. A double marriage linked the thrones of France and Spain, and, if King James could have had his way, the throne of Spain would have been also linked with that of England. Scotland had indeed 'imposed a burden upon England by giving her a king'. In 1610 the Parliament found itself angrily dissolved.

Monarchy
in England

Neither King nor Parliament, however, could be wholly supreme over the English nation. On March 21, 1610, the King had expounded to the Lords and Commons of his Parliament the theory and practice of monarchy. 'I am now', he declared, 'an old king; for six and thirty years have I governed in Scotland personally, and now have I accomplished my apprenticeship of seven years here, . . . I must not be taught my Office.' That office, as he held, was to exercise, in accordance with the laws, the power bestowed on him by God.

'The state of monarchy', he believed and said, 'is the supremest thing upon earth. For kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself [in the Scriptures] they are called gods. . . . They make and unmake their subjects; they have power of raising and casting down, of life and death, judges over all their subjects and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God only. . . . To the King is due both the affection of the soul and the service of the body of his subjects.'

Claims of
James I

This comprehensive commission from on high James further fortified by claiming that the Law of Nature bestowed upon his ancestors hereditary paternal power. He could therefore dispose as he pleased of his inheritance among his children, that is, among his subjects. But 'even as God, during the time of the Old Testament, spake by oracles and wrought by miracles', but, when the Church of Christ was established, both ceased, and He governed within the limits of His revealed will, so was it also with kings. At first, 'when some had their beginning by conquest and some

by election of the people, their wills at that time served for law'. When the kingdoms became settled, however, 'then did kings set down their mind by laws, which are properly made by the king only, but at the roagation of the people'.

Kings who transgress the laws, declared James, will be punished by God; 'the higher we are placed, the greater shall our fall be'. No Christian man ought to tolerate rebellion, but divines may lawfully discuss what God desires. 'I will not be content that my power be disputed upon; but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my laws.'

Parliament could not be equally outspoken, but it was not likely to receive with meekness such doctrines from beyond the Tweed. The ever-famous collision between king and people fills the next fourscore years, and governs foreign policy throughout our period. For us the work and fame of Macaulay, Gardiner, Churchill and Trevelyan, with not a few accessible lieutenants, make no more than a brief general survey indispensable and enable us to place it here.

England
under the
Stuarts

While the first two Stuarts reigned, the foreign policy of England must depend on the fortune of the ever-growing struggle between public opinion and the authoritarian king. The 'nation', embodied in the squirearchy and City, was eager to defend the Protestant cause in Europe. To King James, however, royal authority ranked first, and he was no crusader. War demanded money, of which the spendthrift monarch usually had none. To gain the sinews of war, he must call a parliament and rule in accordance with its wishes, rather than with the promptings of his native wisdom. By 1610 he had brought himself to bargain away for £200,000 yearly what he claimed as his royal rights, but Parliament had become intolerable, and the bargain failed. The rift in the machinery of government was never really healed.

The marriage of a king's children, though vital to policy, remained the least assailable of royal rights, and James strongly favoured a union with Spain. Although stiffly Catholic, Spain was the most dignified of monarchies, and, in James' view, by far the greatest power. In Spain, the King chose what minister he pleased, and was free to throw the burden of government upon him. Allied with Spain, James might maintain peace in Germany, and dispense

with the summons of a parliament. The scheme, fantastic as it was, confined the English aid of his Palatine son-in-law to such volunteers as chose to cross the sea, and the Palatinate was lost in 1623. Next year brought the inevitable breach with Spain, followed by an approach to France. Thus Charles began his reign by espousing a French princess and pledging England to pay a monthly subsidy to Christian of Denmark. For a moment King and Parliament were at one in aiding the opponents of the militant Catholic powers.

England
and the
Thirty Years
War

The year 1626, however, witnessed great Protestant reverses in Germany, and the failure of a Huguenot rising in France. The rising, which was soon renewed, broke the concord between England and France, and in 1627 substituted a war between them. But the next year revealed the truth—that the English nation cared more for its own liberties than for those of foreign Protestants, whether French or German. Thus the overthrow of the Danes, the Huguenots and the German insurgents in 1629 coincided with Charles' autocratic rule and its corollary, a peace with France. Peace with Spain followed (1630). Now that the Catholics seemed to have won the German war, England stood aside, and ceased to have an effective foreign policy. Even Gustavus could not draw them in.

The next eight years (1631–8), forming one-half of Charles I's effective reign, were spent in alienating both Scots and English. While the Germans strove to end their war, and Richelieu to prolong and spread it, men in Scotland, and then in England, took up arms in defence of freedom. Only from Ireland could Charles count on aid. He won some minor battles, but the main strength in Britain was wielded by the Parliament, until, in 1648, Cromwell's army gained control. While the European struggles ended by exhausting Germany and Spain, France fell into civil war and Cromwell mastered the British Isles. Four years of the Fronde enabled the Spaniards once again to take the aggressive (1652).

Cromwell
and Europe

It was impossible, however, that the English Commonwealth should stand aloof from Europe. Much of the Continent held Cromwell a murderous usurper, and in Jersey Charles II posed as king. The victors in the civil war must therefore make themselves so strong that neither

foreign ill-will nor British disaffection could displace them. Cromwell's matchless army, tinged as it was with fanaticism, must be made invincible by the addition of great naval power, and, if possible, of powerful allies. Ironsides must rule or expect extermination.

That was the situation which, in the year of Prince Charles' defeat at Worcester (1651), prompted Cromwell's invitation to the Dutch to effect a union of the two nations. Refusal, like that of France in 1940, forced them to fight on alone. The Navigation Acts, destined to become the founda-
The Navigation Acts
 tion-stone of our commercial empire, stood for an aggressive policy at sea, which in 1652 involved the two Protestant republics in a murderous two-years struggle. As might be expected, however, war served to enlarge and train the fleet, and to promote that autocracy tempered by a species of parliament which served Cromwell until his death (September 3, 1658) on the seventh anniversary of Worcester.

The Lord Protector gained the plenitude of power in 1653, when Mazarin and Turenne proved triumphant over the Fronde and Spain. Next year, by the unscrupulous diplomacy of John de Witt, the House of Orange, kinsmen of the Stuarts, were for ever debarred from quasi-monarchy over the Dutch. England was united with Scotland and Ireland, and her Parliament docked of its Opposition. When Spain refused to gain our alliance at the price of toleration for English visitors and freedom for trade with the West Indies, she found her overseas possessions attacked by an English fleet. Sweden, on the eve of a fresh outburst by
English Naval Power
 her new king, Charles X, was courted, and Denmark forbidden to close the Sound. In 1655 this active policy brought us a varied harvest—Jamaica and the Major-Generals, the infiltration of the Jews, the chastisement of the Barbary pirate-powers, and a commercial and military league with France.

The Anglo-French treaty of Westminster (November, 1655) had many and weighty consequences for Europe. Conceding the toleration refused by Spain, and, at Cromwell's instance, forcing Savoy to spare the Vaudois, Mazarin rendered France a natural ally for Protestants. England secured the reversion of Dunkirk, a Channel fortress of vast importance. Charles II, the son of a French-born

queen, must quit his French asylum. Thus at a time when, with Condé's aid, the Spaniards were often superior to the French, Spain was brought to declare war on England. In 1656 this cost her part of her treasure-fleet near Cadiz, and next year a severe defeat off Teneriffe. A solid English force helped to take Mardyck, and, in 1658, Turenne's victory gained Dunkirk for England.

So matters stood when Cromwell died. He had made England a great European power at the price of alienating the majority of her people from his rule. Even under his weak son Richard, she joined with the French and Dutch in dictating to the conqueror of Denmark, Charles X (May, 1659). Then, however, all unity was lost. While factions fought for power, an effective foreign policy became impossible. This paralysis of England synchronized with a forward march by France. While gaining influence in the north, Mazarin was building up her Rhenish League in Germany, and bringing to a triumphant close her long-drawn strife with Spain. French territorial gains at the Peace of the Pyrenees (November, 1659) were followed by a marriage between Louis XIV and the Infanta in the following June. Although his queen had renounced the Spanish succession, the young King might count on making France rich and powerful in a circle of friendly states.

The
Restoration

Under such conditions, in a Europe simplified by the death of Charles X (February, 1660), the Stuart Restoration took place. When Louis espoused his Spanish bride, Charles had already entered London. The national delight was renewed for centuries on May 29, the date of his arrival, by the wearing of 'Royal Oak', the leaves which had concealed him after Worcester. Soon a Royalist parliament pronounced war against the King unlawful, and confined municipal office to Anglican communicants. At the same time episcopacy was restored in Scotland. Nation and King rejoiced in their new-found unity. In 1662 the Act of Uniformity forced hundreds of Presbyterian ministers to leave the English Church.

Subservience
to France

Signs soon appeared, however, that in foreign policy England must follow France. The disbandment of the army, though necessary to emancipate the King, could not strengthen his hands in any foreign contest. The marriages

between Charles' sister and Louis' brother, and between Charles himself and a Portuguese *protégée* of France, drew closer the link between the two courts. Their association could not be that of equals. While Louis had claimed for himself the authority that Mazarin had built up, and had established the docile Colbert in place of Fouquet, Charles was soon to find that, though his words might be his own, his deeds were dictated by his ministers. In revenue, Louis was undisputed lord of a great income, while Charles was always poor. For the quarter-century in which the restored monarch reigned, France, with three or four times our population, steadily rose in power, while Charles, bankrupt and secretly anti-Anglican, became more and more dependent on her king.

In this strange fashion, England became a kind of arbiter ^{Then} of Europe. If the King of France could be assured even of ^{Arbitrament} her connivance, he could act as a European Caesar. Fate ^{of Europe} gave to a Dutch prince the destiny of leading an English revolt against such an anomaly, and of preparing the long contest which rendered such Caesarism impossible. Our long wars on land brought priceless opportunities of advancement overseas, and left Britain far superior to any other naval power. Thus, 'in a fit of absence of mind', a few million islanders prepared an unrivalled empire.

C. THE DUTCH

In 1672, as we have seen, the power of Louis XIV and the feebleness of almost all the other states encouraged him to force a solution of the great question of the Netherlands in his own favour. To make first the United Provinces and then the rest of the seventeen his clients or his own domain was neither a slight nor an impossible undertaking. To estimate the chances, we must follow the fortunes of the Netherlands since the conclusion of peace in 1648.

To the native historian of the Low Countries, the ^{The} severance of Holland from Belgium then authorized must ^{Seventeen} always be a source of regret. The ^{Provinces} seventeen Provinces, with their wealth and enterprise, their vigorous and fertile population, and their obvious need of union against more spacious states, might perhaps have lived through modern

history as an important independent power. The early nineteenth century, indeed, proved that by 1815 they had lost the will to be reunited. The twentieth finds the religious-minded Dutch with perhaps as many Catholics as Protestants, while in Catholic Belgium, it is said, the racial cleavage is so deep that in the first World War Flemings and Walloons must occupy alternate stations in a military trench. Such are the fruits of separation.

North
and South,
1648-72

The abiding division between north and south owes much to the twenty years which followed the peace of 1648. While Holland then secured her independence, the Spain which had purchased peace with her by sacrificing the sea-power and the trade of Antwerp, kept 'Belgium' as a helpless dependency during the last decade of her war with France. These southern Netherlands, without political initiative of their own, served merely to distract some part of the French war effort, and, at the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), to win relief for Spain by ceding territories to her opponent. Nine years later, at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668), half a dozen still more famous towns went the same way. Throughout our period, the Belgic Provinces were to remain an almost passive prize.

Dutch
Zenith

'The country of herrings, artists and philosophers', on the other hand, finds in these same twenty years the zenith of its great career. The Fronde, the 'Great Rebellion', the decline of Spain, the exhaustion of the Empire, the Christina episode in Sweden—this manifold paralysis of Europe favoured the amazing progress of the triumphant Dutch. That monarchic element which was necessary to make one harmonious country out of seven discordant provinces seemed to be assured when in 1647 the most brilliant of Orange stadholders, Frederick Henry, was succeeded by William II, his son. It was perhaps ominous that this young and soldierly prince resented the peace with Spain, and even dreamed of an alliance with France to partition Belgium and restore Charles II, his wife's brother, to the English throne. The peace, however, inevitably brought the Dutch demobilization, and revived the anti-monarchic party of States'-rights. In November, 1650, before the birth of his son, later William III, while Amsterdam was already reviving the old disputes, William II died.

Death of
William II

Only a few months before his untimely death, Prince William had asserted his almost monarchical authority by a successful *coup d'état*. Now there was no ruler who could guide the Dutch in solving their most pressing problems—their constitution and the hostility of England. Early in 1651 a Grand Assembly, specially convened, reconstructed the state as a confederation. The post of Captain-General was abolished, and five Provinces dispensed with any stadholder. In the peculiar circumstances of the federation, this meant that Holland ruled the others by her weight and herself was guided by the aristocratic councils of her towns. Two years later the resultant anarchy was checked by the rise of young John de Witt, a 'Grand Pensionary' whose ability and energy soon made him the dominant factotum of the Republic (1653-72).

Rise of
de Witt ;
Wars with
England

Meanwhile, in March, 1651, Cromwell, whom many Dutchmen regarded as an assassin, attempted to abolish the long-standing rivalry with England by substantially uniting the two Protestant commercial republics into one. The rejection of his proposals by the Dutch was followed by the famous Navigation Act (October, 1651), a deadly blow aimed at their carrying trade, and an aid to the advancement of their saviour, John de Witt. Earnest negotiations failed to avert the Anglo-Dutch naval war of May, 1652, to April, 1654, a desperate struggle comprising a dozen major battles. In it Tromp perished but Ruyter remained, while Blake and Monk made names worthy of their great opponents. The struggle proved that England had by far the greater power of inflicting damage, and de Witt exceeded his powers in negotiating for the necessary peace.

Aided by Cromwell's accession as Lord Protector, and by an outstanding act of sharp practice in negotiation, de Witt successfully ended the war. The Treaty of Westminster (1654) bound the Dutch to strike their flag in the 'English seas', and to satisfy English claims by payment for past offences. The humiliating demand that they should permanently exclude the child William from the highest offices, indeed, deeply wounded Dutch pride. De Witt, however, saw that peace was necessary and excused his tortuous diplomacy with some success. His courtesy, their own restored prosperity, and his manifest skill in retrench-

ment won over many critics, and his own relatives and admirers constantly strengthened his position. In a few years he became the most influential of historic Dutchmen in his fatherland.

Dutch and
Sweden

Dutch unity, however, remained essential. Although Spain had not regained her strength, and France was not yet dangerous, the peril from England cou'd not be wholly dispelled. Her interests and those of the Republic clashed in too many fields. Immediately, however, it was conflicts in South America and in the Baltic that drove the Dutch to war. De Witt could not ignore the Portuguese aggression against his country's stations in Brazil, and in 1657 he had recourse to hostilities, gaining Macassar and Ceylon. Meanwhile the abdication of Christina paved the way for the adventurous policy of Charles X. The omnipotence which that young king sought in Scandinavia and beyond the Baltic cut right across the wonted course of Dutch commerce, and although he had the support of Brandenburg, de Witt intervened to rescue Danzig. Again, however, Charles moved and laid Denmark low, and in a second Suedo-Danish war the Dutch saved Copenhagen. When Charles, beaten at sea, expired (February, 1660), de Witt, by adroit diplomacy and sea power, had prevented the closing of the Sound.

Immediately afterwards, it became necessary for the Dutch to conciliate the restored Charles II. By removing the ban on his nephew, William of Orange, and by quitting Brazil to please his Portuguese wife, de Witt conciliated the English King and retained the Dutch conquests in the East Indies. At the same time he negotiated a close alliance with France (April, 1662). But the Navigation Act, the English claims to rule the seas, and all manner of 'incidents' remained to nourish further strife with England. De Witt, however, made every effort to prolong the peace, to strengthen the fleet, and, when war was forced upon them, to animate the nation.

Treaty of
Breda, 1667

From the outbreak of war in March, 1665, to the Peace of Breda in July, 1667, a desperate struggle between the Dutch and English fleets continued. It was accompanied in the autumn of 1665 by the Bishop of Münster's invasion, which de Witt repelled by hiring mercenaries and by securing help from France. At sea, although the balance of success

inclined to England, Ruyter's spectacular blow at Chatham conquered peace. By the Breda treaty, the Navigation Act was so far relaxed that the Dutch might carry German and 'Belgian' goods to England, while overseas they renounced New Netherland, but kept Surinam. The province of Holland immediately took steps to guard against any future quasi-monarchy of William. These included the abolition of its own stadholdership.

When peace was made at Breda, Louis XIV was already subjugating Belgium. Even the pro-French de Witt, however, could not endorse so dangerous an outcome of the War of Devolution. Powerless to avert it by diplomacy, he formed with Temple's aid the Triple Alliance of January, 1668. The union, under skilful and determined leadership, of England, the Dutch and Sweden helped to give Louis pause, and the little republic showed natural pride in this unexampled success. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, however, which left the King Franche Comté and many captured towns, was attended by a result of still greater import: his resolve to level Holland with the dust.

The spring of 1672, therefore, brought a catastrophe as terrible as it was sudden. After the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (May, 1668), Louis' first move had been to detach, if possible, Holland's partners from the Triple Alliance. Even without French diplomatic poison, the English nation resented the humiliation in the Medway and the inevitable friction overseas, while Charles II had many grounds for supporting the French King. In 1670 the secret treaty of Dover pledged the Stuart to join in the coming attack, while the aristocratic regents in Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg proved susceptible to Louis' offers. The avalanche, in short, was poised by Louis with the utmost care.

Among the Dutch, the four years' interval brought not a little change. Some merchants in every land will always sell munitions to a prospective enemy, and Louis XIV was armed in part by Dutchmen. A commercial state, moreover, can seldom be induced not to disarm, and the Dutch were a confederation, with the natural tendency of every member to leave sacrifice to the rest. De Witt could scrutinize and animate the fleet, but outside his own Province he could do little in the army. Unduly blamed for the sufferings of the

last war, he had been perhaps over-caressed for the triumphant peace, and so it might be again.

William III

A new war, however, would find a novel and unpredictable factor in that 'Child of the State' who had now grown into a cold and sickly man. Since his legal majority at eighteen (1668), the impenetrable Prince William had made it clear that he was not without ambition, but that he possessed a self-control not less than that of Louis. The natural effect of his advent in the world of politics was to revive the Orange party and to establish a potential rival to de Witt in public life. In February, 1672, even before first England and then France declared war, the young prince became Captain-General of the Union.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GREAT ELECTOR

FEW men have better illuminated the seventeenth century, and few indeed have influenced more the future of Germany and of the world than the Hohenzollern at Berlin whom history knows as the Great Elector. His chief descendant, the Frederick whom all style 'the Great', paid a just tribute after gazing on his remains—'Shut up the coffin; he has done great deeds.'

Born in 1620, the year when 'the Winter King' acquired that name, Frederick William had a hereditary interest in the cause of the Elector Palatine, for his mother was Frederick's sister. Birth also connected him with William the Silent, and the link between Brandenburg and the Dutch was strengthened by the common Calvinism of the Orange and Hohenzollern Houses. All this helped to make Frederick William a student at Leyden and a disciple of Frederick Henry, under whom the Republic reached its golden age. The outcome was a Dutch influence which may be traced throughout his life, not least in his stern resolve to countenance no Dutch provincial liberties among his people. But building, industry, commerce and even colonization were commended to him by what his own eyes had seen in Holland, and the vital part that Brandenburg played in our Glorious Revolution owed much to this lifelong friendship. After a notable project for a marriage with the Swedish Queen, Christina, had foundered, in part on the rock of conflicting interests in Pomerania, he espoused in 1646 Louisa Henrietta, eldest daughter of the Prince of Orange. The memory of his jarring relations with his father and his father's Catholic counsellor, Schwarzenberg, and his lack of brothers or other near kinsmen, naturally increased the political influence of a wife to whom Frederick William was always faithful.

Career of
Frederick
William

Branden-
burg, c. 1640

When, at twenty, the future Great Elector succeeded (December, 1640), he found his authority small, and his dominions wellnigh ruined. The duchy of Prussia, a Polish fief, indeed, had served his father as a refuge. But its people were combative Lutherans, who looked to their nobles and to the Catholic King of Poland rather than to the Calvinist Elector. The war had cost Brandenburg proper some two-thirds of her population. Half the villages were destroyed, and the countryside could not support the electoral army of less than 5,000 men. It was idle to look for succour to the other three groups of the Hohenzollern territories, Ravensberg, Cleves and Mark, each with a dubious future, or to any foreign ally. 'Shall we not end by having a landless Lord?' wrote a Brandenburg statesman.

The young Elector, indeed, was driven to trust almost entirely to his own industry and courage, his conspicuous sense of what was practicable, and his resolve to be hampered by few scruples in its attainment. Anger may indeed be temporary madness, but Frederick William, for the most part his own diplomatist, turned his facile fury to excellent account. He was at least a sincere and tolerant Christian, and he made no pretence of seeking the well-being of states which God had not committed to his rule.

The Brandenburg past, indeed, offered significant hints to an ambitious Elector. The Marks, or marches, five in number, of which his central land-mass was made up, namely the 'Middlemarch' which included Berlin, flanked by the 'old' and the 'new' Marks and approaching Stettin and Schwerin with the Uckermarch on both banks of the Ucker, and Priegnitz,—these were somewhat dreary and sterile portions of a sandy plain abounding in lakes and forests, and well-endowed only with waterways. Berlin, it was said of old, was by nature, above all, the best of burying-grounds. The lack of natural frontiers suggested territorial aggression, and the hint was emphasized by the ancient struggle of the Germans with the native Slavs, to which many Slavonic place-names, as well as the marriage customs of Berlin, bore their witness. The German victory was attested by the survival in Brandenburg of whole communities of Slavs, and by the marked docility of the assimilated population.

In the seventeenth century, moreover, the deaths of several rulers contributed to the aggrandizement of the main Hohenzollern line. Thanks to the extinction of the Cleves-Julich dynasty, the Elector's claim to the succession was honoured in 1614 by temporary cessions which included Cleves, a duchy comprising both the town of that name, and, on the Rhine, the right-bank fortress of Wesel. The Reformation, secularizing the ecclesiastical estates of a missionary Order, had given a branch of the family eastern or ducal Prussia as a Polish fief. This branch died out, and in 1618 the Elector became the Polish vassal, with Königsberg (Kaliningrad in 1946) as his Prussian capital. Among Hohenzollern covenants of mutual inheritance, that with the Duke of Pomerania had promised a vast north-eastern expansion to the Baltic, if and when Duke Bogislav XIV should die childless, as he did in 1637.

To name these territories in 1640 is to indicate the prodigious burden which must be borne by the young Elector. Most visible and vital was the clash of interest with Sweden, involving the coastline from west of Stralsund to east of Königsberg. At the same time, the Cleves inheritance embroiled weak Brandenburg in the complex which comprised France and the Dutch, the Netherlands and Spain, together with many Germans. Lying between the eastern and western systems, she was sure of the ill-will of either Saxony or Austria, and probably of both. Her assets were a dubious trio,—obvious weakness, which not seldom brings endowment, when the strong cannot agree on the division of the spoil; Protestantism, when many powers were Protestant in faith or policy; and the untried political gifts of Frederick William.

Before the eight years had passed which separated the Westphalian peace from his accession, the Elector had shown himself a resolute, devoted and versatile politician. From his dominant and unsentimental egotism, Brandenburg had already gained many and diverse advantages. An admirable consort, dignified, able and maternal, well-managed friendly relations with Poland and avoidance of a chimaerical quest by the Elector for her throne, skilful conduct of the difficult negotiations with Sweden, and movement towards an alliance with that rival power, as

Growth of
Branden-
burg

Frederick
William and
the War

well as bargains with Denmark in the interest of the Brandenburg navy of the future, plans for a Saxon alliance and for a new league of Protestant princes, and firm refusal to replace Bavaria as an Imperial ally—all these had taught both Germans and foreigners to think of the Elector and the electorate as considerable. But when the Emperor's spokesman appealed to German nationalism, the Elector remembered the Catholic view that faith need not be kept with heretics. Meanwhile each of his possessions westward of the Mark was in itself an active 'question', and controversy with Neuburg regarding Cleves-Jülich inevitably involved negotiation with the French.

From the spring of 1645, moreover, the Elector's representatives were constantly negotiating in Westphalia. His stubborn insistence upon either the whole of Pomerania or gigantic compensation for a part, made him a conspicuous nuisance to the congress, but the Swedes, though less consistent, proved hardly less exacting. Brandenburg silver, it was said, influenced their representatives, while Frederick William's apparent readiness to prolong or to rekindle the war was far from ineffectual. His uncompromising claim for religious equality between Calvinists and Lutherans left its mark upon the peace, while his genuine desire for a united Evangelical communion suggested what was not in fact accomplished until 1817.

Post-war
Branden-
burg

In the final stage of the war, the Elector stood firmly by the Emperor, but his spoils came largely from the hand of Mazarin, who arranged the peace. However gained, Brandenburg emerged from the congress with an area almost half as large again as before the war. In Cammin, Halberstadt, Minden and the reversion of Magdeburg she had acquired rich territories which helped her towards continuity of frontier, and offset her failure to appropriate the best of Pomerania. She was now the most spacious state in Germany, with a foothold on every great German river except the Danube, and with a strong and abiding impulse to gain more. Leadership of the Protestants, moreover, was now ascribed to the Elector. It might be ominous, indeed, that much of his achievement had been due to the French and Dutch, that, apart from jealous German princes, Sweden, Poland and the Emperor were all dissatisfied, and

that, near his western dominions, the war between France and Spain went on. Several lines of policy lay open, but none could win the Elector's frank adherence. For some seven years, while the Swedes slowly withdrew, and the vast work of restoring Germany began, Frederick William committed himself to no political system. He had discovered able ministers, Schwerin most noteworthy among them, but no ruler was ever more resolutely or completely master in his own house.

The crisis came in 1655, when the new warrior-King of Sweden, a German no less obstinate than the Elector, flung his army into the complex problem of Poland and her neighbouring states. Charles X, like Frederick William, had vainly wooed his cousin, Queen Christina, but in June, 1654, her abdication brought him the Swedish Crown. To enjoy it to the full, he must escape from constitutional tutelage, and follow the warlike example of the great Gustavus. The Polish Vasa, of whom the weak John Casimir (1648-68) now reigned, gave him the opening that he desired by protesting against his accession, although the Republic was at grips with Cossack rebellion and tsarist intrigue. Ambitious to hasten the great forward movement which had already brought Sweden an empire, Charles espoused the daughter of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and, at the other end of his south Baltic coastline, sought mastery over at least a part of Prussia.

The truce between Sweden and Poland would not expire until 1661, but the obvious appetite of Charles for conquests forced the Elector, with his far inferior forces, into a painful situation. Between his own newly-won eastern Pomerania and his duchy of East Prussia lay Polish or 'Royal' western Prussia, comprising Danzig and the outflow of the Vistula. The Swedes, if handled judiciously, might well attack Poland there, and from them a serviceable ally should make some gain. But they were known to covet what the Elector held in both Pomerania and Prussia, and, as masters of Danzig and beyond, they would be far more dangerous than before. East Prussia, moreover, was a Polish country, often ill-disposed towards a Calvinist Elector, and exposed to Muscovite intrusion. Once lost, it might never be regained.

The immediate course for Brandenburg seemed to be,

if possible, to dissuade the Swedes from war, but to arm in expectation of its outbreak. Should neutrality prove impracticable, alliance with Sweden seemed most likely to yield a profit. Neither Polish Catholicism nor the excellent relations between the Elector and the Polish King appeared to influence the choice of policy. It was supported by the recklessness of the Poles, who, amid their Muscovite and Cossack wars, made extravagant demands on Sweden.

Bases of
Electoral
Policy

A considerable factor in the policy of Frederick William, both then and in the future, was his distrust of his own nobles. In Cleves and Mark, the Estates had behaved as though they, not he, ruled the country. A small war in Berg and Jülich in 1651 had proved the Elector isolated and far from overwhelming, while the Estates of Brandenburg claimed that his policy should be submitted to themselves. Neighbouring princes intervened, and the Emperor demanded that peace should be restored. With no prospect of victory, Frederick William was forced to comply.

What the Elector sought, long unsuccessfully, was a powerful and trustworthy ally. Spain, of course, was inaccessible, and he was determined not to become a satellite of France. Thanks to the provincial independence of Holland, his Orange connexion brought him the suspicion of the Dutch. Their fears for their Baltic trade, however, prompted an eight years' pact, in August, 1655. This led Frederick William, although pro-Stuart, into closer relations with the Commonwealth. The Emperor, on the other hand, was unimpressed by Brandenburg acquiescence in the eventual succession of his son, while the new Duke of Neuburg proved more hostile than the old. Yet the Elector was able to check the designs of Austria for monarchic unity in the Empire, and so gained the reputation of a defender of German liberties. When Charles X plunged northern Europe into war, Frederick William had become a far greater prince than in 1648. He was now to prove himself, for almost as long a time, a political egotist so penetrating, adroit and callous as to compensate for the weakness of his country.

The Elector
and the
Swedish War

The story of how, amid the tornado of contending forces, the Elector skipped coolly from side to side and emerged the master of his dominions and sovereign in East Prussia—this inspiring saga of modern Germany must be only

briefly told. The work was aided by an active team of electoral diplomats, and by a brave and well-found army 27,000 strong. It was preceded by a vigorous and wide-ranging dispute with Sweden as to the terms on which Brandenburg would sell Poland, her overlord and friend, and by negotiations with the Poles which placed in the Elector's hands much of what Charles X most desired. At the close of 1655, Frederick William stood on the very verge of war with Sweden, which then seemed to have conquered Poland. Neither the Protestant nor the Catholic powers, however, would furnish him with an ally, and the Muscovites constituted a peril unrelieved by prospect of profit. He was saved by an almost miraculous Polish rising against the Swedish invaders, and 1656 began with their purchase of his alliance. The treaty of Königsberg then made him the vassal of Charles X for East Prussia and for Ermeland (Warmia), a bishopric which the Swedes now detached from Poland.

Frederick William, the favourite of the Sea Powers, had thus secured himself against immediate attack by the overwhelming army which had crossed the Baltic, but which might not always command the crossing. He had injured Poland, an embarrassed power which might well be on the verge of dissolution. The treaty of Königsberg was a bargain between two ruthless men, each of whom counted on a successful future. It procured for Brandenburg at least a respite and a province almost enclaved in her own East Prussia, together with a great display of affection by the Swedes, and, for different reasons, the approval of France and England. Much, however, if not all, would turn on the coming campaign. It was certain that the Elector's sudden move had shocked the Emperor, the Dutch, the Muscovites and, of course, the Poles, while he could not afford to support an idle army disproportionate in size to his scanty income. Would he leave Charles to his own devices and seek profit from a campaign in the west?

Crisis of
1656

The whole problem was transformed by the Polish national uprising in the first months of Charles' southern campaign. In place of the easy conquests of the foregoing autumn, Charles soon found himself with a few thousand exhausted men and only slender garrisons in the two Polish capitals,

Cracow and Warsaw. His lawless invasion and its failure, his continued warfare and attack on Danzig, roused a host of powers against him. The Emperor and the Dutch, the Danes, the Duke of Courland and the Muscovites were a throng unbalanced by any fresh ally except the rash Prince of Transylvania. It was clear that the Elector's policy might need revision.

At midsummer, none the less, Frederick William agreed with Charles at Marienburg to give him military aid, in return for great territorial gains, to be made at the expense of Poland. It is not improbable that the Polish claims of miraculous intervention in their favour, and John Casimir's vow to combat all heretics, had some influence on this decision, while the prospect that the raw army of Brandenburg would learn war from the experienced Swedes could not be overlooked. In the desperate three-day battle which again took Warsaw from the Poles (July, 1656), the Elector and his artillery and infantry played their part. Then, however, they withdrew to guard, with Swedish help, East Prussia and their share of occupied Poland. Warsaw, meanwhile, again changed hands, and the Polish rally continued.

While the success of the Swedes in subduing with a small army a vast Catholic countryside was plainly doubtful, the Emperor and the Danes showed them an ill-will which could not fail to influence the Elector. Loss of the promised Polish lands, disaffection in East Prussia, and the opinion of his own counsellors did more. On the other hand, John Casimir, though conciliatory, could not consent to alienate Ermeland. An armistice with Poland and fresh negotiations with Sweden therefore preceded the momentous treaty of Labiau (November, 1656), by which Charles made Frederick William the unfettered sovereign of East Prussia and Ermeland. Sweden and Brandenburg then pledged themselves to conclude no separate peace.

The Labiau
and Wehlau
Treaties

By the treaty of Labiau, Sweden had given to Brandenburg the ancient rights and property of Poland, reserving also many Polish provinces for herself. If Poland would confirm this gift, the Elector would obviously lose his motive for attempting to force her to transfer to his dangerous neighbour territories which would increase the peril to himself. Such was the simple calculation which prompted the complex

diplomacy of Brandenburg in 1657. Once again the allies, helped by the Prince of Transylvania, first conquered and then lost the realm of John Casimir. Charles then desired to deal with Denmark, and treated high-handedly the Elector's protests against 'desertion'. His departure for a new Scandinavian war raised the importance of Brandenburg in the east, and the Emperor's death (April, 1657) raised it also in Germany. Scenting cheap plunder, Frederick William was proof against the French envoys and Charles' patron, Cromwell. With the aid of the subtle and unscrupulous Austrian diplomat, Lisola, he actually became the ally of Poland. His price was full sovereignty in East Prussia, and for this he renounced Ermeland, though Elbing became his. Such were the terms of the treaty of Wehlau (September, 1657). A new and cordial intimacy between the rulers of Poland and Brandenburg owed much to the mutual admiration between Frederick William and the Queen.

To Charles X, the Elector pleaded urgent necessity, and sent him a fictitious Brandenburg-Polish treaty of neutrality. Without being completely hoodwinked, the King accepted this and the Elector's excuses. The appearance of friendship between two Protestants who wished each other ill was thus maintained during the memorable winter in which the Swedes dashed from Jutland to Zealand across the ice, and clinched their triumph by the Peace of Roskilde (March, 1658). Charles thereby acquired a dangerous freedom, but Brandenburg, whose Elector was palpably a greater prince than ever before, was not certain to be the object of his first attack. In July, however, the King refused to see her representatives, and he freely spoke of her as likely to grow dangerous if unchecked. The Elector, meanwhile, had been using the long crisis of the Imperial election to sell his vote to Austria at the highest price, demanding Jägerndorf or Glogau, and the payment of a considerable debt. In July, 1658, with some sacrifice of Imperial powers, young Leopold was elected. For almost half a century (1658-1705) Germany was to have a gentle Jesuit-trained Emperor, the incarnate opposite of all that was signified by Charles X. In him Frederick William gained a powerful shield.

The following month found the Elector delivered by his rival from immediate danger. Charles X, determined to

Brandenburg and the Last Wars of Charles X

secure his rear before a new onslaught on Prussia, had suddenly begun the siege of Copenhagen. Bravely defended by its king and citizens, the Danish capital was soon relieved by the Dutch, who could not stomach a Swedish dominion over the Sound when that of Denmark had been happily brought to an end. Meanwhile Frederick William, who stirred up the Dutch, had summoned the Emperor and the Polish King to a joint attack on Holstein. Relieved of anxiety regarding England by Cromwell's death, he organized against the lawless Swedish King a coalition joined or favoured by many powers. He himself took command in Mecklenburg of some 30,000 men. Before the end of 1658, with little fighting, his conquests included Jutland, while the Dutch commanded Danish waters and the Poles gained Thorn.

In 1659, however, Frederick William was taught his place in Europe. When the great conflict between Habsburg and Bourbon remained unappeased, it was not for an Elector of Brandenburg to dictate. Charles had maintained the siege of Copenhagen, and France resolved that her *protégé* should not be crushed by the Germans. What France and England willed, the Dutch and Brandenburgers could not then defy. To chastise Brandenburg, the Duke of Neuburg stood ready to Mazarin's hand. Since Sweden's destiny was to serve France against the Emperor, Frederick William, unable to prevent the Muscovites from making a truce with her, now found that the Dutch would no longer aid him, and that the French frowned on his promising adventure. The Poles, moreover, were, not unnaturally, eager for peace.

The Elector's courage did not fail, but he was no match for a great power steered by Mazarin. In May, 1659, French, English and Dutch agreed at the Hague to end the Scandinavian struggle. Their intervention, denounced by Brandenburg, was repudiated by Charles X, and a most complicated chapter of events filled the remainder of the chequered year. While Charles, despite disasters, remained immovable in Zealand, while England lacked leadership, and Mazarin's gaze was centred on the Pyrenees, Frederick William was reluctantly involved in the Imperial conquest of Swedish Pomerania. In November, however, the end of

the Spanish war freed Mazarin to end the Scandinavian, and the Peace of Oliva came in sight.

For a whole year, while the rumour ran that a partition of Poland was intended, the Elector had been opposing peace, since his interest seemed to dictate continued war. The usual difficulties in deciding the place and membership of a Congress favoured delay, and his insistence that there should be one negotiating body, not several, prevailed. In January, 1660, Brandenburg, Swedes, Imperialists and Poles, together with a French mediator, met near Danzig, at the Cistercian monastery of Oliva. The Dutch, Danish and Courland representatives appeared, while the King and Queen of Poland added to the dignity of the proceedings. Frederick William, eager for Danish support regarding Pomerania, fought a losing battle against a separate accord between Denmark and Sweden, while the sudden death of Charles X in February left the latter barely capable of war. Thus the Elector's more fantastic demands, such as the exchange of Elbing for Stettin, could be declined with safety. The Peace (May, 1660) merely confirmed his independent sovereignty in Prussia. Even Elbing was transferred to Poland. The Elector, none the less, was now a European sovereign, without allies, but surrounded by weakened states. He had become a mature statesman and soldier, whose egotism and ill-faith had roused no conspicuous indignation. But his success already hinted at what might be in store for a Europe which could marshal force while failing to attain the rule of law.

When his new dignity was confirmed at Oliva, Frederick William had reigned for almost twenty years. Eight and twenty more awaited him. But the methods and principles which won him the title of 'the Great Elector' had already been fully displayed, and his contribution to the territorial aggrandizement of Brandenburg was almost completed. The equally important struggle for autocracy within his own dominions, however, continued with great consequences for the future of the world. A prince of simple tastes and mediocre fortune, he aimed at splendour in life and lavish patronage of the arts in order to establish a Brandenburg counterpart of the monarchy of France. Delighting in the chase, he surpassed his nobles in their favourite pleasures,

The Oliva
Peace

The Great
Elector
at Home

paying the price in the gout of his later years. While his Calvinism lessened his popularity with his Lutheran subjects, it was his genuine belief, and his second wife, married in 1668, was compelled to adopt it.

CHAPTER XXII

LOUIS XIV, 1668-1684

THE War of Devolution, though short and one-sided, ^{Louis in War} had taught the world not a little of Louis and of his army. Indifferent to danger, the King showed that he detested haste. Alike in planning a campaign and in participating in a battle, he conducted himself with unsoldierly moderation. Thus if his presence inspired his army, it weighed heavily upon the general in command. His diplomacy was superior, for here bold aims were followed out with perfect self-command and sober judgement. In 1668 Turenne and many civilians were wild to go on with the war, deeming one or two more campaigns enough to give France all the Spanish Netherlands. Louis, however, chose to prove himself moderate when victorious, so that he might build up a system of alliances and then make both the Netherlands and Holland his own. While Louis waited for the death of the sickly King of Spain, what were to be his relations with the Dutch? The answer to that question, vital to the future of all Europe, was determined by many factors, but foremost among them ranked the personal preferences of the King. Even so cool a head as his could not be wholly unaffected by the incense which his subjects forced him day by day to breathe. Despite the semi-divinity which they revered, he had been checked in 1668 by ungrateful Dutch 'merchant boors'. For France ^{Louis versus the Dutch} to become the great naval and commercial state desired by Colbert, moreover, was difficult, perhaps impossible, while the Dutch retained their existing frontiers, fleet and wealth. On his doorstep, Louis felt, was an insolent dependant who scorned his monarchical ideas and his religion, sheltered his disaffected subjects, and actually mocked himself. To *le Roi Soleil*, a Dutch medal showing Joshua making the sun stand still, conveyed the insult it intended. To crush the Dutch would both indicate his own divinity and strengthen France,

but the blow, when it came, must be overwhelming. Louis, sparing no pains and no bribe, worked patiently in a changing world to isolate his victim.

Secret
Treaty
of Dover

With the English King, at least, the French King had a notable success, the more easily that Charles was now secretly the opponent of his own subjects in the matter of religion. In 1669 his heir, James, Duke of York, had openly declared himself a Catholic, while Charles admitted to his Catholic counsellors that he shared their religious views. Numbering among his subjects men who ascribed the Plague, the Fire of London and the Dutch victory at sea to God's wrath at Catholic toleration, Charles more than ever felt the need of Louis' support. In 1670 the secret treaty of Dover, negotiated by his sister, now Duchess of Orleans, pledged the English King to support Louis against the Dutch, and, if need be, in his claims on Spain, receiving in return ample promises of French support. The elasticity of the French King's principles appeared when he placed 'Madame Carwell', a Breton beauty, at his brother Catholic's side to safeguard their secret pact. Henrietta's sons went further towards becoming pawns of France, and with the King thus seduced from duty, parliamentary government paled and shrank. The secret treaty made it impossible that if Louis struck at Holland, England should swiftly assist the Dutch. She was in fact pledged to aid France against them. A lasting agreement was sought with Sweden, and if Poland did not place a Frenchman on her vacant throne, she at least chose a native king from whom nothing need be feared. At the same time France seized Avignon, to extort a tariff concession from the Pope.

Other
Clients of
France

Among the German princes, moreover, Louis' clients came to include no less than four Electors—those of Mainz, Trèves, Saxony and the Palatinate. Denmark, always of weight in the policy of Sweden, and now by no means negligible in Germany, also promised to stand neutral, and, in December, 1671, the Emperor did the same. Perhaps the weightiest of these pacts, however, was that with Bavaria, concluded early in 1670. Defensive in form, it went far towards furnishing Louis with an active German partner in future undertakings. In return for his promise of support in the Imperial Diet, and, besides a subsidy, the hand of

the Dauphin for his daughter, the Elector undertook to collaborate both in Spain and in the succession to the Empire. Thus on all sides diplomacy added to Louis' aggressive power. His quest of Sweden had been checked by an event which powerfully influenced French policy—the replacement of Lionne, who had died, by the ruthless and reckless Louvois as war minister. In the first months of 1672, a brisk auction contest between Dutch and French raised the Swedish price, but in April the gold of Louis gained the day. Should the Emperor or any German prince intervene on the Dutch side, the Swedes undertook to send 16,000 men to their own possessions in Germany.

While Louvois was arming France, and Europe choosing The Invasion of 1672 between the purse-proud Dutch and the ambitious Louis, the philosopher Leibnitz begged the King to engage in a more fruitful venture. Take Egypt, cut the Suez canal and gain all the trade of the Mediterranean—such was his bold advice. The King, however, foresaw himself master in a few months of Antwerp, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and all their immense potentialities of trade, with authority over both Habsburg empires to follow. For this, scorning the humble Dutch diplomats, he took the field in April, 1672, with Turenne, Vauban and some 80,000 men. Condé, with a further 40,000, hastened to his side, while Louvois attended to the supply of such a multitude as modern Europe had never known. His alliance with the Archbishop of Cologne, who also held the straggling bishopric of Liège, gave Louis a direct route from his own frontier to the United Provinces. Blockading Maestricht on the Meuse, where Condé joined him in May, he hurried onwards to the Rhine, and had the supreme good fortune to cross that trusted bulwark with triumphant ease. He could boast of having taken four fortresses in as many days, and the downfall of the Dutch continued. In mid-June, Amsterdam itself was apparently beyond salvation. For a moment the famous hyperbole of Mme de Sévigné seemed to be justified and the King's success so overwhelming that Europe would deny him nothing.

No one could fail to see, however, that the conquest of 'the university of the civilized world', from motives of mere pride and ambition, was fraught with peril for the whole family of nations. War could be 'just' only when

force was the sole means of obtaining justice. In 1672 the Dutch had inquired in vain what Louis' grievance might be, and what redress he wished for. His scornful reply was a manifesto announcing his dissatisfaction with their government. England, his accomplice, had struck without any notification. Such conduct was the substitution of brigandage for public morals. Both the Dutch and several foreign powers were impelled to take their stand against it.

European
Reaction

Early in May, the Great Elector, the most formidable German after the Emperor, agreed to supply the Dutch with more than 20,000 men. In June, while bitter war broke out between the Turkish invaders and Poland, the Provinces were almost beaten to their knees. Ruyter, indeed, gained a victory off Southwold against the French and English fleets, and the Emperor soon recognized, as well he might, the immensity of his own and Europe's peril. The supreme fact, however, was that within a fortnight the French drove the Dutch to inundate their country and to sue for peace.

Louis had raised an army of unprecedented strength, and himself guided it with diligence, severity and skill. Some 120,000 men, furnished by his diplomacy with freedom to use many routes, approached the Rhine on their way to Amsterdam, truly the heart of Dutch resistance. William of Orange strove to maintain the barrier of the river, but on June 12 an adroit manœuvre and a sharp skirmish brought the French across. The several Provinces, in panic, called their contingents home for their own defence. Utrecht surrendered, and Amsterdam seemed to be doomed to the same fate. Louis, however, had shown untimely moderation in the pace of his advance while William of Orange was absent ill. By opening the sluices, therefore, Amsterdam secured at least a respite.

Negotiation, as the adhesion of Brandenburg to their cause had proved, could do something to help the Dutch, but still the power of France seemed overwhelming. It was augmented by the goodwill of Catholics in the Provinces themselves, who looked on the Most Christian King as their deliverer. To buy off Louis, the Protestants, hoping at least to gain time, offered to yield what the French had conquered, together with such conquests of their own from

Spain as would place the remaining Spanish Netherlands at Louis' mercy. The French, however, demanded sacrifices of territory, money and sovereignty which would have made the Dutch almost a vassal state. Five days' leave were granted for discussion between their envoys and their government, but the envoys never returned. The Dutch were in fact embarking upon a revolution.

In July, as usual when threatened with ruin, the Provinces turned for rescue to the House of Orange. William, at twenty-one, became their leader. As the French conquest went on, the Dutch gave a startling proof that their mob, at least, was unthinking, passionate and cruel. De Witt, in the first and most terrifying months of the campaign, had done all that was humanly possible for the defence of the state, by land and sea and by negotiation. The response of the Orangists was to attempt to murder his brother and himself. Again, when the brother lay in gaol at the Hague under sentence for plotting against the Prince, he was visited by John de Witt, and both were torn in pieces (August, 1672). The Prince, meanwhile, had proved his own quality by preferring death to his country's disgrace, and by keeping alive the negotiations with England. A statesman to his finger-tips, he forbore to divide the nation by punishing the murderers. His courage kindled the Dutch and roused in Louis that untimely caution which forfeited victory in the first campaign. Thus William may be said to have preserved the nation which de Witt had notably enriched. While he thus early showed himself an inspiring leader, Ruyter defended the coast against both French and English, and brought the rich fleet from the Dutch East Indies safely home. Louis himself left the war to his generals, and fresh participants, Spain, Brandenburg and Austria, forced them to stand on the defensive. It was impossible for the best of troops in a flooded country to complete their conquest.

Louis had counted on subduing the Republic in one campaign. The second, in which he deigned to lead his army without an assisting general, began with a great political success. The Great Elector, discouraged by the superiority of Turenne, made one of his innumerable changes of front. He concluded with Louis a separate peace at Vossem (June, 1673), and accepted a large subsidy from the

Revolution
in Holland

William III
and 1672

Louis'
Diplomatic
Gains and
Losses

King. The French thus pledged themselves to quit the duchy of Cleves; the Elector, to abstain from war, except in fulfilment of his duty towards the Empire. In the same month Maestricht fell, a loss to which Spain was particularly sensitive, and which enhanced the personal reputation of the conquering monarch. But invasion by sea had failed, and swift movement in a flooded country was still impossible. A peace conference, indeed, was already sitting at Cologne.

Although the conference sat for many months, and the kings of France and England lowered their original demands, Louis could not escape from the consequences of his planned aggression. He and his satellites, the kings of England and of Sweden, found themselves faced by something like a union of insulted Europe. The Empire, the Dutch, Spain and Lorraine were leagued against him; Denmark co-operated; and more was yet to come; while his unavowed ally the Turk was feeling the sword of Sobieski. Success at sea and the capture of Bonn cheered the Dutch, while the able French generals were hampered by the royal conduct of the war. No one could mistake the significance of their retreat from Holland at the end of 1673. Before the campaign of 1674 began, the Elector of Cologne had made his peace, and the Electors of Trèves, Mainz and the Palatinate, with Denmark and other Germans of weight, had definitely joined the coalition.

Growth of
Opposition
to France

Early in 1674 the allies gained a considerable recruit in Frederick III, whom the Danish revolution had made the most absolute king in Europe. A far weightier success was the defeat of Charles II of England. In 1673 his Protestant subjects had secured the Test Act. In February, 1674, by the Treaty of Westminster, they made a profitable peace with the Dutch. The secret apologies of Charles gave Louis an occasion to exercise that gracious and majestic charm with which he could console the unfortunate. But at the same time his devastations were rousing every German ruler. The Empire declared war, and at midsummer Frederick William, as self-willed as Louis and far more soldierly, broke with France. This was indeed a change of scene within two years from the great aggression, and the Dutch conferred the dignity of Hereditary Stadholder

upon the House of Orange. The cruelties of the French within their country bound them firmly to William's side.

Although, some two years later, the conference of Nijmegen began, four more campaigns preceded anything like a general peace. Each of these years drove further home the simple truth that in the existing conditions Europe could not conquer France, and France could not conquer Europe. The first repulse of Louis had seemed a French humiliation. Every year of successful defiance, however, enhanced the repute of France, and encouraged her king to hope that, by victory in diplomacy or in the field, he might yet become a Caesar. On the other hand, Dutch propaganda taught their allies from sad experience how the French might devastate the land and impoverish its inhabitants, if they were allowed to enter.

Early in 1674 Louis had found that England could no longer be secured by bribing Charles II. Although an English contingent remained in his service, the nation made peace with the Dutch. Soon his allies abroad comprised only Bavaria and Sweden, though the action of the Hungarians and Poles reduced the Imperial strength. He himself, however, with Vauban's aid, conquered Franche Comté, while Turenne defeated the Imperial troops at Sinsheim, and, by ruthless devastation of the Palatinate, helped to shield France against invasion. In Flanders, a like result was achieved by Condé, whose desperate struggle at Senef did much to check the Allies. William, indeed, ended his campaign by capturing Grave, but his relations with the Imperialists and Spaniards had not been of the best. Then, in the depth of winter, Turenne, by an amazing march across the Vosges to Belfort, followed by a success against the Great Elector, foiled a dangerous invasion which seemed to have gained Alsace. William, however, had been and remained strong enough to reject the repeated efforts of Louis to make peace, while nothing nearer home forced the French King to refrain from encouraging a Sicilian rising against Spain.

In 1675 the Allies assaulted Sweden, using for that purpose the ever-ready hostility of Denmark. Louis retorted by a Swedish threat to Berlin, which served to recall the Great Elector from the western front. His dash to guard

Decisive
Victory Un-
attainable

Gains and
Losses
of 1674

Decline of
Sweden

his capital, culminating in a charge which drove the routed Swedes from Fehrbellin, were almost as dramatic as the recent exploit of Turenne. This 'Bannockburn of Brandenburg', which a contemporary print styles 'a wondrous victory the like of which is wellnigh unknown', made the style of 'Great Elector' incontrovertible, and began the liquidation of the Swedish provinces in Germany. Soon only Stettin, Anklam, Stralsund and Rügen remained to them. The prospect of a great share in this plunder did much to console the Elector for the Emperor's seizure of the Silesian estates of the Duke of Liegnitz, who died at this point without direct heirs, and whose lands were claimed by Frederick William.

Fluctuating
Struggle
of 1675
and 1676

Meanwhile a fluctuating indecisive struggle went on in the main theatre of war. As usual at this epoch, superior organization gave the French an early lead which the superior manpower of their opponents forbade them to maintain throughout the campaign. In July, however, Turenne was shot dead while reconnoitring beyond the Rhine, and the Imperialists under the veteran Montecuculi crossed the river. A victory of the Lorrainers not far from Trèves menaced the eastern frontier of France. But the Duke of Lorraine died, and his army was disbanded, while, farther south, Condé forced Montecuculi to recross the Rhine. He then himself withdrew into private life. The chief French successes of 1675, moreover, came from the fleet. Du Quesne in Palermo bay defeated the Dutch and Spaniards, and enabled his countrymen to master Sicily.

Through 1676, widespread and fluctuating warfare continued in many fields. The Netherlands saw Louis and his brother laboriously capturing towns, while at Maestricht William failed. Again glory came from Du Quesne and the Mediterranean, where, in sight of Etna, Ruyter was defeated and slain. Louis, moreover, had drawn closer his bonds with the King of England, who might be an acceptable mediator in the peace negotiations. Despite his love of war, indeed, the French King realized that, at the moment, a good peace was preferable, while many high-placed Dutchmen disliked the cost of a struggle which seemed certain to advance the French frontiers towards their country. William of Orange, however, was unshakable in his policy of no surrender,

while Louis remained honourably constant to the cause of tottering Sweden. It was by no means easy for so far-flung a coalition to agree on terms of peace.

To Europe, indeed, the harvest of 1676 yielded the most diverse fruits. On the Rhine Duke Charles Louis of Lorraine succeeded to the estates of his uncle, and also to the command of the Imperial army. In September he gained the weighty fortress of Philippsburg. Lorraine itself, however, was not immediately the objective of the Emperor, harassed as he was by convulsions both in the north and east. Spain, meanwhile, so famine-stricken that Madrid came to number only perhaps one-half of its former population, was now absorbed in a prolonged struggle by Don John, the late King's bastard, to gain the real power. The Turks, formidable under Achmet Kiuprili, even when Sobieski had become king in Poland, made great gains by the Peace of Zurawna, late in October, 1676. In the next week, however, Kiuprili died, and a power largely dependent for eminence upon its very rare great men might well be eclipsed for years to come. The possible decline of the Turks was offset in some degree, from Louis' point of view, by a check in the palpable decline of Sweden. As a soldier, the young king, Charles XI, was less gifted than his father and his son, but in obstinacy he could not be outmatched. In December, on the great south Scandinavian plain, he defeated the conquering Danes in a desperate battle near Lund, and thereby won the hearts of his rescued nation.

Personal
Changes
and the War

Perhaps the most ominous disaster for Louis XIV since 1672 was that William of Orange steadily repulsed his overtures for peace. France, having shot her bolt and missed her mark, might well wish for time to prepare the campaign which would be necessary when the Spanish throne fell vacant. Louis, moreover, despite his success in turning *Frondeurs* into courtiers, could not be sure that the *Fronde* was truly dead. William's triple instinct—to refuse what the enemy desires, to train the less warlike side for inevitable war, and to let the coalition profit by attrition—probably dictated the most advantageous course for the allies. It certainly emphasized their need for the House of Orange. None the less, the campaign of 1676, in which each side conducted a successful siege, revealed a possibility which

might have made an end of Dutch greatness. This was the threat of French supremacy at sea. Three naval battles gave a balance of victory to France, and Ruyter himself perished.

Louis and
Peace

For several years, war and negotiation went on side by side. While Charles of England laboured for peace through the congress at Nijmegen, a war of sieges, favourable to the French, was carried on by Louis and Vauban, and William suffered more than one defeat. The Dutch republicans pressed more strongly than ever that the proffered peace should be accepted. On the other hand, Sweden went from bad to worse; several French provinces saw revolts against taxation; and, in 1677, William won the hand of Mary, daughter of James of York and apparent heiress of England. The marriage was a double triumph, for Louis had made great offers for her union with the Dauphin. Next year, the year of Charles' secret treaty with the French King, was that of Titus Oates and a general outburst against the Catholics in England. All this followed on a definite treaty with the Dutch.

French
Advantages
in 1677

Louis, however, skilfully conquered peace. The timely victory at Lund had influenced not a little the course of the northern section of the struggle in 1677. Against Sweden, the Norwegian section of the Danish-Norwegian monarchy now played a conspicuous part, threatening in the rear forces barely able to contain those of Denmark in the south. Near Landskrona, however, another desperate battle repeated the King's success at Lund, saving the mainland for Sweden while her German possessions were falling to the Great Elector. The main theatre of the European war, however, lay in the west, where Louis derived some indirect benefit from the employment of Polish troops in Hungary. Although this distraction of the Imperial forces could not compare with what he might lose by the new hostility of England, the French King proved on the whole victorious on the field of battle. France was strengthened, moreover, by the failure of Spain to regain her ancient vigour. Don John, although successful in securing power, proved incompetent to use it well, and the Spaniards had neither king nor minister nor general who could restore their waning strength. Such was the setting of the campaign of 1677, in which Louis' brother defeated

William at Cassel, and the captured towns included Valenciennes, Cambrai, St. Omer and Freiburg-in-Breisgau. Thus France was at once fortified beyond the Rhine and aggrandized in the Netherlands.

The year 1678 began with a definite union between the Dutch and English which followed on William's marriage to Mary, King Charles' niece. Parliament openly voted funds for war with Louis, and sent their new ally troops which had formerly assisted France. Both in the Netherlands and on the Rhine, however, the French continued to do well. Ghent and Ypres were taken, and the final battle of the war was a murderous and indecisive struggle for Mons. Although peace between France and Holland had been signed four days earlier, on August 14, Luxembourg and William, neither of whom cared for civilian life, did not deny themselves a battle. Next month Spain also concluded peace. The Swedish wars, however, were not yet over, and in the autumn the Great Elector secured Stralsund. Next month, Greifswald, their last possession in Pomerania, was also wrested from the Swedes. Early in February, 1679, France and the Emperor at last made their peace.

Campaign
of 1678

The treaties which were the fruit of years' negotiation at Nijmegen comprised in Europe important changes of many kinds. With an eye to future aggrandizement on several sides, Louis again showed studious moderation. William regained his principality of Orange and his estates in various French possessions. Maestricht and Messina were yielded up by the French. Colbert's harsh tariff was abandoned, and mutual free trade established by Holland and France. Thus the lessons of the war were embodied in an agreement well calculated to save the French from a future Anglo-Dutch alliance.

Peace of
Nijmegen

To Spain, France restored many towns and districts in the Netherlands and one in Catalonia. But she kept Franche Comté and a strong chain of sixteen fortresses extending along her frontier from Dunkirk to the Meuse.

The Empire regained Philippsburg, but the French established themselves beyond the Rhine at Freiburg, with Breisach to secure the crossing. Lorraine, offered to its Duke on condition of cessions and rights of passage which he declined to accept, remained in French occupation.

War
ended in
Scandinavia

The next task confronting Europe was to end the war in Scandinavia. Here Louis and Leopold acted as mediators, aided by the facts that no battlefield remained in Germany, and that Charles XI had fought Denmark to a standstill. The negotiations gave Louis the opportunity to fling his royal mantle over his allies, and, in substance, to effect a return to the pre-war territorial status. By the peace made in June, 1679, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Charles XI regained all Swedish Pomerania, except a strip of territory on the right bank of the Oder. At Fontainebleau, two months later, the Danes, receiving a modest sum in cash, returned all their conquests. At Lund, moreover, by direct negotiations, the Scandinavian powers agreed to replace their ancient discord by a close military and commercial alliance, and in fact this interlude almost survived the century.

The ruler who felt most deeply wounded by the peace was the triumphant Great Elector. His ready wrath, however, turned above all against the Emperor for failing to support his claims. Louis he implored to refrain from ruining a prince who earnestly desired to serve him. The French in fact vacated Cleves and paid him money, and he became forthwith their unrestrained ally. Thus the strongest and most able of the German princes turned Francophile, even promising to support the Dauphin as Leopold's successor. To conciliate warlike Brandenburg and to bind to himself the young King, Charles XI, Louis promised a war indemnity to the Great Elector. That prince, indeed, had ended his military career with a notable triumph, leading his army in sledges over the frozen lagoon to drive the crumbling Swedes from eastern Prussia. But the secession of all his allies except Denmark made it impossible for him to fight on, and he could only hope that a future descendant might avenge him on the Emperor. In 1680 he found some consolation in the reversion of the important see of Magdeburg.

Northern
Conflict

Meanwhile, in Sweden, Charles XI had grown to vigorous manhood. Thanks to his stubborn valour, the Danes, who were reconquering Scania, had been repulsed at Lund (1676). To keep peace but to prepare for war; to 'reduce' the magnates, that is, to confiscate many of the great estates, and to stand firm for the Protestant faith—such was the policy of the shy, almost furtive, monarch in whom Louis

hoped to find a willing tool. When Denmark also renounced her conquests and made peace at Fontainebleau (September, 1679) the second of Louis' aggressive wars was over, and a new era could begin. Although in France 'prosperity had not kept pace with power', French power, both military and diplomatic, dwarfed that of all other states. The King could pose as 'less, indeed, than God, but greater than the universe'. His subjects now saluted him as Louis the Great, and he did not reprove them.

After nearly twenty years of rule, Louis thus found himself at the head of Europe. He had much to hope from time, and singularly little to fear. The Dutch rejoiced in having escaped destruction. England was paralysed by the disunion between king and parliament and by the uncertainties of the succession. The Empire, a weak body weakly ruled, stood in danger of invasion by the Turks. The year 1679 saw the Great Elector, Louis' pensioner and ally, pledged to vote for him or his son as Emperor. Before it closed, a Bavarian princess had espoused the Dauphin. Throughout Germany, the French King and French culture outshone their German rivals. Meanwhile the north gave no sign of its former greatness, and Spain, ruled by alternate factions, awaited the terrible crisis of her king's decease. A wise ruler of France, therefore, could safely turn to the upbuilding of her people, and to the attainment of social justice at home and of cultural primacy in the world. Louis, however, and Louvois, his leading minister, knew nothing of such ambitions. To them, while forced to wait on events in Spain, it was natural to extend their frontiers in the sole directions possible—Italy and the German east.

It was not until 1681, when the seizure of Strasburg staggered all beholders, that the 'war in peace' of Louis and Louvois began to be understood. But 'the hollow sophistry of the *Chambres de réunion*' followed hard upon the treaties of Nijmegen, and was designed to round off the conquests approved in 1679. Those conquests, it was claimed, comprised not only Franche Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Metz, Toul and Verdun as the war had found them, but also every region to which France could furbish up a title. Such claims, moreover, were referred to French courts, while in the background stood a French army of

Louis as
Caesar

War in
Peace

140,000 men. Thus in 1679 a 'chamber' of the *Parlement* of Metz had set to work, soon to be followed by its sisters of Breisach and Besançon. The last-named swiftly ascribed to Louis some eighty villages, at the expense of Wurtemberg, and many other similar judgements followed. By August, 1680, Strasburg alone in Alsace remained independent.

The outraged German princes clamoured to Leopold for redress, and he and the Diet fully endorsed their protests. Louis, confronted by an Imperial army and a nascent League of Sovereigns, offered a Conference, while William of Orange, whose principality the French had seized, laboured for a European coalition, and the Great Elector begged for a closer alliance with France. England might have held the balance, but she, distracted by internal difficulties, could no longer intervene. The Emperor likewise was paralysed by his troubles in the east. On the last day of September, 1681, therefore, the French King flung down his supreme challenge to Europe and her public law. His troops then suddenly made themselves masters both of Strasburg and of Casale. Within the next month, the Metz tribunal declared most of Luxemburg to be French, and soon that great fortress, 'the Gibraltar of the north', with its protecting ravines and mastery of the route to Germany, came under French blockade. Louis' contempt for law could not have been made more clear.

Louis'
Protracted
Success

For almost five years it seemed that Europe lacked strength to take up the challenge. While Louis, with Madame de Maintenon at his side, plunged ever more deeply into the struggle with Protestantism, all efforts to combat the new Caesarism proved unsuccessful. His appropriation of Zweibrücken (Deuxponts), indeed, cost him the Swedish alliance, for its lord, Charles XI, allied himself with the Dutch in defence of the Nijmegen peace. In 1682 the Emperor loudly condemned the aggressor, and agreed with several north German princes to oppose him. Leopold, however, could not defend his own capital against the Turks. Only the aid of the warrior king of Poland, the 'man sent from God whose name was John', saved Vienna, and perhaps western Europe, in September, 1683. At that moment, a futile declaration of war by Spain enabled Louis to press on in the Netherlands, and, before midsummer, 1684, to launch

FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XIV



the final stroke against Luxemburg. Possession of that fortress, together with Strasburg and all the *Réunions* previously acquired, was the basis of a twenty years' truce, made between Louis and the Ratisbon Diet, on the mediation of the Great Elector (August, 1684). At the same time the Spaniards also yielded. The war with Spain had involved Spain's ally, Genoa, in a five days' bombardment from the sea, which destroyed much of the city. Here again the stern will of Louis imposed a drastic peace. On all sides, French force triumphed.

Truce of
Ratisbon

In 1684, it may be said, Louis was in a position to dictate to Europe. What power could or would oppose his will? Divided England, divided Holland, the powerless Pope, the hardly more powerful Spain—none of these was to be feared. Towards the close of 1683, the French had captured, ravaged and bombarded in the Spanish Netherlands. In the spring, this coercion went on, and, early in June, Luxemburg was taken. The Dutch put pressure upon Spain to submit, and although the Emperor made good progress in his Turkish war, he could not attack France and her allies. In mid-August, therefore, the Truce of Ratisbon came into being. It was based on the recognition by Spain and the Empire for twenty years of Louis' occupation of Strasburg and Kehl, with all the Imperial fiefs that he held before August, 1681, as well as Luxemburg and many villages in the Netherlands. The Dutch acceded to the truce, and the French King counted on making it the basis of a general peace. He could now, without apprehension, deal drastically with those Huguenots who still dared to differ in religion from their king.

CHAPTER XXIII

EUROPE FROM THE REVOCATION TO THE PEACE OF RYSWICK (1685-1697)

THE Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October, 1685, ranks as the turning-point in Louis' reign, and indeed in the modern history of France. It was the climax of her monarchic despotism, and the final abandonment of that large toleration by which Henry IV had fitted her to stand at the head of Europe. Passing far beyond the statesmanlike limits of Richelieu's attack upon the Huguenot state within a state, it justified the most damning verdicts of some of Louis' critics. 'Based on the principle that he was divine, and that to differ from him was wicked', or ascribed to the overpowering zeal and narrow mind of his secret bride, the converted Huguenot, Mme de Maintenon—such ruthless indictments were not wholly without foundation.

The decree of 1685, it need hardly be said, was only the climax of a long campaign by Louis for absolutism in Church and State, an absolutism which might in time subjugate all Europe. Most of his previous acts, indeed, had tended in this direction. Every French institution which could check the monarch had been rendered harmless. The Four Articles of 1682 and the coercion of the Pope over the right of asylum combated the remaining claims of Rome. The successful ending of the war with the coalition had been followed by diverse acts of Caesarism—banishment of many Jews, bombardment and humiliation of Genoa, resplendent reception of envoys from Siam, and naval attacks on the Barbary powers being conspicuous among them. For years past, moreover, such pressure had been applied to the Huguenots that many had taken flight:

The Revocation, indeed, followed upon a decade of most active and varied attempts to cleanse Louis' realm of such Protestant taint as still defiled it. The Catholic clergy,

The
Revocation

The anti-
Huguenot
Campaign

strengthened by several Orders, had been roused to missionary zeal. Louis himself, the long war ended, became conspicuously more devout. King and Church had combined to finance a Treasury of Conversions, some persons receiving several times over the small bonus payable on change of faith. Even the greatest of Louis' ministers must exert themselves against dissent. From 1680 the Mixed Tribunals of Catholics and Protestants were swept away. Soon the learned professions were closed to Huguenots, while the conversion of Catholics and their marriage with Dissenters became illegal. Huguenot midwives were forbidden to practise, but Huguenot children might turn Catholic without parental sanction. The faint line which divided such rules from persecution was soon passed. Protestant foundations were destroyed by hundreds, and their income confiscated to the Crown.

Throughout the early 'eighties, Frenchmen were taught by many examples what it meant to be in conflict with the State. The *Intendants* showed themselves watchful and severe, and some won royal favour by conspicuous acts of persecution. Thanks to their zeal and ingenuity, new torments for the Huguenots were devised. Sometimes the whole burden of taxation was placed upon their shoulders; sometimes they suffered from the famous dragonnades. These took the form of the billeting of many unrestrained soldiers in Protestant houses, to be transferred elsewhere when the conversion of the inmates was complete. Thus whole towns, among them La Rochelle, were brought to mass, but some 200,000 stalwarts fled to foreign lands.

Jansenism

It would be a grave error, however, to suppose that Louis' ever more embittered struggle with Huguenotism was an uncomplicated trial of strength between Catholic and Protestant France. Two other religious contests at the same time embarrassed the monarch and divided Frenchmen. What rights, they might ask, had the Pope within their country? and, if his decrees were not decisive of true doctrine, where could this be found? Both are illuminated by the history of Jansenism, a school of thought which for many decades resisted Louis and prevented Catholic unity in France. While Gallicanism aimed at autonomy of the Church of France, Jansenism sought its purification. The latter was

both the harder to define and the more provocative of lasting passion.

Jansen himself was neither a sectary nor a French subject. Although he had studied in France, he was a Dutchman, for whom the Spanish Government, within two years of his untimely death in 1638, secured the bishopric of Ypres. A deep student, and a harsh and vigorous foe both of Richelieu and of the Jesuits, he had bequeathed as the chief memorial of his life a treatise on Augustine. In this he denounced the remoteness of current theology from religion, the devotion of many Christians to ceremonial, and the substitution by others of mere morality for Christ. His own teaching stressed the utter dependence of every man upon an individual call from God. Intercourse with God, however, he deemed possible only to obedient sons of the Roman Catholic Church. Jansen's teaching appealed both to theologians, and to laymen eager for their own salvation. It was resented, inevitably, by the Jesuits, by the Popes, and, in due course, by Louis XIV. The King's ideal was a uniform Church, obedient to the Crown and holding the same religious tenets as himself. Though milder than the doctrine taught by Calvin, Jansenism was steeped in predestination, and, in 1653, the Pope condemned as heresy five propositions taken from the Bishop's book. The Jansenists, none the less, fought hard, maintaining that not even Rome could know exactly what a dead author had designed to say. Pascal appealed with peculiar eloquence to the tribunal of Jesus Christ. Port-Royal, their venerated monastery in Paris, sustained the Jansenists by the conspicuous holiness of its life and by its uncompromising hostility to Calvin.

Neither the French Church, nor the French King, however, could approve of individualists who abridged the distance between priest and layman, and claimed to be themselves in communion with the Most High. Among the propositions which the Pope condemned was a declaration against 'the half-Pelagian error' of stating that Christ had died for all men. Pascal's anti-Jesuit *Provincial Letters* enraptured educated men. But the connexion between the Fronde and the Jansenists alienated Mazarin, and in 1661 a Royal Commission condemned the five propositions anew. Port-Royal was closed, and Jansenism at least driven underground.

Divisions
in France :
Jansenism

Jansenism
Offensive
to Church
and King

Intermittent
Struggle

The violence of Rome and Paris, however, by no means silenced either the former denizens of Port-Royal or their sympathizers in the Church of France. These always included some among the bishops, and in December, 1667, no less than nineteen sent written protests to the Pope and King. Ten months later, Louis thought to give peace to the Church by forbidding acrimonious discussion, but in vain. In January, 1669, none the less, the Pope, eager to use Jansenist pens against the Protestants, sanctioned this 'Peace of the Church' without making adequate inquiry. The Jansenists, indeed, had grown in numbers, and had found high-placed protectors. But the Jesuits could never be appeased, and in time the autocratic King, eager to prove himself orthodox, struck at the quasi-heretics and rebels whom they opposed.

The royal onslaught was occasioned by a conflict regarding the so-called 'regalia', the royal right to enjoy episcopal revenues so long as a see was vacant. That right did not extend to four dioceses in southern France until, in February, 1673, Louis proclaimed it valid throughout the country. This arbitrary act was challenged by two Jansenist bishops, and, in 1678, the austere Innocent XI, a fiery crusader, plunged into the resultant fray. Thus, in a complex struggle, the Jesuits and the government of France found themselves at issue with the Jansenists and Rome. The French Church, however, rallied around its king, and the Pope excommunicated the nominee of an archbishop (January, 1681). On the brink of a national secession, an impassioned sermon by Bossuet, equally inspiring and inconclusive, produced a better temper in the assembly of the church. The Pope, however, remained inflexible, and in March, 1682, the clerical assembly, without one dissident, promulgated the famous Four Articles. These emanated from the royal cabinet and were designed to put the papacy in its rightful place. The first of them declared that papal power was purely ecclesiastical, and therefore incompetent to depose a king, or to release his subjects from their allegiance. Secondly, it was laid down that the Council of Constance had established the inferiority of the papal power to that of a General Council. Thirdly, that the papacy must conform to the generally accepted laws of the Church, and in particular to the rights

The Four
Articles
of 1682

and customs of the Church of France. Fourthly, that in matters of belief the Pope's decision becomes binding only when approved by a General Council.

The delighted King next day gave orders that the Four Articles should be promulgated in every theological school, and signed by every priest and teacher throughout France. In May, when Innocent's reproof of the assembly for its action regarding the 'regalia' arrived in France, Louis prudently dispersed the gathering. When the Pope refused to institute as bishops those who had not voted against the Articles, the King found means to secure for them the incomes of the sees. It might seem that the richest and strongest of the Roman Catholic nations was bent on establishing an autonomy like that of the Eastern churches.

In actual fact, however, even Louis XIV was not omnipotent within the French Church, nor did he desire permanent enmity against its spiritual head. His own Jansenists and Jesuits were unlikely to combine in permanence against the Pope, while the inferior clergy would not lightly abandon the possibility of an appeal to Rome against the tyranny of their bishop. At the height of their conflict, moreover, the Pope had declined to aid the husband of Louis' mistress, and had granted the dispensations necessary for the King's natural son, a child of ten, to enjoy church revenues. If all Frenchmen were Catholics who shared his own belief, and if the Pope thus acted as his deferential auxiliary, Louis would be content. How nearly he could realize this ideal the next thirty years were to prove. Never did he show greater will-power than in his effort to reign as a conscientiously intolerant king. Before the close of 1685, he had so wrought that the state which had once given the greatest religious freedom now gave the least. Unlike some others, Louis' France neither sold licences to dissent nor winked at unobtrusive Nonconformists.

Before the decisive law, which the Parliament registered in October, 1685, had completely revoked Henry's edict of 1598, Louis tightened the reins controlling his dependent monarchs. James II, openly a Catholic, who succeeded in February, 1685, received magnificent largesse from his French cousin and also triumphed over Monmouth. 'A proud king, but fond of French coin,' sneered his munificent ally. The

Rapprochement of King and Pope

Louis and Foreign Princes

Great Elector, lately joined with the Dutch in a defensive pact, was compelled to declare in writing his fidelity to his treaty with France. Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, whose movements were carefully controlled by Louis, could not escape from conducting with the French a joint attack upon his heretics, which laid waste the Vaudois Alpine valleys in the spring of 1686. In France, meanwhile, scores of supplementary edicts had heightened the persecution. Even foreigners who dwell there were not entitled to toleration. Thus Louis and the French Church had challenged Protestant Europe.

Except in England the European response to the Revocation was not long delayed. The Great Elector issued in the following month an edict offering an asylum to those who fled for conscience' sake from France. He was rewarded before his death in 1688 by the immigration of more than 20,000 Huguenots, who brought to poor and backward Brandenburg the culture and craftsmanship that she lacked, and, in time, furnished many officers of gentle birth to her expanding army. The Elector, in the words of Dr. Ward, 'now actually came to be regarded as holding a position towards Protestantism somewhat resembling that held by Cromwell; and the remote Protestant cantons of Switzerland, apprehensive lest their turn might come next, sought his alliance'. Far more weighty than his relations with the Swiss, however, was his growing intimacy with William of Orange and the Dutch, an alliance to which, early in 1686, was added a secret treaty with the Emperor. This pledged Brandenburg to assist Leopold against the Turks in a war which had already turned strongly in the Emperor's favour. The disputed Silesian inheritance was settled by Frederick William's acceptance of Schwiebus in Silesia and the reversion of East Frisia in satisfaction of his claim to Liegnitz and other districts.

Thus Louis alienated Protestants by his persecution and Catholics by his Caesarism. While Mme de Maintenon was founding St. Cyr for the Catholic education of the daughters of poor nobles, Brandenburg, the Protestant ally of France, was planning war against the King, and inciting William to a descent on England. The Dutch, indeed, detested the Revocation on every ground, and they included a prince,

Dutch
Opposition

William of Orange, whose talent and character challenged those of the Great King. The decline of the French party in Holland was the most ominous sign that Louis might become unable to dictate to Europe as of late. For the moment, however, Brandenburg seemed to confirm its subjection to France, and Savoy combined with the French in a new Vaudois persecution.

In his proud domination over his foreign dependants and in his cruelty towards the French dissenters, however, Louis had gone beyond what Europe could passively endure. The speed and the form of her revolt were determined by the facts that William of Orange existed, and that French policy towards the Dutch since 1672 had given him the support of the whole nation. In the trenchant sentences of Bourgeois, 'The struggle between William and Louis forms and explains the whole history of western Europe until the eighteenth century began. It was a duel between two men, two political principles, and two religions.'

Without the support of a great power, however, William of Orange could not hope to challenge France. But in 1686 it seemed that the Emperor Leopold had largely recovered his freedom of action. Thanks primarily to Sobieski and Eugene, but also to the manpower in which Austria was rich, the Turk was definitely beaten, while Hungary and Transylvania seemed no longer dangerous. Bavaria had been gained by marriage, and support might well be expected from the Papacy, Savoy and Spain. Brandenburg and Sweden, powers particularly well inclined towards the Dutch, perhaps even England, might be drawn into a movement for the defence of treaty rights and of the liberties of Europe.

Such were the causes and the nature of the League of Augsburg of July, 1686. It was made for the unspoken purpose of opposing France. As its place of origin implies, it was an Imperial measure. Certain German states gathered round the Emperor to defend the status of the Empire as fixed by the agreements of 1648, 1679 and 1684. Thus Spain joined in for the Burgundian circle, and Sweden for her German fiefs. But, save from France, what attack was to be feared? It was significant that the Great Elector had already sent troops to Hungary, though his recent treaty with Leopold for mutual aid against damage characteristic

William
and Louis

The
Emperor's
Rise

The League
of Augsburg

of Louis remained a secret. The French King, none the less, saw that mischief was brewing, and took the appropriate steps to check the novel League. In March, 1687, both sides made declarations which at least adjourned the struggle.

King
and Pope

Before the year was over, Louis, none the less, had intervened most insolently at Rome to humiliate a Pope who denied to all ambassadors their anarchical right of asylum. This right meant that the extraterritoriality of an embassy extended to a whole quarter of the Holy City, where malefactors were wont to take refuge from the police. The French ambassador ostentatiously defied the Pope by entering Rome with a considerable force. Innocent declined to see him, pronounced a sentence of excommunication, and extended this to a French Church which had admitted him, representing as he did his royal master, to the sacrament of the altar. Early in 1688, the quarrel seemed to threaten a breach between the French Church and the papacy.

Louis, however, was dependent on the Catholic Church both for his eternal salvation and for much temporal support. This last became apparent just when the feud with Innocent reached its height, for at that moment a complication in the archbishopric of Cologne showed the power of the Pope even against the King. Cologne was the faithful and weighty ally of France, but its Elector was moribund, and the King designated as Coadjutor Cardinal Fürstenberg, his own tried agent. The Chapter was almost unanimous in his favour, but only the Pope could decide that a Coadjutor was needed. The Emperor urged him to resist the election, while great German princes opposed the appointment of a creature of Louis XIV. In June, 1688, the Cologne Elector died. Bavaria put forward her Elector's brother, a bishop-designate of seventeen, and the complicated method of election resulted in his appointment by the Pope. The King could only bluster. Innocent, he declared, was plunging Europe into war; it should cost him his Avignon; Fürstenberg had been chosen Archbishop and should so remain.

Caesarism

Louis, meanwhile, had continued to tread the path of glory. His attitude could hardly be better depicted than by his pronouncement to the Pope, 'God has set me up that I may serve as an exemplar to others, not that I may follow their example'. A second mission from the Siamese and

the foundation of Chandernagore, northward from Calcutta, attested his mounting empire overseas. The Emperor, it is true, continued to defeat the Turks, and these were also attacked both by the growing power of Muscovy and, in Greece, by the triumphant Venetians. But the Turkish war and the Hungarian rebellion continued to drain his strength, while Louis could perfect and increase his fortifications. Through 1686 and 1687, the League of Augsburg could not be formidable. Even the secret adhesion of the Pope, the subjugation of Hungary and the deposition of the Sultan did not suffice to make it the equal of France. Holland, its only moneyed member, still comprised many opponents of William, and England was paralysed by her aggressive Catholic king. The France of the Revocation seemed unassailable.

Many in later generations, none the less, have regarded the Revocation as Louis' greatest political mistake. They regard this proud assertion of unbridled despotism, like Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 or Hitler's in 1941, as the stroke, logical perhaps, but none the less suicidal, which brought the despot down. With his chief problem—that of the Spanish succession—still unripe, he alienated all Protestants by his tyranny and many Catholics by the brutality with which it was enforced. At the same time he presented foreign states with much wealth and many valuable subjects. Soon there were more than 600 Huguenot officers in the army of Brandenburg alone. More serious still, almost every sovereign, from the Pope downwards, had become his enemy. Who, save James II and Denmark, could contemplate a French alliance? All this unpopularity, moreover, had been created, or at least heightened, for no substantial gain. The Huguenots, if unmolested, might soon have dwindled into insignificance. The brutal conversion of nine-tenths of them merely demoralized France.

From 1685 to 1688, indeed, the balance of Europe was turning against the French. If he had lost the Emperor, Sweden and Brandenburg, Louis might still hope for aid from the Turks, the English and William's Dutch opponents. Within three years, however, all these hopes faded, and the would-be dictator found himself in isolation. Since the days of Soliman the Great, the Turks had shown themselves

Louis'
Isolation

Turkish
Decline

politically and socially unprogressive. But the military system which had given them a European empire remained unchanged, and there was no failure of brave and hardy rank and file. As their conquest of Crete and their grave menace to Vienna had lately shown, they were still a power to be reckoned with. Rarely, indeed, could they count on adequate leadership, either in policy, strategy or supply, while the innumerable campaigns of the Christian powers had of necessity improved the western art of war. Thus at the time of the Revocation, Leopold was enjoying an unwonted series of successes beyond his eastern frontier. The Hungarian revolt was crushed and in 1686 Ofen fell, giving the Emperor command of the middle Danube. Next year, this was extended by victory on the classic field of Mohacz, which in turn heralded a military revolt and a revolution at Constantinople. Thus the Habsburgs had recovered Hungary, and Louis, for the time at least, had lost a pillar of his anti-Habsburg system.

League of
Augsburg

The League of Augsburg, however, fell far short of that union of Europe against France which the attitude of Louis invited. It was rather, in theory at least, a secret association of powers interested in Germany to defend the existing settlements. But there was only one aggressor, as he himself well knew, who could unite the Emperor, Bavaria, Savoy, Saxony, Franconia and lesser German princes with the Swedish ruler of Pomerania and the Spanish ruler of the Netherlands in an armed league to defend the public peace and the sanctity of treaties. What force save that of France could necessitate the maintenance of a special defensive army of 60,000 men?

French
Provocations

It is significant that neither the defection of his Protestant allies, nor the successes of the Emperor, nor his own failure to secure the Palatinate inheritance for his sister-in-law, nor the French losses through the Revocation, nor the formation of the League of Augsburg—that none of these disasters caused Louis' Caesarism to abate. Such inveterate obstinacy as his, 'never inflicting an injury without adding an insult', might be intelligible in a ruler who believed himself the mere mouthpiece of his God. Louis had no doubt that God was with him, but he ascribed his greatness, often rightly, to his own calculation and diplomatic skill. At this

dangerous moment, when England might rank herself with his enemies, and French finances were by no means adequate, he recklessly outraged weaker powers, attacking Dutch trade with Turkey and the tariff rules of Spain.

In 1688 war was indeed imminent, but the question of Cologne was rather a symptom than the cause. The year formed one of those fateful moments in which personal changes and the play of diverse forces seem to deflect the course of history. The Elector of Cologne was followed to the grave by the Great Elector, while the birth of the Old Pretender racked England and gave William of Orange his chance. Meanwhile the Emperor was completing his triumph over the Turks, and his son was crowned in Hungary. Just when Louis needed all his strength to overwhelm the Emperor and the Pope, he found his great ally in England threatened by the Dutch, yet unwilling to invoke his assistance. Prompt action was necessary if the Turk was to be saved and a dangerous coalition against France averted. Louis therefore left the Dutch and English to themselves, and hurled his full strength against the Empire. All that he sought, he protested, was to guard against invasion by the confederates of Augsburg, to indemnify the Duchess of Orleans for her loss of the Palatine succession, and to secure the recognition of Cardinal Furstenberg at Cologne.

Meanwhile, the European situation was swiftly changing. In 1685 the Catholic King of England had easily disposed of the Protestant pretender, Monmouth. His people, delivered at no distant date from Cromwell, still believed that rebellion was as the sin of witchcraft, and that they might expect James' Protestant daughter to become Queen Anne. Three years of Catholic aggression, however, had taxed their patience, and in June, 1688, the birth of the King's son drove them to rebel. As the sobriquet 'the Old Pretender' suggests, men salved their consciences by professing that a nameless boy, hidden in a warming-pan, had been smuggled into the chamber of the Queen. Such Catholic trickery, they held, invited James' deposition, and William, as the husband of the rightful heir, was called on to defend the liberties of England. To him, the incarnation of resistance to the King of France, it was 'now or never', and the continental Protestants agreed. Garrisoned by the army

Changes
in 1688

The English
Crisis, 1688

which the Great Elector had bequeathed, the Dutch entrusted William with their fleet, and on November 5 he landed in Torbay. Louis, whose help James had refused, had mastered Philippsburg in the previous week, and his conquest of the Palatinate was proceeding.

If Louis could have known that James would be exiled without a struggle, and that his own most bitter foe would thus acquire the throne of England, he would doubtless have avoided the risk of an Imperial war. He strove, indeed, to represent his coercion of Philippsburg as a mere measure of defence, to be undone when the Imperialists renounced aggression. His policy could be defended as the only way to save the Turk, and as the more feasible that England was on the verge of civil war. But the collapse and flight of James falsified all calculations. Louis, who in 1688 had seized Avignon from the Pope, and bade fair to conquer the Palatinate, found himself in 1689 at war with England and faced with a Grand Alliance.

Louis and
the Grand
Alliance

The Grand Alliance of 1689 was the supreme creation of Louis' mortal enemy, now William III of England. His tireless diplomacy and Louis' Caesarism bound the most diverse powers into a firm union against France. Spain and the Dutch, the Emperor and Brandenburg, Sweden and Bavaria, England and Savoy—such were the constituent members of the league. In 1689, indeed, Louis found James unexpectedly popular in Ireland, while his enemy Innocent XI (1676–89) gave place to a milder Pope, Alexander VIII. France, moreover, was a single and well-trained power, admirably fortified and equipped, and prudently resolved on a defensive. Money was not too plentiful, but the sale of offices, by prejudicing the future, produced an immediate supply. It was difficult for the coalition either to reach the Rhenish fortresses which France had seized, or to conquer them when they had arrived.

One defensive achievement, characteristic of the ruthless Louvois, marked the campaign of 1689 and, for centuries, poisoned the relations between the French and Germans. Unable to hold the Palatinate, and resolved to deny the enemy so good a base, the French resolved on devastation.

Devastation Louvois might see no essential difference between the flooding of Holland and the burning of the Palatinate towns, especially

when the frontier regions of France underwent a patriotic devastation by their defenders. But the destruction of Mannheim, Worms and Speier, with their Reformation memories and Imperial tombs, and, above all, that of incomparable Heidelberg—these military exigencies shocked for centuries those who beheld the ruins. Totalitarian methods, however logical, have never convinced mankind.

In 1690 war raged from the Boyne to the Danube, and from the Low Countries to the Alps and Pyrenees. On the battlefield, as distinct from that exhaustion of resources which often decides protracted wars, the balance of advantage lay with France. William himself was forced to fight in Ireland, and, although, after the disaster of the Boyne, James once more fled to France, England stood in grave peril. Almost at the moment of the Boyne, Tourville's fleet was challenging the Dutch and English, and his signal victory off Beachy Head might seem the prelude to invasion. William, moreover, had failed to win the Irish, who proved at Limerick that their valour could equal that which the Protestant northerners had shown at Londonderry in the previous year.

Meanwhile the able general, Luxembourg, had won a resounding victory in the Netherlands, at Fleurus, In August, at Staffarda, the Duke of Savoy was punished by Catinat for declaring war on France. In October, another Turkish revival, due to the Kiuprili family, led to the reconquest of Belgrade, and to the re-establishment of the Transylvanian menace. Meanwhile, courtesies to the new Pope, such as the restoration of Avignon, inclined him to see in Louis a Catholic champion against heretics, Dutch, English and German. Thus France in a defensive campaign had gained prominent successes.

In the spring of 1691, moreover, the war in Europe continued to go well for France. While William, at the Hague, was toiling to organize and inspire the unwieldy coalition, the French, united and well found, gained several tangible advantages. In March, Catinat conquered Nice. In April, by an assault secretly prepared during the winter, the great fortress of Mons was captured. The downfall of Marlborough proved that Jacobitism was still a danger. Sweden, whose troops had served with William in 1688,

Extension
of the War

French
Advantage
in 1690
and 1691

joined with Denmark in a neutrality designed to safeguard their trade and shipping. In July, however, Louvois died at fifty-one, and France had no more outstanding public servants. Before the year ended, Ireland and Transylvania had been conquered. It seemed clear that the French had small prospect of vanquishing the coalition, so long as it held together, but that the coalition had no greater prospect of conquering France. If, however, England could be brought to change sides, a decision might be arrived at.

England
Holds the
Balance

In May, 1692, therefore, the French made a desperate effort to conquer England. Believing that Russell, who commanded the English fleet, would not fight against James, his lawful king, they ordered Tourville to escort an invasion force across the Channel, though his strength was less than half that of the combined Dutch and English. Russell and his men, however, were not Jacobite enough to desert to a king who fought under the French flag and proclaimed his intention of punishing vast numbers of the rebellious. With the naval disaster of La Hogue, opposite Torbay, danger from the French fleet disappeared. It remained for the combatants to dispute the hedge of fortresses with which both sides protected their frontiers.

South-eastward from Fleurus, where Meuse and Sambre unite, stands the key fortress of Namur, barring the road to Holland. This Louis attacked with overwhelming force, while Luxembourg, in a well-chosen position, kept off William. At the end of June, Namur fell. To save the Grand Alliance, menaced by the derision at his failure, William made a surprise attack on Luxembourg at Steinkirk. The battle was drawn, but Namur was not regained. Meanwhile the Duke of Savoy had invaded Dauphiné in great force. Several fortresses fell, but the province found in Catinat a skilled defender, with a modern Joan of Arc to rouse its people and win a military pension from the King. In the south, as in the north, Louis had proved victorious.

Five years of war had thus produced many great battles and sieges, but no decision. The misery inseparable from protracted warfare vexed the combatants. That of the French was heightened by a bad harvest, while the English believed themselves to be heavily taxed for the sake of blundering foreigners. Now a land-tax of 4s. in the pound

William's
Desperate
Resistance

was imposed, and a descent on France projected. Louis, hoping to deal a fatal blow, created six great armies, made Tourville, Catinat and Boufflers marshals, and established the order of St. Louis for merit by land or sea. Thanks to his own inadequacy, however, but little was accomplished. If Luxembourg could have decided strategy while Louis forced other men to show the energy of Louvois, Brussels might have been seized and Holland faced with invasion. The King, however, first failed to capture Liège and then to overwhelm William in the field. When he had quitted the Netherlands and active service together, his emancipated Marshal attacked William in his entrenchments at Neerwinden, and, at the point of the bayonet, won the most murderous battle of the war. The victory gave him Charleroi, but William's talent for reorganizing a beaten army saved Brussels.

Meanwhile three other fields were witnessing French successes. Heidelberg again suffered devastation, and the bones of its Electors were flung into the Neckar by the demoralized invaders. French corsairs, Jean Bart the most famous among them, joined Tourville in attacking the English Smyrna fleet off Cape St. Vincent, and captured more than a hundred ships. Catinat saved Pinerolo and defeated the Duke of Savoy at Marsaglia. The French superiority in 1693, a superiority visible every year since 1690, was accentuated by the Turkish repulse of the Imperial army from Belgrade.

France, on the other hand, was being drained of blood and treasure in a year marked, like 1692, by failure of the harvest. To gain time for recuperation before the crisis of the Spanish succession, Louis humbled himself to sue for peace. Restitution of the conquests made in this war, cession of French fortresses in Germany, abjuration of claims upon the Netherlands—all these he was prepared to give. But peace in 1693 would have meant that Europe confessed herself unable to coerce the would-be Caesar, and, though weary of war, she shrank from such an ending. Bargaining might go on, but meanwhile the war must continue. With her countryside ruined, with the starving rabble devouring human flesh, with Parisian pamphleteers mocking the Lord's Anointed—France might be rendered harmless. For the present at least, she had ceased to dictate to foreign powers.

Peace
Refused
to France,
1693

Campaign
of 1694

The campaign of 1694 broke the sequence of French successes. Louis' most solid gain was the weakening of William's hold on England by the death of Mary. The foundation of the Bank of England, however, signified a resounding victory over France in the vital sphere of finance. Otherwise almost every Allied undertaking failed. Luxembourg foiled William in the Netherlands; the corsairs saved the French commercial Baltic fleet; the French coasts were on the whole well defended; an invasion of Catalonia was checked by Russell before it reached Barcelona; the French troops proved ineffective on the Rhine. Louis was still ready to pay a moderate price, but peace, which William ardently desired, still escaped him. What novelty could 1695 provide?

Allies
Regain
Namur,
1695

That year began with both gain and loss to France. Her financial straits impelled her to a stroke of righteous national taxation—a graduated poll-tax, which spared no one, but pressed most heavily upon the rich. Its yield, however, was but small. Meanwhile Luxembourg died, and Villeroi proved a far from adequate successor. Seizing his opportunity, William now achieved a resounding feat of arms. Hoodwinking Villeroi, who tried to distract him by bombarding Brussels, he fell upon Namur. Always by its situation strong, the fortress had been so strengthened by Vauban as to be reputed impregnable, and it was in the brave hands of Boufflers, with a garrison of picked men. William and Coehorn, Vauban's rival, however, pressed the siege so vigorously that within two months Namur was lost to France (September 1, 1695). In July another foreign fortress had been sacrificed—Casale, in the hope of purchasing an alliance with the Duke of Savoy. He, however, demanded also Pinerolo, and Louis could not bring himself to alienate what Richelieu had acquired. His sole military success in 1695 lay in the progress of the Turks, by land and sea, against the Imperialists and the Venetians.

In 1696 nothing occurred which could reanimate the flagging war. William, now committed to the Whigs, was more than ever King of England, and England more than ever the financial superior of France. Mere lapse of time, moreover, helped to make the combatants less unbending, while the Spanish succession, which might atone for every

sacrifice, drew ever nearer. But, as before the Peace of Westphalia, there were obstacles not easy to overcome. With so many powers at war, who should mediate between them? Where could a congress meet? How could Louis, the half-divine Providence of James II, accept the usurper William as King of England? The champion of Gallican liberties, none the less, had shown in his dealings with the Pope that, when not carrying all before him, he was capable of moderation and reason, and before the sharp lesson of Namur, he had offered good terms of peace. Time had already done much to adjust the Huguenot question.

Obstacles
to Peace,
1696

In May, 1696, Louis resolved to pay the price asked by the Duke of Savoy, and thereby to win him over. Pinerolo followed Casale; the Waldenses were to be undisturbed in their religion; the Duke's daughter was to espouse the Dauphin's eldest son. France, in effect, would evacuate Italy. In October the disgusted Allies agreed with France that Italy should be neutral. While Louis was thus enabled to outnumber his enemies in the Netherlands, our Parliament voted £6,000,000 for the war and Denmark joined the Grand Alliance. The Habsburgs, indeed, were reluctant either to make any sacrifice or to end the war before the collapse of France. But the Sea Powers, whose demands Louis stood ready to concede, had only to threaten a separate peace to compel the summons of a congress. Thus 1697 became above all a year of negotiation. It was marked in the west by a single important victory, the capture of Barcelona by the French (August). This helped to make Spain repent of her aloofness from the conference for peace. Imperial victories in eastern Europe, notably the defeat of Louis' candidate for Poland by Augustus of Saxony, and Eugene's success against the Turks, could not deflect the Sea Powers from their steps to end the western war.

The year 1697, the sixtieth of Louis' life, is above all else the year of the Ryswick congress. A mediator had been found in Sweden, where Charles XII, an unruly boy of fifteen, was about to be vested with autocratic power by his oversanguine people. In a *château* between the Hague and Delft, a centre reasonably accessible to all, diplomats from the whole of Europe north of the Alps and Pyrenees settled to months of bargaining for the peace that all save the

Peace
Congress,
1697

Habsburgs ardently desired. A month after their first meeting in May, the French delegates stated firmly that they could not discuss any terms short of those laid down at Nijmegen. Their troops were threatening Brussels, and William forbade a rupture. His friend Bentinck met Boufflers privately, thus preventing the substance from being sacrificed to words and forms. Louis would sign a treaty with William and give security to the Dutch, though he would not treat James as other than a lawful king. William, regaining Orange, privately undertook to exclude French Protestants; Louis, to refrain from aiding William's enemies. It remained only for the rest of the Grand Alliance to concur. Louis would wait until the end of August, but no longer.

Treaties of
Ryswick

When the end of August came, French concessions regarding the sale of salt and herrings had won over the Dutch, but the Emperor remained unmoved. Louis announced that he would keep Strasburg, but that otherwise his offer held good until September 20. It was then accepted by the Sea Powers and Spain, Leopold delaying until the end of October. At Ryswick, therefore, England gained her Protestant succession, while the Dutch were allowed to garrison a 'barrier' of fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, thus protecting both the Netherlands and themselves. With eighty-two exceptions, the '*réunions*' were to be restored to Spain, together with all recent conquests. France retained Strasburg and Alsace, returning all other '*réunions*', together with Freiburg in Breisgau, Breisach and Philippsburg. Charles XII regained Zweibrücken (Deuxponts), and the Duke of Lorraine his duchy, except Saarlouis and Longwy. The Rhine became an international river, navigable by all. The colonial side of the war was reflected in the restoration of Pondicherry to the French East India Company in return for commercial privileges for the Dutch.

Europe
of 1697

Europe as constituted by the Ryswick peace was thus a society sharply divided between Catholic and Protestant states, and between the Sea Powers and those of the land. After some thirty-six years of Louis' government and ambitions, Spain was palpably weakened, but the Emperor, the Dutch and England were stronger than in 1661. France had improved her frontiers, which were now broken only by the curious enclave of Lorraine, while she had escaped

devastation such as she had inflicted. None the less, while remaining in many fields the foremost power in Europe, she, like her ageing King, was not what she had been a generation earlier, still less what Colbert would have made her. When the thorny question of the Spanish succession forced her to act, she could no longer settle it without regard to other powers. The statesmanship which had produced the Partition Treaty of 1668 must again be called on.

The war thus ended had formed for almost a decade the main thread and content of the history of Europe. On the mainland Louis had gone far towards vindicating the soundness of his calculations. By sea, beyond the seas, and in lands remote from France, however, consequences arose which he had not and could not have foreseen, and it is hard to maintain that on the whole he either won or lost. It must be remembered that when peace returned in 1697 the Great King was nearing sixty.

Louis and William, at least, perceived the greatness and the difficulty of the coming hour, so far as it concerned the western and the central powers of Europe. They could not realize, indeed, what storms were brewing in the north, nor how the New World would soon subvert the balance of the Old. While the name 'Louisiana' at least hinted at the possibilities of America, three extraordinary young men had mounted the thrones of Russia, Sweden and Poland, and these three swayed Europe's course forthwith. The year of Ryswick is the year in which Augustus of Saxony turned Catholic to qualify for election to the crown of Sobieski. It is also the year in which Charles XII, at fifteen, accepted autocracy over Sweden, and in which Tsar Peter quitted his fatherland to study the civilization of the west. Within three years, the trio would stagger Europe, while the Spanish question had not yet brought about a war.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE NORTH AND EAST DURING LOUIS' RISE

Europe and
Louis' Rise

NO one can doubt that between 1661 and 1697 the history of Europe centres on the rise of Louis XIV. That rise, it may be said with equal confidence, was possible only because most other European powers were exceptionally weak. The England of the Dover treaty, the Spain of Charles II, Poland after the Deluge, the Empire under Leopold, Sweden between Charles X and Charles XII, Russia before Peter the Great—all these favoured the growth of Caesarism in France. The exceptional talent of the Kiuprili told in the same direction. When Louis sought general domination, however, new persons and new movements had grown up which must be studied if the history is to be understood.

Charles XI
in Sweden

Sweden, during the wars which closed in 1678-9, was saved by Louis XIV and by her own Charles XI. The effect of her peril and of this twin salvation appeared in the strangeness of a reign which endured until 1697. The King whole-heartedly believed in absolute rule, and the non-noble Estates agreed with him. Almost furtive in an age of royal pomp, he laboured unceasingly to build up Swedish power, and to prevent its dissipation in adventure. The foremost articles in his creed were, Obey the King, abstain from war, resist the temptations of the French. Thus a solid and relatively large native army and navy came into being, and were financed by a ruthless confiscation of the alienated lands of the Crown. This 'Reduction' rendered impotent that class of *grandees* which Christina had fostered, and which foreign powers might utilize to further their designs. Applied to the Baltic Provinces, however, where the rule of German barons was fundamental, it roused a resentment which went far towards shaping the stormy history of Charles XII.

Sweden thus proved that, at least in the special circumstances of the later seventeenth century, she might govern

an augmented empire and yet keep clear of war. Provinces which others had lately held, and which were severed from her mainland by the Baltic, were in process of Swedish assimilation. Danes, Poles and Germans, however, might not always be equally unaggressive, and even the peace of the north must be affected by what the Turks and Russians chose to undertake. The ancient Swedish antagonisms against the rulers of Poland and Denmark-Norway tempted even Western powers to make political bargains which would involve the most pacific state in war. The fact remains, however, that for almost two decades Charles XI and his people were spared fresh convulsions.

The contemporary history of Poland knew no such repose as Charles XI procured for Sweden. Although the reign of John Casimir (1648-68) had proved less disastrous than in its early days seemed likely, it had cost the Poles bitter loss both in the Ukraine and on the Baltic shore. The truce with Muscovy at Andrusovo (1667) sacrificed all Polish lands beyond the Dnieper, together with the holy city of Kiev. More ominous than the sacrifice of provinces were the fruits of that 'gentry democracy' which was embodied in Poland's constitution. The great aristocratic class, it would seem, cared for nothing but its own prerogatives. To prevent the King, and even the Church, from impairing in any way its independence, and to reduce the serfs to chattels of its own—this must be the object of all Polish institutions. Thus the *Liberum Veto* was fast becoming the normal ending of every diet. A single deputy, by uttering two words of dissent, could terminate the session and annul all its previous legislation. This amazing right bore witness to the theory that the elected members of the Diet personified as many independent states, whose sovereignty could not be modified without unanimous consent. Only second to the *Liberum Veto* as a source of weakness was the system of electing a king only when the throne was actually vacant. During the interregnum, the Archbishop of Gnesen, as Interrex, assumed royal state. At this time the Queen, a French princess who had espoused two Vasa kings, twice roused rebellion by her efforts to secure the succession for Marshal Condé's son. These rebellions, indeed, were suppressed, but they had cost Poland the unity of her army and the hope of

The Polish
Constitution

constitutional reform. In 1668 the frustrated Vasa king renounced the crown.

Michael and
Sobieski

The royal election of 1669 revealed another disease which was latent in the Polish constitution—the rivalry between foreign powers to place their *protégés* upon her throne. On this occasion the gentry, suspicious of Polish magnates moved by private ambition or by foreign pay, secured the election of one of their own class, King Michael. Son of a hero of the Cossack war, claiming descent from a Jagello, husband of the Emperor's sister, he yet proved no monarch for the troublous times. The French and Austrian partisans continued their intrigues for power, while the Turks and Cossacks joined in a new onslaught. In 1672 the key fortress of Kamieniets in Podolia fell into Turkish hands, while the French invasion of Holland quenched any hope of assistance from the West. At this sad juncture, in 1673, the young King Michael died.

Once again, however, Poland rose to the height of a desperate occasion. Refusing a shameful treaty with the Turks, the nation placed on the throne the famous statesman and warrior John Sobieski, who in 1673 had gained a signal victory on the Dniester. So long as the Poles held Chotim, which he had saved, their land was in some degree safe against Turkish invasion. His reign (1674–96) proved him a resplendent national king. The adoring husband of a Frenchwoman, King John allied with France, hoping to regain East Prussia with her aid and that of Sweden. In every sense a giant, by his personality he contributed even more to Polish history than by his politics. At least until Kosciusko, the Poles produced no such inspiring hero, while in his learning, his versatility and his imagination he was a notable representative of their race.

Factors of
Polish
Policy

A strong king of Poland had indeed a wide choice of fields for his ambition. Sweden, Brandenburg, Austria, Turkey, Muscovy—all held provinces wrested from the Republic. His French queen, moreover, augmented Sobieski's liking for adventure and even enlarged its scope. He first allied with France, and for some years dreamed of taming the Great Elector, with willing help from Sweden. Defence against renewed aggression by the Turks, however, formed a prime necessity. A king forced to fight for Lwów

(Lemberg) could hardly attack Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Failing Muscovy, whose third Romanov tsar, Theodore (1676-82), turned away from strife with the Turks, and failing also France, now deep in her western struggle, Sobieski naturally sought out the consecrated enemy of Islam—the Emperor. In him he might well discover also an enemy of the Great Elector, who in 1679, having experienced the might and constancy of Louis XIV, allied himself with France. The Polish King trusted, not in vain, his own personality to rouse the nation and propitiate the partisans of Louis. Side by side with the Emperor, he hoped to marshal a European league for a new Christian Crusade.

To overthrow the Turkish power in Europe, however, the European nations must attain a perhaps impossible unanimity. Sobieski, victorious both before and after his accession, was prepared for many sacrifices of lesser Polish hopes, particularly that of reconquest on the Baltic shore. For a time at least, he would lay aside the rivalry with Moscow, and ally himself with the Emperor, the Sultan's natural enemy. In these quests he was successful, but his efforts to reconcile Bourbons and Habsburgs only impelled Louis XIV to favour the foes of Poland. In 1683 Sobieski broke off diplomatic relations with the French, and made an intimate alliance with the Emperor. Poland, in Halecki's words, once more rose to her feet, conscious of an historic mission to fulfil.

In March, 1683, the Diet consented to the Austrian alliance. Within a few months, the alliance gained Sobieski and Poland a new pinnacle of fame. In July, Vienna, destined to be the centre of Europe, found itself a tottering frontier town. An immense Turkish army under the Grand Vizier threatened to overwhelm the Duke of Lorraine and his Germans, who were perhaps one-third as numerous. On Sunday, September 12, however, Sobieski and his men heard mass upon the heights overlooking Vienna and then dashed down to attack the Turkish camp. 'The Poles', wrote Prince Eugene, then a despatch-rider, 'descended like fools and fought like lions.' Sobieski had planned a two-days battle, but by evening the Vizier and his enormous army were in retreat. The Poles had saved Vienna, and

Sobieski
and the
Turks

Poland with
Austria
against
the Turk

thereby also Poland. In this ever-famous deliverance, of the 76,000 Christians who drove off some 115,000 Turks, about one-third were Poles. Sobieski and Charles of Lorraine worked in perfect harmony, and the King was the first potentate to enter the city. Early next year he joined the Pope, the Emperor and Venice in a Holy League, to which he remained ever faithful. His strength, however, failed, and, though he fought several campaigns, his success was not prolonged beyond the matchless decade which had brought him to Vienna. He reigned for almost thirteen further years, but could not complete the restoration of the state that owed him its salvation. After a severe rebuff upon the Danube in 1683, he drove the Turks again to panic flight, but the Austrians gained the profit. When he joined the Holy League, he was striving thereby to conquer a pathway to the Euxine. But, while the Emperor recaptured Hungary, Sobieski strove in vain to subdue Moldavia and Wallachia, Danubian Principalities, which his ally also coveted. To this end he sacrificed the visionary recovery of the Ukraine. In 1686, by an 'Eternal Peace',¹ he concluded with Sophia, sister of Peter and Regent, a treaty confirming the territorial cessions made in 1667. Moscow was to rule the Cossacks, and to guarantee the toleration of her co-religionists in Poland. But Sobieski's hopes, both of Muscovite help against the Turks and of a Moldavian or Polish crown for his eldest son, paled as his own health faded, while the magnates grew no more patriotic. All hope of Polish union must vanish when, in 1697, Augustus the Strong of Saxony carried the election at Warsaw. Disappointed in his hopes of founding a dynasty, Sobieski left his country an unprogressive Republic, which lay across the path of several neighbouring states. Intolerant Romanism, a growing mystic belief in the sanctity of the Constitution, aristocracy run mad—these, not always unmingled with corruption, characterized the Poland which now placed herself anew under the reign of foreign kings.

Poland
after
Sobieski

Reign of
Augustus

Ten candidates disputed for Sobieski's heritage, with the French Prince of Conti as the favourite. Lavishly supported by Louis XIV, he was actually declared to have been elected,

¹ Named (but seldom in textbooks) the peace of Grzymieltowski, who arranged it.

but his Saxon competitor turned Catholic and won. Only in 1699 did Conti quit the field and Augustus 'the Physically Strong' enjoy an unchallenged throne. In that year, at Carlowitz, the lands lost in Podolia were restored to Poland.

At this juncture, Bernard Connor, Sobieski's doctor, was explaining Poland to the English. The Polish bishops and gentry, he declared, 'will always keep [the King] in such a dependence for the sake of his children, that he shall hardly ever be able to effect any design upon their prerogatives'. 'The Turks and Tartars', he wrote, 'are masters of Podolia and the best part of Ukraina; and the Muscovites conquered the other part of it, Kiovia, as likewise all the vast Duchies of Severia, Smolensko and Czernicovia.' His words might serve as the epitaph of Sobieski, and the clue to the career of his successor. Augustus II, characterized in history by his more than three hundred bastards, had turned Catholic to qualify for the Polish throne, and had defeated Conti by something very like a trick. Conti would have brought Poland the protection of the strongest state in Europe and one too distant to practise daily interference. Augustus bound the Republic to Saxony, an Electorate of alien sympathies in which he constantly resided. 'Gentry Democracy' had made of Poland a gold-mine for a Saxon Elector. From the first year of his reign, Augustus bargained with the neighbours of Poland for her dismemberment.

For a short time, none the less, the Saxon reaped part of the harvest sown by Sobieski. In January, 1699, the treaty of Carlowitz, north-west of Belgrade, regained from the Turks Podolia, the Ukraine and the fortress of Kamieniets. Humbled by Eugene, moreover, and menaced by the rising power of Muscovy, the Turks became henceforward well disposed towards the Poles. It was for the Polish King to penetrate the situation, and to guard against the menace from the east. Augustus, however, had already assented to the scheme of Patkul and the Tsar for a coalition to plunder Sweden. Hoping to regain Livonia for himself, he was content to abandon Kiev and to further the fatal power of Moscow. Russia, meanwhile, was drawing near to her triumphant entry into Europe. The year 1682, when Louis' Caesarism asserted itself on every side, most notably in the Gallicanism of the famous Four Articles, marks also the

Augustus,
Peter and
Charles XII

Russia and
Europe

official beginning of Tsar Peter's reign. Judicious historians have maintained that his destiny was rather to hasten than to initiate, rather to explode a mine which many hands had laid than to drag reluctant Russia towards the West. Within a generation, none the less, that people had made irrefutable her title to European influence. We must briefly survey Russian progress under the predecessors of the greatest of the Romanovs and of all tsars—that Peter whose title to be styled 'the Great' is never questioned. When he succeeded to the throne, his ancestors had reigned for nearly seventy years, but their empire was not yet European.

Lack of
Education

Philaret, who from 1619 until his death in 1633 was its real ruler, had found it impossible to institute an efficient government. Lacking education, Muscovy must lack the necessary men, and how could an educated class arise? Books, teachers, foreign travel, learned ecclesiastics—all were wanting. The government endeavoured to fill the gap from abroad, admitting foreign traders, doctors and technicians. When Michael died in 1645, the 'foreign (or German) suburb' of Moscow sheltered about a thousand Protestant families, and might serve as an instructive example to future tsars.

Michael's
Reign,
1613-45

These importations, and his own well-meaning rule for almost a generation, formed the contribution of the first Romanov tsar. In foreign affairs, his government was willing but inefficient. When the war with Poland was resumed in 1632, the Muscovites failed to regain Smolensk, but, two years later, Ladislas made peace and renounced his claim to the tsardom. In 1642 the Cossacks took Azov from the Turks and offered it to the Tsar. It became clear, however, that Moscow lacked men and money for a Turkish war, and the tempting offer was declined.

Alexis,
1645-76

In 1645, before the Peace of Westphalia had freed the exhausted combatants, Michael Romanov died, and his son Alexis succeeded. In length—to 1676—the reign resembled that of Michael, but in achievement it was far more significant. Alexis succeeded at sixteen, and the revolt of Moscow in 1648 was directed against those about him. Shocked by the misgovernment thus brought to his notice, he became ardent for reform, and began with a codification of the innumerable and haphazard laws. This led in the same

RUSSIA IN 1725



STANFORD, LONDON

year to an assembly of the representatives of 180 towns, and in 1649 to the publication of the Code of Alexis, favouring the gentry and townsfolk at the expense of the magnates, the clergy and the poor.

Next year, however, a series of minor disasters began. Two towns revolted against the effects of the treaty of Stolbova. In 1654 an attack on Poland was foiled by an outbreak of plague. To pay and to supply the army, the Government coined copper in such quantities as to produce inflation, thus destroying the balance of the currency. Copper in relation to silver fell to one-half its former value, and copper was the most widespread medium of exchange. In the advance of the tsardom, however, such disasters were trifles when compared with the opportunity afforded by the downfall of John Casimir in Poland. Lithuania, the Ukraine, primacy in eastern Europe—while Charles X ruled Sweden all these seemed to be within Alexis' grasp. In 1655 the Swedish King marched irresistibly from the Baltic to within sight of the Carpathians.

Triumph
over
Poland

At the same time the army of Alexis became masters of the coveted border fortresses of Poland. Smolensk, Vilna, Kovno, Grodno fell, while Chmielnitski (see p. 244), deprived Poland of Lublin. The Republic, however, was saved by the Muscovite's jealousy of Sweden, which still held Livonia and aimed at their permanent exclusion from the Baltic. Alexis therefore made a truce with Poland and flung himself upon the Swedes. Ingria and Livonia were overrun, but the fortresses held firm, and Riga repelled the Tsar and his huge army. They had driven Charles X to buy the lukewarm allegiance of the Great Elector with the momentous treaty of Labiau (1656), which made him sovereign in East Prussia. Alexis had thus raised a milestone on the road which within three centuries led the Brandenburgers to the gates of Moscow.

Alexis,
Sweden
and
Branden-
burg

Little
Russia

Meanwhile a chapter of no less variety and moment in Russian history was being written in the South. On the eve of Alexis' attack on Poland, Chmielnitski had made him suzerain of Little Russia. In January, 1654, at Pereiaslavl, the southerners had declared the Orthodox Tsar their lord. They were to keep their own Hetman and an autonomy which comprised even relations with foreign

powers. The Tsar merely stipulated that without his knowledge they should not approach either the Sultan or the King of Poland.

Moscow, however, was not yet capable of constitutional refinements, especially when they were applied to lands and tribes so intimately united with her own. The death of Chmielnitski in 1657 removed the mediator between two conflicting claimants. Great Russians garrisoned Kiev and other towns. They sought to extend their administration to Little Russia, and to establish there the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. The unique position of the Cossacks, and their claims to independence, complicated the whole question, and there was talk of a return to the suzerainty of Poland. The new Hetman, with Tartar aid, actually defeated the troops of the Tsar (1659).

Thanks to Chmielnitski's son, however, peace was restored by a partition. The Ukraine east of the Dnieper, together with Kiev, was to obey Moscow, while the lands on the western side returned to the rule of Poland. Such was the outcome of a ten-years war between Alexis and the Poles, ended in 1667 by an agreement at Andrusovo, near Smolensk. The Tsar relinquished his conquests in Lithuania, but kept Smolensk and the Seversk lands about the Desna, including Chernigov. Russo-Polish collaboration in the Ukraine was prompted by the sudden revival of the Turks under the Kiuprili family.

Side by side with the struggles of Alexis against Swedes and Poles went a hard-fought battle with the Patriarch of the Eastern Church. Philaret had been reckoned at least the equal of his son, Tsar Michael Romanov, and Nikon, the next great Patriarch, would have deemed it a sin to yield in church matters to the Tsar. Nikon (1605-81) was a peasant's son, a zealous and studious ecclesiastic. As a village 'pope' or priest, he had founded a family, but the death of his children drove him to religious extremes. While his wife became a nun, he entered the famous Solovetsky monastery in the White Sea, and, first as a monk, and then as an abbot in Novgorod, grew into, in Mr. Sumner's pungent phrase, 'a disconcerting compound of asceticism, learning, pride and imperiousness'. The devotion, fire and eloquence of the handsome young monk, however, impressed the Tsar,

Nikon,
1605-81

thanks to whom he became archimandrite, or abbot, of the oldest monastery in Moscow. Weekly conferences between them followed, and Alexis made Nikon first a Metropolitan and then, in 1652, Patriarch of the Russian Church.

Conflict
between
Church
and State

Nikon accepted the patriarchate with reluctance, and only after the Tsar and Council had promised him a large measure of personal obedience. Alexis, indeed, styled him 'Great lord', and when war broke out with Poland (1654) made him substantially his regent. In a state which was more than half a church, such deference was not free from danger. Undeterred by the dissent of many among his brethren, Nikon uncompromisingly asserted the supremacy of the Church over the State. Such doctrine no Tsar could tolerate, but it was not until 1666 that the sturdy resistance of the Patriarch was vanquished by his deposition. Since 1658 he had claimed the right to live in his private monastery while resuming the Patriarchate when he chose. In the meantime, with less inconsequence, Nikon had championed reforms which permanently split the Russian Church.

Reforms
of Nikon

For some two centuries vain efforts had been made to purge the Russian sacred books of demonstrable errors which had crept into the text. Translation from Greek into Church Slavonic by men whose scholarship was inadequate, and diffusion of their texts by copyists prone to err, led even to the mispronunciation of the Saviour's name. The ritual of the Church was likewise subject to dispute. Where more ancient portions of the Eastern Church crossed themselves with three fingers, and chanted three Alleluias, the Russian usage, sanctified by lapse of time, prescribed no more than two. The ikons, or sacred paintings, had also been modified by innovations from abroad.

Nikon was a self-taught scholar, but he threw himself with characteristic passion into the movement for reform, approved by two successive synods. To an overwhelming majority of Russians, including almost all the monks and popes, what the sacred books had taught their ancestors had become an inviolable part of true religion, and their own salvation was now at stake. The temper which impelled men to make themselves eunuchs, or to go into the forest and burn themselves to death, was latent in the nation. It was akin to that genius for suffering which in battle was

to make the rank and file die rather than surrender, and in retreat forbade them to think of flight. It drove the absent sons of a plague-stricken village to quit their tasks and return, merely to share its fate. 'Novelty spells calamity' was the maxim of Nikon's opponents, and they were ready to find in the dauntless Patriarch their favourite bogey, Antichrist. Revolts sprang up on all sides, and for a decade the Solovetsky monks defied the forces of the Tsar (1666-76). Both Nikon and his successors punished with grim severity all resistance to what they deemed lawful commands.

Such commands might be strange indeed. Before Nikon's patriarchate, clergy had abridged the time during which they were forced to stand before the altar by having several portions of the service read or sung at the same time. Through fear of discontent, the Church Council sanctioned this amazing procedure, until in a later year their decision was reversed. Nikon himself laid more stress upon external unity than inward agreement, aligning his own branch of the Church with that of the Greeks until it should be able to absorb them. Thus he set the Russian Church upon the road which to some of its sons seemed that of destiny—the road which led to the incorporation of all the Eastern Churches in that of Russia.

The immediate consequences of Nikon's reform, however, was a great and growing schism. The so-called Old Believers, mainly from the middle and lower classes, were at one in abhorring the changes which, at Nikon's instance, the Council of the Church had now decreed. They had priests, though it was difficult to train them, and they gradually gained the reputation of being more godly than the members of the official Russian Church. From them, however, sprang fanatics with the wildest tenets, some priestless, some who rejected wedlock, some who abjured all worship, or lashed or maimed themselves, or fled from the society of men.

The rise of the Old Believers owed much to the Archpriest Avvakum (1621-81), a pope's son who surpassed Nikon in force and eloquence, but also in narrowness of mind. His denunciations of the Patriarch as Antichrist brought him to Siberia in 1657, but eight years' exile could not tame his spirit. He attacked officialdom with scorn, untamed by a further fourteen years in ever sterner captivity, until at last

Church
Anomalies

The Old
Believers

he perished at the stake. Like Nikon, he had shown what untamable force lay in the zealotry of Russia.

Wars and
Progress
under Alexis

Religious schism assailed 'the Gentle Tsar' at a time when he was deep in fateful struggles both to the south and to the west of Muscovy. War with Poland from 1654 to 1667, war with Sweden from 1656 to 1659, war in Little Russia with the forces of Stenka ('Steenie') Razin, especially in 1670 and 1671—such was the record of a reign which began with risings in Moscow, Novgorod (the Great) and Pskov. The twin triumphs of Alexis in 1667 by no means ended the achievements of his momentous reign. 'The Kindly Tsar' had then concluded with Poland a truce which proved an epoch, for it marked the permanent superiority of Russia. He had also triumphed over the greatest advocate of the claims of the Russian Church to be superior to the Russian State. That church, indeed, embraced almost all Russian men, a race of conspicuous extremists, wont to follow a principle to its furthest consequences and to shrink from no sacrifice for its realization. Their life from the cradle to the grave was dominated by the Church, while the State was represented by a distant tsar and officials whom most men saw but seldom. The downfall of Nikon before the weeping Alexis therefore marked a great advance in the evolution of the autocratic tsardom.

Rising of
the Serfs,
1668

The last decade of the reign, however, witnessed a dangerous offensive on the part of a third foe to the rising state, a foe less highly organized but not less dangerous than Poland or than the Russian Church. This was the instinct of the Russian labourer for liberty—liberty to choose for himself his dwelling-place and calling, and to reject the demand of the class above him that he should be a serf. That class, however, was indispensable to the transformation of Russia into a considerable power. Without the gentry, the monarchy could do nothing. Its territories were far too vast and inaccessible to be administered from Moscow, even had the Tsar himself been rich and strong. To produce surplus wealth, moreover, the landlord and the industrialist must have labour, such as free Russia herself could neither furnish nor import. Hence the words 'progress', 'army', 'revenue' and 'administration' implied in Russia 'gentry' and 'serf'. But the compulsory change from ancient

liberty to serfdom could not be made without a struggle, probably without many struggles. Such was the famous rising of Stenka Razin (1668-71).

The reduction of the Cossack class to order and the division of the Ukraine between Muscovy and Poland were changes not to be made without friction. Many disaffected peasants fled to the seeming haven of the Don, where they united with the Cossacks or became brigands. The nearness of the Tartar lands also suggested that the Turks might extend their empire northwards and deliver the oppressed. What was certain, however, was that many fugitives had merely become slaves to the Cossacks, and that there was much distress and discontent.

Disaffection found a leader in the Cossack, Stephen Razin, Stenka
Razin who boldly led his comrades to the Persian lands upon the Caspian. Turning thence to Astrachan, they met the commissioners of the Tsar, who persuaded them to return to the Don. Their fame, their booty and the real grievances of the serfs, however, impelled them to create a dangerous revolt upon the Volga, with Tartar aid. In 1670 the towns from Astrachan to Samara fell into their hands, while a social war which did not even spare the churches ravaged the countryside. Moscow itself became uneasy, but next year saw Razin put to flight by the new army at Simbirsk. He was executed, and his followers split into marauding bands. The career of this precursor of the more famous Pugachev a century later showed the abiding infirmity of the Russian state. This was the prevalence of social discontent, with no appeal except to arson, pillage and murder, and no remedy except belated and uncertain military force.

Next year (1672), while Louis XIV marched upon the Dutch and involved the west in a six years war, Alexis was Alexis'
Turkish
War and
Death summoned by the Turks to a still longer struggle. The distance of both Moscow and Constantinople from the lower Dnieper, however, reduced the violence of the war, and the historic significance of the year arises most of all from the birth of Alexis' son Peter. Early in 1676 the Tsar died, leaving two sons by an earlier wife, and a party hostile to that which surrounded Peter's mother.

The rule and the wars of Alexis the Gentle (1645-76) Little
Russia,
c. 1676 had gone far towards transforming his nation. Though

separatism between Great and Little Russians remained vigorous, their union had survived great shocks, and by two decades of precedent the tsardom had gained ground. In 1667 Poland had definitely yielded Little Russia. Many generations must pass, indeed, before south and north could feel themselves one people. Little Russia, from Kiev eastwards, remained a region of rich and open country with scattered homesteads, unlike the Great Russian straggling villages, if indeed the Tartar menace did not enforce either a military settlement or none. Her people were of more purely Slavonic blood than were the northerners, and differed from them in dialect and in their more gentle and sentimental disposition. They retained a large autonomy under a hetman of their own, and stood in close relation to problems and powers which were strange to the other subjects of the Tsar. Turkish policy, Cossackdom, Union of the Greek rite and the papal organization—such were their special questions. Thus the consolidation of Russia formed a task as weighty and perhaps as difficult as her future intrusion into Europe.

Every student knows that a giant destined to perform almost every task which confronted Russia was to reveal himself within a generation of his father's death. Peter the Great, a nominal tsar from childhood, became with the turn of the century the arbiter of Russia's fate. The violence of the torrent which he unloosed compels inquiry into the seemingly stagnant waters on which his predecessors steered their bark almost unseen by Europe. Alexis, after some passing tempests, had seen the Russians advance towards unity, while Sweden and Poland at least acknowledged them as equals before the law. South of the Gulf of Finland, their frontier ran in a slightly concave line from Narva and its river to the Dnieper some 90 miles north of Kiev, whence it followed the river to the cataracts. Farther southwards, Tartars and Circassians cut off Russia from the Black Sea; as did the tribesmen of Cabardia from the Caucasus.

The
Successors
to Alexis

When the Gentle Tsar died, early in 1676, having only reached the middle forties, he left a large family by his consorts of the Miloslavsky and Narishkin families. The former included two sons, Theodore and John, and eight vigorous daughters. Of the Narishkin clan were born

Peter, in 1672, and his elder sister, Natalia. The rivalries almost inseparable from such a situation were increased by two further complications. Theodore, aged fourteen, suffered from an incurable disease, and a party of ambitious nobles struggled for the direction of the state. An unsuccessful attempt to place Peter upon the throne added to the general friction about the court. His mother and her two children were banished thence, by a decree which may be ranked among the weightiest in the history of Russia. For it caused Peter, like Henry of Navarre, to grow up in a village, seeing mankind as nature made it, and without the artificial atmosphere which must surround a throne.

The six years before his death in 1682, during half of ^{Theodore, 1676-82} which he reigned without ruling, proved the invalid Theodore an enlightened reformer, and Russia a land not unworthy of reform. Contact with Poland favoured the infiltration of Western culture, although the progressives remained but few. An Academy of Sciences was founded, and the terrible severity of legal punishments received some mitigation. Smokers, however, were still doomed by the code of 1647 to lose their nose. To Prince Basil Galitsyn, the leading Westerner, was entrusted the task of introducing Western discipline into the army.

Army reform, indeed, was a crying necessity, in view ^{Army Reform} both of the tyranny and the disorder of the *Streltsy* ('arrow-men', now musketeers) who garrisoned Moscow, and of the code of precedence, which for a full century had complicated and sometimes paralysed the command. This code in effect bound each noble family into a corporation, of which no member could serve anyone whose family was of a lower grade. Perplexing and detrimental in social intercourse and in the civil service, this system became dangerous in time of war. Sometimes, indeed, the Tsar saved military discipline by declaring all such precedence to be suspended. With peace, however, the nuisance was revived. Theodore, guided by Galitsyn, and strengthened by a council, ordered the Books of Pedigrees to be burned, and placed all future appointments at the unfettered discretion of the Tsar. This, which has been styled 'his one interesting achievement', showed by its success that Russia was not incapable of reform, and, in time, it mightily increased her strength.

Succession
Difficulties

In April, 1682, the sudden death of the childless Theodore left others to determine the succession. The public held that the rightful heir to the throne was Alexis' son Ivan (John), then fifteen years of age. Ivan's imbecility and ill-health, however, prompted a *coup d'état* in favour of his half-brother Peter, whom the Patriarch proclaimed in the Red Square at Moscow. This violation of the tradition which assigned rule during an interregnum to the Council, as well as Miloslavsky ambitions, provoked a counter *coup d'état*, in which Sophia, third daughter of Alexis, took the lead. The Miloslavsky family and their friends, supported by the mutinous and ill-paid *Streltsy*, and by rumours that the nobles had installed changelings in the royal family, soon seized the capital and put their enemies to death. Before the end of May, by mere force, Ivan and Peter had become joint tsars, with Sophia to rule as regent.

Sophia
Dominant

At this point, the Old Believers strove to inflame the *Streltsy* against Nikon's innovations. Sophia, however, sustained by her paramour Basil Galitsyn, met them face to face, refuted their contentions and rejected their requests. Quitting the capital, she prepared to annihilate the opposing faction, and suddenly slew its leaders. In November the Court returned to Moscow in triumph. All this proved that Russia had no valid constitution, and that ascendancy in Moscow might dispose of the whole state. On the other hand, the Romanov family was beyond question strongly entrenched. Imbeciles, children, women—all might hope for the tsardom, provided that they were of the ruling House.

Peter
Romanov

Sophia, who left the administration to Galitsyn, ruled for several years in Moscow with Ivan at her side, while Peter and his mother dwelt in seclusion, usually at the village of Preobrazhensk. There the Junior Tsar, now growing to gigantic strength and stature, passed much of his time in amateur manœuvres, commemorated by the famous Preobrazhensky regiment which he built up. He was assisted by foreigners from the so-called 'German suburb' of Moscow. Contemptuous neglect by Sophia and the Court, absence of non-military study, aid from Western immigrants superior to the Russians, the strident hatred of the clergy for everything foreign—these influences upon young Peter were soon to affect the history of the world.

Perhaps the greatest of such early influences was fear. Peter and his mother had not known in 1682 whether the monastery to which they fled could save their lives, and the boy of ten had seen the slaughter of his kinsmen. Village life was for them a sort of hiding, commended by its avoidance of a daily challenge to the ruling powers, and by the possibility of escape, if assassins were despatched towards their retreat. No experiences could have done more to sear and warp the youthful Tsar. Throughout his life he detested his court and capital.

On the other hand, constructive influences other than soldiering contributed much to Peter's training. His official and unofficial tutors, though some were toppers, gave him a modicum of schooling, especially in mathematics and science. Languages, German and Dutch, he picked up in the 'German suburb'. The convivial Swiss, General Lefort, later taught him how a Western gentleman might behave, while in the Scottish Catholic, Patrick Gordon, he gained an outstanding soldier and a distinguished friend. Peter's inborn passion for navigation also found some scope on inland waters. The future Russian fleet owed much to his study of a derelict sailing-boat within a hundred miles of Moscow.

While Peter's development did not remove his reputation of a negligible loafer, the rulers of Russia made some political advance. In 1686 they concluded a definite peace with Poland on the terms of the truce of Andrusovo (1667). John Sobieski thus sanctioned a great advance in Russian power and prestige, at the expense of Poland. Besides Little Russia, Kiev was now ceded in return for cash, while the Poles undertook to maintain the liberties of their Orthodox subjects. Next year, Basil Galitsyn led an expedition against the Crimea, north of the Black Sea. By firing the steppe, however, the Tartars, or their Cossack allies, forced the invaders to retreat. The Cossack hetman was then deposed, and Mazeppa elected in his stead.

The year 1689, in which Peter became of age to govern, was outstanding in Russian history. At his mother's behest, he espoused Eudoxia Lopukhina, thus losing all that a happy marriage might have brought him. Sophia clung to power, but a second failure by Galitsyn to conquer the

Progress
in Foreign
Affairs

Peter's
Majority
and
Marriage,
1689

Crimea weakened the authority of the *régime* while a treaty with China marked the Russian withdrawal from the Amur. Such were the preliminaries of an appeal to force which conferred the real sovereignty on Peter.

Civil War :
Peter
Supreme

The decisive factors in an almost bloodless civil war were again the *Streltsy* and the Old Believers. The westernizing rule of Sophia had been far from tolerant of fanatics who resisted the government to uphold the sanctity of false translations, and they were indisposed to fight on its behalf against their lawful sovereign. Galitsyn, moreover, was so unpopular that there had already been threats and attempts to slay him. Thus when the *Streltsy*, many of them Old Believers, rose in revolt, it was by no means certain against whom the revolt was directed. Hearing that armed bands were in the Kremlin, however, Peter fled in panic by night to the monastery of the Troitsa (Trinity), with its garrison 20,000 strong. The shock to his nervous system is said to have maimed it for life. Sudden spasms and grimaces, inability to control his lusts and temper, a savagery remarkable even in Muscovy—all these have been ascribed to the uprising of August, 1689.

Yet the uprising proved fatal only to Peter's foes. Russian history contains few records more farcical than that of the Patriarch's mission from the Kremlin to bring the Junior Tsar to reason. Rejoicing in his unexpected liberation, the holy man made his way to the Troitsa—and stayed there. In a few days, Peter, with Gordon's troops, was ruling from the Kremlin. Tsar Ivan, who lived for some seven years more, was passive in his hands. Sophia was doomed to spend the next seventeen years in a convent, where she died. Galitsyn remained a prisoner for the rest of his lengthy life, and died in 1713.

Although triumphant in 1689, Peter at first left the administration to his mother and to the Patriarch, and changed his life but little. Their rule was definitely hostile to foreign innovations. Next year the Patriarch died, to be succeeded by Adrian, whose dying wish was that all men of other faiths should be burned to death. In 1693 Peter visited Archangel, and for the first time beheld the sea. Despite unfavourable geography, schemes for a fleet thenceforth ranked foremost in his mind. His mother's death in

1694 increased the burden of his duties, but left him more free to choose his policy and agents.

Foreign affairs then claimed his earnest attention. For many years the struggle between the Emperor and the Sultan had continued, with varying fortune. The would-be conquerors of Vienna were its neighbours while still distant from vital Russia. In 1695, however, fulfilling the treaty of 1686 with Poland, Peter attacked Azov, the key to the Caspian and Don. But even the skill of Gordon, he soon learned, could not reduce a fortress which was supplied and reinforced by sea, and the campaign failed. Peter at once began to build, at Voronezh, far up the Don, a fleet superior to the Turkish. In July, 1696, by almost superhuman energy, he took Azov with its aid, and so gave Russia her first triumph against the Turks. Victory, gained by the employment of foreign artificers, heralded an immense advance. Ships, sailors, funds, science, if possible, allies—all must be found by Russia. Peter, sole tsar, since Ivan now died and left no son, strove to do everything at once, so far as possible, with his own hands. He had built a ship at Voronezh and wielded a pike at Azov. Now he would join a band of students in acquiring for Russia the experience of the Western shipwrights. When a tsar, hitherto an idol seldom seen by the populace, and never quitting Russia, made such a contribution, the rich must be content to bear heavy taxation in men and money, while foreign powers might perhaps be expected to join in a crusade.

The Tsar's western journey of 1697 and 1698 gained a world fame surpassing that of any other achievement in his dazzling life. It has been acutely observed that all his seeming whims coincided with the real needs of Russia. 'Peter,' wrote the Pole Waliszewski two centuries later, 'Peter is Russia—her flesh and blood, her temperament and genius, her virtues and her vices—a collective being—a great man, in whom the thoughts and wills of millions appear incarnate.' Her fuller revelation in the twentieth century confirms this diagnosis. In her most outstanding characteristics, intolerance of vested interests, contempt for life in comparison with a new idea, joy in revolt against the past, and in an immediate dash towards the newly envisaged paradise—in all this, as in capacity to learn

Struggle
against
the Turks

Peter's
Fleet

Peter's
Western
Journey

and incredible energy in execution, Peter still stands for Russia.

Peter and
Russia

In will-power and in virtue, however, the Tsar was certainly unlike his people. His Russia was, and long remained, an agricultural society, and that in a climate which vetoed work through the long and snow-bound winter, while spring was short and autumn difficult. The Russians therefore divided their lives between long periods of stern toil and sluggish reaction, an alternation from which, it has been held, their character received its impress. Strenuous and slothful, exalted and depressed by turns, they could be guided and subdued by dint of steadfast force. Such malleability might well be increased by that tendency to exalt immaterial values by comparison with material which characterizes many Slavs. Acton declared Peter's court no place for training a gentleman, saying that to him civilization was material not moral, that truth, honour and justice were to him of small account, and that for such imponderables he had no scales. This grave indictment, though it might in part be extended to Russia, was levelled solely against the Tsar, in whom many of his subjects saw not an ideal Russian but a child of Satan.

Peter and
Western
Europe

The journey begun in March, 1697, had the twofold object of forming a Holy League for co-operation against the Turks, and of endowing Russia with western science. Travelling incognito amid a great embassy of some three hundred, led by Lefort, while Gordon watched over Moscow, Peter now first beheld the Baltic. In Swedish Riga the Russians deemed their reception cold, but in Prussia the Elector Frederick (soon to become a King) gave them a warm welcome and the advice to fight Sweden rather than the Turks. Poland was now in the throes of a royal election, and the eventual accession of the Saxon Augustus instead of the French Conti owed something to Peter's threats.

The Tsar himself spent some five months in the shipyards of Holland, and four in Deptford, studying much else meanwhile. To his companions, 'when a little merry', he would often say that the life of an English admiral was far happier than his own. In January, 1698, he returned to Holland, where his envoys reported their failure to establish the Holy League against the Turks. The expectation of the death of

the childless Charles II of Spain, indeed, gave both Louis and his opponents much else to think of, while France could not be indifferent to the welfare of a Sultan who threatened the Habsburg flank and rear. Vienna, whither the Russians next turned their steps, was no less desirous to escape from every Turkish complication. Venice stood next on the list, but at this point politics called Peter home. Once again, he learned, the *Streltsy* had risen in revolt (June, 1698).

By August, Peter had reached Preobrazhensk, and a whirlwind was let loose on Russia. His homeward route crossed Poland, where his sudden intimacy with Augustus, whose morals were like his own, boded ill for Sweden, the power which obstructed both their paths. First, however, Russia must be purged of rebels and possible rivals, as well as of much that the West had rejected or outgrown. The purging filled the autumn months with tales of horror, but inaugurated a new phase of Russian administration.

Suppression
of Russian
Opposition

The *Streltsy*, it appeared, had been resentful and disaffected, rather than seriously rebellious. Peter's mercenaries overthrew them with ease, and afterwards many prisoners were put to death. Peter's wife, Eudoxia, he flung into a convent, and two of his half-sisters were made nuns. Many Muscovites almost worshipped the beards and robes which they shared with the most sacred figures on the all-pervasive ikons. The word of a man to whom God had given a flowing beard ranked with the oath of one clean-shaven. Peter outlawed both beards and robes, and himself plied the shears on many of his leading subjects, before calling off the barber on payment of a tax. Priests and peasants, however, remained unmolested, since no advantage could be gained by presenting them as Europeans. The Russian year 7208, dating from the Creation and beginning on September 1, was replaced on January 1 by the European 1700. Meanwhile, amid an orgy of hard drinking, the captive *Streltsy* were publicly tortured to death, Peter and his friends sharing in this work also. Some 2,000 lost their lives. Many Russians believed that the moustached and impious tsar must be a changeling or even Antichrist, but the nation as a whole obeyed him. Russia, it seemed, inherited the unity and discipline lacking in many European nations.

Peter's
Helpers

While throughout his reign Peter was rather endured than appreciated by the masses, he early gained the support of a handful of invaluable Russian men. His foreign friend, Lefort, died early in 1699, and in the same year Peter himself closed the eyes of Patrick Gordon. But he had already discerned the talent and energy of a few Muscovites with whose aid he could transform the realm. Menshikov, once a pastry-cook's apprentice, had shared his travels, and henceforth acted as his lieutenant. Golovin, who had fought and negotiated with China, proved an able foreign minister, and Kurbatov managed finance and local government. While, apart from well-watched Moscow, those who abhorred Peter's *régime* could find no accessible meeting-place, the Tsar might count on the support of these three and other high officials in Church and State, together with that of the armed forces and of the conscience of a vast though silent section of the people. Nowhere, indeed, was obedience to the Lord's anointed more potent than in Russia. Revolts were usually local risings against a grievance ascribed to subjects, whom if he knew the facts, the Tsar, men said, would assuredly chastise.

Peter's
Foreign
Policy

Peter next prepared to strike for access to the Baltic. Peace with the Turks, however, was slow in coming. In January, 1699, by the treaty of Carlowitz, Austria, Venice and Poland had gained much at their expense. Next year, Peter's diplomats also at last secured good terms. Ominously enough for the future of the Sultan's empire, the Russians had approached his capital by sea. The efforts of the Western powers, who saw their monopoly of this approach infringed, prolonged the negotiations, but could not break them off. Peter himself escorted the fleet which sailed down the Don from Voronezh to the new Russian fortress of Taganrog, and thence through the Sea of Azov to Kertch, near the entrance to the Euxine. Thence one Russian warship was grudgingly admitted to the waters which the Turks regarded as their dearest jewel, a virgin undefiled by any foreign trader. Pamburg, its Dutch captain, made his own way to Constantinople and maintained himself there by threats of force.

Russo-
Turkish
Settlement
of 1700

After months of negotiation, the Russo-Turkish treaty was signed at Constantinople, the news reaching the Tsar in August, 1700. A thirty years truce raised the tsar's

Resident in Constantinople to equality with those of other Christian powers. Azov and Taganrog remained Russian, while some Dnieper fortresses were abandoned to the Turks. A belt of desert was to separate Russia from the Crimea, and Russian tribute to the Tartars came to an end. Russian pilgrims might henceforth visit Jerusalem without being taxed, and Russian ecclesiastics were immune in the Turkish empire. Peter was thus set free to strive for ampler access to the Baltic.

A few words may indicate how the divided dominions of ^{Hungary and Transylvania} Hungary were affected by the struggles between their neighbours. In Hungary, when Ferdinand III began his milder rule (1637-57), a Catholic reformation had become less of a political adventure. The complexity of the situation was increased, moreover, by proof that the Turks were not intolerant, and that their overlordship might be preferable to that of Protestant or Catholic zealots. At the same time, Transylvania lost influence, when her Prince attempted to secure the Polish crown, while the Westphalian Peace set free the Emperor to develop his power over Hungary. Thus the reign of Leopold I (1658-1705) stands for war against both Hungarian liberties and Turkish domination. The brilliant autocracy of France dazzled many rulers, not least the Emperor.

In 1661 the question of the Transylvanian succession involved the Empire in a Turkish war. Her connexion with the League of the Rhine drew France into the struggle, and in 1664 she helped Montecuculi to win a crushing victory at St. Gothard on the Raab. The truce of twenty years which followed at Vasvar, however, showed great mildness towards the Turks, perhaps with the design of bridling Hungary. They retained the suzerainty over Transylvania and their conquests of Grosswardein and Neuhausel, and received a gift of money. All this infuriated the Hungarians and impelled them to plot for independence. Nine years later, the aristocratic conspirators were crushed by Imperial force, and Hungary was martyred by a reign of terror. Her ancient constitution did not survive, and she was ruled by men who deemed religious toleration a sin.

Although the Magyars were divided, there were many who would face the Emperor rather than submit. The

The Relief
of Vienna,
1683

ambitious Tököli led the rebels, who found natural allies against Leopold in the Transylvanians and the Turks, while France sent subsidies to the opponents of the Habsburg. The Emperor Leopold, indeed, gained much by politic concession, but Tököli threw in his lot with the seemingly irresistible Turk. Such was the prelude to Sobieski's miracle at Vienna in 1683. This was followed by a series of Imperial victories which culminated, four years later, in the triumph of Charles of Lorraine near Mohacz. The Hungarian rebels, whose chastisement was severe, had cost their country a great part of its ancient liberties. The crown became hereditary in the Habsburg house; the chartered right of resistance disappeared; religious toleration was curtailed. The Magyar gentry, it seemed, must content themselves with the relics of an aristocratic constitution.

The tossing waves of high European policy, however, bore Hungary into harbour. A great Kiuprili, favoured by Louis' onslaught in the West, enabled the Turks to menace Leopold once more. Aided by Tököli in Transylvania, he regained Belgrade, while the Emperor appeased the Principality by granting far-reaching autonomy and full religious toleration. After Kiuprili's death, indeed, Eugene and the western peace destroyed the Turkish effort, and the Peace of Carlowitz (1699) ended the war. Of historic Hungary the Sultan kept only the Banat of Temesvar, a quadrilateral north of the Danube between Belgrade and Orsova, and east of the Theiss between Belgrade and Szegedin. Even this they lost within twenty years, for at Passarowitz (1718) the Banat passed to the Emperor.

After-history It may be added that the renewal of the western war naturally interrupted the Hungarian settlement. France, of course, studied to rouse trouble in the Habsburg rear; and found her opportunity in the *jacquerie* of Rakoczy. Madened by war taxation and religious persecution, the Magyar masses rose in 1703, with great success, until the French defeat at Blenheim exposed them once more to Leopold's powerful army. The new Emperor, Joseph I (1705-11), was encouraged by further victories to refuse the rebels' more extreme demands, and the movement for Hungarian independence therefore went on until the first days of his successor, Charles VI (1711-40). By 1715 the conciliatory Emperor

had fully accepted the liberties of Hungary, including freedom of religion. Ruled by a monarch whom they could trust, the Hungarians co-operated in reform. No chapter in their history is more famous than that which resulted from the Pragmatic Sanction and recorded the readiness of the heroic nation to die for its so-called King, Maria Theresa.

CHAPTER XXV

EUROPE AND THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

A. SPAIN UNDER CHARLES II (1665-1700)

AFTER long and violent wars, Europe in 1697 had reached this position—that, although France had failed to conquer her, she could not be sure of continued safety. Spain was still a great prize with an uncertain future. Added to France, she might yet make Louis Caesar. Self-defence therefore forced other powers, so far as might be possible, to guard against the mounting danger. The Spanish succession question, powerful in 1668, was more than ever absorbing thirty years later. It demands a brief review of the disastrous reign then closing at Madrid.

Charles II
Succeeds
Philip IV

The death of Philip IV had made Charles II, a child of four, nominal King of Spain (1665-1700). His father's will entrusted the administration to his Austrian mother, Mariana, assisted by a council of six. The Queen-Mother, however, forced her confessor, Father Nithard, upon the Spaniards, thus establishing an unpopular pro-German government which Don John declined to serve. By a good fortune rare indeed in seventeenth-century Spain, Portugal was then suffering from her vicious King's feud with his brother, and gave up Ceuta as the price of peace (February, 1668). But the fatuous Spanish economic policy remained unchanged, and when, pleading Devolution, Louis struck in Flanders, Spain could not meet him in the field. To raise or pay forces comparable with his was simply beyond her power. The widest of empires must depend on possible allies.

Aggression
of Louis XIV

The first strokes of the war of 1667 wrested from Spanish hands a long series of valuable Flemish towns. The peril with which such conquests threatened the Dutch, and, in a less degree, threatened also their English and Swedish allies, however, evoked an opposition which Louis was not prepared either to ignore or to defy. He therefore turned against Franche Comté, which Spain could not defend, but would

not sacrifice. The three Protestant powers, indeed, procured its retrocession (1668), but Louis' baseless claims to the Netherlands were honoured by the transfer to him of the captured cities as the price of peace.

The next importunate assailant of the Spanish Regency proved to be Don John, demanding the dismissal of Father Nithard. The Spaniards, by a great majority, came out on the same side, and, in 1669, a show of force compelled the Queen-Mother to assent. To sacrifice a trusted counsellor at the bidding of a subject riding with a rebel escort through Spain was indeed a humiliation. But, as Turenne's career had proved, contemporary notions drew a sharp distinction between the sanctities of a royal Regent and of a reigning king, while the previous history of Queen Mariana showed the power in Spain of what might be called public opinion. In 1669, thanks to this opposition, Don John became Viceroy of Aragon.

Meanwhile the ascendancy of Louis XIV over each of his neighbours grew yearly more apparent. After his diplomatic check at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668, his aim must be to avert a new coalition against French expansion in the Low Countries. To this end he courted Spain. Although weakened by privateering overseas, and by the shipwreck of a great fleet at Cadiz, her opposition might still involve him in war on several fronts, against herself, and probably also against her allies. The Spanish Regency, however, realized that, whether France first acquired the Netherlands or conquered Holland, the outcome would be substantially the same. Without Dutch aid, their northern dependency could not be held. They therefore rejected Louis' offer to exchange Portugal for Flanders, and trusted to the associated powers which had checked Devolution.

Louis XIV
and Spain,
1672

At the outset, the Spanish calculation proved unsound. Louis had found a king in England and an aristocracy in Sweden, of which neither would oppose him. The lightning invasion of 1672 seemed to have shattered the Dutch Republic. It may be that the King's strongest foe was his own timidity as a commander. But Louis, if a cautious general, was an exacting conqueror, and all reasonable offers by the Dutchmen were refused. Holland, Spain and Europe therefore gained breathing-space, and what had seemed the irresistible

onslaught of the French became the signal for a seven years' war.

War of
1672

Between 1672 and 1678, Spain paid a great price for the honour of saving Europe. The main battlefield, as Louis' own presence showed, became and remained her Netherlands. She found herself attacked also in Franche Comté, in Catalonia, and, in concert with a local rebellion, in Sicily. Thrice were the French victorious in the Mediterranean over Dutch and Spanish fleets. It profited Spain but little that the Emperor entered the war, that the English were drawn to side with Holland, and that the Great Elector triumphed against the Swedes. The Spaniards themselves could attack only in Roussillon, and there without success. They could only plunge deeper into financial ruin during the war, and make bitter sacrifices at its close.

Spanish
Losses,
1678

The long negotiations at Nijmegen embodied the triumph of nimbler wits at the expense of Spain. Her coastline in the Netherlands remained hers, indeed, only because the Sea Powers wished to keep it in hands weaker than those of Louis. But the Dutch did not hesitate to make a separate peace based on Spanish losses, and no power prevented France from the incorporation of Franche Comté. Thus, while Spain regained many places in the Netherlands and one in Catalonia, she must renounce a dozen in Flanders, Valenciennes, Cambrai, Aire, St. Omer and Ypres among them. She thus conceded to France a strong line from Dunkirk to the Meuse. From 1678 she was palpably an exhausted power, by no means immune from famine, and with a fast-dwindling population. Her capital was thought to have lost half its citizens, while Burgos, the capital of Old Castile, remains only a glorious relic of its earlier days.

Inadequate
Rulers

What a strong king or a minister like those of France could have made of Spain in Louis' heyday, it is impossible to decide. The terror of a preventive war always hovered over her northern frontier. But after November, 1675, when Charles, at fifteen, came of age to govern, a series of inadequate men and women steered the state. The worthless Queen Mariana had exalted an unworthy favourite, Valenzuela. This man foiled one attempt of Don John to rule by controlling the young King, whom Habsburg inbreeding had made feeble almost to imbecility. Don

John, however, sallied forth from Saragossa, and, with the aid of the disgusted nobles, mastered the Queen and drove the favourite into exile. Despite the unwonted peace, none the less, Don John lamentably failed to rule better than his predecessors. He saved the King, indeed, from yet another Habsburg bride. In August, 1679, Charles gladly espoused a fascinating princess of Orleans, the niece of Louis XIV and granddaughter of Charles Stuart. Next month Don John died, and the Queen-Mother returned to power.

The tragedy of the young French Queen of Spain lasted for a decade, until her unhappy death in 1689. By that time, Louis' fate had reached its crisis, but the power of Spain was in eclipse. It was, indeed, impossible to determine wherein that power consisted. The King's edicts, however obtained, had binding force, while the Queen-Mother could at least tyrannize over the Queen. There was a First Minister, the Duke of Medina-Celi, who from 1680 to 1685 consented to hold office. There were councils, ministries and viceroalties, but no effective government. Perhaps the strongest corporation was the Church, which burned heretics in unprecedented numbers. Spain, it is true, could never cease to be taken into account in the struggle between Louis and the European order, but neither the Great King nor his opponents now rated her as more than a secondary power.

The cavalier treatment of Spain by Louis XIV on several frontiers inspired her adhesion in 1682 to the alliance which afterwards produced the League of Augsburg. The Dutch and Swedes were then marshalling many German princes, including the Emperor, in defence of the great European treaties, which were plainly menaced by France. Although the Turkish onslaught paralysed the Emperor, Spain declared war at the end of 1683. Louis therefore attacked both in Luxemburg and Catalonia, and, in spite of brave resistance, won a triumphant peace (1684). Next year, Count Oropesa succeeded Medina-Celi as minister, and for a few years infused some energy into suffering Spain. In 1686 the completed League of Augsburg confronted an intolerable king, who had humbled the Pope and the Huguenots, Spain and the Emperor alike. Two years later the storm broke,

French
Dominance

War of the
League of
Augsburg

but, happily for Spain, its chief fury raged beyond the Pyrenees. Flanders and Catalonia, however, must expect to be attacked.

At this crisis, the feeble Charles II again became a pawn in the game of matrimonial exchanges. In 1689, when his French queen died, the Queen-Mother insisted that he must re-marry. So evenly divided were the Spaniards between a French and an Austrian match, that the Emperor was desired to select the bride. He chose a greedy virago, a princess of Neuburg, and Spain found herself irrevocably entangled in the war. Her position was such that both the victories and the reverses of her numerous allies combined to involve her in loss. Thus, when the French failed in Ireland, they were impelled to concentrate more upon land warfare, while their success against Savoy imperilled Spanish Italy. The French victory off Beachy Head enabled them to cut off Spain more readily from Italy, and that just when the new phase of the Turkish war tended to distract the Emperor. Since 1689 William had been King of England—an Anglo-Dutch combination which promised little tenderness for the country of the Inquisition. In 1691 Oropesa fell, and with him all hope of a coherent and patriotic government. Meanwhile the frontier war favoured the French, and Spanish coast towns suffered from their bombardment.

The
Succession
Problem

From 1693, at the latest, the approaching extinction of the royal line took the foremost place in Spanish politics. Since the state was still in great measure rather dynastic than national in its basis, the reign of a feeble, childless invalid lessened the energy both of her subjects and of her allies. At the same time, a royal attempt to ignore the very real differences between her constituent kingdoms, and to entrust three *grandees* with rule over as many paper sections of the land, made governmental chaos complete. The English fleet had saved Barcelona; French troops had invaded Catalonia; the Turks were moving forward; the death of Luxembourg had eased the situation in the Netherlands; Namur was reconquered—but all such fluctuations seemed to the Spaniards trivial in comparison with their sufferings at home. Spain's own—largely alien—rulers were trampling on their subjects' historic rights,

and confiscating whatever wealth they had. Not for the first time nor the last, Spain became bankrupt (1696). When Savoy was seduced by Louis, and Vendôme captured Barcelona, even Spaniards could not deny the need for negotiation. The Queen-Mother's death in 1696 at least removed one complication.

In the following year, at Ryswick, whose situation near The Ryswick Settlement the Hague suggests that Western powers, including England, were involved, a congress met which was the lineal descendant of the meetings in Westphalia and at Nijmegen. The terms of the treaties thus achieved in 1697 were dominated by Louis' need for peace, and by his desire to secure the utmost advantage from Charles' expected death. The Protestant Succession in England was recognized; almost all conquests were abandoned, and with them claims for which France had gone to war. Spain thus regained Catalonia, together with Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath and Courtrai, as well as two contributions of doubtful value to the safety of her Netherlands. There a barrier of fortresses confronting France was to be occupied by troops in the pay of Holland, while Louis added to their security by evacuating his conquests on the right bank of the Rhine. From the point of view of Spain, it was perhaps no less important that the rise of William's England might restore the European balance which her own decline and the ascent of France had overthrown.

On the morrow of the Ryswick peace, Louis, of course, concentrated his energies on the Spanish succession. French diplomacy was then unequalled, and, early in 1698, one of its foremost practitioners, Harcourt, arrived in Spain. While William III negotiated with Tallard for Partition, Harcourt, through the Cardinal Archbishop Portocarrero, was building up French influence over the wretched Charles and many of his subjects. Without the knowledge of his German queen, the King appointed a new confessor, and thus gained courage to defy the detested consort.

Now began the famous but futile attempt, the most Partition Policy wounding conceivable to Spain, made by foreign powers to enforce upon her whatever succession they might deem best for Europe. From the Spanish standpoint, their own empire was indivisible; and its throne, the property of an heir-at-law whose identity the lawyers must discover. Something of a

prima facie case could thus be made out for three princes—the Dauphin's second son, the Emperor's second son, and the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. The Bavarian was descended from Philip IV and also connected by descent with the Habsburgs. According to the partitioning powers, his succession to the bulk of the Spanish empire would least endanger peace. Their treaty therefore gave the French and Imperial candidates compensation in Italy, and assigned to him Spain, her Netherlands and her Indies.

Second
Partition
Treaty

Early in 1699, however, soon after the quasi-partition at Carlowitz of the Turkish empire in Europe, the Bavarian prince died in childhood. His supporter, Oropesa, who had regained influence at court, was forced by the mob to retire. Thus the French party in Spain became supreme. France and the Sea Powers then agreed on a Second Partition (March, 1700). This assigned Spain, the Netherlands and the Indies to the Archduke Charles, and provided that, by ceding her Italian share, France might acquire Lorraine. The Emperor forthwith registered his dissent. He went so far as to grant the Elector of Brandenburg a crown, thereby securing his far-reaching support against France. The French party, however, gained a victory over the unstable will of the dying King. Early in October, he bequeathed all to Louis' grandson, Philip, and within a month expired. In mid-November, Louis accepted the will, thereby delighting Spain, and disappointing the Archduke Charles and the Duke of Savoy, the reversionary heirs. Caesarism once more menaced Europe.

B. EUROPE AND LOUIS XIV (1697-1706)

The latest years of the dismal reign of the Spanish Charles II must now be viewed through the eyes of Europe.

The
Spanish
Succession
Question

Since the Peace of Ryswick, the leading powers, indeed, had been preoccupied above all else with Spain. A great empire in two continents must soon change its lord, and at all costs it must be prevented from enabling him to overwhelm the other European states. The moribund Charles II was closely akin to both of the most dangerous monarchs, the Emperor and the King of France. Leopold's mother was a younger daughter of Philip III, and his wife a younger

daughter of Philip IV. If heredity were automatically to decide, Louis had clearly a better claim, for his mother and wife were the eldest daughters of the same Spanish kings. If, on the other hand, the heir to a throne could treat his title as mere private property, it was significant that the brides of France had renounced their rights of succession, while the Austrians reserved them. To avoid an evident outrage upon the balance of power, the Emperor claimed the inheritance for his second son, the Archduke Charles, and Louis, for the second son of the Dauphin, Philip, Duke of Anjou.

Heredity, however, could be urged in favour of a third claimant, whose grandmother was the Spanish wife of Leopold, and his father, Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, the wise ruler of the Spanish Netherlands. While Madrid was torn by pro-Austrian and pro-Bavarian factions, and the frail King wearied of his Austrian queen, the powers were deep in preparation for the crisis. Louis unostentatiously girdled Spain with his fleets and armies, and employed Harcourt, a skilful diplomat, to win the favour of Madrid. William and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, had to contend with their nations' weariness of war, but without the Dutch and English, Leopold could hardly hope to coerce the French. Louis therefore did not refuse their offer of an agreed Partition, in place of that continued unity which all Spaniards desired. If peninsular Spain fell to the Electoral Prince, other claimants might be solaced with outlying lands, and a European war averted.

By mid-October, 1698, after long negotiations between France, England and the Dutch, it was agreed that the bulk of the Spanish dominions should be ruled by the Electoral Prince. France was to receive Naples and Sicily, a kingdom which might give her great interest in the Mediterranean, together with compensation for Luxemburg in Italy and in the Pyrenees. The Archduke Charles was to be offered Milan. This arrangement, however, though it promised Spain prosperity and Europe peace, roused both the Emperor and the Spaniards to fury. Leopold saw the greater part of Spain assigned to France and Bavaria, powers usually hostile to Austria, while Spain resented partition by English, French and Dutch, her three upstart enemies. In November, 1698,

Partition
Treaty
of 1698

Charles announced that he had made the Bavarian his universal heir. Louis ingeniously suggested that Bavaria should renounce what the treaty had earmarked for the other claimants. Early in February, 1699, however, the Electoral Prince lay dead, so opportunely for the Emperor that rumour even charged him with using poison. Partition must be negotiated anew.

New
Strength
of Austria,
1699

In little more than a year, the Second Partition Treaty was agreed on. During 1699 a vigorous exchange of views went on, while in some respects the situation changed. England turned ever more firmly from the risk of war, thus driving William near to abdication. The dominant fact had been hitherto the superiority in armaments of France to every rival, so that, with the aid of the Sea Powers, she might always count on victory. In January, 1699, however, the great Peace of Carlowitz recorded an unprecedented triumph of the Emperor and his associates over the Turks. All Hungary, save the Banat of Temesvar, the region east of the lower Theiss, now became his, with Transylvania and much of the territory of the Croats and Slovenes. It was also to his advantage that, north of the Dniester, Kameniets henceforward guarded Poland, while the Morea and some Dalmatian strongholds passed to Venice. Fortune, moreover, had given him, in Prince Eugene of Savoy, a general of rare ability, whose crushing victory on the Theiss at Zenta (September, 1697) went far towards compelling peace. Exhausted as she was, Austria might soon become more than ever formidable, and Louis was therefore the more ready to adopt his favourite pose of modesty and reason.

Partition
Treaty
of 1700

Thanks in the main to the momentary moderation of France, the Second Partition Treaty (March, 1700) assigned Spain, the Netherlands and the Indies to the Archduke Charles. France herself was to add Milan to her former share. From the Sea Powers' point of view, this arrangement should secure peace for Europe, and the commerce of the Spanish empire for themselves. The possibility that the French would gain domination in Italy might be left to the future, while the morality of thus partitioning the dominions of a neighbour could be defended by the difficulty of curbing Louis XIV, and by the catastrophic consequences of leaving him unpugged with regard to Spain.

Two obstacles to the success of any equitable partition, however, presented themselves without delay. The proposed arrangement was scouted both by Leopold and by Spain. The Emperor, whose diplomacy at Madrid had been contemptible, offered no really constructive suggestion. The Spaniards, however, aided by Louis' admirable agents, began to see that their best chance of maintaining their empire lay in entrusting it to the King of France. Their dying monarch, indeed, strove to secure the help of the Emperor in preparing the inheritance of the Archduke Charles, but without success. Louis, on the other hand, by recalling Harcourt and sending troops to the Spanish frontier, shook Charles' resolution. Influenced by the Spanish primate, the dying man turned to the Pope for advice, since heretics were demanding that he should cheat his Catholic kinsman and heir. The husband of Mme de Maintenon, however, was now in high repute at Rome, and the primate Portocarrero bade fair to be the real ruler of Spain. Innocent XII, therefore, replied as the Jesuits and the Spanish people desired. Early in October, Charles II bequeathed his undivided empire to Philip of Anjou, with the proviso that France and Spain should never be united. Four weeks later he died.

November, 1700, therefore, brought perhaps the greatest crisis in all the two-and-seventy years that Louis passed upon the throne. At the moment when the amazing struggle between Charles XII and Russia was being engaged, the French King and his counsellors must choose between the Partition Treaty and the testament of Charles. The treaty, it should be borne in mind, had never been accepted by the Emperor, and it was uncertain whether the Sea Powers could be counted on to secure its execution. The Spaniards, on the other hand, would do their utmost to resist the Austrian sovereign to whose rule it had condemned them. Louis had now to choose between accepting for his grandson their spacious and friendly empire, or forcing it to submit to the Habsburgs, his hereditary foes. Although the Emperor at this moment tempted the Great Elector's son with the crown of Prussia, he could not form a party strong enough to attack both France and Spain. Cologne and Bavaria, like Portugal, were partisans of France. Louis, moreover,

Charles'
Death and
Louis'
Choice

was not the king, nor France the nation, to be cowed by craven fears of being great. A week after receiving the dazzling tidings, he presented Philip to his courtiers as the King of Spain, and the Spanish ambassador declared that the Pyrenees no more existed. In February, 1701, after a long triumphal progress, Louis' grandson reigned as Philip V at Madrid.

Philip V
Spain

February, 1701, when the fifth King Philip entered his enraptured capital, seemed to bring quite unwonted happiness to Spain. A handsome youth succeeded a human wreck: the proud empire remained undivided, and by far the greatest potentate in Christendom stood pledged to its defence. Savoy, as usual, joined what seemed to her the winning side, and the Sea Powers, with Portugal, Cologne, Bavaria and many lesser German princes, recognized Philip as king. None the less, before the year was over, the battle of Spain had been begun. In Italy, the Emperor's great warrior, Eugene, made his presence felt, while Boufflers challenged Europe by occupying the Spanish Netherlands. In September William III united the Sea Powers and the Emperor in a new Grand Alliance, and Louis, by a series of haughty acts, cemented it and gained it the support of the Dutch and English commercial classes. The seizure of the Dutch Barrier, the menace to both Dutch and English trade, the reservation of Philip's rights to the French throne, the ceremonial recognition of the Old Pretender as James II's successor—these were the deeds which for a full decade determined the history of Spain and Europe.

Philip V, for a short space an amiable young Bourbon happily wedded to a vigorous Savoyard princess, must suffer for his grandfather's attempt to dictate to Europe. No member of the Grand Alliance denied his right to Spain, though the widowed Habsburg Queen declared that her husband had verbally recalled the bequest before he died. The hostile powers fought to prevent the union of France and Spain, to defend the commercial concessions made to them by the late king, to save the Indies and their own Indian trade from France, and, in the Netherlands and Italy, to establish barriers for their own security. Thus the War of the Spanish Succession was not attributable to any new transgressions by the Spanish King or people. Louis'

carefully phrased exhortation to his grandson, indeed, had been redolent of a happy future. 'Be a good Spaniard,' said the old King, 'tis now your foremost duty, but remember that you were born French to reconcile the two peoples; that will bring happiness to both and peace to Europe.'

Louis might be an incomparable actor of majesty, but after forty years as dictator he had Caesarism in his bones, and complete disguise was impossible. 'Lose no time in carrying out my commands', was no way to write to the King of Spain. He confessed that he worked more on Spanish business than on French, and that he looked forward to the time when the commerce of the Spanish empire might be transferred from Dutch and English hands into his own. Meanwhile he felt affronted by the spectacle of Dutch troops holding the Barrier fortresses to guard against the grandfather of the Netherlands' present king. Early in February, 1701, the French seized both the fortresses and the garrisons, thus making the Dutch army hostages for the recognition of Philip V. Thus the Dutch hastened to grant, thereby recovering their troops and gaining time to prepare for war.

Without England, however, war against France was impossible, and there opposition to William's policy was at its height. The Act of Settlement, which now secured to the House of Hanover the reversion to the crown, significantly debarred the future sovereign from quitting England, or making war for his continental possessions, without consent of Parliament. The Tory attitude towards the war and William appeared in the attempted impeachment of the leading Whigs for their share in the Partition treaties. But while the negotiations with the French went on, the national temper rose, and, before the summer, the Commons were eager to support the Dutch in their resistance. Both Sea Powers were outraged by French appropriation of Spanish commerce. In April, moreover, the Imperialists had crossed the Alps, and Eugene was conquering Milan.

The Italian campaign of 1701, in which the French and Spanish were faced by the Imperialists alone, suggested that a new Grand Alliance might quickly prove successful. Eugene found Catinat and Villeroy far inferior to himself, while the Duke of Savoy, father-in-law of Philip V. maintaining the traditions of his House, sought chiefly his own

Louis
the Cause
of War

England
the Arbiter

Italian War,
1701

advantage. Early in September, the new Grand Alliance was agreed on at the Hague. Without disputing Philip's throne, the Sea Powers joined the Emperor in a new treaty of Partition, for the security of Europe and for their own advantage. Louis, they declared, must agree to their acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Naples, Sicily and various parts of Tuscany and Spanish America. Spanish colonial commerce must be renounced by the French in favour of the Sea Powers, and the two crowns must never be united.

England
Alienated

Within ten days of the Hague agreement, the indiscreet magnificence of Louis infuriated the bulk of the English nation. James II, who with his family were honoured guests in exile, died, and Louis publicly assured his son of his protection. The new James III, in English history the Old Pretender, as a Catholic was incapable of the succession. Louis, indeed, continued to treat William as *de facto* king, while among his own titles William kept that of 'King of France', but the slighted nation was in no mood to argue. William found himself popular as never before. In the shortest time possible, he broke off the negotiation with France, and secured a bellicose House of Commons. With an Emperor who had no other enemy, and with Sea Powers whose resources surpassed his own, Louis, now the decadent king of a declining state, stood face to face with disaster.

Death of
William :
Coalition
Continues

In March, 1702, however, before he could taste the joy of his promising campaign, King William died. The French sincerely thanked God for the providence which had thus removed the creator of the nascent coalition. None but William, they believed, could harmonize the Dutch, the English and the Austrians. His throne was filled by an indolent woman, whose conscience reproached her for thus supplanting her brother, James III. In Holland, moreover, the extreme Republicans had been William's foes. Both states, however, remained true to his policy, and, in mid-May, Louis received three declarations of war.

Behind the Emperor and the Sea Powers stood Denmark and many German states, who had promised men in return for cash, while Louis' Caesarism cemented all the allies. Accident, moreover, had placed at their disposal a triumvirate which might give them hope of vanquishing even France.

The Dutch state was swayed by an inconspicuous and therefore more serviceable public servant of rare ability and of the highest character, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, Heinsius. England could dispose of the greatest soldier in all her history, and at the same time a supreme diplomatist, the Earl—in December, 1702, the Duke—of Marlborough. To crown all, the merest chance had given Austria a great foreign general whose talents raised her in war and peace to a height which her own sons could not have reached. History at this point turns on the personality of Prince Eugene.

Triumvirate
includes
Eugene

Born in 1663, of high rank, but poor and unprotected, a would-be soldier, but conspicuously ugly, sickly and undersized, Eugene was the fifth son of a Savoyard prince, the Count of Soissons, and of Olympia, one of the nieces whom Mazarin brought to France and whom the King had learned to disapprove. As a boy, he idolized Louis, but in 1683 begged him in vain for the command of a company. His valour against the Turks, however, won him a dragoon regiment from the Emperor, and thereafter his rise was swift. Equally bold and fortunate, a deep student of all that related to war, but never pedantic or visionary, he was noted for brilliant intuition, high character and friendly disposition. To detach him from the Grand Alliance, Louis secretly offered him wealth, office and a marshal's baton, but in vain. In September, 1697, he crushed a great Turkish army at Zenta. Their dead approached 30,000; Transylvania was saved; and, in 1699, the triumphant Peace of Carlowitz marked the eclipse of Louis' invaluable eastern ally. If Austria could venture on the War of the Spanish Succession, it was in great part because she possessed a general and a counsellor in Eugene.

When the will of Charles of Spain was made known, a dispassionate calculation showed solid reasons for Louis' acceptance. Leopold was then old, unarmed and poor, while almost every other sovereign must face domestic problems which seemed to forbid his interference. The warlike Germans, the unwarlike Italians, the youthful rulers of Scandinavia, Poland and Russia, the harassed King who reigned in England and influenced Holland—none, it might well be thought, could or would plunge into war. Savoy

Impediments
to Coalition
Overcome

had been won over to Louis' side, Spain would support the French king, and a few years should bring a Turkish recovery. But the influence of Eugene with Leopold, his bold stroke in northern Italy, and the admirable understanding with Marlborough that he at once achieved, opened the chapter which ended only at Utrecht. Two men of genius and a steadfast Dutchman were to prove stronger than Louis and his system.

Louis'
Allies and
Measures

In defying the coalition, whose brilliant leaders disposed of a quarter of a million men, France was supported by not a few allies. The great Spanish empire for which she fought, however, was a majestic wreck, needing defence on many sides and lacking both men and money. The defects of the King and Queen were partially covered by the Princesse des Ursins, the energetic and intriguing mistress of the Court. At first, indeed, all Iberia opposed the coalition, for Portugal owed to France her renewed independence, and since 1640 had been her ally. Savoy, moreover, was linked by marriage with both France and Spain. Bavaria sought to avenge on the Emperor the death of the Electoral Prince, and, by shielding France against Austrian invasion, to gain the Netherlands, perhaps even the Empire, as a reward. The Elector's brother, the Archbishop of Cologne, also sided against the heretics with the Most Christian and Most Catholic Kings.

These alliances went far towards veiling the fact that neither France nor Louis were what they had been in earlier days. In the administration, the human capital bequeathed by Mazarin was exhausted, save in the person of the ageing King. An autocrat seldom inspires able and independent public servants, and the laborious Louis imagined that, by working still harder, he could atone for the inadequacy of feeble but docile colleagues. In the classic case of Voysin, promoted because his wife had lent Mme de Maintenon a dressing-gown, the King swept aside his confession of weakness with the assurance that he himself would cover the defects. The army, of course, retained more independence, and Villars, Berwick and Vendôme proved able generals. But, here again, Louis promoted courtiers, and lowered the service by establishing a hundred new regiments recruited by officers who thus purchased their commissions. A royal

navy inadequate for its many tasks was likewise padded with privateers of doubtful value.

The campaign of 1702 afforded more than one hint as to the course which the war was likely to follow. In the northern struggle, Charles XII, having cowed the Danes and routed Peter's army, was engaged in conquering Poland—a task which must delay indefinitely any direct participation by Sweden in the western conflict. Indirectly, since the Polish King was Elector of Saxony, Charles XII deprived the Emperor of a Saxon contingent, a deficiency made good by the newly-made 'King in Prussia', who sent 30,000 mercenaries in place of the 8,000 due. On the whole, France found herself and her allies compelled to stand on the defensive. In 1702 Louis had still to pay for the Revocation and for the French devastation in Germany. The Cevennes, where the Protestant rebels were known as Camisards, taxed his military resources, while the Rhenish Germans fought against him with doubled zeal.

In Italy, the alliance of Savoy helped France to oppose Eugene in Milan, where Catinat and Villeroi had already found themselves outclassed. In 1701 Louis' ally, the Duke of Mantua, had been driven from his duchy, and lesser Italian princes won for the Imperial cause. In 1702—to the great profit of France, said her wits—Villeroi was captured. Vendôme, an eccentric genius, grandson of Henry IV and Gabrielle d'Estrées, then checked Eugene's career of conquest, though he could not drive him from the country. Meanwhile, the familiar battleground in the Low Countries once more saw the armies struggling for its many fortresses. The Dutch had strong defences and a great host, while the Spanish Netherlands were ill-defended, and Cologne far from secure.

To Marlborough all this suggested a war of movement, which might crush the French and their allies in the field, and thus bring about a decision. The Dutch, however, preferred to take no risks, but rather to broaden the belt between themselves and France by a number of successful sieges. Thus limited, Marlborough could only follow up the earlier conquest of Kaiserswerth by taking fortresses in Brabant, as well as the great city of Liège. This, with

¹ Frederick, successor of the Great Elector,

Progress
in 1702
and 1703

victory at sea and the destruction of a Spanish treasure fleet, was a profit inadequate to the Allies' superiority in numbers, which might vanish with the advent of the new levies now forming in France. At the same time, the sluggishness of the Margrave of Baden prevented rapid progress in southern Germany, though the Bavarian seizure of Ulm provoked the Diet to declare war on France and her allies (September, 1702). The foundation of St. Petersburg, the creation of a Russian navy, the despatch of Russian troops to assist the King of Poland—all this promised to prolong the freedom of the west from northern intervention. Hungary was once again stirred by France to rise against the Habsburgs. On the other hand, the revolt in the Cevennes spread, and 60,000 men must be detailed to put it down. In May, Portugal sought greater safety by joining the Allies, and, in December, Methuen arranged a further treaty which bound her closely to Britain. Her port was to displace the claret brought from France, while in return her markets were opened to British textiles. Thenceforward the Allies had a firm base for attacking Spain.

In the fighting of 1703, however, honours were more evenly divided. Thanks to Marlborough, the French were expelled from Cologne. In the absence of Eugene, on the other hand, Villars skilfully extricated the Elector of Bavaria from a difficult situation, caused in part by the Imperial army raised to carry out the resolution of the Diet. The Duke of Savoy, none the less, decided that the Emperor would be the better paymaster, and the following year began with an Austrian army side by side with his own.

Campaign
of Blenheim

In 1704, therefore, the French must fight six campaigns at once, with no ally except their feeble *protégés*, Bavaria and Spain. Their most advanced army, isolated, ill-found and not too ably led, was that which defended Bavaria and its Elector. By an amazing secret march, in the course of which he rallied to his standard Hessians and Prussians, Marlborough transferred his troops from the Meuse to the Danube, met the Imperialists near Ulm, and crossed the river early in July. There Eugene joined him, and the Elector and the French gave battle. On August 13, at Blenheim (Höchstädt), the Allies destroyed the Bavarians and French, whose numbers almost equalled their own.

Bavaria lay prostrate before them, and in September they crossed the Rhine.

Blenheim must always rank among the decisive battles of the world. A few hours, it seemed, had changed the fate of kingdoms, and wrested from France all possibility of imposing her will on Europe. After Blenheim, it was said, Mme de Maintenon must break to Louis the news that he was no longer invincible. With his general and half his army captives, the King could neither save Bavaria, nor hold many of his recent gains in Germany. As great in diplomacy as in war, Marlborough at Berlin secured the Grand Alliance against interference from the north or east of Europe, though the Hungarian incubus continued to paralyse the Emperor.

Jealousies of all kinds, however, cramped the strategy of the victors. Among their major gains in 1704, none the less, was the abandonment of the policy of Partition. The English fleet bore the Archduke Charles to Lisbon, whence, as Charles III of Spain, he hoped to conquer what, he claimed, was his hereditary realm. In his name, Rooke, repelled from Barcelona, had already captured the gateway of the Mediterranean—Gibraltar.

The effect of the staggering blow of Blenheim, none the less, was to rally the French nation round its undaunted King. With no ally save his grandson, Louis became more than ever the symbol of the unity of France. In disaster he showed himself great, especially when, with exquisite sympathy, he condoled with sufferers from the misfortune. In 1705, on the other hand, the moral inferiority of the Allies marred a campaign which might have been decisive. Enfeebled by mutual jealousies, they seemed incapable of a combined onslaught upon France. The Emperor was accused of thinking only of Hungary; the Dutch, of disunion, of cowardice and of profiting by trade with the enemy; the English, of indifference to the safety of their continental allies. Louis further sapped the energy of his foes by dangling before them plans for a new Partition. Meanwhile, the revolt in the Cevennes had died away, and the army had been refreshed and freed from the distraction of Germany. The defence of the fatherland against Marlborough was now laid on the broad shoulders of Villars.

Friction
in 1705

The Austrian garrisons roused the Bavarian people to revolt, so that next year both Bavaria and Cologne were put to the ban of the Empire. In the north Marlborough's activity was nullified by the exaggerated caution both of the Margrave of Baden and of the Dutch.

Allied
Progress
in Spain,
1705

In Spain alone, and there after many fluctuations, could the Allies claim any real progress in 1705. Disappointed of valid aid from Portugal, but encouraged by the successful defence of Gibraltar, they induced Charles III to base the intended invasion on Catalonia. While one brave foreigner, Mme des Ursins, roused the Spaniards to defend Philip V, another, that human whirlwind, Lord Peterborough, captured Barcelona and planned to attack Madrid. Catalonia had never been Spanish at heart, while Valencia and Aragon were by no means assimilated to Castile. These three provinces recognized Charles III, and thus redeemed the Allies in 1705 from total failure. Louis' boldness in sending his grandson to Madrid, however, was rewarded by the prospect of a new ally. Already triumphant against Savoy, none the less, Marlborough, by diplomatic action at Berlin and at Vienna, again protected the western struggle from interference, while the crown given to the Great Elector's son continued to bring in many Prussian recruits.

Accession
of Joseph I

In May, 1705, however, the long reign of the Emperor had ended, and his son Joseph I (1705-11) succeeded him. This attractive Habsburg showed the fullest confidence in Eugene, and although Turin alone defied Vendôme, Savoy remained unsubdued. The new Emperor's Hanoverian consort had brought him two daughters, who married the Bavarian and the Saxon princes, but he had still no son. His brother, 'Charles III of Spain', might therefore succeed to the Empire, and the Allies in that case would have fought against the Bourbon preponderance only to restore that of the Habsburgs. Each year that left this family situation unchanged must weaken the basis of the Grand Alliance. Louis, moreover, was now reduced to negotiation. Thus the coalition was doubly threatened with the loss of its reason for existence—the Caesarism of Louis XIV. Every winter, moreover, gave the Allied powers several months for reflection on the diminished noxiousness of France and the increased offensiveness of each other. The Dutch in particular, after

William's death, could not fail to see the uncertainty of English politics, and the greed of their English allies for commercial advantages at their expense. The Republic, indeed, was exhausting itself for ever to be rid of a peril which had in fact passed away. Almost as many reasons could be adduced for an *entente* with France against England as for a war with England against France. Much depended upon Heinsius, a man born in the days of Louis XIII and an inflexible supporter of William III. But the Dutch were neither militant nor docile. Political differences among them had encouraged Louis in the autumn of 1705 to offer them a new Partition. If Philip might keep Spain and the Indies, the Archduke would be free to share the remaining Spanish possessions with Bavaria and Lorraine, whose Duke would yield Lorraine and several fortresses in the Netherlands to France. The Grand Pensionary, however, was not tempted by an offer which no patriotic Spaniard could have endorsed.

In English histories, 1706 is sometimes styled 'the year of victory', or 'the *Annus Mirabilis* of the Grand Alliance', and it is far from uninteresting to survey the causes and the meaning of these terms. Never was that prime factor in success, the Duke of Marlborough, more influential or more dazlingly triumphant. After the campaign of 1705 he toured the Allied capitals, visiting in turn Vienna, Berlin, Hanover and the Hague, before returning to dominate London. Everywhere, Allied discontent melted in the sunshine of his smile. The Emperor found his own overwhelming burden cut down. King Frederick, duly paid, consented to fight on in Italy. The Electress Sophia was reconciled with the English court. Above all, the Dutch agreed to reinforce and pay Eugene. Thus the foundations were laid for the momentous victories in Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and Italy which followed.

At the same time, however, it is impossible entirely to reject the contention of Mr. Lecky, that the reasonable objects of England had been attained before the campaign began, and that after its close the continuance of warfare spelt an English disaster. The aims of the Grand Alliance—an adequate barrier for the Dutch and a reasonable satisfaction in Italy for the Emperor—were, the critics hold, secure at the close of 1705. 'Had the peace been made in

Dutch
Doubts

'The Year
of Victory',
1706

1706 instead of 1713, more than thirty millions of English money, as well as innumerable English lives, would have been saved.' The Allies, however, had neither conquered nor converted Spain, and their union was incomparably less complete than that of France. They might justly fear that, by negotiation, Louis would complete the mounting distaste of some of them for war, and thus gain superiority before the next campaign. France, after all, was fighting both for her own existence and for the dynasty to which most Spaniards now cordially adhered.

Marlbor-
ough's
Triumphs,
1706

Although not even Marlborough could move the States General to countenance adventure, his second-best plan for 1706 brought dazzling results. A cold statement that Philip V was driven out of Spain into Roussillon, that Eugene expelled the French from Italy, that Marlborough took Antwerp and conquered the Spanish Netherlands, and that Louis earnestly sued for peace—this suffices to indicate the features of an incomparable year. A triple problem confronted the Allies—to make Charles III master of Philip's dominions both in the Netherlands and Italy as well as in peninsular Spain. It was complicated by an early triumph of Vendôme, who in April drove the Imperialists from Brescia. Marlborough would gladly have joined Eugene in this southern theatre, but the timid Dutch, learning that the Margrave of Baden had quitted Alsace and recrossed the Rhine, vetoed the move.

Had Marlborough conquered in Italy, he would have utilized British sea power in a direct attack on Spain. Baulked in this, he strengthened Eugene for a slower conquest, and himself moved in the Netherlands. Villeroi, however, boldly marched against him, and at Ramillies a desperate and epoch-making duel took place. The French then learned what cavalry could do in difficult country when handled by a master, and how far a beaten army might be driven in panic flight. The battle cost them some 15,000 men, and the conquests which followed drove them headlong to Courtrai. Brabant and most of Flanders were thus lost, with Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, Ostend and other important towns. At the same time, the victory at Ramillies influenced every other theatre of war. The Margrave was saved by Villars from pursuit, and Eugene enabled in September to

capture Turin. King Charles III was proclaimed in the Netherlands, and the Estates of Flanders and Brabant concurred. Marlborough even marched on Lille, bringing Vendôme from Italy in haste to safeguard France. Meanwhile the French and Spaniards had vainly attempted to regain Barcelona, and English and Portuguese troops proclaimed Charles in Madrid. The Habsburg, however, prudently contented himself with the Crown of Aragon, which he assumed behind the screen of mountains, at Saragossa. Louis, deprived by Eugene of Italy, offered as the price of peace to restrict Philip to the two Sicilies and Milan, giving Spain and the Indies to Charles III and the Netherlands to the Dutch. But before Marlborough could reject this offer, the Spanish people had restored the capital to Philip.

The second alternative from which Louis might hope for salvation lay in a possible outcome of the great northern war. For much of the seventeenth century Sweden had been the ally of France, and her Charles XII now seemed invincible. If his policy was incalculable, so also was that of Peter, the upstart Tsar. The remote and mysterious north might yet intervene to overthrow the western coalition. That possibility warrants a detailed account of its history during the crisis in Spain.

The
Northern
War

CHAPTER XXVI

THE GREAT WAR OF THE NORTH (1700-1706)

Attack on
Sweden

FROM the Russian point of view, Peter's attack on Sweden in 1700 was an alluring speculation. War with the Swedes would assuredly train Russian armies in one of the best schools in Europe, at the same time expanding the Tsar's revenue from taxation and his autocratic power. Few Russians could resent taxes imposed to break the Swedish yoke, nor could they count on their removal after peace. Earlier generations had made Sweden the gaoler of Muscovy, and a tsar need have as little compunction in attacking her as Peter had in hoodwinking her by deceitful assurances of friendship. The 'window on the Baltic' which he sought would not only gratify his personal craving for navigation; it would also give Russia access to her only possible source of wealth at that time—trade with the Western nations.

Opportunity
of 1700

If made in 1700, moreover, a Russian war with Sweden promised swift success. Augustus, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, would be a powerful ally: the co-operation of Sweden's rival, Denmark, might be expected: the Sea Powers, Sweden's protectors, were absorbed in the affairs of Spain: the harsh measures of Charles XI had alienated many of his subjects in Livonia. One of them, Patkul, was busily traversing neighbouring lands to move their rulers against Sweden. Although she had made pacts with Holland, England and several German states, it was hardly too much to hope that her only active friends would be the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the Sultan of Turkey, the first of no great strength and the second exhausted by recent wars.

Charles XII

The war of 1700 against Sweden, with the Baltic as Peter's goal, was preceded, however, by much involved diplomacy. The young Charles XII, whose amazing capacity and strength of will were quite unknown, had been made an autocrat at fifteen by an impulse of the Estates of November, 1697.

He found relations strained between the King of Denmark, then Christian V (1670-99) and Frederick IV, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp (1694-1702). What he could not divine was the elaborate conspiracy which in the autumn of 1699 united against him Peter, Augustus and the new King of Denmark, Frederick IV (1699-1730). Although Duke Frederick had lately espoused a Swedish princess, the alliance with Denmark had been renewed, while Augustus was only securé on the hard-won throne of Poland because his Saxons remained there to oppose the Turks. Up to the moment of the Russo-Turkish truce, Peter seemed most affectionate towards his Swedish friends. By a strange chance, at the moment when the Turks were detached from all their European wars, and the Western powers must concentrate upon their own affairs, the crowns of Scandinavia, Poland and Russia fell to young, inexperienced and ambitious men.

All Europe, and perhaps all history, might be scoured in vain for a parallel to the youth who in 1700 began to make Charles XII the name at which the world turned pale. It is no reproach to Peter's statesmanship, as he understood the art, that in the first campaign he could not cope with Sweden. While caressing that power, he had promised King Frederick and Augustus that he would join them as soon as his Turkish war was ended. That promise he exactly performed. He had not calculated, however, upon two facts soon to be revealed: that Sweden at this juncture was strong enough to deal with all her foes, and that Charles, 'scorning to be a statesman', could never forget or forgive the treachery to which he had been exposed. When the conspiracy between his neighbours revealed itself, the King renounced his boyish antics, quitted the capital, which he never saw again, and spent his manhood as the heaven-sent chastiser of the crime.

The war, known as the Northern War of 1700 to 1721, ^{Russia and the Northern War,} began with an attack on Swedish Riga. Without any declaration, Augustus sent his Saxons across the Polish frontier to seize that vital port and fortress, with a view to recovering Livonia ¹⁷⁰⁰⁻²¹ ¹ for Poland. One man alone suspected the design, for the Saxons brought no siege-guns with them,

¹ 'Livonia' is often inclusive of Estonia, as 'England' of Northern Britain.

but that man was Dahlberg, the veteran governor of the city. Thanks to him, the onslaught failed, and the Saxons must content themselves with capturing the fort of Dünamünde, which at least barred Riga from the sea. These were the strokes which caused Charles to consign routine business to the council and the governmental 'Colleges' in Stockholm, while he himself steered the state from his headquarters. Meanwhile the Saxons, having failed to rouse the Livonian nobles to rebellion, soon returned to Warsaw.

Charles next determined to surprise the hostile coalition. In the foregoing autumn, King Frederick had sent 12,000 men to his own domains in Slesvig-Holstein, to be used against Duke Frederick when the time was ripe. The Saxon march on Riga gave the signal, and the Duke could hardly hope to make an effective defence. Charles, however, was not only the natural ally of Holstein-Gottorp against Denmark, but also the dear friend and brother-in-law of its Duke. When the siege of ducal Tönning failed, and William III fulfilled his treaty obligations by sending a fleet to the Sound, Charles himself crossed south of Elsinore and menaced Copenhagen. King Frederick saved his capital by making peace with the Duke at Travendal (August, 1700), thus removing all grounds for a Swedish attack. The Duke was thereby recognized anew as sovereign in ducal Holstein, while Denmark pledged herself not to aid the enemies of Sweden.

The
Peace of
Travendal,
1700

The Peace of Travendal was a great success for Charles XII, since it immobilized Denmark, his nearest potential foe. Had the news of its conclusion reached Peter earlier than it did, he might well have refrained from making war. The loss of Denmark and the failure to rouse the Livonians meant that Russia must challenge Sweden with no ally save Augustus, whose attack on Riga had failed. Within a few days of the Peace, however, Peter had sent a declaration of war to Stockholm and a numerous force to Narva.

Peter
Declares
War

Narva, with the fortress at the south-west of Lake Ladoga, soon to become famous as Schlüsselburg, were the strongpoints of the Swedish rampart against the Muscovites. Both had been for many months prizes which Peter planned to gain. Narva, however, was also Augustus' objective, and his counsellors feared that the Russians, not its former

lords the Poles, would make themselves masters of Livonia. The fortress lay on the left bank of the Narva river, some eight miles from the Baltic, and, to invest it, the Russians must take up positions to the westward. They were in great numerical force, but deficient for the most part in other requisites of warfare. Peter went with them as a captain, but, after a month's bombardment, he retired to work at diplomacy and supply, leaving the Duc de Croy in command.

Meanwhile Charles, eager for action, had landed at Pernau in the north-east of the Gulf of Riga. With him were the forces designed first to fight King Frederick and then Augustus. Balked of both encounters, since Riga was now safe, they hastened eastwards by land, and, on November 20, drove the Russians into the River Narva or in headlong flight beyond it. Although Peter's former playmates did well, an eye-witness declared that the outclassed Russian generals had no more heart in their breasts than a frog has hair. Their command numbered at least four times Charles' 8,000, together with the garrison of Narva.

Peter's future must now depend upon the use that Charles would make of his victory. Would he march on, to rout the remaining Russian forces, and thus shatter a dangerous monster at its birth? Or would he content himself with his success against each of the three conspirators, and gain a great reward by fighting the Catholics in western Europe? The weakness of a divinely appointed avenger, such as he deemed himself, is that he must punish the offender regardless of his own advantage. Augustus had broken the peace as signally as Peter, but thus far had met only with a rebuff. Impelled also by an unwarranted contempt for the possibilities of Russia, and doubtless also by memories of the ancient feuds with Poland, and sensible of the danger from Denmark, from Frederick of Prussia, and from the unbeaten Saxons in his rear, Charles decided to winter in eastern Estonia and to attack Augustus in the spring. At this juncture, the death of Charles II of Spain increased the acuteness of the crisis in the west.

Europe, though ill-knit, was not so disjointed that the northern and the western wars could be fought without mutual reactions. While Louis XIV was eager to have Sweden on his side, he feared the opposite, and therefore

Crisis
after
Narva

Connexion
of the
Western and
Northern
Wars

urged Augustus to continue the fight against her. Charles XII, on the other hand, claimed the help of France as guarantor of the broken treaty of Oliva. With his own grim humour, roused by the sight of Russians drowning in the Narva river, he referred to distant Stockholm those French diplomatists who came to press their master's invitation. As he knew well, some hundreds of miles of painful travel would extract only a reference back to his own person. At the same time, Augustus, though unsupported by the Polish Diet; was demanding compensation for his exploits in the past campaign. As Professor Halecki insists, Poland needed and desired unbroken peace. Augustus, however, dragged her into a new war, which completed her ruin. 'She had no more implacable enemy than Peter; the King made him his intimate ally. Since the treaty of Oliva, every reason for a conflict with Sweden had disappeared.' In return for aid in recovering Livonia, Augustus offered neighbouring powers in effect to partition Poland.

Plans
for 1701

This complex situation inspired in 1701 two comparatively simple plans. Peter, having claimed imaginary successes against the Swedes, and hurried on the fortification of their probable route into Russia, met Augustus near the Courland frontier and agreed on a joint campaign. While Augustus attacked in Livonia, Peter undertook to furnish auxiliaries and subsidies, himself at the same time attacking Ingria. Peace was to be made in common, all conquests in Livonia falling to Poland. Charles, on the other hand, prepared to strike across the Düna river, thus dividing the Russians from the Poles, and drawing nearer to Sweden and her potential enemies.

Augustus
the Enemy

In July, 1701, the Swedes, under General Stuart and their king, attempted to cross the Düna in face of the Saxons and Russians. A floating bridge and a smoke-screen helped to deceive the enemy, while 7,000 men slipped across in landing-barges. A hot fight then drove off the allied troops, with heavy loss, but without disaster. In consequence, the same considerations which had made Charles turn south instead of east continued to hold good. Reserving the overthrow of Peter for a later day, 'regarding the contest as a duel between two champions, to be ended, if not by the death, at least by the dethronement of one of them', the Swedish warrior-king

resolved that Augustus should pay for his treachery with his crown.

Peter once confessed his gratitude to the Almighty for having deprived foreign nations of insight into the realities of Russia. Never was such gratitude more due than in the six years which followed the campaign of 1701. In January, 1702, Sheremetiev, the ablest Russian general, with an immense superiority in numbers, defeated Colonel Schlippenbach not far from Dorpat (Tartu). The Colonel would never admit that he had lost the battle, but Peter in ecstasy made Sheremetiev a Field-Marshal. July, however, brought an undeniable Russian success, which left Livonia defenceless. The victors laid the province waste, deporting many prisoners to Russia. All this was very different from the measured advance which Charles had ordered his lieutenants in that region to carry out. Incomparable in the performance of his own marches and combats, the hero-king was apt to demand no less from his ill-supplied lieutenants, who were neither kings nor heroes. Peter, his inferior as a soldier, judged better what his own subordinates were likely to achieve.

Russian
Victories
in Livonia

The contrast between the two monarchs stamped the achievements of 1702 and 1703, an epoch in the evolution of the world. In one sentence, their outcome was that, while Charles trampled upon Poland, Peter secured his road to the Baltic and to the west. At first, the Tsar's thoughts naturally turned towards defence—in Livonia, in the region which a Swedish conqueror of Livonia would approach, and even in Archangel. A strong French fleet, it was said, was about to attack that sole link of Russia with the west, then crowded with Dutch and English shipping. Peter therefore hastened northward, encouraged by the stand of Sheremetiev in Livonia. Under the Tsar's own eye, ships were built and fortifications strengthened, while his lieutenants removed all immediate danger of an invasion based on the Swedish Riga front. In the autumn, Peter could attempt to conquer Ingria from the Swedes.

Gains
in 1702
and 1703

Charles, meanwhile, expecting nothing less from the fugitives of Narva than an offensive, was swiftly subjugating Poland. With their 'broken' Diets, interregna and 'gentry democracy', the Poles were ill-qualified to meet invasion,

Charles
Conquers
Poland

the more so when it came from Sweden, whose royal house of Vasa some still looked on as their own. As the Swedes approached, Augustus made an ill-judged effort to tempt the royal anchorite with the most famous of his countless mistresses. A more normal messenger was even worse received. Almost without opposition, the Swedish King took Warsaw, having already mastered Vilna and Kovno. To reassure the Poles, who only now began to think of the war as other than the affair of their Saxon monarch, he had proclaimed that his sole design was to free them from that perjured sovereign. Negotiations, however, failed, since neither side would concede what the other deemed essential.

In mid-June, 1702, Charles marched south towards Cracow, where Augustus was adding to his Saxons a substantial force of Poles. On July 9, thanks to his own generalship, he gained a hard-won and indecisive success at Klissov, where Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp fell. Cracow was occupied, and superior numbers beaten, but Augustus saved his army and gained full Polish support. The attitude of Denmark, moreover, became ambiguous. Again Charles must postpone his attack on Russia.

St. Peters-
burg and
Cronstadt

Peter, thus reprieved at Archangel, in Livonia and now in Poland, was hurrying on with the most startling project of his amazing reign. Not only did he reach the Baltic and fortify his new possessions, but he began a new city in a conquered marshy waste, and was soon to make it the administrative capital of his empire. The years 1702 and 1703 also saw Russia force open a door into Europe. While Charles marched up and down in Poland, his rival recovered Ingria, Swedish since 1617.

Peter's first step must be to reduce the key-fortress of Nöteborg ('Nut-borough'), built on a nut-shaped island in the broad and swift-flowing Neva, near its source in the south-west of Lake Ladoga. In October overwhelming numbers, eleven days' bombardment and an assault lasting thirteen hours forced the little garrison to surrender. 'A tough nut, but now happily cracked,' wrote the victor; 'our artillery did its work well.' He renamed the fortress Schlüsselburg, as the 'key' to the Neva and its 60-mile course to the sea.

With the New Year (1708) came a severe Russian defeat

in Courland, but in Ingria a new success. There Charles' absence and the lack of any strong directing body in Stockholm was severely felt. Peter, on the other hand, with Menshikov as his right-hand man, toiled incessantly to realize his dream. Between the campaigns he dashed to Voronezh, pausing when more than half-way from Moscow to dedicate the new fortress of Ranenburg. 'At the blessing [by the Metropolitan of Kiev]', Peter wrote to Menshikov, 'we drank brandy at the first bastion, sack at the second, Rhenish at the third, beer at the fourth, mead at the fifth, and Rhenish at the gates.' From Voronezh and the fleet he sped back to Schlüsselburg, to attack the 'New Entrenchment' on the Neva, near the river's final turn towards the sea. Four attacks upon the uncompleted fort caused its surrender on the second day, and, a week later, Peter and Menshikov gained their first naval victory by capturing two Swedish ships within the river (May, 1703).

These Russian successes caused Charles to lift the ban on sending reinforcements to the Baltic. A Swedish squadron watched the river-mouth, and some troops operated on the Baltic shore. Peter, however, in the hottest haste, founded a new fortress and city on an island north of the Neva, and began to fortify a captured Baltic islet some 18 miles away. To the first he gave his own name with the Swedish preface Sankt (Saint) Petersburg. The second, Kronslot ('Crown Castle'), grew into the fortress and town of Cronstadt. Before the winter, the Tsar enjoyed the exquisite pleasure of piloting a Dutch ship into his new-made port.

Charles, meanwhile, was making heroic efforts to conquer a vast country with a small though well-trained army, and to drive Augustus from the throne. In April, 1703, he won a considerable victory at Pultusk on the Narew river. But he was learning the truth of a dead Swedish statesman's warning—that Poland was an open country, whose people did more harm in flight than in pitched battles. Thorn (Torun), Danzig and Poznan (Posen) fell to his attack, but the war showed little sign of ending. Early in 1704, at his behest, and thanks to bribes promised in his name, a Diet, drawn chiefly from Great Poland, declared Augustus deposed. In May, however, a rival Diet from Little Poland and Lithuania attacked Charles' Polish clients, and declared war against

Swedish
and Russian
Gains, 1704

him. In such circumstances it was far from easy to find any candidate for the Polish throne who would array the nation by Sweden's side against Russia. In July, however, the mild and cultured Stanislas Leszczynski was declared by a Confederation to be the Poles' elected king, and Charles set to work to expel the deposed Augustus. Marching south, he captured Lemberg (Lwów), but Augustus meanwhile eluded him and regained Warsaw. An amazing march towards Silesia gave Charles a victory at Punitz, but once again the Saxons made good their retreat. Charles had driven them from Poland, but for the next eight months he must watch the Silesian border.

Such was the issue of a campaign which was marked in the west by the French collapse at Blenheim, and in the north by Peter's capture of Dorpat, after a stubborn defence. Soon afterwards, in August, Narva was stormed, and the Tsar himself could not check the massacre of its defenders. Ivangorod, across the river, succumbed almost without Russian loss. Lewenhaupt, Charles' general in Courland and Lithuania, however, proved highly efficient in defence, and the busy diplomats and Polish magnates might give the wars a new direction in 1705.

Crisis
of 1705

Fresh evidence, indeed, suggested in 1705 that in warfare the Russian troops and generals were far inferior to the Swedes, and that Peter could count on no sincere ally. Augustus had been driven from Poland to his own Electorate. In Poland contending factions assured the impotence of their country. What course ought Charles XII to follow?

While the Swedish King kept watch on Saxony, and spared no effort to place Stanislas firmly on his throne, Peter yielded to Patkul's exhortations so far as to make a cautious advance into the Polish realm. There, however, Lewenhaupt stood on guard, keeping Riga and northern Poland safe. In July, Sheremetiev found him strongly posted at Gemäuerthof, south-west of Riga and east of Libau. Adroitly using broken ground to compensate for his inferior numbers, the Swede repulsed the invaders, inflicting a loss of some 6,000 men. Peter was thereby driven to abandon the advance, but he occupied Courland, while the Swedes were too few to risk exposing Riga. Charles, meanwhile, was detained near Warsaw by the Poles' delay in

crowning Stanislas and thus paying the Swedish price of peace. He thereby sacrificed a moment of rare advantage against Russia, for both the Bashkirs beyond the Volga and the town of Astrachan at its mouth were in revolt. In September, however, Stanislas was crowned, and, within two months, Sweden and Poland made their peace at Warsaw. The Poles agreed to wage a common war against both Augustus and Peter, and to join in no future alliance against Sweden. Charles, in return, restored the peace of Oliva, thus renouncing his recent conquests. Instead of exacting full religious freedom for Polish Protestants, moreover, he accepted a restoration of the pre-war status. Above all, from the historian's point of view, he bound himself not to withdraw his troops from Poland until the new *régime* was safe. On that side, therefore, he stood committed to a defensive war.

Peace of
Warsaw

The following months tended to confirm the King's belief in his superiority to the Russians, a belief which Europe in general shared. His pledge to defend Poland, of course, did not debar him from aggressive action against hostile troops on Polish soil. With 20,000 men, therefore, he hurried to Grodno, the fortress on the Niemen, where an equal number of Peter's best soldiers were quartered for the winter. While Charles blockaded Grodno, Augustus, its commander, seized an opportunity to quit that fortress, and, with Saxon, Russian and Polish troops, to strike at Rehnskold, Charles' lieutenant in the province of Posen. Early in February, 1706, however, Rehnskold shattered the assailants at Fraustadt, near the northern boundary of Silesia, whence only a quarter of their 20,000 men escaped. The Swedish loss in killed and wounded did not reach 1,500. Peter thereupon saved his Grodno forces by a swift flight to Kiev, leaving the pursuing Charles to flounder in the Pripet marshes. Augustus meanwhile fled to Cracow.

Swedish
Victory at
Fraustadt

After the Fraustadt disaster, Peter trembled for Kiev, and hastened thither to organize the defence. Charles, however, was not uninfluenced by the French defeat at Ramillies (May 23, 1706), which might indeed bring other powers into the northern war, but at least kept France from interfering. While Saxony was still devoid of troops, he resolved to make his entry into Augustus' lair, and thus, as

he said, 'strike at the root of the evil'. With scant respect for the Emperor, who, he declared, had given Augustus passage, he marched across Silesia into Saxony. The Imperial Diet was too deeply divided to interfere, and the Sea Powers confined themselves to formal remonstrances against these warlike acts in Germany. At Altranstädt, not far from Lützen, the Swedish King found himself master of Saxony.

Victorious
Peace of
Altranstädt

The outcome of Charles' daring move was a triumphant peace. By October 20, 1706, the terms imposed at Altranstädt were ratified in Poland by Augustus. A single meeting in a filthy Saxon village had sufficed to draft a treaty which might rank with the fruits of the long and stately negotiations in Westphalia, in the Pyrenees, and at Oliva, Nijmegen and Carlowitz. Augustus' envoys pleaded for a partition of Poland with Stanislas, or for his renunciation of the throne during their master's lifetime, offering to ally Poland with Sweden in return. But Charles insisted that Augustus should not only abdicate forthwith, but that he should also maintain the Swedish army in Saxony until the Emperor and the Sea Powers had guaranteed the peace. Complete abandonment of Russia and the surrender of Patkul were also conditions to which Augustus gave assent. It was not surprising that he secretly negotiated with the Tsar, and hoped for a change of fortune.

Charles XII
at
Altranstädt

Hardly had the Altranstädt treaty been ratified, indeed, before a combined force of Swedes and Poles was overwhelmed near Kalisch, south-east of Posen, by Menshikov in far superior strength (October, 1706). Augustus, however, could find no way of escaping from his recent pledge. He quitted Poland, and in December feasted with Charles at Altranstädt. The Swedish King, indeed, designed to remain in Saxony until he had received the stipulated guarantees for what he had done in Poland, and had accumulated strength for what he designed to do in Russia. As a powerful army in the heart of Europe under such leadership might sway the western war, his camp became the Mecca of diplomacy, as soon as winter interrupted the campaigns.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR FROM 1707 TO UTRECHT

AFTER the victories of 1706, the obvious distress of France and the seeming indifference of Charles XII to the fate of the author of the Revocation, it seemed that another successful campaign should give victory to the Allies. If 1706 had been their year of victory, however, 1707 proved to be their year of disaster. France then showed that, although she could not conquer Europe from a Marlborough and a Eugene, she could and would defend her own soil against the mutually discordant invaders. The French in effect retired behind the Alps, and in the Netherlands stood on the defensive, aided by the unaggressive instincts of the Dutch. Even Marlborough could not win Dutch consent to a daring movement. Spain, meanwhile, showed that her sons could still fight, and that the Castilians stood firmly by their own anointed king. Their revival, and Louis' reduction of the battlefield, heralded a striking success.

Failure of
the Allies
in 1707

In April, Berwick almost annihilated his opponents at Almanza, some 150 miles south-eastward of Madrid, thus reducing the Spain of Charles III to a fraction of Catalonia. The union which England, after years of bargaining, now made with Scotland was parodied by a union with Castile, to which Aragon was forced to submit. In France the northern campaign proved uneventful, but in the south, Eugene and Sir Cloudesley Shovel failed by land and sea to capture Toulon. Hence Spain could not be reached from the north-east. In the east, Villars was brilliantly successful. He crossed the Rhine, forced lines reputed impregnable, reached Stuttgart, and levied an enormous contribution, before being compelled to abandon wider schemes by Eugene's menace to Provence. The Allies had only secured Louis' abandonment of Italy, taken Susa, in its deep Alpine

Allied
Successes
in 1708

valley, and occupied the untenable kingdom of Naples. This formed the sole blot upon the King's success.

In 1708, however, the outlook changed once more. The French treasury was almost empty. The King had coined his plate, but the unpaid army dwindled. Commerce was annihilated by the Sea Powers: the taxes had become unbearable: in the Church and court, parties arose demanding peace at any price. Louis attempted to rouse the Scottish Jacobites by landing James III in Scotland; but the French ships returned without reaching its shores. This British success was followed by others of greater fame. In the Netherlands, Marlborough was faced by a great army under Vendôme, while Berwick observed Eugène in Alsace. France had a new ally in the resentment aroused in the Catholic Low Countries by the heretic soldiers who garrisoned their great cities. Thus the French were enabled to recover Ghent and Bruges, and Oudenarde was threatened. Marlborough, however, believed that attack was the best defence, and Eugene, with a large force, marched from Alsace to join him. When it appeared that the action could not be delayed, he hurried on in advance, and shared with Marlborough in Vendôme's first defeat. This, the deliverance of Oudenarde (July, 1708), was the triumph of a small force, experienced and ably led, over a great but untrained army hampered by the interference of Louis' grandson, its nominal commander. That prince, now Duke of Burgundy and Louis' probable successor, insisted on a withdrawal to Ghent. In August, therefore, the Allies could lay siege to Lille, where Boufflers and a strong garrison held a fortress reputed Vauban's best. For four months, the French army, far superior in numbers and strengthened by Berwick's advent, looked on while Boufflers was forced into surrender. Meanwhile the neighbouring provinces of France were harried, Flanders doomed to conquest, and, by British sea-power, Sardinia and Minorca taken.

The year 1708, which thus proved Marlborough and Eugene superior to the French, saw two great turning-points in other lands. Queen Anne was induced to withdraw her confidence from Marlborough's Duchess, and Charles XII, as is described elsewhere, diverged towards Little Russia.

In his camp at Altranstadt, the Swedish King had seemed to be the arbiter of Europe. With his creature, Stanislas, upon the throne of Poland, and with the invincible Swedes entirely at his disposal, he might humble either the Emperor or the Tsar, and render Louis XIV either subservient or supreme. Every instinct, however, bade him retrieve his own Baltic provinces, which Peter had dared to conquer, and humble for ever the Muscovites, whom he had routed in 1700. Doubting his own strength, the Tsar had offered to restore the conquered provinces as the price of peace. But he could not bring himself to give up St. Petersburg, the 'residence' which he was actually creating upon Charles' territory, and it is said that the King then promised that he would dictate peace in Moscow. Bidding his friends at Riga and Warsaw join him, while his Finnish army dealt with St. Petersburg, and the Cossacks of Little Russia rose to regain their freedom, Charles crossed the Beresina, approached the Dnieper, and defeated the Russians at Holóvzin.

Removal
of the
Swedish
Factor in
Europe

Holóvzin, however, closed the Swedish king's eight years of triumph over the conspirators of 1700. He found the eastern road to Moscow devastated by partisans. He had erred, moreover, in supposing that by establishing a king on the Polish throne he had secured the Polish people. Never dreaming of abandoning Moscow as his goal, he marched south-east to meet the Cossack hetman Mazeppa, and, with him and his people, to assail the Russian capital. He was unfortunate in that his own reinforcements largely failed, that Mazeppa came rather as a fugitive than as a national leader, and that the winter of 1708-9 was such as no army in a foreign land could hope to bear unscathed. The Spanish succession, it was clear, would not be decided by Charles XII.

There are good grounds for thinking that the campaign of 1709, surnamed from the early autumn battle the campaign of Malplaquet, decided the great Succession War and shaped the forthcoming peace. Hostilities, it is true, went on for three years more, and came to an end in circumstances, by methods and on terms far different from those appropriate to 1709. It was on the field of Malplaquet, none the less, that the dominant issues were determined. France, though defeated, was not conquered, and Spain kept her Bourbon king.

Campaign of
Malplaquet
(1709)

No European war involving many powers could survive eight campaigns without great transformation. Statesmen and generals mature or decay or vanish, nations become stronger or weaker, appetites are whetted or appeased. The bonds uniting coalitions are almost certainly relaxed, for while some powers feel that the game is no longer worth the candle, others, with greater hopes of gain, insist that the basic compact must be fulfilled. More often than not, the coalition has been formed because a single power, Spain, France or Germany, threatens the independence of the other members of a family of nations. Is peace, some of them will protest, to be denied to them after this independence has been secured? In 1709, was unconditional surrender to be expected from the Bourbon powers, one the foremost in Europe for a generation, the other, long the most potent in the world, and still the proudest?

Louis
and the
Coalition

Louis, the most refined of statesmen, save when intoxicated by success, had proved after the campaign of Oudenarde that he could draw reasonable conclusions from events, despite the humiliation of defeat. Peace on such terms as he was eager to concede would have guarded Europe against the twin evils which his unbridled ascendancy had threatened—French dictatorship and the suppression of Protestantism. The sincerity of his offers was guaranteed by the obvious agony of France. In 1707 his Finance Minister had warned him that the treasury was bankrupt, and the troops for many months unpaid. He had striven desperately to break the Coalition by concessions to the Dutch, but in vain. In 1709 the despised merchant republic inflexibly demanded a barrier including Lille, Liège and Bonn, and refused to Philip the smallest compensation for the loss of Spain. Even these demands did not move Louis to break off the secret negotiation. For the terrible winter which destroyed Charles XII threatened France with starvation, and her envoy journeyed to the Hague to beg for peace.

The Dutch
and
Marlbrough
Unyielding

The answer of the Dutch, who spoke also for the Emperor and for Britain, could hardly have been more humiliating to the King. It embodied the counsels of soldiers assured of immediate victory, and of statesmen with an ingrained distrust of France. All previous demands were repeated, new cessions of territory demanded, and Louis required to

guarantee that within two months his grandson would transfer the Spanish empire to his rival Charles III. This last, and this alone, the King declared impossible. The Allies were resolved that France should not recuperate in peace while they fought on in Spain. Louis, on the other hand, would not exchange a war in defence of France for a war in support of his enemies against his grandson. Marlborough, wielding a power such as no English subject had ever before attained, was tempted as no other to avert appeasement. The Emperor had declared that he should be regent in the Netherlands, and he aspired to lifelong command of the British army. 'The attempt to prolong war for his own private advantage' is styled by Acton 'the deadliest of his crimes.' Marlborough might at least plead in mitigation that he refused a gigantic bribe from France.

The outcome of the diplomatic struggle was a brilliant victory for the aged King. Louis could now direct his officers in Church and State to explain to his loyal subjects in moving language how a treacherous enemy had forced him to fight on. The nation, threatened with invasion, rallied around the throne. To equip and feed his troops, Louis had sold his plate, and the magnates followed his example. Recoinage and a forced loan from the merchants helped in the great task, while the prospect of escaping starvation filled ranks which casualties and desertion had thinned. In 1709 Villars found himself facing Marlborough with an army, which might indeed be the last army of France, but which numbered some 120,000 men. By his cheery contact with the rank and file, and by his zeal in providing such rations and comfort as the times allowed, the Marshal vastly increased the effective strength of his command. Where a less popular general might have had more skilful soldiers but such as would disband if he suffered defeat, Villars could count on his lads to fight as desperately as these in battle, and afterwards, if defeated, to form again as he should direct. However vague their notions of their fatherland and even of their king, they knew and loved their general and obeyed him as a father. The morale of the French northern army reached its height when the veteran hero, Boufflers, arrived, and chose to serve under Villars,

Louis
rouses
France :
Villars

his junior. The repulse of the Imperialists and Savoyards farther south had already encouraged the defenders of the French frontier against Marlborough and Eugene.

Marlborough and Eugene, none the less, threatened France as Mercy and Victor Amadeus could never do. Marlborough had never lost a battle nor failed to triumph in a siege, a record which was always to remain unbroken. Though hampered by the late start of the campaign, by the accustomed caution of the Dutch, and by Villars' wise abstinence from adventure, he overcame the brave resistance of Tournai, and menaced the vital fortress of Mons, beyond which lay the road to Paris. By unbroken secrecy and incomparable marching, he isolated Mons before Villars could intervene to save it. If the French again failed in prudence, as at Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde, the remaining fortresses and the routed army could hardly save the capital. The continuance of the war depended upon Villars and his men.

Malplaquet

Villars, indeed, with some 80,000 to 100,000 troops, was outnumbered by about one-fifth, and had many raw recruits. His eighty guns were but two-thirds of the Allies'. He must therefore enlist the woods and marshes, in which the region of the frontier abounded, and, by field fortifications, enhance their value as a screen. To guard against a French attack, Eugene and his Germans encamped so as to cover a northern breach between the forests, while Marlborough, with the Dutch and English forces, covered that named from Malplaquet, a hamlet on the frontier of France. Villars, having manœuvred so as to guard this Malplaquet gap, built almost impregnable defences during the two nights and one day which the enemy required for concentration. Then, on September 11, 1709, their terrible assault began. In desperate fighting hand to hand, the Dutch suffered the gravest slaughter. The French losses fell below those of the Allies, being by modern estimates some two-thirds as heavy or even less than one-half. When Villars, like Eugene, was wounded, Boufflers took command, and, since an unsuspected British force menaced his rear, retreated without losing a single flag or gun. Mons indeed fell, but Paris, at least for that campaign, was safe.

The French, it is true, never again dared to meet

Marlborough in the field. But the wounded Villars was acclaimed as a hero by the countryside, and Louis, it was said, would be rid of his enemies if God should vouchsafe them another Malplaquet. This revival of French confidence was accompanied by many other fateful changes in the background of the contending forces. Ostensibly, the Dutch and British remained more than ever determined to force Louis to fulfil all their demands. On the morrow of Malplaquet, they had secretly agreed that the Dutch should hold the Spanish Netherlands as an Imperial fief, and that France must recognize the Protestant succession and expel the Pretender. In March, 1710, therefore, when their diplomats met the French in the little fortress of Gertruydenberg, they stiffly demanded that Louis should purchase a short armistice by declaring war against his grandson. Villars held that even this price should be paid, and the King and Council offered subsidies, if the Allies would themselves attempt the expulsion. In July, however, the Allies' determination to make no abatement brought the negotiations to an end. Louis, rightly deciding that, if he must fight on, it should be against his enemies rather than against his children, called Europe to witness that the guilt of further bloodshed was not his.

Changed
Background
of the
Allied
Armies

The campaign of 1710, which saw a Russo-Turkish war follow Poltava, justified Louis' reluctant choice of evils. Marlborough, indeed, continued to take fortresses which interfered with his supplies, and thus indirectly safeguarded the road to Paris. Villars, however, remained firm in blocking his path without engaging. He even gave the name of *Ne plus ultra* to a fortified line stretching westwards from Bouchain for more than 30 miles. Little, however, was accomplished in the Netherlands, and less in the Alpine and Rhenish theatres of war. The great military events of the year occurred in Spain; the still greater political events, in England and in the north and east of Europe.

Campaign
of 1710 :
Spain Lost

The needs of France had caused Louis to withdraw his troops from Spain. The Imperialists and British, commanded by Starhemberg and Stanhope, thus became free to establish Charles III by subduing those Spaniards who stood by Philip. They were superior upon the sea, and might count on the support of Catalonia, of Portugal and

of at least a part of Aragon. Eight years upon the Spanish throne, however, had made of Philip V a truly Spanish king, for whom Castile and her sister provinces were ready to murder and even to fight. Guerillas flocked to harass the invaders. While the Gertruydenberg negotiations hampered the French, indeed, Stanhope's energy brought victory at Almenara and Saragossa, and Michaelmas saw Charles III in Madrid. The arrival of Vendôme, however, emphasized the weakness of a monarch supported against his subjects chiefly by a modest foreign force. Mid-November found Charles in retreat from the capital, with Vendôme in vigorous pursuit. Early in December, Stanhope and the rearguard were trapped in Brihuega. The British, whose absence had hampered Marlborough in Flanders, fought bravely, but were denied either rescue or escape. Soon Starhemberg drew rein in Barcelona, and the attempt of the Allies to impose a king on Spain had disastrously and obviously failed. It remained to be seen how the Dutch, British and Austrian champions of 'No peace without Spain' would react to this new situation.

Opponents
of Continued
War

Parliamentary England, however, had already broken with the Whigs and moneyed men. In August the Queen dismissed her ministers, and, in October, their opponents gained a resounding victory at the polls. The Tories, indeed, were already pursuing a realistic policy of agreement with France to end the costly and unprofitable war. The Russian victory at and after Poltava over Charles XII had distracted from western Europe much of the attention hitherto centred upon the overthrow of Louis XIV. The Emperor Joseph, Frederick of Brandenburg, in English eyes 'certainly, after the Emperor, the most considerable prince in the Empire', George of Hanover, Frederick IV of Denmark—all these found that the crisis in the north claimed their first attention. The Duke of Savoy had no notion of becoming a catspaw for Whig or Dutch doctrinaires. At whatever sacrifice of honesty and honour, the later stages of the Spanish war synchronized with vigorous secret negotiations between the Tory ministers and France. Before the close of 1710, the British Government was pledged to abandon Charles III, if both Bourbon powers would undertake to favour British commerce.

This Tory secret *entente* with France was powerfully strengthened in April, 1711, when the Emperor unexpectedly died. Until December, Charles III of Spain had his own Imperial election to secure, while the absurdity of making the Holy Roman Emperor lord also of Spain and of the Indies could not be disguised. The Allies' war, indeed, continued, and in September, 1711, Marlborough performed his last great feat of war by penetrating, without the loss of a man, the Villars *Ne plus ultra* line. At the same moment as the British thus acquired a superfluous road to Paris, a French squadron bombarded Rio de Janeiro as a reprisal against the Portuguese.

Death of
the Emperor

When Starhemberg had retreated from Villa Viciosa before Vendôme, the Spaniards mocked the flight of their would-be monarch and his foreign friends. To the English Tories, however, the Spanish adventure had long passed beyond a jest. The Queen, the landed gentry and many of the wits saw Britain wasting her blood and treasure for the profit of Dutchmen, Austrians and the Duke of Marlborough. Harley and St. John, who had now replaced the Whigs, began the year 1711 by a secret negotiation with France. In April the Emperor's sudden death transformed the European problem, for Charles III of Spain must become the Emperor Charles VI. Men who had been ready to fight on to prevent France, when refreshed, from breaking her promises and dominating Spain, were unwilling to sacrifice their country and the balance of Europe, only that the Spaniards might be forced to obey the Emperor. After months of secret bargaining with the French, one list of peace-terms was sent to the Dutch for their consideration, while another recorded the concessions to Britain which Louis had promised to make. Such was the setting of the news now broken to the helpless Dutch—that Britain had secured the basis of what promised to be a satisfactory peace. In January, 1712, the Congress of Utrecht began.

Before the diplomats of France and of the Allies met at Utrecht, the greatest of English generals had been disgraced. To favour the Queen's contemplated desertion of her allies, Marlborough was charged with embezzling public funds, and in December, 1711, without investigation, he was ignominiously dismissed from office. A few days later, his faithful

Disgrace of
Marlborough
and Deaths
in France

friend Eugene was rapturously received in England, but neither Marlborough nor the Emperor was the gainer. When the Congress met, it adjourned without a decision, but the talks between the French and English continued. They were complicated by the amazing series of royal deaths in France which, early in March, 1712, left only a sickly child between Philip V and the succession to Louis XIV. The loss of the Dauphin in April, 1711, made his son, the Duke of Burgundy, heir apparent. But within a year both he and his Savoyard duchess died, and, barely four weeks later, their elder son followed them to the grave. Such mortality, suggesting to contemporaries either Divine displeasure or undetected crime, might well have shaken both the public and the aged King. Both, however, remained undismayed, and, to avert international peril, Philip renounced his hereditary claim to France, while his brother Berri and their elder kinsman, Orleans, likewise abandoned Spain. The whole chapter attested Louis' unbroken strength, both in character and in the allegiance of his people.

Upheavals
in Europe

The historian, none the less, must recognize that in the five years which separated Malplaquet from the advent of George I (September, 1709–August, 1714), Europe passed through a stretch of rapids almost unmatched in her modern course. Every leading power was threatened with shipwreck. Those who have followed the careers of Napoleon, Hitler and Hirohito, potentates whose claims fundamentally resembled those of Louis XIV, cannot fail to recognize the dangers that await the frustrated Caesar or superman. For a decade after Blenheim, however, the French endured without disloyalty their mounting losses of every kind and their almost unrelieved defeat. In Britain military glory and the advance of commerce and of power by sea could not blind men to the weight of taxation and of debt, or to the deepening peril of civil war. Nothing can be more probable than that, had such been possible, a politic adhesion to the English Church would have quadrupled the strength of the Old Pretender. The rulers of Britain could evade their difficulties only by degrading their unrivalled general and betraying their steadfast but exhausted allies.

Spain, meanwhile, narrowly escaped a destruction subsidized by Louis, her great protector. The Dutch paid for

their exertions the price of prostration and of permanent decline. The Empire lost all hope of unity by accepting the promotion of the rulers of Brandenburg, Saxony and Hanover to be foreign Kings, and by the sanction of Austrian predominance and of diversity in religion. Sweden as a European factor was in collapse; Poland had collapsed already. In Muscovy a new great power was rising, but in 1711 its architect, the Great Peter, escaped destruction only by the folly of the Turk. Italy, like Portugal, remained at the mercy of foreign potentates.

In this welter of disastrous possibilities, the history of Europe was chiefly shaped by the contact between Britain and France. On the eve of the campaign of 1712, these powers concluded a truce, and Ormonde, Marlborough's successor, left both Eugene and the Dutch in the lurch. The result was that Louis' tremendous enterprise in Spain, though unsuccessful, ended with victory. In July, Villars tricked Eugene, crossed the Scheldt and triumphantly stormed Denain. Deserted and defeated, the Emperor's forces failed not only to gain fresh fortresses, but to hold those which had been acquired in Marlborough's later campaigns. Soon the Dutch joined in the truce with Louis, and Portugal followed their example. Philip's renunciation of his claim to France at last deprived the war of any basis or excuse. Savoy became the next combatant to lay down arms. In the new year, 1713, the Dutch yielded to Britain so far as to revise their claims to a Barrier and to embody them in a new agreement. The Empire alone, since December ruled by Charles VI, still clung to hopes of territorial compensation.

At Utrecht, therefore, the Dutch could bargain with the French in the presence of the English, and that with genuine resignation to the inevitability of peace. Thus, in the early months of 1713, when Berri and Orleans had solemnly renounced all claims to Spain, all the warring powers except the Emperor could at long last bring their warfare to a close. However conceived and procured, the Utrecht agreements might claim to be righteous, and they proved to be abiding. Many challenges to future warfare were removed, and reasonable compensation was made for damage done. Thus the fundamental pact achieved in Westphalia and the Pyrenees was modernized and strengthened.

End of the
Western
War

Utrecht
Congress

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE NORTHERN WAR, 1707-1713

Northern
Politics
in 1707

THE year 1707, indeed, was in the northern war rather a year of diplomacy and armament than of combat. Marked in the west by Anglo-Scottish union but also by British checks at Almanza and Toulon, which gave the French new hope, its chief effect on the duel between Charles and Peter was to reveal the policy of the several states. The Emperor, it was clear, favoured the foes of Sweden. Bent on raising the Imperial power, he resented the intrusion into Germany, and even into Poland, of a king who was his vassal for Pomerania. He had given free passage through Silesia to Augustus' munitions and armed men. After Kalisch, he sent congratulations and a portrait to the victorious Menshikov. Russian prisoners who escaped from Saxony were enlisted in Joseph's army. He and his British allies, moreover, were disturbed by the sight of Charles XII as a possible arbiter in the west, and still more by his reception of an ambassador from Louis XIV.

Marl-
borough's
Mission

All this, and Charles' famous reticence, caused Marlborough himself to journey to Altranstädt in April, 1707. At their interview, the Duke's resplendent compliment, confessing his wish to study war under the King, roused no response in kind, nor could Charles be enlisted for the western struggle. But Marlborough, as able in diplomacy as in war, discerned that his thoughts were centred on his Russian plans, and that he was unlikely to join forces with the ultra-Catholic Louis. The Englishman did something to allay the friction between Charles and Joseph, but it was not until late in August that those monarchs could agree on terms. The Emperor, threatened by Rakoczy in Transylvania and by German Protestant princes, then consented to restore the Silesian Lutherans to the status of 1648, and to secure the bishopric of Eutin to the house of Holstein. In September, therefore, Charles could march back to Poland in triumph

through Silesia, where his co-religionists regained more than a hundred churches through his exertions.

Despite the two triumphant treaties of Altranstädt, however, the bickerings of 1707 had cost Charles very dear. While his splendid army rusted in idleness, Peter was straining every nerve to increase the Russian power. He wrestled with a new Cossack rebellion on the Don, pervaded Poland, where he planned a new royal election, perhaps of Prince Eugene, raised fresh ramparts, fresh taxes and fresh recruits in Russia, and thought out a practicable plan for the next campaign. Taught by the experience of earlier collisions, he resolved to lay waste the country on the Swedish line of march, trusting to the destructive effect upon his foes of endless tramping through guerilla-infested woods, swamps and rivers.

Peter's
Activity
in 1707

To judge by the acts of Charles since he routed the Russians at Narva, he was guided throughout by two convictions—that he could beat them at any time in a pitched battle, but that he should not begin an invasion until he had safeguarded his rear. By the autumn of 1707, with immense and unceasing labour, he had averted all apparent danger at the hands of the Poles, the Germans and the Danes, while the course of events seemed to have rendered harmless France, the Sea Powers and the Turks. Whether a more diplomatic monarch could have achieved this apparent safety in a shorter time must be a matter of opinion. But as soon as Charles received the necessary reinforcements, he turned to chastise the usurper of his Baltic shore, and set out for Moscow by the shortest route. Moscow still formed the heart of Muscovy, and Peter's innovations had so shaken the allegiance of many of his subjects that the capture of Moscow might well destroy his power. To save the city he must risk his army. That risk Peter was bent on avoiding to the last moment possible.

Policy of
Charles XII

Having crossed the Vistula in December, 1707, Charles defied the winter and made for Grodno. He led the vanguard across the Niemen, but was halted by dearth and weather at Smorgonie, not far south-east of Vilna. In March, 1708, he arrived near Minsk, compelled once more to await fresh provender and reinforcements. At the end of May, he summoned Lewenhaupt from Riga, while Stanislas

Swedish
Invasion
of Russia

and the Polish army prepared to co-operate in the invasion. The King reckoned that he would march into Russia at the head of some 80,000 men.

Charles thus expected to dispose of forces immensely superior to those which Peter could array. Nor was it impossible that his best ally against Russia might be the Tsar himself. Such a standing outrage on Russian tradition as Peter could never lack foes at home. Posterity cannot precisely appraise the disaffection which seven years of his godless antics had aroused in the Russian common man. We know, however, that the silent masses seemed to prize above all else their ancient faith, and this, it seemed, was defied and insulted daily by him who should have been its chief defender. Why had their church no Patriarch since Adrian died? Why was her spokesman thus supplanted by a mere Metropolitan? Why was every tradition for the behaviour of their supreme ruler flouted?

Russian
Public
Opinion

The most zealous, such as the men of the lower Volga, denounced the outrages which good Christians now must suffer—beard-shearing, foreign dress, the taint of tobacco, exhortations to idolatry—besides such grievances as taxes on baths and store-houses, which prompted Russian subjects to rebel. On the other hand, the Tsar remained the Lord's anointed, who shared in the services of the Church and appointed the higher clergy, while his countrymen possessed a genius for self-sacrifice and submission, and the invaders were Lutherans and Romanists speaking foreign tongues.

Confronted with such a dilemma, the Muscovite peasant was perhaps more likely to obey, or to destroy himself, than to subvert the government. Peter, indeed, had an inborn understanding of the Russian mind which few if any Russians and no foreigner, then or thereafter, could approach. But it may safely be said that the invader might expect to profit by the Tsar's un-Russian policy, and that he might reasonably hope for a continuance of the recent tendency of sections of his subjects to rebel. Peter's offer to give up all other conquests if he might keep St. Petersburg did not indicate over-confidence.

The Little
Russians

Charles' strongest hopes of a new ally, however, centred upon Little Russia. There could be no comparison between the strength of the bonds which united Moscow to the Tsar

and those which linked him with Kiev. The Little Russians, like so many neighbours of Moscow throughout her history, felt their cultural superiority to their 'barbarian' neighbours. They kept their own customs and their own hetman, and they naturally disliked the new taxation, due to Peter's wars. These likewise prejudiced the Cossacks' privileges, which a centralizing ruler must in any case find unwelcome. The collapse of Poland before Charles, moreover, seemed to prove that the Tsar could not protect his allies. Mazeppa, for twenty years the hetman, therefore secretly consented to throw in his lot with Stanislas and Charles against Peter. It remained to be seen how far he could speak for Little Russia, or whether the Cossacks of the Don, already in revolt, would combine with the invaders.

After three months in camp near Minsk, Charles moved on towards Moscow, still nearly 500 miles distant. He was closely watched by Peter, who disposed of a larger force, but was determined not to hazard it in any battle. Forty toilsome miles and an adroit manœuvre took the Swedes safely across the Beresina. Mohilev, beyond the Dnieper, was their next objective, but, before reaching it, they defeated Sheremetiev on July 4, 1708, in a battle which Charles regarded as the most skilful of all won under his own command. Before crossing that now famous river, the Swedes spent almost a month in Poland, vainly awaiting the recovery of Ingria and the arrival of Lewenhaupt with reinforcements. Men and horses alike were suffering from the long campaign and from the guerilla tactics of their foe. When at last they moved towards Muscovy, it was to engage in manœuvres so complex that it is only certain that the direct route by Smolensk had been abandoned.

March of
Charles XII
—Mazeppa

Although Lewenhaupt, with the expected reinforcements and supplies, was still delayed, in mid-September Charles marched south-east towards Mazeppa. The hetman had been twice denounced to Peter without shaking the Tsar's belief in him, but his obvious treason now aided the Russians more than his fidelity could have done. For Charles' move towards him enabled Peter to crush the tardy Lewenhaupt, and when at last Mazeppa fled to the Swedish army, declaring that he was dying and had gone to seek extreme unction, Menshikov hurled himself upon his capital and destroyed it.

To the Swedes Mazeppa brought a bare 2,000 men, while his alliance complicated their whole campaign.

Peter's
Plans and
Innovation

All these events combined to draw Charles southward and away from Moscow. The destruction of Baturin, Mazeppa's capital, meant the loss of its accumulated supplies, only replaceable from untouched country, while the Tsar's troops never ceased their harrying and devastation. Charles must now base his hopes on Stanislas, or even on Turkish aid. Meanwhile Peter's energy was attested by his introduction, during a year of mortal conflict, of a new system of administration. Russia was now divided into eight 'Governments', each with a Governor appointed by the Senate and with a symmetrical hierarchy of officials. Although his jester, in a Russian jingle, denounced St. Petersburg as girt in by sea and swamp, woe and moaning,¹ the costly creation went on.

Winter of
1708-9

Europe thus approached the fateful year 1709, which decided that Russia might enter the family of nations, and that France must relinquish her aggression. In both decisions, but especially in the first, the vagaries of nature played no small part. This was the famous winter which to this day remains unparalleled for cold.

Campaign
of Poltava

On the naked plains of Little Russia, horsemen were frozen in the saddle and birds dropped dead in flight. The Swedish regiments shrank, and many who survived lost limbs from frost-bite. Charles, who had condemned Patkul to a ghastly death upon the wheel, seemed unabashed by the sufferings either of himself or of his men. It is said that when a soldier had lost both feet, he ordered his top-boots to be filled with straw, so that he could march on the stumps with the rest. During the winter, his army dwindled to 20,000, perhaps a quarter of the Russian strength. Cannon were few and powder musty. With such odds in his favour, the Tsar, while never ceasing his harrying tactics, could venture to cut off the Swedish and Polish reinforcements on which Charles relied. At the same time Menshikov, sailing down the Dnieper, destroyed the *Sech*, or stronghold, of the Cossacks beyond its cataracts, who were disaffected.

Peter, meanwhile, with an eye to Turkish intervention, was building ships at Voronezh and visiting his strongholds at the mouth of the Don. Prudence undoubtedly suggested

¹ *More, gore, moch & och.*

² Zaporogian.

that Charles, who was now hemmed in between the Dnieper and its tributaries, should retreat westwards across the river. There he might gain reinforcements and allies, while in Russia he risked annihilation. Against the advice of his generals and his chief engineer, however, he insisted on laying siege to Poltava, a small fortress on the Vorskla, built some 500 miles south of Moscow to guard against Tartar attack. A month later, in mid-June, Peter joined his forces, who were strongly posted northward from the town.

Suspecting, probably with good reason, that the aim of the invincible King was to draw him into battle, the Tsar declined to move until the garrison was near capitulation. He had then the immense good fortune that his adversary was severely wounded in the foot while reconnoitring the Russian camp. Rehnsköld, indeed, took over the command, and (by Russian reckoning) on June 28, 1709, both sides advanced to battle. On that fatal day of Poltava, the Swedish infantry was annihilated by guns of French design, and the cavalry, at first triumphant, was later forced to flee. Rehnskold and other generals became prisoners, but Charles, who had attended the battle in his litter, was among the last to escape. When the fugitives, moving towards Turkey, reached the Dnieper, thousands were captured and led in triumph to Moscow. Charles with 500 men crossed Dnieper, Bug and Dniester, to be welcomed at Bender by the Turks. There he could plan further enterprises while still a cripple.

The outcome of Poltava, as Peter justly claimed, was that the foundations of St. Petersburg became secure. With the northern autocrat in Turkey, and peace with France rejected by the Allies, the Tsar could turn with greater freedom to the transformation of Russian institutions and the assertion abroad of Russian power. Charles, none the less, was by no means an extinct volcano. Poltava he regarded as a mere incident, affecting his policy of bridling Russia as little as it reduced his authority at home. While undeniably the enemy had taken Reval, Riga and Viborg, and joined naval forces with the Danes, the Turkish fortress on the Dniester became the centre from which he governed the Swedish empire and moved the Turks to make war. While still in Turkey, he despatched a scientific expedition to Palestine and Egypt.

Charles' familiar nickname of 'the Madman of the

Peter and
Charles after
Poltava

North', moreover, disguises the essential reasonableness of his policy on the morrow of Poltava. If Sweden were to retain her power, she must, as after-history has shown, bar Russia from the Baltic. This she had done a century earlier, with infinitely less resources. Since that day, her former rival, Poland, had declined, while the Turks, despite some reverses, had shown that, given good leadership, they remained a mighty empire. Charles, whom, as the greatest warrior within their ken, they must and did respect, proved his statesmanship by seeking, persistently and not without success, the Sultan's co-operation against Peter. Within two campaigns of Poltava, the Turks made a virtual prisoner of the Tsar.

Enemies of
Sweden

After Poltava, none the less, the enemies of Sweden seized their opportunity to attack what in her 'Period of Greatness' she had built up. Even before Charles' reverse, Frederick of Denmark and Augustus allied themselves for reconquest, to be begun as soon as Peter should agree to join them. Poltava assured them of Russian support, and in August, 1709, Stanislas must flee to Swedish Pomerania, accompanying the Swedish force from Poland. Early in November, while Peter turned against Riga, and himself hurled the first grenade into the fortress, 15,000 Danes crossed the Sound without a battle. In January, 1710, they gained some success in their lost provinces on the farther side. The Swedes, however, could still raise troops for home defence, and in Stenbock they had a commander far superior to any Dane. At the end of February, near Helsingborg, he crushed the invaders, ending for ever their reconquest of southern Sweden.

Swedish
Gains and
Losses

The Russians, meanwhile, were striving to safeguard Ingria and St. Petersburg by conquests in Livonia and southern Finland. While the siege of Riga went on, they crossed the ice to attack Viborg, at first without success. Peter himself risked his life to bring them supplies and inspiration, and he received a full reward. In June the fortress fell, to be followed in the remaining summer months by Riga, Pernau and Reval. The year 1710, therefore, saw the Baltic provinces definitely conquered by Russia. If, however, the diplomatic efforts of Charles in Turkey should realize his hopes, these Russian gains would be short-lived.

In November, 1710, the King's hopes came near fulfilment. Influenced by his Tartar vassal of the Crimea, the Sultan declared war on Russia. Such was the outcome of a long and involved diplomatic struggle, in which the danger of prejudicing their own western war involved the Sea Powers, the Emperor, Hanover and Prussia. The final plunge was taken when Peter rashly used threatening language to the Turks. His own danger then compelled him to desert the Danes and Saxons, and turn to the Christian races of the Balkans for aid against their oppressor.

Crisis
of 1710

The first Russian crusade to liberate the Orthodox subjects of the Turk, however, proved a resounding failure. In March, 1711, Peter left Moscow for the front, allying himself on the way with Augustus and with the Governor of Moldavia. In June, to rouse the Balkans, he ventured to cross the Dniester, although the enemy was tormenting the invading Russians with their own weapon of starvation. Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, in five times greater force, had captured Braila and passed the Danube. Russians and Turks met on the Pruth, and Peter's position seemed desperate. He himself abandoned hope, except of miracle, and ordered his newly-established Senate, if he fell, to choose 'the worthiest' as his successor. Sheremetiev, however, engaged in what might well seem a hopeless negotiation, and met with incredible good fortune. The greed or folly of the Vizier flung away the fairest imaginable opportunity of paralysing Russia.

The Peace of the Pruth (July, 1711), at a moment when Peter was ready to concede almost anything, stipulated only that he should abandon Azov, Taganrog, his fleet and the Polish adventure, granting Charles a safe passage to his own dominions. Even these terms left Peter downcast, while Charles regarded them as untimely but full of hope. Their outcome, however, must favour the new attack upon his own dominions, which were nearing exhaustion. The death of the Emperor, who was succeeded as Charles VI (1711-40) by the so-called Charles III of Spain, together with that of the Dauphin, pointed to an early close of the western struggle, and the year ended with the downfall of Marlborough, its leading spirit. Ought not Charles to return to his own domains?

War and
Peace on
the Pruth,
1711

Charles'
Return from
Turkey,
1712

The events of the following year suggest that to this question only one answer is possible. The Turks were at the moment incapable of an aggressive major war. It is true that the remonstrances and manœuvres of the Swedes and the non-performance of the recent treaty by the Russians renewed for a brief space the Turco-Russian struggle. Terminated when Peter at last yielded Azov and Taganrog, it might well be again resumed, as indeed it was, in 1712. Even in that case, however, Charles could hardly expect from it gains comparable with what he stood to lose by refusing to return from Turkey. Mediation by the western powers, alliance with Prussia, friendship with Britain, mercenaries from the German princes—all were at his disposal. To Europe, Russia was still the enemy of all free nations. With these aids he could secure his provinces in Germany, and regain much of what he had lost beyond the Baltic.

The prospect, indeed, fell short of Charles' design to place a client on the Polish throne and to chastise the aggressive Tsar, but it was far more attainable. There was assuredly no doubt which course his subjects would prefer. The King, however, remained deaf to reason. 'Such is my master's will', his envoy had once declared. 'He never changes his resolve.' The year 1712, none the less, revealed the weakness of his position. Stenbock, indeed, reorganized the Swedish fleet, but in the summer the Danes seized Bremen and Stade. The Elector of Hanover, meanwhile, occupied Verden, on the hypocritical pretext of guarding it against the Danes. Unless Sweden could step in, Stanislas and his Polish friends would be no match for the party of Augustus, supported by Saxon and by Russian arms. The Swedes, however, were immobilized by the need of defending Pomerania against Menshikov, the more so as their supply fleet was lost at sea.

Swedish
Struggle in
Germany

In October, 1712, however, a victory of Stenbock over the Danes transferred the struggle to Mecklenburg, where the Swedes could at least find means to live. But the approach of Danes, Saxons and Russians in far superior strength threatened Stenbock with encirclement if he stood still. In December, therefore, after a four days' march in Swedish heroic style, he hurled himself upon the Danish King. At Gadebusch, south-west of Wismar, he won a

brilliant but barren victory. Although the Turks had once again declared war, Peter refused to leave his western army, and at Gadebusch the Danish cavalry remained unbroken. Compelled to march once more, Stenbock turned towards Holstein-Gottorp. In February, 1713, he found himself in Tönning, with some 10,000 combatants. Besieged by forces thrice as strong, in May he was starved into surrender. Like Rehnsköld and Lewenhaupt in Moscow, he died a prisoner, in Copenhagen.

While Sweden's German provinces were thus beset, and Peter turned to conquer Finland, Charles laboured on among the Turks. At Bender he formed a little Swedish colony, and his policy attracted many supporters in the Turkish capital. This naturally increased the desire of their opponents to expel him, and, if possible, to betray him to Peter or Augustus. Early in 1713 the Sultan ordered him to quit the Turkish empire. 'Iron-head', as the Turks surnamed him, was aware of the intrigue, and refused compliance. With less than fifty men, he defended his house at Bender against many thousands of Turks and Tartars, provided with a dozen guns. Ten of the assailants, it is said, he slew with his own hand. After hours of battle, the Turks burned down the house, and Charles became the Sultan's prisoner. In his honourable confinement at Demotika, near Adrianople, he had the mortification of seeing a Turkish peace with Russia negotiated by the Sea-Powers (July, 1713). This meant that Peter could throw all his strength into the northern struggle. Thus the Utrecht settlement of 1713 found Charles XII striving to rouse the Turks against the Russians, while Peter, in northern Europe, sought all manner of gains from the destruction of the Swedish empire. Before tracing their complex and pregnant struggle to its close some five years later, we must return to the western question which they had been forced to leave unaffected.

Charles in
Turkey

CHAPTER XXIX

THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT

Treaties of
Utrecht

AT Utrecht, while the Emperor was slowly taught that he must reconcile himself to peace, a mass of treaties had been framed, ranking in importance with those of Westphalia, and summing up the progress of Europe in the half-century of Louis' rule. England and the Dutch on one side, on the other France and Spain, with Savoy, Prussia and Portugal, and a general regard for the warring Emperor's rights—such were the treaty-making powers. It is recorded that Spain and Portugal were the last to agree, signing in February, 1715, on the public promenade, since neither would enter the other's house, and the English mediator had gone home.

France with
Prussia
and with
England,
1913

The first Utrecht agreement, that between France and Prussia, was the least important. Louis remedied a gratuitous insult in his earlier manner by recognizing that the Elector had become a king. He likewise admitted Frederick's rights over Neufchâtel and Upper Gelders, and himself received an acknowledgement of his own title to Orange. Next, after almost interminable bargaining, came the chief fruit of the Congress—the price which France should pay for peace with England. The crown of Spain, of course, must never be united with that of France. The Protestant succession was admitted, and the Pretender was never to re-enter France. The menace of a fortress at Dunkirk was removed. Louis undertook to destroy the existing works within five months and never to restore them. St. Christopher, Newfoundland, Acadia and Hudson's Bay and Strait were given to England. In Newfoundland, however, the French retained valuable rights of drying fish, and they kept Cape Breton island. Other pregnant clauses provided for mutual privileges in trade and navigation, while a separate treaty adjusted the American boundaries

between the French and Portuguese. Both banks of the Amazon, France admitted, belonged exclusively to Portugal.

Several more treaties were signed by the French early in April. Of these the most important provided for the future safety of the Dutch. France regained Lille, Aire, Béthune and St. Venant, but assented to a double check upon her own future aggression. The Spanish Netherlands were to be transferred to Austrian rule and guarded by a ^{The} ~~Barrier~~ ^{Barrier} of fortresses under Dutch control. These included Ghent, Furnes, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi, Namur and several more—a formidable list, if an artificial and hazardous arrangement. The terms of the treaties favoured the exploitation of the Netherlands by the Sea Powers for their own exclusive advantage. They also made impossible expansion in the Netherlands by France.

To Victor Amadeus, France at the same time returned Italy Savoy and Nice while conferring upon him the throne of Sicily and the right of succession to Spain, if the line of Philip failed. These concessions, like those in the Netherlands, were obediently reiterated by the Spanish Crown. Portugal received a concession to Brazil at the expense of French Guiana, while an unusual provision guarded against commercial disputes between these colonies by forbidding their commercial intercourse altogether. Three months later, Spain made three great concessions to Britain. Gibraltar and Minorca, implying the mastery of the Mediterranean, ^{The} ~~remained~~ ^{Asiento} remained in British hands, and the famous Asiento promised the islanders an immense and highly profitable trade. For thirty years they undertook to send to Spanish America not less than 4,800 negroes yearly, with as much merchandise as was necessary for their support. Finally, Spain ceded to Portugal the colony of San Sacramento north of the River Plate. A separate commercial Franco-Dutch treaty for twenty-five years recognized the principle of free ships, free goods, already established between France and Britain for neutrals in time of war.

The treaty between Spain and Britain was delayed until Philip could bring himself to renounce Sicily. Stating clearly ^{Other} ~~Spanish~~ ^{Provisions} that the recent long and costly war had been solely due to the imminent danger to all Europe from the too close union of Spain and France, it confirmed their mutual renunciations.

Spain also recognized the Protestant Succession and ceded Gibraltar and Minorca, which ports Moorish settlers and Moorish warships might not enter. The treaty of Utrecht, on Queen Anne's intercession, provided for the Catalans a full amnesty and the privileges of Castile.

Imperialist
War, 1713

Meanwhile the war between France and the Emperor had been renewed, although Charles lacked men and money, and his lifelong preoccupation with his Pragmatic Sanction had begun. Villars now faced Eugene upon the Rhine, where in August he gained a notable success by capturing Landau after a ten weeks' siege. Freiburg-in-Breisgau fell in mid-November, since neither the Emperor nor the Empire could furnish a field army on the scale of that of France. Charles, it was clear, must do like all the other Allies and submit to peace. Ten days after the capitulation of Freiburg, Eugene and Villars met at Rastadt, to produce in a few weeks the draft of a treaty which recognized Charles' title 'King of Spain'. Louis, however, was far from sharing his marshal's indifference to diplomatic forms, and it was not until March, 1714, that the revised peace of Rastadt, which lay between the armies of Villars and Eugene, quenched the last embers of the European conflagration. Even then it was necessary that the Empire should confirm what the Emperor had done, and that the Emperor, as ruler of Austria, should make detailed arrangements for their Barrier with the Dutch.

Treaties of
Rastadt
and Baden

In September, 1714, at Baden, in Switzerland, where the Congress met, the French clauses framed at Rastadt were translated into Latin and the treaty in effect reissued by the Diet as their own. In the meantime yet another royal death had weakened the French succession, but the death of Anne had not produced a civil war. The bargain between Louis and Charles, therefore, had already received in a sense the endorsement of Europe. It deprived the Bavarian Elector of the expectation of Sardinia, but restored him, together with the Elector of Cologne, to the rights and dignities of which they had been dispossessed for taking sides with France. Hanover was confirmed in the new Electorate which she had held since 1708. Alsace, including Strasburg, was once more yielded to France, which retained the key fortress of Landau, but renounced Alt Breisach, Freiburg

and Kehl. In Italy the Emperor retained Naples, Sardinia, Milan, Mantua and the fortified ports (*Presidi*) of Tuscany.

It remained to reconcile the Emperor to the position devised for him by his western opponents and allies—that of a sovereign of the former Spanish Netherlands whose frontier fortresses were to be in the occupation of the Dutch. It was hardly possible that an Austrian Habsburg holding the highest lay office upon earth should willingly become the gate-keeper of the heretic republicans of Holland. History, indeed, was to show the justice of his contention that his own troops would protect the Dutch more effectively than isolated garrisons of foreign mercenaries such as they, a non-military state, might hire. More than a year passed in discussion before a new version of the Barrier treaty could be agreed on. This disgusted the inhabitants, but appeased the two guardian powers, and was amply guaranteed by Britain. By the chief of its 28 clauses, the Emperor undertook that no portion of his new domain should ever be ceded to France or any other power, and that it should be garrisoned by at least 30,000 men, of whom two-fifths should be furnished by the Dutch. In return the Emperor ceded several districts, undertook an annual payment of 1,250,000 Dutch florins, and assured the Dutch rulers and troops of permission to worship freely in buildings with no outward signs of consecration. Seven ‘places’, including Namur, Tournai and Ypres, fell to their share, while waterbound Dendermonde was to be garrisoned by both, its governor named by the Emperor but swearing allegiance to the Dutch. As to commerce, that between Britain and the Netherlands was to continue on the existing footing until a tripartite treaty could be arranged. Failure to achieve this was destined to give the Austrians an excuse for annulling the whole agreement.

While peace was thus being laboriously fortified in the cockpit of Europe, war in several remoter fields did not cease to rage. In Spain, Barcelona, the last stronghold of the newly-made Emperor, was tenaciously defended by the Catalans against the French battalions fighting for Philip V, as well as a Franco-Spanish fleet. In September, 1714, however, Berwick took the great port by storm and the Spanish war was over. The lately widowed King, whose

New
Barrier
Treaty

Europe
after
Utrecht

conspicuous weakness had given full scope to Mme des Ursins' strength, now allowed himself to be married to Elizabeth Farnese, of Parma, as to whose personality that lady had been misinformed. Before the winter ended, she found herself deported by the new Queen, who, with her fellow-countryman Alberoni, proved no friend to Spanish peace. Meanwhile, other royal deaths were modifying the European situation. In 1713 the advent of Frederick William in Prussia had replaced a weak and lavish king by one of very different character. In August, 1714, Queen Anne's death gave the throne to George of Hanover and the ministry to the Whigs. For a whole generation it remained doubtful whether the Hanoverians would take root in Britain, and in 1715 came a Jacobite appeal to force, the so-called Fifteen.

CHAPTER XXX

THE NORTHERN WAR AFTER UTRECHT

UNTIL peace was restored to western Europe, Peter's ^{Peter and Finland} success both in Germany and Finland had been mediocre. There was little unity of aim between the Tsar and his Western allies, while in the Finnish war, although Helsingfors (Helsinki) was captured, the Russians bungled both by sea and land. From the moment of Peter's intervention, however, the Swedes, ill-led and outnumbered, could not protect their province. Before the end of 1714, all Finland had been subdued. Great tracts of country were laid waste, and thousands of captives were transferred to Russia.

Meanwhile the Turkish career of Sweden's king had come ^{Charles XII} to a dramatic close. Foreign and domestic politics combined ^{Defeated} to overcome even his self-will. The end of the Spanish Succession war had changed the Scandinavian horizon. Louis XIV displaced Britain as Sweden's possible ally. Prussia and Hanover were set free to seek their own advantage, while greater powers lost sympathy for an obstinate warrior-king who unreasonably obstructed a general peace. Swedish Stettin, like Swedish Verden, passed by some jugglery into alien occupation—in this case that of Prussia. Above all, Stanislas himself abjured the Polish throne. With Russia and Turkey at peace and Augustus King of Poland, Charles must accept defeat. 'The necessarily unreceptive mind of the royal knight-errant' (Godley) had at last felt something of the truth.

At the same time, even the patient Swedes were forced to take some measures for their own preservation. One of their armies had vanished at Poltava; another, at Tönning; a third, in Finland; and the new Russian fleet was threatening the Swedish shores. At long last, the Council determined to disobey the King, and, countenanced by his sister, to summon a Diet. In December, 1713, the Estates assembled,

and at once declared their wish to negotiate for peace. They also proposed to abandon Charles' new system of taxation. A breach was averted, however, by the arrival of royal letters which forbade the Diet to assemble, but declared that the King intended to make peace with Poland.

Return of
Charles XII

With the new year (1714), after nearly eleven months of unwonted rest in bed, Charles suddenly resumed his normal life. In September, when Prussia had joined his foes, he turned his face towards his famine-stricken country. The Hanoverian Elector was now our George I, a change of sovereign boding ill for Sweden. Plans for partition were rife, while Charles inflexibly declined the least surrender. Stralsund and Rügen, none the less, were the sole remnants of his south Baltic empire.

No chapter in Charles' life characterized him better than that which records his journey across Europe in 1714. He quitted Demotika in state, and travelled normally through the Sultan's dominions. In Wallachia he became Captain Peter Frisk, riding north-westward, largely by night, with two companions, finally with only one. Budapest, Vienna, Nuremberg, Cassel and Würzburg were passed in turn, too swiftly for would-be kidnappers or murderers to be successful. A fortnight sufficed for the ride from the southern boundary of Transylvania to the Baltic shore. There, in a November snowstorm, two travellers claimed admission to Stralsund, where the stone which served as a royal bed may still be seen. Thus Charles XII returned to Sweden.

The rapture with which the Swedes received their king, and the feats which, in his four remaining years, a small and suffering nation led by him accomplished, form the most resplendent tribute to himself and them. In 1715 Sweden must face not only Russians, Danes and Saxons, but also Prussians, intent on keeping Stettin, and Hanoverians, who now held Bremen and Verden. French gold and French diplomacy were at Charles' service, but he had no ally. In July the Danes and Prussians laid siege to Stralsund with some 50,000 men. The King himself inspired the defenders, while for three months his fleet prevented the Danes from bringing siege artillery from Stettin. Before Christmas, however, all was over. But Charles, once again severely

wounded, had reached his mainland in an open boat, and the victors, as a tribute to the marvellous defence, allowed a thousand of his men to follow.

The year 1715, of which the autumn saw a child succeed to the throne of Louis XIV, and the Old Pretender threaten Britain, thus arrayed a great but inharmonious league to invade and conquer Sweden. Weary as they were, the Swedes still rallied round their hero-king, whose fame was great enough to warn off Peter when he headed a great host in Zealand (1716). Charles, since the ice would not bear him to Denmark, planned to strike at his foes by invading Norway. His leading counsellor was now a Holsteiner, Count Gortz, harsh and unscrupulous, but none the less devoted to his master. To him the Swedish people loyally ascribed their sufferings from a war which brought their country into a state of perpetual siege. Their history seemed to have become a catalogue of taxes new and old, of conscription, forced loans, monopoly and currency debasement, but they still revered and loved their king.

Charles'
Swedish
Career,
1715-18

Meanwhile diplomacy was active, and its prospects were enhanced by discord between the allies. In 1717, however, Britain, imagining that Charles was leagued with the Pretender, seized Görtz at Arnhem, and Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister, in London. Next year, in May, while Britain and Sweden were negotiating for peace, plenipotentiaries from Sweden and Russia met in the Åland islands. Their discussions illustrated a truth which Görtz at least had discovered—that much might be hoped for in the west by an adroit display of friendship with the Russian bogey. Peter actually proposed to retain Ingria, Narva and Viborg, and either to return the Baltic Provinces, or to retain these also on condition of uniting his arms with those of Sweden. The aim of the alliance between king and tsar would be no less than the conquest of Norway and of Mecklenburg, with the recovery of Sweden's lost German possessions. Charles, indeed, declined to entertain such a speculation, but it reveals both the mind of Peter and the effect on European politics of the advent of Russia.

Peter's
Diplomacy

The negotiations of 1718 settled nothing. In the autumn Charles returned and invaded Norway. There he might force Denmark to make peace, restoring what she had taken

both from himself and from the House of Holstein. In December his death, 'by a bullet discharged at close range from a small-barrelled firearm', during the siege of a border fortress, transformed the politics of northern Europe. After Charles XII, Sweden ceased to aspire to greatness by way of war.

Peter the
Great

The duel between Charles and Peter which had pervaded the history of Europe since 1700 thus ended in the complete triumph of the Tsar. Thanks above all to Peter, the power whose alliance France scorned in 1717 within a century trampled on Napoleon. That Europeanization of Muscovy which he had far advanced before his death in 1725 belongs mainly to the last decade of his reign. Before we take leave of him in 1715, however, its main contours were visible and may now be lightly sketched.

The external likeness and the deeper contrast between the rival autocrats deserves a moment's consideration. Each claimed and exercised throughout his reign the very plenitude of power. Charles at fifteen, overruling all precedent and exhortation, placed the crown on his own head, and forced his Senators to shield him with a canopy as he rode to his coronation. When his subjects swore allegiance, he would not fetter himself by making the customary promise in return. He, however, found a well-ordered administration, which his forefathers had built up, and able men to serve him in war and peace.

Peter, on the other hand, was endowed with sacred authority, modified in practice by a no less sacred though unwritten constitution. While Charles had submissive Lutherans to deal with, Peter faced a Church which, with many obeisances, demanded the Tsar's respect for the usages and traditions by which he and they were bound. His problem was to exercise a semi-divine authority without conceding to the Church its wonted share. The vastness and ignorance of Russia favoured rebellion, though they also reduced its danger to the State.

These factors accentuated the differences between the two sovereigns' rule. Charles was inscrutable and strenuous, living chiefly outside Sweden, and concerned above all things with foreign policy and war. Peter unceasingly rushed about his dominions, and, unlike Western monarchs, appeared

suddenly in foreign lands. Both autocrats counted on profiting by each other's work. Charles said in effect, 'Let the Tsar build cities: we shall capture them', while Peter declared that Charles, by favouring the Jacobites, had brought him the favour of Britain. Both were recklessly brave, but the Tsar, notoriously drunken and unchaste, fell as far below the King in morals as he excelled him in talent and penetration. Charles, as posterity must feel, was forcing Sweden by feats of arms into a position superior to what her resources could maintain, while Peter hurried Russia madly forward along her natural path of progress.

Until Charles had been driven back to Sweden, Peter ^{Their Reforms} could attempt no systematic programme of reform. The changes that he decreed were piecemeal, dictated chiefly by the requirements of the war. All, however, except those which concerned the Church, were consistent with the ideas and designs which had inspired pre-Petrine Muscovy. As the Polish wars and the 'German suburb' showed, his ancestors had felt that their seclusion was unnatural, and that they had much to gain from the West. Peter westernized by shearing beards and robes, by enforcing foreign travel, by brief decrees such as that which compelled Russian cities to adopt wholesale the law of Sweden. Every noble, he felt and later decreed, must serve the State, and service to the State conferred nobility. This seeming revolution was appropriate to a race conspicuous beyond all others for fraternity.

Peter's reforms were often born of war, but St. Petersburg, ^{St. Petersburg} his most conspicuous creation, also gave rise to war and largely shaped its course. A military and naval fortress from the first, its civic growth was ever hastened by unsparing use of power. Built in a marsh, liable to inundations, so placed that among its citizens unbroken health was rare, it none the less grew year by year more populous. In 1714, when the Senate was removed to it from Moscow, it contained more than 34,000 buildings. Like Versailles, the new creation cost the lives of a whole army. Now, though the nobles detested it, they were forbidden to build in stone elsewhere, while Peter's thoughts advanced towards degrading Moscow in its favour. On Basil Island, north of the Neva's mouth, he planned a settlement whose formal avenues and canals

reproduced what he had seen in Holland. To glorify St. Petersburg he did not hesitate to sacrifice Archangel. Charles could equal him in violence, but by no means in imagination. Historians' estimates of Peter and his work have differed widely, but none can deny that both must be accounted great. It is certain that his decrees were prompted by the immediate needs of the interminable wars, that they were of the most sweeping character, and that the nominal penalties at least were overwhelming. On occasion, as the murder of his only son may show, he spared no violence to attain his ends. Those ends, however, were always the greatness and prosperity of Russia. The fact that he escaped assassination suggests that his tormented subjects felt that their tsar was patriotic. The seeming impulsiveness of the decrees cannot deprive them of their character of appropriateness to the needs of a nation which its ruler by instinct understood. Peter was incarnate Russia. Some Russian historians claim that he merely hastened her progress along lines which his Romanov predecessors had laid down. None can deny the skill of the Tsar who found his instruments everywhere and shaped them to his ends—Menshikov from selling pies, Prokopovitch from a monastery in Kiev, Scots, Germans, Swiss and so forth.

Baffled perhaps by the impossibility of understanding a Slav, Western judges pronounce the most contradictory verdicts upon the Great Tsar. One holds him beyond all doubt the worst of the great rulers in Christian history. Another pronounces him at heart deeply religious, surpassed by few in the conviction of being God's instrument for good. One Englishman declares him European in his intellect, Asiatic in his sport, savage in his wrath. Another likens him to a criminal of the lower classes who is found to be a great constructive statesman. Another finds him indifferent to truth, honour and justice. Yet another picturesquely shows him stimulating Russia as a Russian stimulates his horse—with a tremendous punch. It is significant that in 1762 Catherine, already the interested devotee of Russian history, was ambitious to be his successor. She, it was said, in all emergencies turned to the archives for light on what Peter would have done, and seldom, if ever, in vain. The great Tsar had felt and considered every Russian need.

CHAPTER XXXI

EUROPE IN LOUIS' LAST YEARS (1713-1715)

WHEN the Utrecht treaties at last restored peace to France, Louis had little more than two years to live. For a prince born in 1688, his vitality and energy were still amazing. In 1709 he still regarded himself as capable of making good the defects of a fellow-worker. In 1714, when yet another royal prince was removed by death, he ventured to legitimatise two of his bastards, and drew up an elaborate scheme of government for his successors. Among his last acts were favours to the Jacobites, which, like the replacement of Dunkirk by Mardyke, attested his unceasing resolve to assert independence of England, and his expectation that the Jacobites would triumph.

Louis in Old
Age : His
Autocracy

The King's life during these last two years, indeed, epitomized what he had done for France. The popular reaction to his death, which many of his subjects regarded as an emancipation, showed that he had not won all their hearts. But throughout the disastrous war they had proved that the mutinous France of earlier days had vanished. Ravailleurs, pro-Spaniards, Huguenots, Frondeurs, Camisards, were no longer visible. Even Jansenists had suffered suppression by a king whom Mme de Maintenon and his Jesuit confessor had encouraged to become a loyal ally of the Pope. Although the age of Voltaire was approaching, and Orleans, the natural guardian of the infant Dauphin, was a well-known freethinker and rake, France lacked an open Opposition. The climax of Louis' autocracy, indeed, came one month before he died, when the *Parlement* accepted his decree that his bastards should rank above the greatest non-royal peers. If the legitimate blood royal failed, moreover, they were made capable of succeeding to the throne. The testament by which in effect he substituted the legitimized Duke of Maine for the vicious and suspect Orleans as regent failed, it is true, to achieve its purpose. It was, none

the less, a convincing proof that Louis to the very last had no reason to abate or to question his absolute mastery of France.

A modern Frenchman has added titles to influence beyond what history proclaims.

‘He created France anew in his own image’, cried M. Bertrand. ‘In even the smallest county towns, he built the town hall and the theatre, the aqueducts and fountains, made roads and citadels and seaports. He accomplished far more than did his sculptors and painters, for he fashioned our temperament and our minds. We learned from him and his great writers to be heroic and gentle, to share with others in emotion, and to think clearly, as well as to make talent the arbiter of our career. Thus Louis became the representative of France before the centuries and the nations, the great historic Frenchman. A man of action, where rival states find their heroes among intellectuals, he is the perfect Latin of modern times.’

Exhaustion
of France

French unity, however, could not disguise the national exhaustion. With perhaps eight times the manpower and the natural wealth of Holland, France need not fear that her load of debt would doom her to permanent impotence. But more than two decades of almost incessant war against powerful coalitions must tax the strength of any nation in any age. It had long been customary for a French father to say that his son would make his first campaign in a specified future year, hardly reckoning with the possibility of peace. It is calculated that, since the outbreak of the War of Devolution, Louis’ campaigns had cost France some twelve hundred thousand men and an outlay of perhaps fifteen hundred million *livres*. In the later years, the annual expenditure had been more than eight times the revenue. Although Versailles and Paris remained impressive, their former brilliance was gone, and a sombre monotony characterized the court. None could deny that Louis had failed to conquer Holland, or to gain anything adequate from Spain, while Britain had defeated his armies in the field, and had gone far towards driving her opponent from the seas. Perhaps the best tribute to the French King is that, in spite of all this, his reign was still spoken of as great. Even a critic (Seeley) who would reserve that epithet for the period of the Cardinals, substitutes only ‘triumphant and brilliant’ for the age when Louis ruled. Lavissee, the most masterly of modern French historians, finds the supreme estimate of Louis’ reign in the fact that, after a period of equal length

Lavissee
on Louis’
Failure

had followed his death, the exhausted monarchy broke down. The great King, indeed, secured French obedience throughout more than half a century. But he both drained the treasury and impaired the sources of supply. In religion, he failed either to subordinate the Pope or to silence for ever the French Protestants and Jansenists. At his death, both Gallicans and Parliaments revived.

Louis, Lavissee holds, was neither a theorist nor a practical reformer. His government might be described as one of unlimited interference to enforce the King's despotic will. Although his decrees and regulations were innumerable, provincial differences, even in weights and measures and in taxation, remained unchanged—'a kind of anarchy beneath the stately robes of monarchic order'. Privilege, alike of the Church, the nobles and the Parliaments, was unaffected. Although in 1661 France had been strong and Europe weak, and although in 1669 the French fleet equalled the Dutch and English combined, Louis failed to absorb the Spanish Netherlands or to establish a great naval power. These failures dwarf what he in fact accomplished—the transformation of France into a vast fortress enlarged by parts of Flanders and Hainault, as well as Franche Comté, the Cambrai country and Strasburg. The failure of the reign was chiefly due to the shortcomings of the King, who sacrificed the fruit of much patient toil by insulting or defrauding every power. Thus Europe was kept at war by a man who had neither a general's head nor a soldier's heart.

France, none the less, for many years admired and even loved a king who in speech and bearing personified her glory. But he saddled her with a despotic government which his successors could neither wield nor exchange for a better. Voltaire it was who consecrated the glory of

'a man not bad at heart, who had qualities, even virtues, of beauty and grace, and the gift of admirable speech. When France shone, he represented her with brilliance, and when she was overwhelmed, he declined to admit defeat. He played his great part, from the splendid raising of the curtain to the tragic close, in a kind of artificial fairyland'

of palaces created in a wilderness and peopled with uprooted men and women, bewitching to our unfamiliar eyes.

Such is the verdict of a great French spokesman after two hundred years.

Louis and
the French
Revolution

The real significance of Louis' reign, historians both French and foreign have declared, is that it led to the Revolution. 'Politically, Louis XIV made it inevitable by his excessive despotism; economically, he made it necessary by the excessive distress; socially, he made it possible by lowering the privileged classes to the rank of courtiers, and reserving government service for the members of the Third Estate' (Lacour-Gayet). Perhaps an even stronger influence, however, was that of seeds sown during Louis' reign, but not by his hand, and largely outside France. It is indisputable that the Revolution found much inspiration in the precedents of 1689 and 1776, supplied by England and the United States of America. Louis, again, might be the reluctant parent of Voltaire, but Rousseau was wholly alien to his being. 'Excessive despotism' bred secret satire and rebellion: it could not comprehend the dreams and tears of those who gave sentiment the first place in their life.

Louis and
Religion

Probably the foremost influence of the Great King arose from his treatment of religion. In 1610 religion might still claim to be the greatest force in Europe. In 1715 it retained no little influence in strengthening individual states. 'The Lord's anointed' ruled, as his people acknowledged, with a measure of divine authority, and they tended to love only their fellow-churchmen and to regard all heretics with distrust and even hatred. Thus in many states the Church formed a great factor of nationality, to the great profit of the Crown. On the eastern frontiers, men asked not 'Pole or Russian?' so much as 'Latin or Greek?' In Germany, as distinct from the German states, indeed, the quest of religious unity had been abandoned, but it might well be true that this abandonment had made German unity unattainable. Among the German Houses, at any rate, that of Austria gained undoubted profit from its unfailing adhesion to the Roman Church. It had yet to be seen what Prussia, with a Calvinist dynasty ruling provinces mainly Lutheran but some Catholic, would accomplish in the Empire and outside.

By 1715, however, history had proved that, while religion might still influence politics, its influence could not claim to be decisive. Richelieu's achievement in this sense could never be obliterated or reversed. Lutheran, Calvinist,

Anglican, sectarian—these divisions might promote toleration, but they made Protestant unity impossible. Loyalty to the Pope, on the other hand, utterly failed to outweigh many political antagonisms. Both Spain and Portugal, for example, were strict Catholics but relentless mutual foes. Catholic France was at daggers drawn with Catholic Austria, as were often Lutheran Denmark with Lutheran Sweden. The Protestant Dutch must base their security now on Catholic France against Catholic Spain, now on Catholic Austria against Catholic France. Savoy never allowed her Catholicism to hamper her freedom of policy or of alliance, while all Italy was Catholic but not seldom engaged in internal strife. At the same time Sweden, the most intolerant of Lutheran states, became the associate of Louis XIV, and Louis, the Catholic patron, humiliated the Pope and founded much of his political system upon an understanding with the Turk. In 1715, therefore, men might reasonably hope that, apart from possible crusades, religious wars were over.

This hope could only be strengthened by the removal of the aged King. In his last years much had happened which must heighten the intolerance of the author of the Revocation. Intent on his own fate in the world to come, strengthened by the society of his pious wife, and grievously chastised by Providence, Louis had every incitement to avoid the smallest failure to exercise his god-given power. His zeal was heightened by the ardent Le Tellier, 'a Jesuit of blood and iron', whom he made his confessor in the spring of 1709. At the same time Fénelon moved towards the formation of an alliance between King and Pope against the Gallicanism and Jansenism which sullied French religion. Hence came the exercise of absolute authority in a crime which shocked multitudes of Frenchmen then unborn—the destruction of Port Royal.

Louis'
Intolerance :
Port Royal

The convent of Port Royal in Paris ranked as the holy place of Jansenism, and for a whole generation it had been obnoxious to the King. During the agony of France before Malplaquet, Louis compelled Noailles, Mme de Maintenon's Archbishop of Paris, to close it by decree, and this the Council of State confirmed. At the end of October, 1709, the few remaining nuns were driven out, and the building and church were closed. Next year these were razed to

the ground, and in 1711 even the dead were removed from the venerated burial-place. Contemporary Paris, indeed, looked on unmoved, and the Jansenists stoutly maintained their tenets. Noailles himself was attacked as their accomplice, while the Abbé Quesnel's *Moral Reflections on the New Testament* was stigmatized as a manual of heresy. Louis and Clement XI joined forces, the famous bull *Unigenitus* of September, 1713, condemning, in the usual unmeasured language, more than a hundred propositions in Quesnel's book.

Religious
Conflicts

Papal violence, however, roused the French as royal violence had failed to do. Noailles, whom Clement had condemned, found some fifteen supporters among the bishops. Two years were vainly spent in the endeavour to secure obedience, and the battle between Jesuit and Jansenist raged on until the Revolution. The King's death saved Noailles from deposition, while Orleans proved at least no bigot.

Louis'
Death

Preparation for his decease, indeed, had filled many of the ageing Louis' days. He then consigned to the care of high officials of the *Parlement* that sealed will appointing a council of Regency, over which Orleans should merely preside. Maine, one of its members, was to have charge of the infant King, with Villeroy as the governor. This procedure showed both Louis' rigid autocracy and his distrust of Orleans. As August drew on, his weakness and his pains increased, but to the last he acted majesty. Among his farewells the most memorable was that to the child who was to fill his place. Him he blessed and exhorted to shun the wars and extravagance which had defaced his reign. His last conscious act was to repeat the Creed in a firm voice. On September 1, within a few days of his seventy-seventh birthday, he died.

The French people, oppressed by wars and taxes, showed some relief. All could see that Louis had failed either to win the Netherlands or supremacy at sea, or complete harmony within the Church. On the morrow of his death, the *Parlement* annulled his will, and Orleans became an unfettered regent. Soon the legitimization of his bastards was done away, and the Jansenists were released from prison. Despite his failure to abolish all religious diversity at home

or to secure French domination over the Christian world, however, he had made France a world-power, and a state unified as never before his day. His work was at once tested by the absence of a competent successor. No Queen survived him, and the *de facto* consort, Mme de Maintenon, whose unflagging care had doubtless prolonged his life, withdrew noiselessly from the court as soon as his agony began. Even under the notorious Orleans, however, the crown remained unshaken, and the dream of Philip of Spain that he might yet be King of France found no support in fact. Within a fortnight the Regency was in command of seven departmental councils. These were appointed to control foreign affairs, the two services, finance and commerce, home affairs and religion. Under such a government, with a better arrangement of the law-courts and an increased tolerance of belief, the nation might do well. An early trophy was secured for Louis XV when Mauritius became the Île de France.

France after
Louis XIV

The fate of France, however, had been proved by the history of the last thirty years to be inseparably bound up with the fate of England. Never had a history been stranger than that of the part played by England in the political evolution of seventeenth-century Europe. In literature and in philosophy, of course, her contribution eclipsed that which she had made in every earlier century, and it still remains supreme. From Shakespeare and Bacon down to Addison and Pope, our achievement was such that Germans claim the author of *Hamlet* as spiritually their own, and in tsarist Russia *Paradise Lost* ranked as a 'best-seller' at country fairs. Within our period, Hobbes and Locke were actual factors in the theoretical basis of European rule. In science, moreover, Harvey and Newton alone would suffice to make the English contribution great, while the firm establishment of the Anglican Church, and all that Fox and Bunyan stand for, warrant a like claim in religion.

England's
Varied
Eminence

In agriculture, despite the potato and the progress of enclosures, English achievements were less striking. Long civil wars and wars by sea, however, with plague, tempest and other blows of fate, failed through a chequered century to bring about a Great Famine. Meanwhile, England moved towards that insular unity and sea power which strengthened

both the basis and the commerce of the state, and secured her against disaster. In industry, she gained from peaceful intercourse with progressive states and from the safe asylum which she could offer to refugees. Italians, Scots, Jews, Germans, Huguenots, Dutchmen—almost every Western race contributed to Britain's progress, and she learned much from intercourse with far more distant lands. Tea and brocades, coffee-houses, quinine and snuff enforced the teaching of the potato and of tobacco.

Features of
English
History

Between 1610 and 1715 the deepest cleavage in England's history came with the Glorious Revolution. Between 1610 and 1638, despite the Amboyna Massacre and Buckingham's expedition to Ré, the Stuarts had steered clear of war. Thenceforward until the Restoration, England was usually at war, in Scotland or Ireland, at home, or against the Dutch or Spain. Then, for almost twenty years, the restored Stuarts fought only two short wars against the Dutch and crushed Monmouth's rebellion. War in Ireland and by sea ended in 1690, when William and Mary kept the crown. But France had now gained a position and acquired a policy which forced England for Europe's sake and for her own to wage war with one short interval for two-and-twenty years. In short, during a century in which European peace was almost unknown, England had fought for less than half the time, and then usually well within her strength. To this abstinence, as well as to the sea power, commerce and colonies which she incidentally acquired, she owed her approach to primacy in Europe.

It is curious that while the sovereign had still much control over policy, no King of England was a pure-bred Englishman. From Scottish Stuarts and their consorts, Danish, French and Portuguese, to Dutch William and German George, the sequence is broken only by the insignificant queen of half-French James II and by their daughter Anne with her Danish husband. Thus the monarchy helped Britain to be European.

At the Glorious Revolution, in Acton's vivid words, the history of nations had turned into its modern bed, and the Englishman became the leader of the world. In 1715 the flight of Bolingbroke, the impeachment of the Tory ministers and the downfall of the Old Pretender showed how com-

pletely the French had been deceived at Utrecht, when they counted on a Jacobite succession. Although their nation still outnumbered the British by three to one, and possessed greater skill in manufacture and a more fertile soil, the needs of trade and French inferiority in sea power dictated an *entente*, and this was soon to be established. With its aid, the Regency and the Whigs could face successfully the unprecedented complications of post-war Europe.

Outside Britain, where Jacobitism was not to be extinguished for a generation, and France, where the next decade disclosed no ruler of distinction, many European powers presented new or unsolved problems which must affect the whole. Elizabeth Farnese and Alberoni had expelled Mme des Ursins, and with her the influence of Spain France. Now Spain was planning a revival of her old pre-eminence on a firmer basis of military power. The Spaniards, with their long coastline and great possessions overseas, could not fail to embarrass an Emperor who had acquired some of their maritime dominions without himself disposing of a fleet. Thus when the Farnese queen ruled Spain and Charles VI was lord in Italy, there was strong reason for a complete reversal of the antagonism between Britain and Louis XIV's France. For a time at least, the two Western powers must collaborate in defence of their Utrecht settlement.

Farther afield, changes no less important in the European Charles XII structure seemed imminent. As we have seen, the emergence and Peter of two amazing sovereigns had utterly transformed Muscovy and Sweden. The year 1714, when Charles XII crossed Europe to Stralsund, saw Peter lord of Finland and even of Other the Åland isles, a Baltic bastion of Sweden. This first great Powers Russian naval action seized what was to become a station for the fleet. The Turk, it seemed, had accepted the emergence of a new great Christian power, while Poland, long the guardian of Catholic Europe, had become substantially a protectorate of the Tsar. What these changes would mean to Denmark and to Germany grew clear in 1715. Peter, whose name had hitherto been absent from the list of European sovereigns published annually in Paris, now became the ally of Prussia, Hanover, Poland, Saxony and Denmark. At the year's end, when Stralsund fell, it seemed

that the Swedish hero must defend his fatherland against a great coalition led by the Russian Tsar.

The
Russian
Problem

It was easy to perceive, however, that such a league contained the seeds of its own decay. Peter had already raised Russia high enough to prove, on the one hand, that a new threat to all his fellow-members in the coalition had arisen, and, on the other, that the threat was one which they could not but resist. The presence of the Russians in Mecklenburg signified that both Scandinavia and Germany were menaced by an alien band of conquerors, whose religion was hostile to their own, whose civilization was far inferior, whose language was to them incomprehensible, and whose limitless designs they could not fathom. The Russians, like the Turks, might be useful catspaws for such distant powers as France, but they were obviously dangerous to neighbours in northern Europe.

Change in
Prussia

It was therefore the more important that in February, 1713, King Frederick I of Prussia had been succeeded by his son Frederick William (1713-40), familiarly known in history as the Sergeant King. The late monarch was exceptional among the Hohenzollerns for extravagance and love of pomp, failings which may indeed have done something to gild his novel crown, but which, in a poor country, involved an empty treasury and harsh taxation. Frederick's provision of troops for the alliance against Louis XIV with regularity and without due reward, was also unique in the records of his House, and was naturally resented by his people. King Frederick William, whose advent coincided with the close of the Spanish Succession war, immediately cut down his court expenses to the minimum, increased his army to the utmost possible, and used it only to procure immediate gains by Prussia. Before he had spent a year upon the throne, he had joined with Holstein in occupying Stettin, and was preparing to indemnify himself for his expenses by keeping that invaluable port for Prussia. Thus he was led to join the league against Charles XII, but it was easy to predict that he would not long welcome the presence in his neighbourhood of so dangerous a conqueror as Russia.

The future of Europe after the death of Louis XIV, however, must depend first and foremost on the great powers, France and Britain. Spain, as events were soon to prove,

could cause at least a temporary upheaval, and none could foresee what might be the consequences of the sudden rise of Russia. It was certain, however, that the great central region over which, by birth or by election, Charles VI held sway, could not fail to play an important part in every section of the Continent. Charles was at once the overlord of the Hanoverian who reigned in England, and the possessor of those Belgian lands whose safety was essential to the Dutch. The rival and recent foe of France, he was still, in his own eyes, the rightful King of Spain. Italy was chiefly his; the Turk was his vanquished but ambitious rival; Russia, Poland and Scandinavia each touched his interests and concerned his policy. Both 'Germany' and 'Austria' confronted him with a thousand complex problems of their own.

Charles VI
(1711-40)

This congeries of tasks, reminiscent of the burden of his great precursor Charles V, confronted a man of mediocre ability and peculiar prejudices, who was hampered, like few of the historic Habsburgs, by a deficiency of heirs. The fact that he had daughters, but, save for seven months in 1716, no son, signified that on his death some only of his dominions could be held by his eldest child. To make a woman Holy Roman Emperor was unthinkable. As lord of 'Austria', however, Charles could issue a 'Pragmatic Sanction', or family law, providing that all his territorial possessions might pass at his death to a single heiress. Such a provision, if sanctioned by the Estates of his various dominions, would have binding force, and treaties of guarantee might then be obtained from other powers, some of whose rulers doubtless stood to lose by the new arrangement.

The
Pragmatic
Sanction

In 1713 the Emperor therefore decreed that if no son survived him, his eldest living daughter should succeed to his Habsburg lands. Should he fail to leave a daughter, the daughters of his brother Joseph, the late Emperor, were to provide the heir, and failing these, the daughters of Leopold I, his uncle. From its promulgation, to the close of the remaining seven-and-twenty years of his reign, this Pragmatic Sanction was to be the foremost interest of Charles VI. Its violation, notably by Prussia in 1740, shaped the history of Europe for many years.

The Pragmatic Sanction, though on dynastic grounds it linked together lands which in time to come might prefer

Charles,
Spain and
Eugene

some different arrangement, was an important and largely successful attempt to deal with a most complex problem. If no strong 'Austria' was thus created, a Belgian succession war and a Neapolitan succession war might well break out, and only as the first of many like misfortunes. That Joseph's daughters espoused the ambitious lords of Bavaria and Saxony hinted at the possibilities of future strife. Charles VI, however, showed his likeness to his Imperial father and his unlikeness to his Imperial brother by his favour to his Spanish adherents and his disfavour to Eugene. At a cost which the Austrian treasury found it difficult to bear, those Spaniards who had shared his flight from the Peninsula were formed into a so-called Spanish Council, and entrusted with the administration of the former Spanish provinces in the Netherlands and in Italy. This indeed was reversing the evolution of the Emperor's namesake and model Charles V. He, it is true, had grown more Spanish, but it was after quitting the Netherlands to live in Spain. His descendant, perhaps from love of ceremonial stiffness, became more Spanish when the Spaniards had driven him out.

Like his father also, and unlike his brother, Charles viewed with jealousy the superior fame and talent of his greatest subject, Prince Eugene. That incomparable acquisition by Austria now found himself the leader of the German party against the Spanish. He was therefore slighted by the Emperor and deprived of the Vice-royalty of Milan. War, however, soon made him once more indispensable, and by 1718 he had vanquished the Turk and given Austria the greatest territorial extension that she ever reached.

Austrian
Greatness

Within three years of Louis' death, therefore, his competitor for Spain ruled dominions extending from the frontiers of Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria and Switzerland to northern Serbia and the Aluta river. Beside an Emperor whose own possessions were so vast, and who disposed of the Netherlands and of much of Italy, such rulers as those of Prussia and Bavaria seemed mere princelings, while Britain and France were no more than equal powers. The Turk was definitely forced to the defensive, while the Pragmatic Sanction promised to endow the new Austria with lasting strength. Who could have surmised that, two decades later, she would be struggling for bare life, and destined



STANFORD, LONDON

to escape only by yielding provinces to the Turks and Prussians ?

The
Emperor
and Italy

Italy, meanwhile, was never more truly than in 1715 a region rather than a state. None of her constituent members showed vigour except Savoy—a power which by origin and temperament was not Italian. Venice was permanently lamed; the Papacy, at least temporarily humbled. The outstanding influence upon Italy of the Utrecht settlement was the revival of the Emperor as a candidate for mastery of the whole. His tenure of the Imperial office gave Charles the right to several fiefs, Modena and Siena first among them, while he could advance formidable claims to the greater part of the wide north Italian plain. Savoy alone would have the resources necessary to resist. Thus Elizabeth's new forward movement in Spain challenged the natural development of the Habsburg Empire.

Thrd
Barrier
Treaty


That Empire had now gained a singular expansion in the Netherlands. At last, in mid-November, 1715, the Barrier treaty had been concluded. The negotiation had survived the King whose ambition had made a Barrier needful, and the ministries whose ambition had dictated successive schemes. Now, when great European wars seemed out of date, the Emperor, on whom the Spanish struggle had conferred the Netherlands, yielded to the Dutch a substantial share in his acquisition. Frontier posts and slices of frontier territory became their own; the key fortress of Dendermonde was shared with the Austrians; seven fortresses, including Ypres, Tournai and Namur, were entrusted to them; and they were promised an annual maintenance grant of twelve hundred thousand florins. As they, like Britain, continued to profit from the closing of the Scheldt, which sterilized the finest waterway in Europe, and from the joint control of Belgian tariffs, the Emperor had but little cause to rejoice in his sovereignty over a remote and insecure possession.

The
Northern
and
Maritime
Powers


In 1715 the end of the Scandinavian struggle could not be foreseen. When, some three years later, Charles XII perished, he had taken the offensive against the Danish-Norwegian power. Beyond the Baltic, however, his rule did not survive the year of Louis' death, and there could be no likelihood that the league against him would be forced to disgorge its prey. Meanwhile, in Britain the rise of Walpole

pointed to a strictly realistic policy. Jacobitism, in his view, was to be banished by prosperity, and the naval powers, whatever the past history of France, must unite in preserving order. The Dutch had lost all appetite for territorial gains in Europe, while the Poles and their Saxon king could not act independently of Russia. For a time at least it seemed necessary to look beyond the ocean for much of the political motive power of Europe. The New World, it seemed, might well disturb the balance of the Old.

THE FRENCH MONARCHY, 1610-1715




EMPERORS OF THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG, 1519-1740



Gustavus Vasa (K. 1523-60)


Gustavus Vasa (K. 1523-60)



THE FRENCH ROYAL FAMILY

Son of Charles, Duke of Vendôme, Antony of Bourbon, d. 1562 = Jeanne, Queen of Navarre, dau. of Henry II of Navarre and Margaret, great-great-granddau. of Charles V, King of France 1364-80

(1) Margaret of Valois, dau. of Henry II (1547-59), = Henry IV (1589-1610)
 sister of Francis II, Charles IX, Henry III,
 d. 1589, and of Francis, D. of Alençon and
 Anjou, and of Elizabeth = Philip II of Spain



INDEX

[N.B. Dates placed without brackets after the names of sovereigns denote the period of their reign. For the greater states, see Table of Contents and items of their leading men.]

- A
- Academy, French, 186, 282
 — Russian, 375
 Acadia, 440
 Adda, river, 142
 Addison, Joseph, 457
 Adrian, Patriarch, d. 1700, 378, 432
 Adrianople, Peace of, 1713, 439
 Age (Period) of Greatness, Swedish, 436
Aides, 269
 Aire, 230, 388, 441
 Aix-les-Bains, 268
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 1668, 291, 308, 311, 386
 Alais, Peace of, 1629, 145
 Alberoni, Cardinal, Minister, 1714–19, 444, 459
 Albert, Archduke, 25, 44
 Alexander VIII, Pope, 1689, 352
 Alexis 'the Gentle', Tsar, 1645–76, 209, 237, 244, 288, 366, 368–74
 Alfonso VI of Portugal, 1656–67,
 Algiers, 237
 Almanza, battle, 1707, 419, 430
 Almenara, battle, 1710, 426
 Alsace (Elsass), 174, 182, 190, 201, 203, 228, 230, 337 f., 358, 406, 420, 442
 Alt Breisach, 442
 Altmark, truce, 1629, 62, 145, 156
 Altranstadt, Peace, 1706, 418, 421, 430
 Aluta, river, 462
 Amazon, river, 441
 Amboyna, Massacre, 1623, 114, 195, 458
 Amsterdam, 107, 109, 112, 214, 308, 327 f.
 Amur, river, 378
 Andrusovo, Treaty of, 1667, 245, 361, 369, 377
 Anhalt, Christian of, 119, 124, 126
 Anjou, Philip, Duke of (Philip V) (1700–1746), 97, 147, 186
 Anklam, 332
 Anne, Queen of England (1702–14), 420, 426 f., 444
 Anne 'of Austria', 102, 138, 221, 233 f., 293, 297
 Anne of Denmark, 72
 Antwerp, 107, 189, 196, 198, 289, 327, 406
 Åland islands, 447, 459
 Arabia, 107
 Aragon 294 387, 419, 426
 Archangel 378, 413 f., 450
 Aristotle, 257
 Arminius, Arminianism 45, 110
 Arnheim 447
 Arnim, Hans Georg von, 164, 172
 Arras, 182
 Artois, 182, 226, 230, 289
 Aschaffenburg, 164
Asiento, the, 441
 Astrachan, 373, 417
 Astronomy, 254
 Ath, 391
 Augsburg, 165
 — League of, 1686, 347 ff., 389 f
 — Peace of, 1655, 15
 Augustus, Saxon Elector and Polish King (*see* Frederick Augustus)
 Australia, 137
 Authorized version, xii, 251
 Avignon, 272, 348, 352 f
 Avvakum, 371 f.
 Azov, 366, 379, 382 f., 437 f.

B

- Bacon, Francis, 26, 457
 Badajoz, 299 f
 Baden, 119
 — Margrave of, 402, 406
 — Swiss, 442
 Bâle (Basel), 177

- Balkans, 437
 Baltic, provinces, the, 368, 380, 383,
 413, 415, 436, 446
 Baner, Field-Marshal, 174
 Bank of England, 356
 Barbary Powers, 305, 341
 Barcelona, 183, 226, 296, 356 f., 390 f.,
 403, 407, 426, 443
 Barczay, Achatius, d. 1661, *see*
 Transylvania
 Barricades, the, 202, 205
 Barrier, the Dutch, 358, 391, 396 f.,
 422, 429, 441 ff., 464
 Bart, Jean, 355
 Barwalde, Treaty, 1629, 148, 160
 Bashkirs, 417
 Basil, Tsar (1505-33), 76
 Basil island, 449
 Basques, 4, 25, 28, 183, 294
 Bath, 255
 Bathory, King Stephen, 51
 Baturin, destruction of, 1708, 434
 Bavaria, 118, 160, 188 f., 194, 202,
 204, 316, 326, 331, 347 f., 395,
 400, 402 ff., 405, 442 f., 462
 — Electoral Prince of, 392 ff.
 Baxter, Richard, 206
 Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 284
 Bayonet, 278
 Beachy Head, battle, 1600, 353,
 390
 Bearn, 100, 268
 Beaufort, Duke of, *Roi des Halles*,
 1616-69, 188
 Bedmar, Conspiracy of, 1618,
 Beggars of the Sea, 119
 Belfort, 331
 'Belgians', 103 f., 307 f., 462
 Belgrade, 353, 355, 365, 384
 Bender, 435, 439
 Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832),
 Bentinck, 358
 Beresina, river, 421, 433
 Berg, 205, 318
 Berlin, 314, 331, 403 ff.
 Bernhard, *see* Saxe-Weimar
 Berri, Duke of (1686-1714), 428 f.
 Berwick, Duke of (1670-1734),
 Marshal, 400, 419 f., 443
 Besançon, 338
 Béthune, 441
 Bethlen Gabor, *see* Gabor
 Black Sea (Euxine), 382
 Blake, Admiral, 217 f., 237
 Blenheim, battle, 1704, 182, 279, 384,
 402 f., 416, 424, 428
 Bockskay, Stephen, 66
 Bogislav XIV, Duke of Pomerania,
 159, 315
 Bohemia, 113 ff., 116-30, 164, 251
 Bohemian Brethren, 122
 Boileau (1636-1711), 284
 Bolingbroke, Viscount (1678-1751),
 458
 Bonn, 330, 422
 Bordeaux, 227 f., 263, 299
 Bons Godounov, 86
 Borderlands, 243 f.
 Bornholm, Is., 248
 Bouchain, 425
 Bossuet (1627-1704), 344
 Boufflers, Duke of, 1644-1711,
 Marshall, 355, 358, 396, 420, 423
 Boyne, battle, 1690, 353
 Brabant, 286, 289, 406 f.
 Braganza, Catherine of, 232, 271
 Brahe, Peter, Count (1602-80), 72
 — Tycho (1546-1601), 254
 Braila, 437
 Brandenburg, 57, 110, 119, 132, 156,
 174, 182 f., 226, 310, 349, 393
 Braunau, 122 f.
 Braunsberg, 155 ff.
 Brazil, 309 f., 441
 Breda, 149, 181
 — Peace of, 1667, 114, 149, 290,
 310 f
 Breisach, 172, 181, 188, 190, 203, 230,
 335, 338, 358
 Breitenfeld, battle, 1631, 148, 162 ff.,
 175, 177, 185, 294
 Bremen, 149, 203, 438, 446
 Brescia, 406
 Brest, 279
 Brest-Litovsk, 51, 59,
 Bretons, 266
 Brihuega, battle, 1710, 426
 Bromsebro, Peace of, 1645, 208
 Broussel, Pierre, Provost of Mer-
 chants, 222
 Bruges, 189, 291, 406, 420
 Brussels, 291, 356, 358
 Buckingham, Duke of (1592-1628),
 130, 144, 458
 Budapest, 446
 Bug, river, 435
 Bunyan, John (1628-88), 8, 457
 Burgos, 388

Burgundy,
— Duke of, 420, 428

C

Cabardia, 374
Cabelau, 70
Cadiz, 306, 387
Calais, 218, 279
Calcutta, 349
Calderon, 231
Calvin, John, and Calvinism, 103 ff,
113, 118, 126 f., 163, 195, 214,
252, 317, 324
Cambrai, 289, 335, 388, 453
Cameronians, 119
Camisards, 401, 451
Cammin, 316
Canada, 280 f.
Candia (Crete), 209 f., 237
Canea, 237
Cape Breton Is., 440
— St Vincent, 355
Cardinal-Duke, (Richeheu), 148, 184
Carew, Sir Geo., d. c. 1613, 52-8
Carlowitz, Peace, 1699, 365, 382, 384,
392, 394, 399
Carpenter, Nathaniel, 256 ff.
Cartesianism, *see* Descartes
Cartier, 281
Carwell, Mme. (de Quérouaille), 326
Casale, 144 ff., 152, 226, 338, 356 f.
Casimir the Great, 49
Caspian, 373, 379
Cassel, 335, 446
Castile, 426; Council of, 292; and
Aragon, 419
Catalans, Catalonia, 183, 189, 196,
198, 206, 224 f., 294-300, 335,
356, 388 ff., 404, 419, 425, 442
Catelet, Le, 230
Catholic League, 149
Catherine the Great, 450
Catinat, Marshal (1637-1712), 353 ff.,
397, 401
Cerdagne, 230
Cervantes (1547-1616),
Ceuta, 386
Constantinople, 350, 373
Cevennes, 401 ff.
Ceylon, 310
Chambéry, 93, 210
Chambres de réunion, 337 f., 340,
353

Champlain, Samuel de (1567-1635),
270, 280 f.
Chandernagore, 349
Charleroi, 391, 441
Charles I of England, 1625-49, xiv,
130, 132, 195, 206, 215, 223, 294,
303 f.
— II of England, 1660-85, 206, 250,
271, 289 f., 299, 304 ff., 307 f.,
310 f., 326, 330 f., 334 f.
— II of Spain, 1665-1700, 274, 286 f.,
325, 380, 386-95, 411
— V, Emperor, 38 f., 104 f., 117, 194,
461 f.
— VI, Emperor, 1711-40, 24, 384,
392 f., 403 f., 406 f., 423, 425 ff.,
428 f., 437, 442 f., 459, 461 f., 464
— III of Spain, *see* Charles VI,
Emperor
— IX of Sweden, 1604-11, 51, 58 ff.,
69
— X of Sweden, 1654-60, 195, 205,
226, 232, 238, 245 ff., 248 f.,
305 f., 310, 317 ff., 321, 368
— XI of Sweden 1660-97, 333 f.,
336, 338, 360 f., 408
— XII of Sweden, 1697-1718, 251,
357, 359 f., 395, 401, 407-18,
419 ff., 426, 430-9, 445-9, 459,
464
— IV, Duke of Lorraine,
— V, Duke of Lorraine, 333, 384
— Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, 93, 145
— Emanuel II, 1648-75, 211
Charnacé, 145, 156, 160
Chatham, 311
Cherasco, Treaty, 1631, 186
Cherbourg, 279
Chernigov, 62
Chevreuse, 223
China, 378, 382
Chmielniski (Khmelnitsky), 244, 368 f.
Chotim, 362
Christian IV of Denmark, 1596-1648,
xii, 71 ff., 76 ff., 120, 132, 147,
149, 152 ff., 158, 170, 191 ff.,
208, 304
— V of Denmark, 1670-99, 409
— of Halberstadt, 129
Christina of Sweden, 1632-54, 166 f.,
192, 208 f., 221, 246, 308, 310,
313, 317, 360
Cinq-Mars, Marquis of, 185, 186, 296
Circles, Imperial, 130

Clement VIII, Pope, 1592-1605, 59

— XI, Pope, 456

Cleves, 314 f., 318, 330, 336

Cleves-Julich (Juhlers), *see* Julich

Coblenz, 177, 181, 188

Code (Russian) of, 1649, 209

Coehorn, 356

Coke, L. C. J., 6

Colbert, J. B., 271 f., 276-80, 284, 307

Cognac, 286

Cologne, 188, 327, 330, 348, 351, 395, 400 ff., 442,

Colonization, 2 f.

Columbus, Christopher (d. 1506), 252, 257

Compiègne, Treaty, 1635, 180

Concini, Marshal (d'Ancré), d. 1617, 96 f., 98 f.

Condé, 295

— the Great (1621-86), 94, 97, 99, 187, 189, 190, 192, 199, 222 f., 225 ff., 228 f., 290, 297, 299, 331 f.

— Mme, 94

Conflans, 230

Connor, Bernard, 365

Constance, Council, 1414-18, 165, 344

Constantinople, Treaty of, 1700, 382 f.

Conti, Prince of (1664-1709), 223, 364 f., 380

Conversions, Treasury of, 342

Copenhagen, 232, 249 f., 310, 322, 410

Copernicus (1473-1543), 155, 251, 254, 258

Corbie, 189

Coryat, Thomas (c. 1577-1617) 18, 34

Cossacks, 62, 236 f., 240, 242 ff., 318, 362, 364, 366, 369, 373 f., 377, 421, 431, 433 f.

Counter-remonstrants, 110, 112 f.

Courland, 320, 412, 415 f.

Courtrai, 391, 406

Covenanters, 119

Cracow, 54 f., 247, 320, 414, 417

Crete, 236, 350

Crimea, 377 f., 383, 437

Croats, 162, 394

Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658), xii, 192 f., 205, 218, 226, 249 f., 287, 299 f., 304 ff., 309, 351

— Richard (1626-1712), 306

Cronstadt, 415

Croy, Duc de, 411

Cyprus, 93

Czechs, 128

D

Daemonology (James I), 12 .

Dahlberg, Erik, 410

Dalmatia, 209

Danube, xx, 163, 316, 350, 402

Danzig, 52 f., 156 ff., 310, 317, 320, 323, 415

Dauphiné, 269, 354

D'Avaux, 178

Defenestration, *see* Prague

Delft, 109, 357

'Deluge', the Polish, 58, 238, 360

Demotika, 439, 446

Denain, battle of, 1712, 429

Dendermonde, 464

Denmark, 160, 190, 330, 354, 357

Deptford, 380

Descartes, René (1596-1650), xi, 255, 260 ff. 263

Desna river, 369

Dessau Bridge, battle, 1626, 150

Devolution, War of, 1667-8, 251, 287, 386 f., 452

Dijon, 268

Dirschau (Tchew), 155

Dissidents, 59

Dnieper river, 361, 373 f., 383, 421, 433 ff.

Dniester river, 362, 394, 435, 437

Don river, 373, 379, 382, 431, 433 f.

— Quixote, 251

Donauworth, 118, 205

Dorpat (Tartu), 154, 413, 416

Dort (Dordrecht), 109

— Synod, 1618, 113, 214

Dover, Secret Treaty of, 1670, 311, 326, 360

Downs, battles of the, 1639, 1652-3, 218, 228

Drenthe, 109

Drogheda, sack of, 1649, 206

Duna river, 412

Dunamunde, 410

Dunes, battle, 228

Dungeness, battle, 1653, 218

Dunkirk, 189, 195 f., 198, 226, 228 ff., 271, 279, 335, 338, 440

Dupes, Day of, 1630, Nov., 142, 147, 158 ff., 163, 226, 228, 305

Du Quesne, Abraham, Marquis, (1610-88), 332

Dutch, xii, 42-8, 160, 195 ff., 325-31, 422

E

- East Friesland, 346
 — India Company, Dutch, 42, 106,
 317, 319 f, 336, 362
 — Prussia, 248, 317, 320, 368
 Eastern (Orthodox) Church, 88 ff.
 Egypt, 327, 435
 Ehrenbreitstein, 181
 Elbe river, 159, 164, 174, 185, 188,
 203
 Elbing, 156, 321, 323
 Electors, Imperial, 37 ff, 326
 Elfsborg, 76 f
 Elizabeth of Bourbon, Sp. Q., 293
 — of England, 1558–1603, 301
 — of the Palatinate (1596–1662), 126,
 130
 Elizabeth Farnese of Spain, 1714–
 46, 444, 459
 Elsinore, 410
 Enghien, Duke of, *see* Condé, 187, 188
 England, 160, 182, 185, 189, 190,
 206, 214 f, 217, 228, 306, 353
 English Seas, the, 217
 Enkhuizen, 109
 Erfurt, 164
 Ermeland (Warmia), 319 ff
 Estonia, 157, 409, 411
 Eternal Peace, 1686, 364
 Eudoxia Lopukhina, Tsaritsa, 1689–
 99, 377, 381
 Eugène, Prince (1663–1736), 2, 347,
 357, 363, 384, 394, 396 f, 402,
 404, 419 f., 424 428 f, 442, 462
 Eutin, Bishopric of, 430
 Exclusion, 1654,

F

- Fehrbellin, battle, 1675, 332
 Fénelon François, Archbishop (1651–
 1715), 455
 Ferdinand II, Emperor, 1615–37, 24,
 36, 63, 92, 120, 124, 127, 129,
 149 ff., 151, 156, 160, 164, 165,
 170, 171, 173
 — III, Emperor, 1637–57, 66, 171,
 173, 181, 185, 188, 201, 203, 321,
 383
 — Joseph, of Bavaria (1692–9), 439,
 445, 459
 ‘Fifteen,’ the, 444
 Finland, 4, 445
 Fire of London, the Great, 1666, 326

- Flanders, 286, 289, 386 f, 406 f, 420,
 426, 453
 Flemings, 308
 Florence, Fleurus, battle, 353 f.
 Fontainebleau, 336; Peace of 1679, 337
 Fontenelle, Bernard de (1657–1757),
 284
 Foreland, North, battle, 1666,
 Form of Government, the Swedish,
 1634, 168
 Fouquet, Nicolas, Marquis, (1615–80),
 226, 266, 271, 307
 Four Articles, of 1682, 341, 344 f, 365
 Fox, George (1624–91), 8, 206, 457
 Franche Comté, 181, 286 f, 289 ff.,
 311, 331, 335, 337, 386 ff., 453
 Frankfort-on-Main, 118, 164
 Frankfort-on-Oder, 160 ff.
 Fraustadt, battle, 1706, 417
 Frederick III of Denmark, 1648–70,
 208, 215, 246, 249 f., 330
 — IV of Denmark, 1699–1730, 409,
 426, 436
 — Augustus, of Saxony and Poland
 (1697–1734), 357, 359, 364 f,
 380, 408–18, 436 f., 445
 — III of Brandenburg, 1688, ‘King
 in Prussia’, 1701–13, 380, 392,
 395, 401, 404 f., 426, 440, 460
 — Elector Palatine, 240; ‘the
 Winter King’ (1619–32), 126,
 128, 130, 204, 251
 — Henry of Nassau, 114, 181, 196 f,
 197 f, 308
 — William I, Prussia, 171, 173, 176;
 ‘the Sergeant King’ (1713–40),
 245, 247, 444, 460
 — ‘the Great Elector’ (1640–88),
 98, 176, 182 f, 201, 204 f., 226,
 247, 249, 275, 288, 311, 313–24,
 328–32, 336 ff, 340, 346 f., 351 f,
 362 f., 368, 388
 Freiburg-in-Breisgau, 335, 358, 442
 Frejus, 181
 French Administration, 141, 256–70,
 275
 — East India Company, 358
 Fronde, the (1648–53), 20, 95, 189,
 202, 205, 212, 221, 297, 304 f.,
 308, 333, 343, 451
 Funen, Is, 248
 Furnes, 441
 Furstenberg, Cardinal, Archbishop of
 Cologne, 1688, 348, 351

G

Gabelle, 20, 210, 269
 Gabor, Bethlen (Transylvania), (1613-29), 63, 66, 124, 126, 129 f., 138, 238
 Gadebusch, battle, 1712, 438 f.
 Galileo (1564-1642), 251, 254
 Gahtsyn, Prince Basil, 375 ff.
 Gallas, 173, 185, 191 f.
 Gallicanism, 342
 Gardie, Jakob de la, 78
 Gaston of Orleans, (1608-60), 144 f., 147 f., 181, 185, 187, 222
 Gelders, Upper, 289, 440
 Gemauerthof, battle, 1705, 416
 Generality lands, 198, 269
 Genoa, 340 f.
 'Gentry Democracy', Polish, 365
 George I of England, 1714-27, 170, 172, 426, 428, 438, 444, 446
 — William of Brandenburg, 1619-40, 155, 172
 Germain-en-Laye St., Treaty, 1679, 336
 Gertruydenberg, negotiations, 1710, 425 f.
 Ghent, 189, 291, 335, 406, 420, 441
 Gibraltar, 403 f., 441 f.
 Gipsies, 4
 Glogau, 321
 'Glorious Revolution', 458
 Gnesen, Archbishop of, 361
 Gobelins, 283
 Golovin, 382
 Gomarus, Professor, 45
 Gondî, Paul de, Cardinal de Retz, 224
 Gonsalvo da Cordoba, 24, 32
 Gordon, Patrick, 2, 377 ff., 382
 Gortz, Count, 447
 Gothard, St., on the Raab, battle, 1664, 286, 288
 Gothenburg, 76 f.
 'Governments', Russian, 434
 Grand Alliance of, 1689, 352, 357 f.
 — — 1701, 396-407
 Grandier (d. 1634), 13
 Grand Assembly, 1651, 309
 Grave, 331
 Gravelines, 230
 Graz, 258
 'Great Elector', see Fred. William of Brandenburg
 Great Russia, 369, 374

Greifswald, 335
 Grenoble, 268
 Gonzaga, House of, 240
 Grisons, 100
 Grodno, 368, 417, 431
 Grosswarden, 238, 383
 Grotius, Hugo, 46, 113, 167, 255
 Guana, French, 441
 Guienne, 225
 Guise, Duke of, 185, 298
 Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1613-32, xii, 32, 62 f., 86, Chap. XI, 132-71, 195, 250, 304
 Gyllenborg, Count, 447

H

Haarlem, 109
 Hagenau, 200
 Hague, 105, 109, 357, 405, 422
 Hainault, 289, 453
 Halberstadt, 204, 316
 Halland, 193
 Hals, Franz, 282
 Hanau, 164 ff.
 Hanover, House of, 397; city, 405, 438, 442, 446
 Harcourt, 182, 228, 391, 393
 Harjedal, 193
 Harley, see Oxford
 Haro, Don Louis of, 224, 231, 296 f., 299
 Harvey, William (1578-1657), xii, 251, 254, 457
 Hawkins, Sir Richard, (c. 1562-1622), 8
 Heidelberg, 124, 126 f., 129, 132, 353, 355
 Heilbronn, League of, 1633, 171, 173, 177, 294
 Heimsius, 393, 399, 405
 Helsingborg, 436
 Helsingfors (Helsinki), 445
 Henrietta Maria, Queen (1609-66), 132, 143, 232, 326
 Henry IV of France (1553-1610), xi, 9, 17, 25 ff., 31, 92, 132, 140 f., 180, 375
 — VIII of England, 37
 Hereford, 302
 Hesse-Cassel, 160, 174
 Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679), 457
 Hochstadt, battle, 1704, see Blenheim
 Hogue, La, battle, 1692, 354
 Hohenzollern, 314

Holland, 452
 Holóvzin, battle, 1708, 421
 Holstein; 191 f., 322, 448, 460
 Holstein-Gottorp, 248 f., 317, 408 ff.,
 414, 439
 Holy League, 1684, 364
 Hoorn, 109
 Horn, Arvid, Count (1664-1742), 168,
 173, 191
 Howell, James (c. 1594-1666), 15 ff.,
 22, 28 ff
 Hudson's Bay, 440
 Huguenots, 19 ff., 31, 95, 100, 119,
 143, 145, 169, 176, 178, 266, 271,
 304, 340-58,, 389, 451
 Hungary, 126, 350, 383 ff., 402
 Hus, John, 121 f
 Hvítfeldt, Arild, 73

I

Iberia, 182
 Ibrahim, Sultan, 1640-8, 237
 Ile de France, 457
 'Importants', the, 188
 Index, 255
 India, 10
 Ingria, 247, 368, 412, 414 f., 433, 447
 Innocent X, Pope, 1644-5, 192 f.
 — XI, Pope, 1676-89, 344 f., 348
 — XII, Pope, 1691-1700, 352, 395
 Innsbruck, 192
 Inquisition, 26, 254
Intendants, 186, 222, 276, 342
 Ireland, 107, 184, 304, 352 f.
 Ironsides, 305
 Isabella, 'the Catholic' (1451-1504),
 24 f.
 Ivan (John) III, 'the Great', 1462-
 1505, 86
 — IV, 'the Terrible', 1533-84, 83
 — V, Tsar, 1682-96, 374, 376, 378
 Ivangorod, 416

J

Jacobites, 449, 451, 459, 465
 Jadviga, Queen, 50
 Jagello, 50, f., 362
 Jagerndorf, 321
 Jamaica, 299, 305
 James I of England, 1603-25, xi, 12,
 46, 51 f., 112, 120, 127, 130, 132,
 301 ff.
 — II of England, 1685-89, 326, 345,
 351 ff., 358, 398

James III, *see* Old Pretender
 Jamtland, 193
 Janissaries, 236
 Jankovitz, 192
 Jansenism, 169, 264, 342 ff., 451, 453,
 455 f.
 Jersey, 304
 Jerusalem, 93, 383
 Jesuits, 9 f., 20, 36, 59, 65, 80, 118,
 121, 123, 194, 238, 260, 264, 301,
 321, 343 ff., 395, 456
 Jews, 4-7, 48, 110, 244, 305, 341
 John George of Saxony, 126 f., 152
 — of Austria, Don, 289, 333 f., 386 f.,
 388 f.
 — III of Sweden, 51, 70
 — IV, of Portugal, 183, 296
 — Tsars, *see* Ivan
 — of Östergötland, Duke, 74
 — Casimir of Poland, 1648-68, 244 ff.,
 249, 317, 320 f., 361, 368
 Jordan, Dr., 255
 Joseph I, Emperor, 1705-11, 384,
 404, 418, 426 f., 430, 437, 461
 — Father (1577-1638), 145 ff., 160,
 170, 181
 Juan José (Don John), 224-228,
 297 ff., 386 ff.
 Julich (Juhers), 40, 98, 110, 112, 119,
 121, 205, 314, 318
 Junior Tsar, 376, 378, 389
 Jutland, 191, 249, 321

K

Kaiserswerth, 401
 Kahsch, battle, 1706, 418, 430
 Kalmar, 77
 Kamienets, 242, 362, 365, 394
 Kehl, 340, 443
 Keksholm, 76
 Kemenyi, 239
 Kepler, John (1571-1630), 73, 251,
 254, 258, 260
 Kertch, 382
 Khocim, *see* Chotim
 Kiev, 242, 245, 288, 361, 365, 369,
 374, 377, 417, 433, 450
 Kirchner, Hermann, 33
 Kiuprii, xix, 238 f., 286, 333, 353, 384
 Klissov, battle, 1702, 414
 Klostergrab, 122
 Knared, Peace, 1613, 77 ff.
 Königsberg (Kalmningrad), 155, 315,
 319, 363

Kosciuszko, General (1746-1817), 362
 Kovno, 368, 414
 Kremlin (Moscow), 378
 Kristianopol, 77
 Kurbatov, 382

L

Labiau, Treaty of, 1656, 320, 368
 Ladislas IV of Poland, 1632-48, 60,
 85, 239 f, 242 f., 366
 Ladoga, Lake, 410, 414
 La Fontaine, Jean de (1621-95), 284
 La Hogue, battle, 1692, 354
 Landau, 442
 Landrécies, 230
 Landskrona, battle, 1677, 334
 Languedoc, 170, 266, 269, 280
 La Rochelle, 144, 260, 342
 Laud, Archbishop, xiv
 League, Catholic, 1609, 129
 Lech, river, 165
 Lefort, General, 2, 377, 380, 382
 Leibnitz, Gottfried (1646-1716), xi,
 327
 Leicester, Earl of, 47
 Leipzig, 160, 161, 165
 Lemberg (Lwów), 65, 156, 362, 416
 Lens, battle, 1648, 190, 199, 222
 Leopold I, Emperor (1658-1705), 228,
 238, 274, 286, 289 f., 321, 338,
 347, 358, 383 f, 392 f., 395, 399,
 461
 Lerina, Duke of, 24, 26, 292 f.
 Lérins Is., 181
 Le Tellier, 271, 277
 — Fr., S. J., 455
Letter of Majesty, 1609, 122 f., 129
Lettres de cachet, 276
 Lewenhaupt, General, 416, 431, 433,
 439
 Leyden, 109
Liberum Veto, 239, 242, 361
 Liège, 180, 327, 355, 401, 422
 Liegnitz, 346
 Lille, 420, 422, 441
 Limburg, 289
 Limerick, 353,
 Linchamp, 230
 Lionne, 232, 271, 277 f., 327
 Lisbon, 300
 Lisola, 321
 Lithuania, 369, 415
 Little Russia, 368 f., 372, 374, 377,
 432 ff.

Livonia, 80, 154, 156 ff, 245, 247,
 250, 365, 368, 408 ff, 412 ff, 436
 Locke, John (1632-1704), 457
 Londonderry, battle, 353
 Longueville, Duchess of (1619-79),
 223, 227
 Longwy, 358
 Lorraine, and Duke of, 170, 177, 180,
 190, 226, 230, 232, 286, 332 f.,
 335, 337, 358, 363 f, 405
 Louis XIII, 1610-43, 98 f, 102, 120,
 136, 163, 178, 182, 184 f, 186,
 233 f, 269
 — XIV, 1643-1715, xi, xvii, xix, 3,
 30 f., 119 f., 134, 136, 144 ff,
 146 f., 152, 181, 203, 205, 222,
 226, 231 ff, 264-91, 306, 311,
 325, 359 f., 363 f., 386-407, 411,
 420-9, 440 ff, 445, 451-7
 Louise of Orange, 201, 313, 315, 381
 Louisiana, 359
 Lourdes, xxi
 Louvois, François, Marquis de (1641-
 91), 271, 275, 277, 327, 337, 352,
 354 f
 Lower Saxon Circle, 149
 Lubeck, Peace of, 1629, 151, 158, 190,
 208
 Lublin, 368
 — Union of, 1569, 368
 Lull, Jean Baptiste (c. 1633-87), 283
 Lund, battle, 1676, 333 f; treaty of,
 1679, 336
 Lusatia, 173
 Luther, Martin (c. 1484-1546), and
 Lutheranism, 115, 118, 252
 Lutter, battle, 1626, 150
 Lutzen, battle, 1632, 166, 167, 172,
 175, 418
 Luxemburg, 230, 286 f, 289, 338,
 340, 353, 355, 389, 391
 — Marshal, Duke of, (1628-95), 354,
 356, 390
 Luynes, Duke of (1578-1621), 99, 144
 Lwów, *see* Lemberg
 Lyons, 146

M

Macassar, 310
 Macedonia, 98
 Machiavelli, Nicholas (1469-1527), 34
 Madagascar, 185, 270
 Mademoiselle, La Grande, *see* Mont-
 pensier

- Madrid, 130, 333, 386, 388, 393, 396,
404, 407, 426
- Maestricht, 195, 327, 330, 332, 335
- Magdeburg, 148, 152 159 ff, 200, 204
316, 336
- Magyars, 63 f.
- Mahommed IV, (1648-87), 237 f, 383
- Maime, Duke of, 451, 456
- Maintenon, Mme de, Marquise (1635-
1719), 338, 341, 346, 400, 403,
451, 455, 457
- Mainz, 128, 164 f., 188, 192, 326, 330
- Malines (Mechlin), 289
- Malmo, 191
- Malplaquet, battle of, 1709, 421, 424,
428, 455
- Mannheim, 164, 353
- Mansfeld, Count of (c 1580-1626),
126, 129ff., 150
- Mantua, 143 f, 146, 152, 154, 181,
401, 443
- Mardyck, 306
- Maria Theresa, Queen, 385
- Mariana of Spain, 297, 386 ff, 389 ff.
- Marie de' Medici, Queen (1573-1642),
94, 96, Chap. X *passim*, 184, 293
- Marienburg, secret treaty of, 1656,
320
- Mark, 314, 318
- Marlborough, Duke of (1650-1722),
xii, 32, 353, 399 f, 402 f., 404 ff,
419 f., 422 ff., 426 ff, 437
- Marsaglia, battle of, 1693, 355
- Martinet, Gen., 278
- Martinitz, 122
- Mary II, Queen (1662-94), 334, 356
- Masaniello, Revolt of, 1647, 210 f,
222, 298
- Matthias, Emperor, 1611-19, 66, 98,
118, 122
- Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625), 46,
106, 108, 110 ff., 114
- Mauritius Is, 457
- Maximilian of Bavaria, 118 f., 123,
127 ff., 130, 165, 170, 172, 188,
193, 201, 393
- I, Emperor, 1493-1520, 38
- II, Emperor, 1564-76, 92, 117
- Mayflower*, the, 128
- Mazarin, Cardinal (1602-61), 78, 146,
184, 186 ff., 196 f., 201 f., 204 f.,
209 f, 214, 221-35, 249, 265, 270,
272, 276, 287, 297, 305, 316,
322 f, 343, 399 f.
- Mazeppa (Mazepa), Hetman (1644-
1709), 377, 421, 433 f
- Mechlin, *see* Malines
- Mecklenburg, 323, 438, 447, 460
- Medina-Celi, Duke, 389
- Medway, 287
- Memel, 156
- Menin, 441
- Menshukov, Alexander, (c 1661-1729),
382, 415, 418, 430, 434, 438, 450
- Mercy, General, 424
- Messina, 335
- Methuen, John, 402
- Metz, 190, 302, 269, 337 f
- Meuse, river, 109, 180, 335, 354, 388,
402
- Michael Romanov, Tsar, 1613-45,
78, 85, 366, 369
- King of Poland, 1669-74, 362
- Middlemarch, 314
- Milan, 94, 393 f, 397, 401, 443, 462
- Miloslavsky, family, 374 ff.
- Milton, John (1608-74), xii, 252
- Minden, 204, 316
- Minorca Is, 420, 441
- Minsk, 431, 433
- Mitau, 80, 154
- Modena, 231, 464
- Mohacz, battle, 1526, 350; 1687, 384
- Mohammed IV, Sultan, 1648-87, 237
- Mohilev, 433
- Moldavia, 364, 437
- Moléc, President (1584-1656), 223
- Molière (1622-73), 284
- Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle
(1608-69), 218
- Monmouth, Duke of (1649-85), 345,
351, 458
- Mons, 335, 353, 391, 424, 441
- Montaigne, Michel de (1533-92), 15
- Montecuculi, Count of (1609-80), 332,
383
- Montferrat, 145
- Montmorency, 97, 148, 170
- Montpensier, Mlle de, Duchess (1627-
93), 144, 223
- Montreal, 281
- Monzon, Treaty of, 1626, 143, 186
- Moravia, 122, 129, 185, 191
- Morea, 394
- Moriscos, 292, 295
- Moryson, Fynes (1566-1630), 34
- Moscow, 366, 376, 382, 415, 431, 433,
437, 449

Moselle river, 181, 187
 Muhlhausen, battle of, 1673,
 Munich, 165, 212 f.
 Munster, 184, 189, 192, 194, 197 f.,
 310
 Murad IV, 236
 Murillo, 231
 Muscovy, xvii, xx f., 51, 76, Chap
 VI, A

N

Namur, 189, 289, 291, 354, 356, 390,
 443
 Nantes, Edict of, 1598-9, 8, 36, 91,
 95, 141, 154, 272, 341, 345, 349
 Naples, 183, 210 f., 298, 420, 443, 462
 Napoleon I (1769-1821), 37, 279
 Narew river, 415
 Narishkin family, 374
 Narva, 81, 374, 410 ff., 416, 447
 — battle of, 1700, 411 ff., 431
 Natalia Narishkin, 375
 Navarre, 206, 294
 Navigation Acts, 1651, 1660, 215 ff.,
 305, 309 f.
 Neckar river, 355
 Neerwinden, battle of, 1692, 144
Ne plus ultra line, 425, 427
 Neuburg, House of, 110, 119, 316,
 318, 322, 390
 Neufchâtel, 440
 Neuhausel, 383
 Neva river, 414 f., 449
 Nevers, Duke of, d. 1665, 144, 163
 New Amsterdam, 290
 — York, 290
 Newfoundland, 440
 Newton, Sir Isaac (1642-1727), xi f.,
 252, 457
 Nice, 353, 441
 Niemen river, 417, 431
 Nijmegen, treaties of, 1678-9, 331,
 334, 337 f., 358, 388, 391
 Nikon, Patriarch (1605-1681), 369 ff.
 Nithard, Father, 297, 386 f.
 Noailles, Archbishop (1651-1729),
 455 f.
 Nordlingen, battles of, 1634-44, 170,
 173, 175, 177, 188, 294
 Norway, 107, 447
 Noteborg, 414
 Novgorod, 76, 79, 86, 369, 372
 Nuremberg, battle of, 1632, 165, 446

O

Oates, Titus (1649-1705), 384
 Oder river, 159, 160, 188, 336
 Ofen, 350
 Oland Is., 77
 Old Believers, 371, 378
 — Pretender, the, 351, 398, 420, 425,
 428, 440, 447, 458
 Oldenbarnevelt (also Barneveldt),
 Johan van (1547-1619), 46, 105,
 108, 110 ff., 195, 214, 250
 Oliva, Peace of, 1660, 232, 245, 249,
 Oldenburg, House of, 71
 251, 285, 323, 412, 417
 Olivarez, Duke (1587-1645), 129 f.,
 142, 177, 183, 185, 224, 231
 Orange, 104 f., 329, 333, 335, 358, 440
 Oratory, French (1611), 293
 Orkneys, 218
 Orleans, Duchess of, 351
 — Gaston, Duke of, (1608-60), 157,
 165
 — Philip, Duke of (1640-1701), 428 f.,
 456 f., 451
 Ormonde, second Duke of (1665-
 1745), 429
 Oropesa, Count, 392
 Osel Is., 191, 193
 Osnabruck, 184, 192, 194, 205
 Ostend, 406
 Oudenarde, battle of, 1708, 420, 422,
 424
 Oxenstierna, Axel, Count (1583-1654),
 78, 132, 154, 156, 163, 168, 169,
 171, 174, 180, 201, 208, 246
 — Bengt, Count (1623-1702),
 Oxford, Robert Harley, Earl of (1661-
 1724), 427

P

Palatinate, 165, 173, 304, 326, 330 f.,
 352
 Palermo, 332
 Palestine, 435
 Pamburg, Captain, 382
 Pappenheim, Field-Marshal, Count of
 (1594-1632), 172, 451, 456
 Paris, 225 f., 424, 427, 452
Parlement, 178, 225 ff., 232, 268
 Partition, Treaty of, 1698, 392 f.;
 1700, 392, 394 f.; 1701, 398
 Pascal, Blaise (1623-62), 263 f., 343
 Passarowitz, treaty of, 1718, 384

- Patkul, Reinhold (1660-1707), 154,
 365, 416, 418
 Patriarch, Russian, 378, 432
 Pau, 268
 Paul V, Pope, 120
Pays d'elections, 268 f
 — *d'états*, 268 f
 Pecquigni, 185
 Pedigrees, Books of (Russian), 375
 Pereiaslavl, 368
 Pernau, 411, 436
 Perpignan, 87, 296
 Peter the Great, Tsar, 1682-1725,
 xii, 251 f., 359, 364, 366, 373, 375-
 83, 401, 407-18, 429-39, 445-50,
 459 f.
 Peterborough, Lord, 40
 Philaret Romanov, Patriarch (? 1553-
 1638), 85, 366, 369
 Philip of Orleans, *see* Orleans
 — II of Spain, 1556-98, 22, 26 ff.,
 92
 — III of Spain, 1598-1621, 24, 27,
 231, 292, 301, 391
 — IV of Spain, 1621-65, 114, 130,
 203, 221, 224, 229, 231, 271, 286,
 289, 293-300, 386, 392
 — V of Spain, 1700-46, 392 f., 396 f.,
 404 ff., 421 ff., 425 f., 428 f., 443,
 457
 Philippeville, 230
 Philippsburg, 190, 203, 333, 335, 352,
 358
 Piedmont, 182
 Pillau, 155 ff
 Pinerolo (Pignerol), 94, 146, 203, 211,
 271, 355 ff
 Plague, the Great, 1665, 35, 326
 Plate river, 441
 Podolia, 362, 365
 Poland, 107, 361 f., 365, 402, 412 f.,
 415, 417
 Poltava, battles of, 1709, 81, 425 f.,
 435 f., 445
 Pomerania, 159, 167, 174, 181, 201 f.,
 248, 316, 323, 336, 430, 438
 Pondicherry, 358
 Port Royal de Paris, 1626-1710, 343,
 455
 Portocarrero, Cardinal (1635-1709),
 391, 395
 Portugal, 183 f., 196, 206, 225, 230,
 271, 294 f., 299, 386 f., 425, 427,
 440 f.
 Posen (Poznan), 415, 417
 Prado, 296
 Pragmatic Sanction, of Charles VI,
 April, 1713, 442, 461 f.
 Prague, 126, 128, 164 ff., 173 ff., 184,
 192 f., 193 f., 202, 240
 — Defenestration, May, 1618, 124,
 132, 194, 250
 Preobrazhensk, 376, 381
Presidi, the, 25, 443
 Priegnitz, 314
 Pripet marshes and river, vii, 49, 417
 Prokopovitch, 450
 Protestantism, 119 f., 155
 Provence, 269, 419
 Prussia, 107, 155 ff., 174, 440, 454,
 460
 Pruth, Agreement of the, 1711, 437
 Pskov, 78, 372
 Ptolemy, 2nd century A D., 253
 Pultusk, battle, 1703, 415
 Punitz, battle, 1704, 416
 Pyrenees, Treaty of the, 1659, 229 f.,
 234, 249, 251, 271, 299, 306, 308

Q

 Qaro, 5
 Quebec, 281
 Quesnel, Abbé (1634-1719), 456

R

 Radziwill family, 54
 Rákóczy, Sigismund, 1630-48, 66
 — George II (1621-60), 192, 238
 — Francis II (1676-1735), 384, 430
 Raleigh, Sir Walter (c. 1552-1618),
 xiv, 22, 113
 Ramillies, battle of, 1706, 406, 417,
 424
 Ranenburg, 415
 Rastadt, Treaty of, 1714, 442
 Ratisbon (Regensburg), 38, 146, 172
 — Truce of, 1684, 340
 Ravallac, François (1578-1610), 92,
 451
 Ravensberg, 314
 Razin, Stenka, Hetman, d. 1671, 372 f.
 Ré Is, 458
 Reduction, Swedish, 360
 Regensburg, *see* Ratisbon
 Rehnsköld, General, 417, 435, 439
 Religion, 454 ff.
 Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-69), 232
 Remonstrants, 45 f., 110

- Rennes, 268
 Restitution, Edict of, 1629, 144, 147, 151, 160, 172, 173, 177
 Rethel, 226
 Retz, Gondî, Cardinal de (1614-79), 223, 227
 Reval (Tallinn), 69, 435 f
 Revocation, *see* Nantes, Edict of
 Revolution, French, of 1789, 454
 Rhine, 327, 356, 358, 391, 419
 — League of the, 1658, 228, 274, 288, 306, 383
 Richelieu, Cardinal (1585-1642), 13, 30, 78, 95, 98 f, 100 ff, 132 f, 134-49, 152, 158 ff., 163, 164, 166, 170, 177, 178, 180, 181 ff., 184, 195, 202, 232 f, 240, 247, 252, 273, 281, 293 ff, 341, 356, 368, 435
 Riga, 53, 80, 247, 380, 409 ff, 416, 431, 436
 Rio de Janeiro, 427
 Rochefort, 279
 Rocroi, battle, 1643, 187, 188, 196, 224, 230, 297, 299
 Romanov dynasty (1613), 60, 78
 Rooke, Admiral, 403
 Roskilde, Treaty of, 1658, 248, 321
 Rotterdam, 109, 327
 Rouen, 268
 Roussillon, 183 f., 185, 206, 230, 296, 388, 406
 Rubens, 251
 Rudolph II, Emperor, 1576-1611, 65, 118, 122, 258
 Rueil, 222; Peace of, 1649, 223, 227
 Rügen Is., 202, 332, 446
 Russell, Edward, Admiral (1653-1727), 354, 1697, Earl of Orford, 356
 Russia, 209, 395, 465
 Ruysdael, 282
 Ruyter, Admiral de, 309, 311, 329, 332
 Ryswick, Peace of, 1697, 357 ff, 391 f.
- S
- Saarlouis, 358
 Sabbatai, Sebi (1626-76), 5 f.
 St. Bartholomew, Massacre, 24 Aug., 1572, 118
 St. Christopher, 440
 St. Cyr, 346
 St. Germain-en-Laye, 222, 227, 386; Treaty of 1679,
 St. Gothard, battle, 286, 288, 383
 St. John, 427
 St. Louis, Order of, 355
 St Omer, 230, 335, 388
 St. Petersburg, 402, 415, 421, 432, 434, 449 f
 St. Venant, 441
 Saluzzo, 93
 Salvius, 200
 Samara, 373
 Sambre river, 354
 San Sacramento, 441
 Saragossa, battle of, 1710, 426; city, 296, 389
 Sardinia, 420, 442 f
 Saumur, 97
 Savoy, 92 f., 142, 154, 180 f., 210 f, 230, 294, 347, 353, 357, 390, 392, 397, 402, 404, 429, 441, 464
 Saxe-Weimar, Bernhard of, 160, 164, 173, 174, 181 f.
 Saxony, 161, 185, 326, 365, 416 ff., 462
 — John George of, 161, 162, 170, 171, 173, 174
 Scandinavia, 132, 156, 190, 336
 Scania, 336
 Scheldt river, 114, 429, 464
 Schlippenbach, Colonel, 413
 Schlussemburg, 410, 414 f
 Schwarzenberg, 313
 Schwerin, 314
 — Kurt, Count of (1684-1757), 317
 Schwiebus, 346
 Schwen, 215
 Scotland, Union, 1707, 419
 Sedan, 185
 Senef, battle of, 1674, 331
 Serbia, 462
 Settlement, Act of, 1701, 397
 Sévigné, Mme de, Marquise (1626-96), 327
 Shakespeare, William (1564-1616), xi, xii, 251, 457
 Shares (in Companies), 251
 Sharp Resolution, the, 112 f.
 Sheremetiev, General, 413, 416, 437
 Shovel, Sir Cloudesley (c. 1650-1707), 419
 Siam, 341, 348
 Sicily, 388, 441
 Siebenburgen, 66

- Siena, 464
 Sigismund III of Poland, 1587-1631,
 58 ff., 67, 76, 80, 85, 155 ff., 170,
 239
 Silesia, 122, 129, 174, 185, 416, 418,
 430 f.
 Simbirsk, 373
 Sinsheim, battle, 1674, 331
 Skytte, J., 80
 Slavata, 122
 Slesvig-Holstein, 410
 Slovenes, 394
 Smolensk, 60, 62, 240, 288, 366, 369
 Smorgonie, 431
 Sobieski, John, King of Poland, 1673-
 96, ~~xii~~, 251, 330, 333, 338, 347,
 359, 362 ff., 377, 384
 Soissons, 185
 Soliman, 'the Great', 349
 Solovetsky Monastery, 369, 371
 Sophia, Electress, 405
 — Romanov, 364, 376, 378
 Sound, The, 69, 74, 191, 197, 215, 305,
 322, 410, 436
 Southwold Bay, battle of, 1665, 328
 Spain, 107 f., 171, 177 ff., 183, 196 ff.,
 224, 231, 305, 340, 389 ff., 396,
 419, 440 f., 462
 Spanish Council (Charles VI), 462
 Spinola, Marquis, General (1569-
 1630), 103, 111, 114, 128, 146,
 149
 Spinoza, Baruch (1632-77), xi, 7, 262 f.
 Spires (Speier), 353
 Stade, 438
 Stadtlohn, battle of, 1623, 130
 Staffarda, battle of, 1690, 353
 Stanhope, James, Earl (c 1673-1721),
 425 f.
 Stanislas Leszczyński (1677-1766),
 416 ff., 421, 431, 433 f., 436, 438,
 445
 Starhemberg, General, 425 ff
 States-General (France), 1614, 97 f.
 Steen, Jan, 282
 Steinkirk, battle, 1692, 354
 Stenay, 226
 Stenbock, Magnus, Count, 436
 — Marshal (1664-1717), 438 f.
 Stettin, 159, 202, 314, 323, 332,
 445 f., 460
 Stockholm, 250, 410, 412
 Stolbova, Treaty of, 1617, 86, 368
 Strafford, xiv, 184
 Stralsund, 150, 155, 159, 315, 332,
 335, 446, 459
 Strasburg, 200, 203, 337 f., 340, 358,
 442, 453
 Streltsy, 375 f., 378, 381
 Stuart, General, 412
 Stuhmsdorf, Truce of, 1635, 174, 180
 Stuttgart, 419
 Suez, 327
 Sully, Duc de (1560-1641), 94
 Surinam, 290
 Susa, 419
 Sweden, 14 f., 177, 182, 202, 331, 408
 Szeklers, 65
- T
- Taganrog, 382 f., 437 f.
 Taille, 20, 268 f.
 Tallard, Marshal, 391
 Tartars, 242 ff., 377, 383, 435, 437
 Temesvar, Banat, 384, 394
 Temple, Sir William (1628-99), 24,
 311
 Teneriffe, 306
 Test Act, 1673, 330
 Theiss river, 384, 394
 Theodore Tsar, 1584-98, 83, 86
 — — 1676-82, 15, 83, 363, 394 f
 Thionville (Diedenhofen), 187, 188,
 230, 250
 Thorn (Torun), 155, 415
 Thou, de, 185
 Thurn, Count Matthias, 122, 124, 126
 Tilly, Count of (1559-1632), 128 ff.,
 146, 148, 150, 158 160 ff., 162,
 165, 172
 Tokoh, 384
 Tønning, 410, 439, 445
 Torbay, 352
 Torstensson, Marshal, Count (1603-
 51), 184, 185, 191 f., 193
 Tory, 397, 426 f
 Toul, 180, 203, 268, 337
 Toulon, 419, 430
 Toulouse, 268
 Tournai, 424, 441, 443, 464
 Tourville, Comte de, Admiral (1642-
 1701), 353 ff.
 Transylvania, 63-6, 98, 124, 238, 286,
 320 f., 353 f., 383 f., 394, 446
 Trautmannsdorff, 200
 Travendal, Peace of, 1700, 410
 Treasury of Conversions, 342
 Trent, Council of (1545-63), 118

Trèves (Trier), 177, 181, 193, 326, 330, 332
 Triple Alliance, 1668, 290, 311
 Troitsa, Monastery, 378
 Tromp, Admiral Martin Van (1597–1653), 182, 196, 198, 217 f.
 — Admiral Cornelius Van (1629–91), 295, 309
 Trondheim, 60, 248 f
 Troubles, Time of (Russian), 96
 Truce, Twelve Years', 1609, 106, 110, 189, 292
 Tunis, 237
 Turenne, Marshal, Vicomte de (1611–75), 32, 187 ff, 192 ff, 223, 225 ff, 228, 275, 289, 299, 305 f., 327, 329, 331 f, 387
 Turin, 93, 182, 210 f, 404, 406
 Turkey, XIX, 87 ff, 209, 236, 408
 Tuscany, 232, 443
 Tuttlingen, battle, 190

U

Ucker river, 314
 Uhlfeldt, Corfits (1606–64),
 Ukraine, 238, 242, 365, 369, 373
 Ulm, 188, 402
 Uniats, 51, 54, 59, 117, 374
 Uniformity, Act of, 306
Unigenitus, Bull, 1713, 456
 Union, Protestant or Evangelical (1608–21), 124, 127 ff
 Upper Gelders, *see* Gelders
 Urban VIII, Pope, 1623–44, 132, 135, 146, 166, 171, 192
 Ursins, Mme des, Princess (1642–1722), 400, 404, 444, 459
 Usedom Is, 159, 202
 Utraquists, 122
 Utrecht, Peace of, 1713, 400, 427 ff, 439–43, 459, 464
 — Union of, 105

V

Valencia, 294
 Valenciennes, 299, 335
 Valenzuela, 388
 Valka, 157
 Valladolid, 26
 Valtelline, the, 100, 142 ff., 146, 293 f.
 Vasa, House of, 67, 120, 205
 Vasvar, Truce of, 1664, 383
 Vauban, Marshal (1633–1707), 275, 278, 289, 327, 331, 334, 356, 420

Vaudois, the, 305, 346 f
 Vendôme, Duke of, Marshal (1654–1712), 391, 400, 404, 406, 420, 426 f
 Venice, 142, 209, 211, 276, 381, 394, 464
 Vercelli, 211
 Verden, 149, 203, 438, 445 f
 Verdun, 190, 203, 268, 337
 Versailles, 273, 283, 449, 452
 Viborg, 435 f, 447
 Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy and King of Sardinia (1666–1732), 182, 346, 424, 441
 Vienna, 118, 163, 192, 286, 290, 350, 363, 379, 381, 384, 404 f., 446
 Villars, Prince, Duke and Marshal, (1653–1734), 400, 402 f, 406, 419, 423 ff, 427, 429, 442
 Villaviciosa, battle of, 1710, 427
 Villeloi, Francis, Duc de (1644–1730), 99, 356, 397, 401, 406, 456
 Vilna, 368, 414, 431
 Vistula river, 155, 317, 431
 Volga river, 373, 417
 Volhynia, 244
 Voltaire, François (1694–1778), 451
 Voronezh, 379, 382, 415, 434
 Vorskla river, 435
 Vosse, Peace of, 1673, 329 f.
 Voysin, 400

W

Waldenses, 357
 Waliszewski, K, 379
 Wallachia, 364, 446
 Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland (1583–1634), 123, 129, 146, 149 ff
 Wallhof, 154, 155 ff., 158, 159, 160, 164, 165
 Walloons, 166, 170, 172, 177, 308
 Walpole, Sir Robert, Earl of Orford, 464
 Warsaw, 247, 320, 410, 414, 416
 — Peace, 1705, 417
 Waterloo, XVI f.
 Werben, 161
 Weser river, 163, 203
 West India Company, Dutch, 109
 — Prussia, 317
 Westminster, Treaty of, 1655, 305, 309; 1674, 330

Westphalia, Peace of, 1648, 174, 187,
194, 199-212, 228, 236, 246, 249,
299, 357, 383, 391, 429

Whigs, 356, 397, 427, 459

White Hill, battle, 1620, 128, 260

William Louis of Frisia, 106, 108

— 'the Silent', 111, 301

— II of Orange (1626-50), 46, 205,
215 f., 308 f.

— III of Orange (1650-1702), King,
Feb., 1689, 2, 214, 216, 218, 272,
75, 308 ff., 312, 328-35, 338,
347, 349-59, 390 f., 393 f., 405,
458

Windau, 156

Wismar, xxi, 203, 438

Witt, John de, 217 ff., 263, 290, 305,
309 ff., 329

Wittenberg, 115

Wollin Is., 159, 202

Worcester, battle, 1651, 216, 305 f.

Worms, 353

Wrangel, Karl Gustav von, Marshal
(1613-76), 156, 193 f., 248

Wurtemberg, 119

Wurzburg, 164, 446

X

Xanten, treaty of, 1614, 40, 98, 111,
121

Ximenes, 24

Y

Ypres, 335, 388, 441, 443, 464

Z

Zamoyski, 51

Zaporogians, 242 ff., 434

Zealand Is., 248, 321 f

Zeeland, 109, 447

Zenta, battle of, 1697, 394, 399

Zurawna, treaty of, 1676, 333

Zusmarshausen, battle, 1648, 194

Zuyder Zee, 48, 290

Zweibrucken (Deux Ponts), 338, 358